Tentative Ruling: John Doe v. Santa Barbara Unified School District, et al.
Case Number
26CV03177
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 10/21/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff John Doe: Anthony L. Label, Steven A. Kronenberg, Bryan Ceglio, The Veen Firm LLP
For Defendant Miguel Angel Juarez: Self represented
For Defendants Santa Barbara Unified School District, Board of Education of the Santa Barbara Unified School District, Andrew Grimes, and Andrew Mitchell: No appearance
RULING
For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff to proceed under pseudonym is denied without prejudice.
Background
Using a pseudonym, plaintiff John Doe (Plaintiff) commenced this action on May 14, 2026, by filing a complaint against Santa Barbara Unified School District (the SBUSD), the Board of Education of the SBUSD (the Board), Andrew Grimes (Grimes), Andrew Mitchell (Mitchell), and Miguel “Michael” Angel Juarez (Juarez) (collectively, defendants), asserting eight causes of action: (1) sexual battery (against Grimes, Mitchell, and Juarez only); (2) battery (against Grimes, Mitchell, and Juarez only); (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of unfit employees (against the SBUSD and the Board only); (4) negligent failure to warn, train, and educate; (5) negligent supervision of a minor; (6) violation of right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution; (7) invasion of privacy; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against Grimes, Mitchell, and Juarez only). As alleged in the complaint:
Plaintiff is enrolled as a student in Dos Pueblos High School (the school), which is within the SBUSD. (Complaint, ¶ 2.) Grimes, Mitchell, and Juarez were employed by the SBUSD as special education professionals, paraprofessionals, or staff members at the school. (Complaint, ¶ 3.) The Board is responsible for the operation, supervision, and management of the SBUSD. (Complaint, ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff is a minor with special needs, including communication limitations and developmental disabilities, which render him vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse. (Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 16.) On May 2, 2025, Plaintiff’s mother discovered that, while attending the school and under the care, custody, and supervision of defendants, Plaintiff had suffered physical and sexual abuse that was committed by Grimes, Mitchell, and Juarez. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14, 17, 18, 32-33, 34.) The abuse occurred in private areas like restroom facilities while supervising or assisting Plaintiff with toileting and hygiene. (Complaint, ¶ 34.) On May 8, the Sheriff of Santa Barbara County issued a press release announcing the arrest of Juarez for sexual battery. (Complaint, ¶ 33.)
On June 22, Juarez filed a general denial of the complaint.
On September 22, Plaintiff filed a motion “to proceed under pseudonym.” As of this writing, no opposition to the motion has been filed with the Court.
Analysis
“The names of all parties to a civil action must be included in the complaint. [Citation.] That requirement extends to real parties in interest—anyone with a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action.” (Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 105, 109 (Santa Clara).) Therefore, as to Plaintiff, the present motion “to proceed under a fictitious name is a request that a party be allowed to litigate anonymously.” (Ibid.)
An “important constitutional right is implicated when a party is allowed to proceed anonymously: the right of public access to Court proceedings. Among the guarantees of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is that Court proceedings are open and public. [Citation.] Public access to Court proceedings is essential to a functioning democracy. It promotes trust in the integrity of the Court system, and it exposes abuses of judicial power to public scrutiny. [Citation.] The right of public access applies not only to criminal cases, but also to civil proceedings like this one. [Citation.] And the right to access Court proceedings necessarily includes the right to know the identity of the parties. [Citation.]” (Santa Clara, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 110-111.)
“In light of these constitutional issues, absent a specific statutory authorization, a plaintiff does not have an absolute right to sue anonymously. [Citation.] Instead, they must ‘file the initial complaint or petition conditionally under a pseudonym and then move for an order granting permission to proceed that way.’ [Citations.] ‘[B]efore authorizing a civil litigant to use a pseudonym, the trial Court must apply the “overriding interest test” outlined in [NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178] and [California Rules of Court,] rule 2.550(d).’ [Citation.] That test requires the trial Court to expressly find facts establishing that: (1) there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to Court records; (2) there is a substantial probability that interest will be prejudiced if a pseudonym is not used; (3) the use of the pseudonym is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (4) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest.” (Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment LLC (Oct. 8, 2026, B347645) ____ Cal.App.4th ____ [2026 WL 3025506], original italics.)
“In deciding the issue the Court must bear in mind the critical importance of the public’s right to access judicial proceedings. Outside of cases where anonymity is expressly permitted by statute, litigating by pseudonym should occur ‘only in the rarest of circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Santa Clara, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 111-112.)
The present motion includes a request for an order permitting Plaintiff’s purported guardian ad litem to proceed in this action under the pseudonym Jane Doe. “A guardian ad litem is not a party to the action, but is the party’s representative and is an officer of the Court.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 36, 47.) “[A] guardian ad litem’s role is more than an attorney’s but less than a party’s.” (In re Christina B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1454.) “[A] guardian ad litem represents the interests of a person in legal proceedings who lacks capacity to represent himself or herself in those proceedings.” (J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 965.) “When there is no conflict of interest, the appointment is usually made upon application.” (A.F. v. Jeffrey F. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 737, 747; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 372 & 373.) “The Court may appoint a guardian ad litem under a pseudonym pursuant to the requirements of” Code of Civil Procedure section 372.5. (Code Civ. Proc., § 372.5, subd. (a).)
As of this writing, the Court has no record of the filing of any application conditionally under a pseudonym for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of Plaintiff in these proceedings, or of any “an ex parte request for leave to appear under a pseudonym” by the person applying for that appointment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 372.5, subd. (b).) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the motion is premature and procedurally inappropriate as to the request for a guardian ad litem to proceed under a pseudonym, and will be denied on that basis.
As to the request for an order permitting Plaintiff to proceed in this case under the pseudonym John Doe, the exists some question as to whether service of the summons, complaint, and motion was appropriate or proper.
Court records reflect that on July 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed in this case a proof of service of the summons and complaint on Grimes; separately filed a proof of service of the summons and complaint on Mitchell; and separately filed a proof of service of the summons and complaint on the SBUSD (collectively, the proofs of service). The proofs of service each state that the summons and complaint were served on Grimes, Mitchell, and the SBUSD (collectively, the SBUSD Defendants) “by acknowledgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.30. Summons, complaint, civil cover sheet and addendum, notice of case assignment and CMC, ADR info, and Notice and Acknowledgment (POS-015) emailed to Cyrus Khosh-Chashm, authorized to accept service for [the SBUSD Defendants].” (Proofs of service, ¶¶ 5(d).)
A summons “shall be served on a person [w]ithin this state” as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 413.10 et seq. (Code Civ. Proc., § 413.10, subd. (a).) Relevant here, “[a] summons may be served by mail as provided in [Code of Civil Procedure] section [415.30]. A copy of the summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by first-class mail or airmail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of the notice and acknowledgment provided for in subdivision (b) and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.30, subd. (a).) Because the proofs of service show that the summons and complaint were “emailed” to an attorney purportedly authorized to accept service for the SBUSD Defendants, the present record indicates or suggests, for the reasons discussed above, that the summons and complaint were not served in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 415.30.
The Court is also unaware of any legal authority that permits an initial pleading and summons to be served by electronic transmission including under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6. (See, e.g., Wagner v. City of South Pasadena (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 943, 951 [discussing “service of an initial pleading ... by facsimile transmission”].)
“If no provision is made in [Code of Civil Procedure section 413.10 et seq.] or other law for the service of summons, or if a plaintiff, despite exercising reasonable diligence, has been unable to effect service of the summons by any of the methods authorized under this chapter, the Court in which the action is pending may, upon motion, direct that summons be served in a manner that is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to be served, including by electronic mail or other electronic technology, and that proof of such service be made as prescribed by the Court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 413.30, subd. (a)(1).) “Thus, ... the trial Court has the discretion to authorize service by another means.” (Crane v. Dolihite (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 772, 786.)
The Court also has no record of the filing of any motion authorizing the summons and complaint to be served on the SBUSD Defendants by electronic mail. Also relevant here as to the SBUSD, Code of Civil Procedure section 413.30 “does not apply in an action against a governmental entity or an agent or employee of the governmental entity who has been sued in an official or individual capacity.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 413.30, subd. (b); see Complaint, ¶¶ 11-13 [alleging compliance with Government Code section 910].)
Even if the motion could present information, evidence, or argument showing that the summons and complaint were served on Grimes, Mitchell, and the SBUSD in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 413.10 et seq., available information and evidence reflects that the motion was served by “e-mail or electronic transmission” to Juarez and the SBUSD Defendants at the electronic mail addresses listed in the proof of service attached to the motion. (Motion at pdf pp. 9-10.)
As an unrepresented party in this action, Juarez “may consent to receive electronic service.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (c)(1), (2).) “Express consent to electronic service” may be given by either “[s]erving a notice on all parties and filing the notice with the Court” or by “[m]anifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the Court or the Court’s electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the party’s electronic address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (c)(3)(i), (ii).)
Court records reflect that Juarez has not filed and served a notice consenting to receive electronic service in this action. Moreover, the general denial to the complaint filed by Juarez was not filed electronically with the Court. Though that general denial includes an electronic address, this alone is sufficient to show why Juarez manifested affirmative consent to receive electronic service of the motion. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the available evidence and information shows or suggests that Plaintiff has not provided Juarez with statutorily compliant written notice of the present motion “in the manner prescribed in” Code of Civil Procedure section 1010 et seq. and in accordance with “fundamental principles of due process ....” (Jones v. Otero (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 754, 757; California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Smith (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 838, 870 [general discussion].)
As to the SBUSD Defendants, “[a] person represented by counsel, who has appeared in an action or proceeding, shall accept electronic service of a notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (b)(2).) Court records show or suggest that the SBUSD Defendants have not made a general appearance in this case, such as by filing a response to the complaint. (See also La Seigneurie U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504 [“it is only upon the making of a general appearance that a defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the Court.”].) Further, the filing by the SBUSD Defendants of a peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 does not constitute a general appearance by those parties. (Loftin v. Superior Court (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 577, 579–580; see also Hospital Council of Northern Cal. v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 331, 339 [“There is no requirement ... that they must have filed a general appearance in order to avail themselves of the motion to disqualify.”].) For these and all further reasons discussed above, electronic service of the motion on the SBUSD Defendants also appears inappropriate and improper.
For all reasons discussed above, and considering the constitutional and due process issues described above, the Court will deny the motion, without prejudice to its refiling upon correcting or addressing the deficiencies discussed herein.