Tentative Ruling: Christian Van de Walle, et al. v. Karen Lantz, et al
Case Number
26CV01035
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 06/01/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction
Tentative Ruling
Christian Van de Walle, et al. v. Karen Lantz, et al.
Case No. 26CV01035
Hearing Date: June 1, 2026
HEARING: Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Christian Van de Walle and Neil Greenleaves: James F. Scafide, Figueroa Law Group LLP
For Defendants and Cross-Complainants Karen Lantz and Andrew Farkas: Francis J. Cunningham, David S. Bartelstone, Cunningham Treadwell & Bartelstone, Robert A. Curtis, Aaron Lee Arndt, Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis
TENTATIVE RULING:
The order to show cause re: preliminary injunction is denied.
Background:
This action commenced on February 17, 2026, by the filing of the verified complaint by plaintiffs Christian Van de Walle and Neil Greenleaves against defendants Karen Lantz and Andrew Farkas for: (1) Quiet Title - Prescriptive Easement Driveway; (2) Quiet Title - Prescriptive Easement Trellis and Planter; (3) Declaratory Relief; (4) Trespass - Utilities; (5) Private Nuisance; (6) Equitable Easement; (7) Tresspass - Metal Wall; (8) Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction; and (9) Trespass.
As alleged in the complaint:
Plaintiffs have owned and resided at 910 Roble Lane for over two decades and rely on a specific driveway path across the neighboring property at 916 Roble Lane for all vehicular access. (Compl., ¶ 1.) In Aprill 2025, defendants unilaterally constructed a 30-foot metal wall, within the established easement area, that has reduced the access path to an approximately 10-foot “bottleneck” that creates an immediate safety hazard and prevents the reasonable use and enjoyment of plaintiffs’ property. (Ibid.)
In June 1978, an easement for ingress and egress was recorded, which describes a 10-foot-wide strip within the southerly 20 feet of the property located at 916 Roble Lane. (Compl., ¶ 9 & Exh. A.)
In February 2000, an easement for ingress and egress was recorded, which describes a 10-foot-wide strip within the southerly 20 feet of the property located at 916 Roble Lane. (Compl., ¶ 10 & Exh. B.)
For more than 40 years, plaintiffs and their predecessors have utilized a concrete driveway, that is approximately 22 feet in width, for all vehicular and pedestrian access. (Compl., ¶ 11.) This driveway is located well above the theoretical corridor described in the 2000 grant. (Ibid.)
On May 19, 2026, defendants answered the complaint, admitting some allegations and denying others.
On May 19, 2026, defendants also filed a cross-complaint against plaintiffs for intrusion into private affairs, private nuisance, and declaratory relief. Essentially, the cross-complaint alleges that plaintiffs have engaged in a pattern of harassment and surveillance against defendants.
Plaintiffs now seek a preliminary injunction requiring defendants to remove the metal wall and raised area to restore the driveway to its previous size.
Defendants oppose the request.
Analysis:
“(a) An injunction may be granted in the following cases:
“(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.
“(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.
“(3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
“(4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief.
“(5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief.
“(6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.
“(7) Where the obligation arises from a trust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a).)
“A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist therefor. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the opposing party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (a).)
“ ‘The general purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a determination on the merits of the action. [Citation.] “ ‘The granting or denial of a preliminary injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy. It merely determines that the court, balancing the respective equities of the parties, concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or ... should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him [or her].’ ” [Citation.]’ (SB Liberty, LLC v. Isla Verde Assn., Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 272, 280.)
“In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (i) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and (ii) the balance of harm presented, i.e., the comparative consequences of the issuance and nonissuance of the injunction. [Citations.] The scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at trial on the merits.” (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 441-442.)
“The trial court’s determination must be guided by a “mix” of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff’s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction.” (Butt v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 678.)
The easement at issue in this case is a claimed prescriptive easement. Plaintiffs claim to have a vested prescriptive right to utilize a 22-foot width of paved driveway.
“The elements necessary to establish an adverse use are: (a) open and notorious use; (b) continuous and uninterrupted use; (c) hostile to the true owner; (d) under claim of right; and (e) for the statutory period of five years. (Civ. Code, § 1007; Code Civ. Proc., § 321.) “ ‘The above elements are designed to insure that the owner of the real property which is being encroached upon has actual or constructive notice of the adverse use and to provide sufficient time to take necessary action to prevent that adverse use from ripening into a prescriptive easement. The burden of proof as to each and all of the requisite elements to create a prescriptive easement is upon the one asserting the claim. [Citations.] The existence or non-existence of each of the requisite elements to create a prescriptive easement is a question of fact for the court or jury. [Citations.]’ ” (Twin Peaks Land Co. v. Briggs (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 587, 593.)
Defendants argue that plaintiffs have never had access to 22 feet of driveway, at the location of the subject improvements, because there was a preexisting planter in place that occupied the same area as the new improvements. As evidence of the preexisting planter, Lantz declares:
“It is unclear how the Plaintiffs claim that they have been using a 22-foot-wide driveway in the spot immediately in front of where we installed the Driveway Adjacent Improvements. It would be impossible for them to have done so, because there was never 22 feet available to them, not even before the installation of the Driveway Adjacent Improvements.” (Lantz decl., ¶ 24.)
“Right now, the paved usable portion of the driveway in front of the Driveway Adjacent Improvements is at least 10 feet wide. Attached hereto as Exhibit ‘9’ are pertinent portions of a Proposed Site Plan which includes surveyed dimensions of 916 Roble, including the improvements located thereon. An enlarged portion of the Site Plan, focused on the detail of the driveway, is also included as Exhibit ‘9’ and incorporated herein.” (Lantz decl., ¶ 25.)
“As can be seen from the Site Plan, the paved driveway is at least 10 feet in width as it traverses past the Driveway Adjacent Improvements. There is no driveway to the north or south of that area and there was never an additional 12 feet available to the Plaintiffs, even before the installation of the Driveway Adjacent Improvements, as the improvements essentially replaced the pre-existing planter in the same footprint.” (Lantz decl., ¶ 26; emphasis omitted.)
“An ariel view of 916 Roble is attached hereto as Exhibit ‘10’ and incorporated herein by reference. The ariel view shows our 916 Roble with the black arrow pointing at the home and the Plaintiffs’ neighboring parcel, 910 Roble, to the east, with a shared driveway leading from Roble Ave, past our 916 Roble to the Plaintiffs’ 910 Roble. The ariel view, together with a photo taken from the inside of our home which shows the existence of the prior planter, represents a fair and accurate depiction of how the shared driveway area looked before Andrew and I installed our Driveway Adjacent Improvements.” (Lantz decl., ¶ 28; emphasis omitted.)
“To the north of the portion of the driveway which is at issue, was the planter which existed prior to Andrew and I having installed our Driveway Adjacent Improvements. The planter, which can be seen in the Exhibit ‘10’ ariel photograph, and the Exhibit ‘10’ photograph taken from the vantage point of the front door looking out at the driveway, had already restricted the usable portion of the paved driveway in this area to about 12 feet even before the installation of the Driveway Adjacent Improvements.” (Lantz decl., ¶ 30; emphasis omitted.)
A review of the exhibits, especially the last photograph of Exhibit 10, does show that there was a planter in place at the location of the improvements that are currently in dispute. As such, plaintiffs have failed to show, for purposes of this request, that they have a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on their claim of having a prescriptive easement over that portion of the property. Further, there are conflicting inferences that can be drawn from the evidence regarding access for emergency vehicles and other safety concerns. Because of those conflicting inferences, given the fact that plaintiffs have the burden of proof, for purposes of the present request the safety arguments fail.
Even if they had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the claim, the request for the preliminary injunction, requiring defendants to tear down the improvements would fail on the balance of harm analysis.
“Perhaps the prototypical mandatory injunction is an order requiring the defendant to remove an improvement it has made to challenged property. For example, “ ‘in an action to establish an easement, a preliminary injunction ordering a party to remove an existing fence that blocks the easement is a mandatory injunction,’ ” while “ ‘restraining the party from parking or storing vehicles along the easement is a prohibitory injunction.’ ” [Citations.]” (Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1042.)
“ ‘Where, as here, the preliminary injunction mandates an affirmative act that changes the status quo, we scrutinize it even more closely for abuse of discretion. ‘ “The judicial resistance to injunctive relief increases when the attempt is made to compel the doing of affirmative acts. A preliminary mandatory injunction is rarely granted, and is subject to stricter review on appeal.” ’ ” [Citation.] The granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial “ ‘is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established.’ ” [Citations.]” (Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 625.)
The court will decline to issue a preliminary injunction that requires defendants, at significant expense, to remove the improvement project. A full evidentiary trial will be required.
Objections
The parties each object to evidence submitted by the others.
Defendants’ objections to the evidence in support of the order to show cause are ruled upon as follows:
Objections Nos. 1 and 2 are overruled. The statements are not evidence. They are arguments contained in the moving papers.
Objections Nos. 3 and 4 are sustained. They constitute improper argument and conclusions and are not based on personal knowledge.
Objections Nos. 5 and 6 are overruled.
Defendants’ objections to evidence offered in support of reply are overruled.
Plaintiffs’ objections to the evidence in opposition to the order to show cause are ruled upon as follows:
Objections Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are overruled.
Objections Nos. 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 are sustained.