Tentative Ruling: Peter McCoy Construction vs M Preciado Pool Plastering Inc
Case Number
25CV06878
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 04/20/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Petition to Release Property from Mechanic's Lien
Tentative Ruling
Peter McCoy Construction v. M. Preciado Pool Plastering, Inc.
Case No. 25CV06878
Hearing Date: April 20, 2026
HEARING: Petition to Release Property from Mechanic’s Lien
ATTORNEYS: For Petitioner Peter McCoy Construction: Robert G. Campbell, Scott R. Laes, Cox, Castle & Nicholson LLP
For Respondent M. Preciado Pool Plastering, Inc.: No appearance
TENTATIVE RULING:
The petition of petitioner Peter McCoy Construction to release property from mechanics lien is denied without prejudice.
Background:
As alleged by petitioner Peter McCoy Construction:
Petitioner is the general contractor for a construction project at 810 Lilac Drive in Santa Barbara, California (the Property). (Petition, ¶ 1.) Petitioner’s contract with the owner of the Property, who hired petitioner, obligates petitioner to cause any mechanics lien recorded by a subcontractor or supplier against the Property to be removed. (Petition, ¶¶ 1-2.)
On or about July 16, 2025, a mechanics lien in the sum of $24,500 (the Lien) was recorded against the Property, for labor, materials, equipment, services, and work allegedly furnished by M. Preciado Pool Plastering, Inc. (Preciado Pool), for a work of improvement. (Petition, ¶ 5 & exhibit 1 [Lien].) The Lien identifies Preciado Pool as the “claimant” and Peter J. Tolan (Tolan) as the “owner”. (Ibid.)
The date by which an action to foreclose on the Lien expired on October 14, 2025, and was not extended. (Petition, ¶ 6.) Preciado Pool has not commenced any action to enforce the Lien, nor has any extension of credit been requested or recorded. (Petition, ¶¶ 7-8.) Though the Lien has expired and unenforceable, the Lien remains a burden on title to the Property. (Petition, ¶¶ 8.)
Though Preciado Pool has admitted in emails and documents that its work was completed on April 16, 2025, and that Preciado Pool performed no work after that date, Preciado Pool did not serve a preliminary notice until May 12, 2026. (Petition, ¶ 11 & exhibits 2-3 [Preciado Pool letter and email to petitioner].)
On August 26, 2025, counsel for petitioner sent to Preciado Pool, by certified mail with return receipt requested to the address shown on the Lien, a written demand to remove the Lien (the Demand). (Petition, ¶ 13.) The Demand was returned as undeliverable. (Ibid.)
On September 16, 2025, counsel for petitioner sent the Demand to Preciado Pool’s last known email address. (Petition, ¶ 14 & exhibit 4.) Petitioner’s counsel did not receive any notification that the email was not delivered to Preciado Pool. (Ibid.) Preciado Pool did not respond, and did not release the Lien on the Property. (Petition, ¶ 15.)
On October 13, 2025, petitioner’s counsel called Preciado Pool’s office and asked to speak to the manager. (Petition, ¶ 16.) Counsel was referred to “Otilia”, explained that he was calling to ask for the Lien to be released and to follow up on the September 16, 2025, correspondence to Preciado Pool, and advised Otilia that if petitioner was forced to file an action to expunge the Lien, petitioner would seek costs and attorney’s fees. (Ibid.) Otilia stated that Preciado Pool would not release the Lien. (Ibid.)
Petitioner filed its verified petition against respondent Preciado Pool on November 3, 2025. The petition seeks an order declaring the Lien null, void, and of no legal force and effect; that the Property be released from the Lien; and awarding to petitioner attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $3,900, plus attorney’s fees incurred to respond to any opposition to the petition, and to prepare for and attend the hearing. (Petition, ¶ 19 & p. 4, ll. 21-28.)
Attached to the petition is a memorandum setting forth the facts, law, evidence, and arguments relied on by petitioner to show why the Lien is invalid, void, unenforceable, and should be expunged, and why petitioner is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The petition and memorandum are supported by declarations of petitioner’s counsel, Robert G. Campbell and Scott R. Laes. (Petition at pp. 7-13.)
On November 20, petitioner filed a proof of service of the summons.
On January 14, 2026, petitioner filed a notice, and proof of service of that notice, that the Petition is set for hearing on April 20, 2026, at 10 a.m. in this Department.
As of this writing, Preciado Pool has not filed with the court, an opposition or other response to the petition.
Analysis:
For all reasons discussed herein, the petition is deficient and will be denied on that basis, without prejudice to any appropriate petition for an order to release the Property from the Lien that may be filed in the future.
“The owner of property or the owner of any interest in property subject to a claim of lien may petition the court for an order to release the property from the claim of lien if the claimant has not commenced an action to enforce the lien within the time provided in [Civil Code] [s]ection 8460.” (Civ. Code, § 8480, subd. (a).) Civil Code section 8480 provides: “The claimant shall commence an action to enforce a lien within 90 days after recordation of the claim of lien. If the claimant does not commence an action to enforce the lien within that time, the claim of lien expires and is unenforceable.’ (Civ. Code, § 8460, subd. (a).)
As a threshold matter, the plain language of Civil Code section 8480 expressly authorizes only an “owner of property or the owner of any interest in property” to petition the court. (Civ. Code, § 8480, subd. (a).) The petition shows, expressly and by inference, that the owner of the Property is Tolan. (Petition, ¶ 5, exhibit 1 [Lien identifying Tolan as owner or reputed owner of the Property], exhibit 3 [same re preliminary notice].) Neither the petition nor its supporting memorandum include any facts which show, expressly or by inference, that petitioner is the owner of the Property, or owns any interest in the Property. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the petition fails to show that petitioner has standing to petition the court under Civil Code section 8480, for an order to release the Property from the Lien.
The petition contains additional deficiencies further discussed below.
“A petition for a release order shall be verified and shall allege all of the following:
“(a) The date of recordation of the claim of lien. A certified copy of the claim of lien shall be attached to the petition.
“(b) The county in which the claim of lien is recorded.
“(c) The book and page or series number of the place in the official records where the claim of lien is recorded.
“(d) The legal description of the property subject to the claim of lien.
“(e) Whether an extension of credit has been granted under Section 8460, if so to what date, and that the time for commencement of an action to enforce the lien has expired.
“(f) That the owner has given the claimant notice under Section 8482 demanding that the claimant execute and record a release of the lien and that the claimant is unable or unwilling to do so or cannot with reasonable diligence be found.
“(g) Whether an action to enforce the lien is pending.
“(h) Whether the owner of the property or interest in the property has filed for relief in bankruptcy or there is another restraint that prevents the claimant from commencing an action to enforce the lien.” (Civ. Code, § 8484, subds. (a)-(h).)
The copy of the Lien attached to the petition is not certified. The petition also fails to allege the book and page or series number of the place in the official records where the Lien is recorded, or a legal description of the Property. For these reasons, the petition fails to comply with subdivisions (a), (c), and (d) of Civil Code section 8484.
Though the petition alleges that petitioner sent the Demand to Preciado Pool, the petition fails to allege that Tolan complied with Civil Code section 8482, including by giving Preciado Pool, at least 10 days before the petition was filed, notice demanding that it execute and record a release of the Lien. It is also unclear from the petition whether any such notice, including the Demand, fully complies with Civil Code section 8100 et seq. (See Civ. Code, § 8482 [the notice “shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 8100) of Title 1....” (Civ. Code, § 8482.)
The petition also does not allege whether Tolan has filed for relief in bankruptcy, as required by subdivision (h) of Civil Code section 8484.
The notice of the hearing date on the petition must be served “in the same manner as service of summons, or by certified or registered mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, addressed to the claimant as provided in Section 8108.” (Civ. Code, § 8486, subd. (b).) Relevant here, Civil Code section 8108 provides that notice may be given to a claimant such as Preciado Pool at “the claimant’s address shown on the claimant’s contract, preliminary notice, claim of lien, stop payment notice, or claim against a payment bond, or on the records of the Contractors’ State License Board.” (Civ. Code, § 8108, subd. (e); see also § 8004 [defining “claimant”].)
Even if the court were to assume without deciding that the manner of service of the notice of hearing filed by petitioner and described above is appropriate or proper, the preliminary notice attached to the petition shows that Preciado Pool’s address is 12700 Foothill Blvd. in Sylmar, California. (Petition, exhibit 3 at pdf p. 32 & exhibit 4 at pdf p. 60.) Though the address reflected in the preliminary notice does not include “Ste. A”, the address reflected in the proofs of service filed by petitioner includes “Ste. A”. (Nov. 20, 2025, Proof of Service of Summons, ¶ 4; Jan. 14, 2025, Notice of Hearing at pdf p. 3 [proof of service].) As the address reflected in the proof of service of the notice of hearing filed by petitioner does not match the address reflected in the preliminary notice of Preciado Pool, the court is unable to determine whether service of that notice complies with Civil Code section 8486.
“At the hearing both (1) the petition and (2) the issue of compliance with the service and date for hearing requirements of this article are deemed controverted by the claimant. The petitioner has the initial burden of producing evidence on those matters. The petitioner has the burden of proof as to the issue of compliance with the service and date for hearing requirements of this article.” (Civ. Code, § 8488, subd. (a).) As the petition is deficient for all reasons discussed above, petitioner has failed to meet their burden to produce evidence on the matters described in the petition, including in regard to whether petitioner has standing to bring the petition or whether the petition, and service of the petition, complies with statutory requirements. Therefore, the court will deny the petition.