Tentative Ruling: Timothy Cooley et al vs Antonio Gijon et al
Case Number
25CV06002
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 05/18/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Demurrer
Tentative Ruling
Timothy J. Cooley, et al. v. Antonio Gijon, et al.
Case No. 25CV06002
Hearing Date: May 18, 2026
HEARING: Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiffs Timothy J. Cooley and Ruth M. Hellier: James F. Scafide, Figueroa Law Group
For Defendants Antonio Gijon and Norma Gijon: Craig S. Granet, Rimon, P.C.
TENTATIVE RULING:
The demurrer of defendants to plaintiffs’ complaint is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiffs shall file and serve any first amended complaint on or before June 18, 2026.
Background:
Timothy J. Cooley (Cooley) and Ruth M. Hellier (Hellier) (collectively, Plaintiffs) own real property commonly known as Assessor’s Parcel Nos. 077-060-055 and 077-060-054 (collectively, Plaintiffs’ Property), which is located in the County of Santa Barbara, California. (Complaint, ¶ 1 & exhibit A [legal description].) Antonio Gijon and Norma Gijon (collectively, the Gijons) own real property commonly known as Assessor’s Parcel No. 77-060-42 (the Gijon Property), which is located in the County of Santa Barbara, California. (Complaint, ¶ 2 & exhibit B [same].)
Plaintiffs’ Property and the Gijon Property are the subject of an “Easement Agreement” dated December 1993, that was recorded in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara on December 17, 1993. (Complaint, ¶ 3 & exhibit C.) The Easement Agreement was modified by an “Agreement Modifying Easement Agreement” (the Amendment) dated August 6, 2009, that was recorded in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara County. (Complaint, ¶ 4 & exhibit D.)
The Easement Agreement and the Amendment (collectively, the Easement) purports to grant to the Gijons a “perpetual exclusive easement” over a portion of Plaintiffs’ Property (the Easement Area), and exclusive use of the Easement Area for landscaping and agricultural purposes, for the housing, riding, training, and care of horses, and the construction of fences, corrals, and stables, among other purposes. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5-6.) The Easement also grants to the Gijons all rights to the water system located within the Easement Area, and requires the Gijons to maintain, and to pay for all property taxes and assessments attributable to, the Easement Area. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) Because the Easement grants to the Gijons exclusive, perpetual use of the Easement Area, transfers the water system, and imposes property tax liability, the Easement constitutes a de facto transfer of a fee simple interest in the Easement Area. (Complaint, ¶ 8.)
Though the Easement Agreement acknowledged that a formal subdivision might be necessary, and contemplated a “Lot Split” and “Conveyance of Legal Parcel” to formalize the division of land, this process was never completed. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs contend that the Easement constitutes an illegal transfer of real property and violates Government Code section 66410 et seq. (the Subdivision Map Act or Act). (Complaint, ¶ 11.) The Gijons dispute this contention, and claim that the Easement is valid and enforceable. (Ibid.)
On September 24, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their verified complaint against defendants the Gijons, asserting four causes of action: (1) declaratory relief; (2) Quiet Title; (3) violation of the Act; and (4) slander of title.
On February 6, 2026, the Gijons filed a demurrer to Plaintiffs’ complaint, and each cause of action asserted therein, on the grounds that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
On March 20, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the demurrer of the Gijons, and separately filed a motion for an order imposing sanctions against the Gijons and their counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 (the Sanctions Motion), on the grounds that the demurrer is factually and legally frivolous, was filed for an improper purpose, and was maintained after Plaintiffs provided a formal “safe harbor” notice.
On May 4, the Gijons filed an opposition to the Sanctions Motion.
On May 8, Plaintiffs filed a notice withdrawing the Sanctions Motion. As a result of the filing of that notice, the Sanctions Motion was taken off-calendar.
Analysis:
“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
The grounds for the demurrer include that each cause of action asserted in the complaint is based upon the third cause of action for violation of the Act. As to that cause of action, the demurrer contends that the allegations of the complaint show that the Easement confers to the Gijons only limited rights in the Easement Area for limited purposes, and reserves all other uses of the Easement Area to Plaintiffs. The demurrer further contends that the complaint does not show that Plaintiffs are excluded from using the Easement Area. For these reasons, the demurrer argues, the complaint does not show that the Gijons hold the equivalent of fee title ownership, or that the Easement constitutes a subdivision for purposes of the Act.
The demurrer also asserts that Plaintiffs do not have standing to claim any violation of the Act because Plaintiffs are a successor to the grantor and, pursuant to the Act, are bound by the conveyance created by the Easement. The Gijons also contend that, when Plaintiffs acquired the Plaintiffs’ Property in 2011, they were on notice of the Easement which was recorded. Because an action for a violation of the Act must be brought within one year of discovery of that violation and Plaintiffs were on notice of the Easement when they purchased the Plaintiffs’ Property in 2011, the demurrer argues, the third cause of action is time barred.
For the reasons discussed above, the Gijons contend, the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a third cause of action for violation of the Act and is time-barred. Because the first, second, and fourth causes of action are based on a purported violation of the Act, the Gijons further argue, those causes of action fail for the same reasons. In addition, the demurrer asserts that any slander of title was known to Plaintiffs in 2011 such that the fourth cause of action for slander of title is also barred under a three year statute of limitations.
In support of their demurrer, the Gijons have filed a request for judicial notice of two grant deeds (the Deeds) recorded in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara on, respectively, January 14 and February 23, 2011, which the Gijons assert show the dates Plaintiffs acquired the properties identified as Assessor’s Parcel Number (APN) 077-060-40 and APN 077-060-41. (Gijon RJN, ¶ 1 & exhibit A.)
In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the APNs for Plaintiffs’ Property “were originally 077-060-040 and 077-060-041[]” and were changed by the County of Santa Barbara in 2022 without Plaintiffs’ permission. (Complaint at p. 1, fn. 1.) Because the Deeds were recorded in the official records of Santa Barbara County and are proper subjects of judicial notice, and as Plaintiffs raise no factual dispute concerning those recorded instruments, the court will grant the request for judicial notice of the Deeds. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 194.) Judicial notice does not extend to any factual matters stated in those documents or their proper interpretation. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117; Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)
In their opposition to the demurrer, Plaintiffs assert that, because the complaint alleges that the Easement is void whether due to a violation of the Act or otherwise, the statute of limitations has not run. Plaintiffs further assert that an action for quiet title never runs against an owner in possession. Plaintiffs also contend that the Gijons are judicially estopped from raising the bar of any statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs also contend that the third cause of action for violation of the Act provides only a “specific statutory hook”, and that the complaint also asserts a legal theory independent of any violation of the Act which arises from the exclusivity and scope of the Easement, which Plaintiffs contend constitutes, in effect, a transfer of a fee simple interest and creation of a separate possessory estate. Plaintiffs also asserts that the Gijons have engaged in a physical ouster by installing metal fencing which excludes Plaintiffs from their fee title area, and renders the Easement a “de facto” subdivision which is void under the Act. (Opp. at pp. 1-4.) For these reasons, the opposition argues, the demurrer fundamentally misreads the complaint which is sufficient to allege claims and controversies in regard to whether the Easement is valid, or improperly creates a separate possessory estate or illegal subdivision in violation of the Act. (Opp. at p. 5.)
In support of their contentions, Plaintiffs have filed a request for judicial notice of a verified complaint filed by the Gijons in Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 24CV05292 entitled Gijon v Cooley, et al. (the Gijon Action), to show why judicial estoppel applies here and that the Gijons have engaged in the ouster described above. (Pl. RJN at p. 1 & exhibit A.) Plaintiffs also request judicial notice of a dismissal of that case. (Pl. RJN, exhibit B.)
“The demurrer tests the pleading alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters which do not appear on the face of the pleading or cannot be properly inferred from the factual allegations of the complaint.” (Executive Landscape Corp. v. San Vicente Country Villas IV Assn. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 496, 499.) The complaint does not include any factual allegations showing, expressly or by inference, that the Gijons engaged in an ouster as Plaintiffs contend, or that the Gijons filed the Gijon Action. Furthermore, and notwithstanding whether the Gijon Action is a proper subject of judicial notice, the court does not take judicial notice of the allegations of the Gijons’ verified complaint, or the truth of any hearsay statements contained in that pleading. (Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145.) For these reasons, the court will deny judicial notice of the Gijon Action, which, for all reasons discussed above, includes extrinsic matter not alleged on the face of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
“‘An easement is an interest in the land of another, which entitles the owner of the easement to a limited use or enjoyment of the other’s land. [Citations.] [¶] An easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in another’s possession and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘An easement may be created by (1) an express grant, (2) an express reservation, (3) an implied grant, (4) an implied reservation, (5) necessity, (6) prescription, (7) a recorded covenant, (8) dedication, (9) condemnation, (10) estoppel, or (11) a court decision....’ [Citation.]” (Main Street Plaza v. Cartwright & Main, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1053–1054, fn. omitted.)
The parties do not appear to dispute that the complaint is sufficient to show that the Easement was created by an express grant pursuant to the Easement Agreement. (See also Complaint, exhibit C.) Though Plaintiffs contend that the complaint shows that the exclusive nature of the Easement constitutes an improper transfer of a fee interest, the complaint does not allege a prescriptive easement which “by definition, cannot be exclusive.” (Silacci v. Abramson (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 558, 563.)
Further, “[t]he exclusive use of a defined area of the servient tenement by the owners of the dominant tenement is not prohibited under California law.” (Gray v. McCormick (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1032.) “The rule regarding an ‘exclusive easement’ is one of long-standing: ‘[A]n “exclusive easement” is an unusual interest in land; it has been said to amount almost to a conveyance of the fee. [Citations.] No intention to convey such a complete interest can be imputed to the owner of the servient tenement in the absence of a clear indication of such an intention.’ [Citation.]” (Mehdizadeh v. Mincer (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1308.) “If the express language of the easement grants the right to use the whole of the property, the easement is exclusive.” (Rye v. Tahoe Truckee Sierra Disposal Co., Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 84, 94.)
Though the Easement Agreement grants a “perpetual exclusive easement over, under across and through” a portion of the Plaintiffs’ Property (complaint, exhibit C at pdf p. 11, ¶¶ 1 & 2.1), “[w]hether a so-called exclusive easement constitutes ownership in fee, rather than an easement, depends upon the circumstances of the case [citation], including the terms of any applicable conveyance [citation]. Thus, a conveyance that ‘“‘“purported to transfer to A an unlimited use or enjoyment of Blackacre ... would be in effect a conveyance of ownership to A, not of an easement. [Citation.]”’”’ [citation]. In contrast, an easement incorporating a right of exclusive use may fall short of ownership in fee when the easement is restricted in scope” (Blackmore v. Powell (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1593, 1600 (Blackmore)).
Notwithstanding the terms “perpetual” and “exclusive” appearing in the Easement Agreement attached to the complaint, the allegations of the complaint do not show, expressly or by inference, why any use of the Easement has unduly burdened the Plaintiffs’ Property, has left Plaintiffs with only a minimal right to use that property, or has dispossessed Plaintiffs of the Plaintiffs’ Property. “[W]hen there is a conflict between a complaint’s allegations and exhibits that is direct and indisputable, the exhibit will prevail. For example, where a complaint alleges that a written contract contains certain text, but the contract is attached to the complaint and does not contain the alleged text, then the assertion in the complaint can be disregarded. There, the allegation in the complaint is directly and plainly contradicted by the exhibit. Moreover, that application does not require the court to assume the underlying truth of any fact asserted in an exhibit.” (Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court of Kern County (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 713.)
Furthermore, the Easement Agreement states that the easement is for the purposes expressly set forth in that agreement. (Complaint, exhibit C at pdf p. 11.) As the terms of the Easement Agreement circumscribe the scope and use of the Easement Area by limiting the purposes for which that area may be used, is reasonable to interpret the grant of exclusive control as “intended solely to protect [those] restricted rights.” (Blackmore, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1600.) For these reasons, the complaint does not show why the Easement constitutes a conveyance of a fee ownership as Plaintiffs contend.
In addition, though the Amendment provides for the payment of property taxes assessed and charged against the Easement Area by the Gijons (complaint, exhibit D at p. 1), apart from citing code provisions which provide that the payment of taxes is a prerequisite for adverse possession, the opposition of Plaintiffs does not cite any legal authority showing why the payment of property taxes for the Easement Area, alone, indicates fee ownership. The court is also unaware of any such authority.
As to the assertion that the Easement constitutes a subdivision of land as defined by the Act, the Act is “‘the primary regulatory control’ governing the subdivision of real property in California. [Citation.] The Act vests the ‘[r]egulation and control of the design and improvement of subdivisions’ in the legislative bodies of local agencies, which must promulgate ordinances on the subject. [Citation.] The Act generally requires all subdividers of property to design their subdivisions in conformity with applicable general and specific plans and to comply with all of the conditions of applicable local ordinances.” (Gardner v. County of Sonoma (2003) 29 Cal.4th 990, 996–997 & fn. 4 (Gardner) [discussing definitions of “design” and “improvement”] as used in the Act].)
As used in the Act, “‘[s]ubdivision’ means the division, by any subdivider, of any unit or units of improved or unimproved land, or any portion thereof, shown on the latest equalized county assessment roll as a unit or as contiguous units, for the purpose of sale, lease, or financing, whether immediate or future.” (Gov. Code, § 66424.) “Ordinarily, subdivision under the Act may be lawfully accomplished only by obtaining local approval and recordation of a tentative and final map....” (Gardner, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 997.)
The same or similar reasoning and analysis apply. For the reasons further discussed above, the complaint fails to allege facts showing, expressly or by inference, why the Easement constitutes a subdivision for purposes of the Act. Furthermore, the allegations of the complaint do not show “a division of land for sale, lease, or financing.” (van’t Rood v. County of Santa Clara (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 549, 565, original italics.)
For all reasons discussed above, and as a reasonable interpretation of the complaint shows that each of the asserted theories of liability arise from the purported exclusivity of the Easement and whether the Easement constitutes an improper subdivision under the Act, the court will sustain the demurrer to the complaint and each of the causes of action asserted therein. As this is Plaintiffs’ original complaint which does not show on its face that it is not capable of amendment considering the extrinsic matters further discussed above which Plaintiffs are not precluded from including in any amended pleaded, the court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. (Eghtesad v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411.)
As the court will sustain the demurrer for the reasons discussed above with leave to amend, it is not necessary, at this stage of the proceeding, to address the additional grounds raised in the demurrer, also considering the possibility that those grounds may be mooted by any appropriate amendment to Plaintiffs’ complaint (and the court presently makes no findings in this regard). (See, e.g., Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 476 [general discussion re quiet title]; United Pacific-Reliance Ins. Co. v. DiDomenico (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 673, 676–677 [same re declaratory relief].) The court notes, however, that there exists some question as to whether the cause of action for violation of the Act is, under the circumstances alleged here, authorized by that statute. (See, Gov. Code, § 66499.32.)