Tentative Ruling: Annika Peacock vs James Peacock
Case Number
25CV05454
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 05/11/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
CMC; Motion: Strike
Tentative Ruling
Annika Peacock v. James Peacock
Case No. 25CV05454
Hearing Date: May 11, 2026
HEARING:
- Demurrer to Complaint
- Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Annika Peacock: Self-represented
For Defendant James Peacock: Melissa J. Fassett, Cory T. Baker, Price, Postel & Parma LLP
TENTATIVE RULING:
- The demurrer of defendant James Peacock to the complaint of plaintiff Annika Peacock is sustained, with leave to amend, as to the first (fraud), second (promissory estoppel), fourth (defamation), and fifth (constructive trust) causes of action. The demurrer is in all other respects overruled.
- The motion of defendant to strike portions of the complaint is granted, with leave to amend. The words “emotional distress,” in paragraph 10 of the complaint, and paragraph 2 of the prayer for relief (“For punitive damages in an amount to punish and deter Defendant’s fraudulent and defamatory conduct”) are ordered stricken from the complaint.
- Plaintiff shall file and serve her first amended complaint on or before May 26, 2026.
Background:
As alleged in plaintiff Annika Peacock’s complaint:
In December 2020, plaintiff and defendant James Peacock reached a mutual understanding that defendant would fund the purchase of the real property located at 524 Feather River Drive, Chester, California (the Property). (Complaint, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff would hold co-title, manage the property, reside on-site, pay all necessary property taxes and insurance, and invest labor and capital to improve it. (Ibid.)
Both parties expected that once the Property was stabilized and improved, plaintiff would buy out defendant’s interest under fair terms. (Complaint, ¶ 4.) This expectation was not documented in a written contract, but was expressed consistently by defendant through verbal statements and conduct. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff invested over $150,000 in capital improvements and performed extensive unpaid labor, including construction management, landscaping, repairs, and tenant supervision, substantially increasing the value of the Property. (Complaint, ¶ 5.)
Beginning in 2021, plaintiff made multiple buyout offers based on the shared understanding and the increased value of the Property due to her work. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) Defendant rejected all offers and instead began making knowingly false financial claims. (Ibid.)
On May 30, 2025, defendant, through William M. Hulett of Bedford, Ohio, transmitted a letter to plaintiff’s attorney falsely alleging that plaintiff and her
husband were mere tenants at the Property, that they had entered into a rental contract requiring $750 monthly payments, and that they had failed to make any
payments, resulting in alleged arrears exceeding $40,000. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) Defendant further asserted that plaintiff owed him $10,000 in closing costs and attempted to leverage these false obligations to coerce a $390,000 buyout. (Ibid.)
Defendant’s claims were knowingly false. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s name appears on the recorded deed as a co-owner of the Property. (Ibid.) No such rental contract exists, and plaintiff has never been a tenant of defendant. (Ibid.) Defendant’s statements were intended to discredit plaintiff’s legal and equitable rights in the Property, to inflate his bargaining position, and to interfere with her ability to secure financing or compel a fair buyout. (Ibid.) Defendant has repeated similar false assertions to third parties, including plaintiff’s legal counsel, thereby damaging plaintiff’s reputation and exposing her to reputational and financial harm. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) As a result of defendant’s conduct, plaintiff has been blocked from accessing her equity, refinancing, or selling the Property. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff lost the opportunity to acquire a separate small business and has experienced financial harm, emotional distress, and reputational damage. (Ibid.)
On August 11, 2025, plaintiff filed her complaint in this action asserting six causes of action: (1) fraud; (2) promissory estoppel; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) defamation; (5) constructive trust; and (6) declaratory relief.
On January 7, 2026, defendant filed a demurrer to each cause of action of the complaint. Defendant concurrently filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint. Defendant also concurrently filed a cross-complaint against plaintiff.
On January 27, 2026, plaintiff filed an answer to the cross-complaint.
On February 6, 2026, plaintiff filed a combined opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike. On May 4, defendant filed separate replies in support of the demurrer and motion to strike.
Analysis:
(1) Demurrer
“ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
Plaintiff’s first cause of action asserts a claim for fraud. “The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) “In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Id. at p. 645.) “This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., internal quotation marks omitted.)
Defendant argues that the allegations are insufficient because the complaint does not allege a false statement of past or existing fact, when or where the statement was made, how plaintiff relied upon it, or facts showing the statement was false at the time alleged. Defendant also asserts that the statements are protected by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). Plaintiff alleges that defendant, through “purported counsel” sent a letter making false claims regarding the legal relationship between plaintiff and defendant. (Complaint, ¶ 7.)
With respect to the allegation that the lawyer’s letter constitutes the misrepresentation, the allegations are sufficiently specific as what the alleged misrepresentation is, how and where it was made, and that it was done on behalf of the defendant. At least some of the statements made are statements of fact or mixed statements of fact and law, for example, that payment due was not made. However, the reliance element is missing.
“Actual reliance occurs when a misrepresentation is ‘ “an immediate cause of [a plaintiff’s] conduct, which alters his legal relations,” ’ and when, absent such representation, ‘ “he would not, in all reasonable probability, have entered into the contract or other transaction.” ’ [Citations.] ‘It is not ... necessary that [a plaintiff’s] reliance upon the truth of the fraudulent misrepresentation be the sole or even the predominant or decisive factor in influencing his conduct.... It is enough that the representation has played a substantial part, and so has been a substantial factor, in influencing his decision.’ [Citation.]” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 976–977.)
While plaintiff alleges that the statements made in the lawyer’s letter are false, plaintiff does not allege that she took any action or suffered any detriment because she believed the representations were true. Taking action on the belief that the representations were false do not meet the elements of fraud. The demurrer will be sustained to this cause of action on this ground.
Defendant also alleges that this claim of misrepresentation is barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)(2): “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] … [¶] (b) In any … (2) judicial proceeding ….” The litigation privilege generally attaches to communications made in connection with existing or anticipated litigation. (Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1194.) The allegations in the complaint, however, are too general for the court to determine on the face of the complaint whether the letter which is alleged to communicate the misrepresentations fall within or without the litigation privilege. (See Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251 [“A prelitigation communication is privileged only when it relates to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.”].) The demurrer will not be sustained on this ground.
Plaintiff’s second cause of action is for promissory estoppel. “The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.’ [Citation.]” (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of Cal. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 901.) Plaintiff alleges only an ambiguous expectation of a buyout on unspecified terms. (Complaint, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts to state this cause of action. The demurrer will be sustained to this cause of action on that ground.
Plaintiff’s third cause of action is for unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is the basis for a cause of action for restitution. (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)
“ ‘The phrase “Unjust Enrichment” does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[I]n any event, ... there is no particular form of pleading necessary to invoke the doctrine” of restitution.’ [Citation.]” (Dunkin v. Boskey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 171, 198, fn. 15.)
Plaintiff has alleged making improvements to the Property with the understanding that the Property is held as a co-tenancy with respective rights and duties of the parties (Complaint, ¶¶ 3-5) while at the same time alleging that defendant has asserted that plaintiff has no ownership interest in the Property (Complaint, ¶ 7). In other words, if defendant’s assertion proves correct, plaintiff has made improvements to the Property and performed services for the benefit of the Property under the mistaken belief that plaintiff is a co-owner of the Property. To the extent defendant retains the benefits of plaintiff’s improvements and services under those circumstances (or otherwise beyond defendant’s rights as a co-owner), plaintiff may be entitled to restitution. The demurrer will be overruled as to this cause of action.
Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action asserts a claim for defamation. “ ‘Defamation requires the intentional publication of a false statement of fact that has a natural tendency to injure the plaintiff’s reputation or that causes special damage.’ [Citation.] The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 87, 97.)
Defendant argues that the allegations are insufficient because the alleged statements are subject to the litigation privilege and that there is no actionable publication.
Plaintiff alleges the defamatory statements as: “On May 30, 2025, Defendant, through his counsel, published false statements to Plaintiff’s attorney, including that Plaintiff was a tenant who failed to pay rent and that she owed tens of thousands of dollars in arrears and closing costs.” (Complaint, ¶ 25.)
As before, the allegations are not sufficiently specific for the court to determine that the false statements are or are not subject to the litigation privilege. The demurrer will not be sustained on that ground.
“Publication, which may be written or oral, is defined as a communication to some third person who understands both the defamatory meaning of the statement and its application to the person to whom reference is made. Publication need not be to the public or a large group; communication to a single individual is sufficient.” (Ringler Associates Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1179.)
Plaintiff alleges a communication made by defendant’s counsel to plaintiff’s attorney. (Complaint, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff does not allege a non-privileged communication to a third person. The demurrer to this cause of action will be sustained on this ground.
Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is for constructive trust. “A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that compels a wrongdoer—one who has property or proceeds to which he is not justly entitled—to transfer same to its rightful owner.” (Shoker v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 271, 278.)
Defendant argues that as an equitable remedy, plaintiff must plead a cause of action to which a constructive trust may be a remedy.
“[T]he constructive trust is a species of an involuntary trust which is created by operation of law. (Civ. Code, § 2217.) It is predicated upon section 2224, which provides that: ‘One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.’ The case law explains that in order to create a constructive trust as defined in section 2224, three conditions must be satisfied: the existence of a res (property or some interest in the property); the plaintiff’s right to that res; and the defendant’s acquisition of the res by some wrongful act. [Citations.] … [T]he wrongful act giving rise to a constructive trust need not amount to fraud or intentional misrepresentation. All that must be shown is that the acquisition of the property was wrongful and that the keeping of the property by the defendant would constitute unjust enrichment.” (Calistoga Civic Club v. City of Calistoga (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 111, 116, fn. omitted.)
Plaintiff alleges: “Defendant’s conduct constitutes a misuse of legal title and obstruction of Plaintiff’s equitable interest.” (Complaint, ¶ 30.) “The Court should impose a constructive trust over Defendant’s interest in the Property to prevent unjust enrichment and to preserve Plaintiff’s rights.” (Complaint, ¶ 31.)
Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff appears on title as a co-owner. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff does not allege that defendant now has legal title to the Property or to any other specific property to which title should equitably conveyed to plaintiff. The demurrer will be sustained to this cause of action.
Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is for declaratory relief. Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot use declaratory relief as a substitute for a partition action.
“Any person interested under a written instrument, … or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property … may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract. He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. The declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)
“A complaint for declaratory relief is legally sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties … and requests that these rights and duties be adjudged by the court.” (Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society (1944) 23 Cal.2d 719, 728.)
Plaintiff alleges a dispute as to her rights and duties with respect to the Property. (Complaint, ¶¶ 7, 33-34.) These are sufficient allegations to state a cause of action for declaratory relief.
While it is true that declaratory relief may be withheld where alternative causes of action provide adequate remedies (Mendoza v. County of Tulare (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 403, 420), declaratory relief may be used to determine that a course of conduct is or is not consistent with the respective rights of the parties without seeking remedies that change the present relationship of the parties (such as a partition action). Declaratory relief is a cumulative remedy and, for pleading purposes, may be asserted as an alternative to other claims. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1062.) The demurrer will be overruled to this cause of action.
To the extent the court sustains the demurrer, this is a demurrer to plaintiff’s original complaint and the demurrer will be sustained with leave to amend.
(2) Motion to Strike
“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)
Defendant concurrently moves to strike the words “emotional distress” from paragraph 10 of the complaint, and to strike paragraph 2 of the prayer for relief.
Plaintiff alleges: “As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff has been blocked from accessing her equity, refinancing, or selling the Property. She lost the opportunity to acquire a separate small business and has experienced financial harm, emotional distress, and reputational damage.” (Complaint, ¶ 10.)
As discussed above, the court will sustain the demurrer to the first (fraud), second (promissory estoppel), fourth (defamation), and fifth (constructive trust) causes of action, leaving in the present complaint the third (unjust enrichment) and sixth (declaratory relief) causes of action.
Emotional distress damages are not generally available as a remedy for contract-related claims, including claims based on quasi-contracts under an unjust enrichment theory or based on declaratory relief. (See Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 558.) Plaintiff does not allege facts upon which emotional distress damages would be available under the currently viable causes of action. The motion will be granted to strike the allegation regarding emotional distress damages.
Because the court will sustain the demurrer to the causes of action for fraud and for defamation, which are the only two bases set forth in plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, the motion to strike will also be granted to strike the prayer for punitive damages.
For the same reasons discussed above, the motion to strike will be granted with leave to amend.