Tentative Ruling: State of California ex rel. Tamayo v. The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company LLC
Case Number
25CV04446
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 10/14/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
1) Motion of Plaintiff to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One; 2) Motion of Plaintiff to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff State of California ex rel. Neftali Tamayo: Ryan T. Kuhn, Christine Reyes, Kiryl Karpiuk, Protection Law Group, LLP
For Defendant The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, L.L.C.: Jennifer B. Zargarof, Alexander L. Grodan, Anthony E. Birong, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
RULING
(1) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of plaintiff State of California ex rel. Neftali Tamayo to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set one, is granted, including the award of monetary sanctions. The court will sign the proposed order as to this motion.
(2) As set forth herein, the motion of plaintiff State of California ex rel. Neftali Tamayo to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, set one, is granted in part, denied in part, and continued in part. The motion is granted to require further responses to request Nos. 1, 5, 13, 16, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 54, 56, 60, and 61. Defendant shall serve further verified written responses, without objection except as to privilege, within 20 calendar days of service of this order on defendant, shall concurrently produce all documents identified to be produced, and shall concurrently serve a privilege log as to all responsive documents withheld from production, including in the privilege log sufficient additional information for the court to determine the claim of privilege. The motion is denied as to request Nos. 2, 3, 41, 42, 55, for which no further response is required. Denial of the motion is without prejudice to the service of new requests which may cover the same subject matter but are appropriately particularized. The court orders the parties to further meet and confer as to request Nos. 6, 7 11, 14, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, and to file reports with the court, on or before October 30, 2026, as to the positions of the parties, including identifying specifically all matters resolved and unresolved. The hearing on the motion is continued as to these requests, and as to requests for sanctions, to November 18, 2026.
(3) Plaintiff shall serve written notice of this order and file proof of service with the court.
Background
On July 16, 2025, plaintiff Neftali Tamayo filed this representative action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA, Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). Tamayo brings this action on behalf of aggrieved employees for various wage and hour violations.
On December 5, 2025, defendant The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, L.L.C. (Ritz-Carlton) filed its answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 22 affirmative defenses.
On January 7, 2026, the court held a case management conference at which the court denied Ritz-Carlton’s request to stay discovery, set a trial date for December 2, 2026, and set a final case management conference for May 6, 2026.
On April 16, 2026, plaintiff served his special interrogatories, set one (SI), and requests for production of documents, set one (RFP). (Kuhn decl. re SI, ¶ 6 & exhibit 1; Kuhn decl. re RFP, ¶ 6 & exhibit 1.)
On May 6, 2026, the court held a case management conference confirming the trial date of December 2, 2026, and continuing the final case management conference to October 7, 2026.
Following agreed-upon extensions, Ritz-Carlton served its responses on June 16, 2026. (Kuhn decl. re SI, ¶ 10 & exhibit 3; Kuhn decl. re RFP, ¶ 10 & exhibit 3.)
Following an unsuccessful meet-and-confer effort and no supplement responses having been served, plaintiff filed these motions to compel further responses to the SI and RFP on August 5, 2026.
The motions are opposed by Ritz-Carlton.
On October 7, 2026, the court held a case management conference confirming the trial date of December 2, 2026, and the hearing on these motions for this hearing date.
Analysis
(1) Special Interrogatories
Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to SI Nos. 1 through 4.
“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: [¶] … [¶] (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(3).)
SI No. 1 is: “Provide the CONTACT INFORMATION for all COVERED EMPLOYEES who formerly worked for DEFENDANT during the COVERED PERIOD. (For purposes of these Interrogatories, ‘CONTACT INFORMATION’ as used herein shall be defined as referring to first, middle, and last names, last known home address, last known home and mobile telephone numbers, last known
personal e-mail address, and last known fax numbers. ‘COVERED EMPLOYEES’ refers to and means all current and former hourly employees employed by DEFENDANT within the State of California at any time during the COVERED PERIOD. ‘DEFENDANT’ refers to and means Defendant THE RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL COMPANY, L.L.C. ‘COVERED PERIOD’ refers to and means the time period from May 12, 2024, to the present. A proposed Belaire-West notice is enclosed herewith. Plaintiff proposes engaging the services of Phoenix Class Action Administration as the third-party administrator and allocating the cost of administration equally between the Parties.)”
The response to SI No. 1 is: “Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the ground that it seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects to this interrogatory to the extent that it seeks information in which individuals who are not parties to this action have a legitimate expectation or right of privacy or confidentiality under California law, and any other constitutional, statutory, or common law right of privacy. Defendant further objects to this Interrogatory on the ground that it is overbroad. Defendant further objects to this Interrogatory on the ground that it is unduly burdensome and harassing. Defendant further objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds that, to the extent it incorporates a Covered Period extending ‘to the present’ or otherwise seeks information concerning a current-employee population that changes over time, it purports to impose a continuing duty to supplement beyond the obligations imposed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendant further objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it is not reasonably particularized to persons with knowledge of discoverable matter because it seeks individualized employment information for all current ‘COVERED EMPLOYEES,’ regardless of whether they worked at relevant locations, during relevant shifts, under relevant managers, in relevant job classifications, or under the policies and practices challenged in the operative pleading. Defendant further objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds that the term ‘COVERED EMPLOYEE’ requires Defendant to make legal determinations regarding the scope of any putative class, representative group, or allegedly aggrieved employee population, and Defendant does not concede Plaintiffs definitions, class allegations, PAGA allegations, or proposed scope.”
The principal dispute between the parties as to this interrogatory is whether the interrogatory is too broad in scope when one compares the California Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 (Williams) with the 2024 amendments to PAGA.
(A) Williams
In Williams, a plaintiff brought a PAGA action and sought contact information for fellow California employees of the defendant employer. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 538.) The plaintiff worked at one of the defendant’s stores, but sought PAGA remedies on a companywide basis. (Ibid.) The plaintiff served special interrogatories asking for contact information of each nonexempt California employee. (Id. at p. 539.) The defendant objected on the grounds that the request for contact and employment information statewide was overbroad because it extended beyond the plaintiff’s particular store and job classification, the request was unduly burdensome because the plaintiff sought private information without first demonstrating he was aggrieved or that others were aggrieved, and that the request was an invasion of the privacy of third parties. (Ibid.) The plaintiff moved to compel responses. (Ibid.)
After a hearing, the trial court granted in part and denied in part plaintiff’s motion to compel. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 539.) The trial court ordered the employer to provide employee contact information, but only for the store where the plaintiff worked and subject to a Belaire-West notice and an equal sharing of costs by the parties. (Ibid.) The court denied the motion as to the other stores, but left the door open for a renewed motion for discovery after the plaintiff appeared for deposition. (Ibid.) The plaintiff sought writ relief in the Court of Appeal from the denial of access to employee contact information for all but one store. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal denied relief, holding that as the party seeking to compel discovery, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery, but failed to do so. (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 538.) After reiterating discovery standards, the Williams court first noted that the plaintiff “was presumptively entitled to an answer to his interrogatory seeking the identity and contact information of his fellow … employees. [The employer] had the burden of establishing cause to refuse [the plaintiff] an answer. The trial court was limited to determining whether, for any objections timely interposed, [the employer] had carried that burden.” (Id. at p. 542.) The Williams court then addressed the employers’ three objections: (1) The objection that the plaintiff’s “request for statewide employee contact information ‘is overbroad in that it seeks information beyond the scope of permissible discovery in that it extends to individuals outside of the position, job classification, and location, in which Plaintiff worked.’ ” (Ibid.) (2) The objection that “the interrogatory ‘is unduly burdensome, in that Plaintiff is requesting private information about thousands of third parties, without making a prima facie showing that he is an aggrieved employee or that any aggrieved employees exist outside of the store where he worked.’ ” (Ibid.) (3) The objection to “the request ‘to the extent it seeks private information that is protected from disclosure by Article I section 1 of the California Constitution without consent.’ ” (Ibid.)
In addressing the first objection, the Williams court found that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged Labor Code violations among employees in California and that employee contact information was clearly within the statutory scope of discovery. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 543.) In the context of a PAGA, the court noted:
“PAGA’s standing provision similarly contains no evidence of a legislative intent to impose a heightened preliminary proof requirement. Suit may be brought by any ‘aggrieved employee’ ([former] Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (a)); in turn, an ‘ “aggrieved employee” ’ is defined as ‘any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed’ (id., subd. (c), italics added). If the Legislature intended to demand more than mere allegations as a condition to the filing of suit or preliminary discovery, it could have specified as much. That it did not implies no such heightened requirement was intended.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546.)
In addressing the second objection of burden, the Williams court noted that the employer argued that the interrogatory is unduly burdensome because it sought contact information for thousands of employees without a prior showing that the plaintiff himself has been subject to Labor Code violations. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 549.)
“A trial court ‘shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ [Citation.] However, as with other objections in response to interrogatories, the party opposing discovery has an obligation to supply the basis for this determination. An ‘objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required.’ [Citation.] As the objecting party, [the employer] had the burden of supplying supporting evidence, but in response to [the plaintiff’s] motion to compel it offered none. Given this, the trial court had nothing in the record upon which to base a comparative judgment that any responsive burden would be undue or excessive, relative to the likelihood of admissible evidence being discovered.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 549-550, fn. omitted.)
“California law has long made clear that to require a party to supply proof of any claims or defenses as a condition of discovery in support of those claims or defenses is to place the cart before the horse. The Legislature was aware that establishing a broad right to discovery might permit parties lacking any valid cause of action to engage in ‘fishing expedition[s],’ to a defendant’s inevitable annoyance. [Citation.] It granted such a right anyway, comfortable in the conclusion that ‘[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.’ [Citation.]” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 551.)
“In pursuing such discovery, the strength or weakness of the plaintiff’s individual claim is immaterial: ‘[I]t is well established that relevancy of the subject matter does not depend upon a legally sufficient pleading, nor is it restricted to the issues formally raised in the pleadings.’ [Citation.]” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 551.)
In addressing the third objection of privacy, the Williams court rejected the “compelling need” test adopted by some Courts of Appeal. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 556-558.) The Williams court instead adopted a three-prong framework derived from Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1. (Williams, at pp. 552-554.) In the specific context of the discovery at issue in Williams, the court noted: “In wage and hour collective actions, fellow employees would not be expected to want to conceal their contact information from plaintiffs asserting employment law violations, the state policies in favor of effective enforcement of these laws weigh on the side of disclosure, and any residual privacy concerns can be protected by issuing so-called Belaire-West notices affording notice and an opportunity to opt out from disclosure.” (Id. at p. 553.) “[C]omplete bans on disclosure to vindicate privacy interests, or disclosure subject to an opt-in requirement, may significantly hamper the ability of aggrieved employees, deputized by the state, to assist in broad and effective enforcement of the labor laws. [Citations.] Future courts confronted with privacy objections to similar requested disclosures should be mindful of this potential impact when weighing whether to embrace a complete ban like the one imposed here or instead to seek alternative solutions that might accommodate the competing interests at stake.” (Id. at p. 555.)
Finally, the Williams court observed:
“Additionally, the Court of Appeal indicated discovery could or should be contingent on [the plaintiff] establishing a uniform companywide policy. A uniform policy may be a convenient or desirable way to show commonality of interest in a case where class certification is sought, but it is not a condition for discovery, or even success, in a PAGA action, where recovery on behalf of the state and aggrieved employees may be had for each violation, whether pursuant to a uniform policy or not. [Citation.] This is not to say uniform policies play no role in PAGA cases; proof of a uniform policy is one way a plaintiff might seek to render trial of the action manageable. But nothing in PAGA or our privacy precedents suggests courts can or should condition disclosure of contact information, which might lead to proof of a uniform or companywide policy, on prior proof of a uniform or companywide policy.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 559, fn. omitted.)
“ ‘The trial courts in exercising their discretion should keep in mind that the Legislature has suggested that, where possible, the courts should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery....’ [Citation.] The privacy interests of fellow employees elsewhere in California could have been addressed by conditioning discovery on a Belaire-West notice, as was done for discovery of contact information of employees at [the plaintiff’s] own store. Accordingly, [the employer’s] privacy objection does not support the denial of statewide discovery.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 559, fn. omitted.)
(B) 2024 Amendments to PAGA
Ritz-Carlton argues that the 2024 amendments to PAGA have superseded some of the Williams analysis. According to Ritz-Carlton, the amendments limiting the definition of “aggrieved employee” changed the scope of PAGA and because plaintiff here has not articulated any specific violation he personally experienced and plaintiff’s own records do not substantiate the violations alleged (an assertion disputed by plaintiff), “there is no basis in his personal experience to support discovery reaching every employee at every California property.” (Opposition, at pp. 8-9.)
There have been substantial revisions to PAGA since the decision in Williams. The definition of “aggrieved employee” has been amended to its current language: “For purposes of this part, ‘aggrieved employee’ means any person who was employed by the alleged violator and personally suffered each of the violations alleged during the period prescribed under Section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except that for purposes of actions brought pursuant to paragraph (2), ‘aggrieved employee’ means any person who was employed by the alleged violator against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed within the period prescribed under Section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (c)(1).)
Subdivision (c)(1), as amended, does nothing to change the analysis of Williams. Williams noted that the definition of “aggrieved employee” focused on alleged violator and alleged violations, terms not changed by the amendment. The Legislature instead created the early evaluation process. Nothing in the amendments to section 2699 limited or conditioned discovery as explained by Williams. (See People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 659 [“The Legislature is presumed to be aware of ‘ “judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]”].) In light of the Supreme Court’s construction of discovery in PAGA, had the Legislature intended to modify the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the Legislature could have done so directly, but it did not.
The 2024 amendment also added subdivision (p): “The superior court may limit the evidence to be presented at trial or otherwise limit the scope of any claim filed pursuant to this part to ensure that the claim can be effectively tried.” (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (p).)
New subdivision (p) gives the trial court the authority to limit the scope of trial. While subdivision (p) might, in appropriate circumstances give the trial court authority to limit claims and thereby affect the scope of permissible discovery, nothing in subdivision (p) requires the court to do so or imposes any limit that must first be overcome by the plaintiff before obtaining discovery. Instead, subdivision (p) ties together with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2017.020, 2019.020, subd. (b), 2019.030, 2030.090, and 2031.060 addressing protective orders that may limit or sequence discovery. Ritz-Carlton has not made a motion for a protective order.
(C) Application to Interrogatories
“[I]f a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on responding party to justify any objection.” (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)
In opposition to the motion to compel, Ritz-Carlton points out the lack of specificity in the complaint, asserts that plaintiff has no standing to make claims beyond the Labor Code violations that he has not personally experienced, and should not use discovery before a violation as to plaintiff or at plaintiff’s own worksite has been shown. (Opposition, at p. 4.) Ritz-Carlton complains about the court having set a trial date without granting the requested statutory stay, that the case sat dormant after the attorney handling the matter switched firms, and counsel for Ritz-Carlton has been working on preparing substantive responses while suffering personal and health challenges. (Id. at pp. 4-5.)
With respect to the complaint, the court agrees that the complaint’s allegations are very general. The discovery sought does not, however, exceed the scope of claims asserted in the complaint. Moreover, Ritz-Carlton did not challenge the pleading as uncertain (see Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 409, 417 [uncertainty waived if not raised by special demurrer]) and Ritz-Carlton has not provided any evidence showing that plaintiff expressly narrowed his claims. The fact that the 2024 amendment to PAGA narrowed standing to assert PAGA claims does not change this analysis. As the Williams court explained, plaintiff generally alleges standing and plaintiff is not required to provide preliminary proof of his claim in order to obtain discovery. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 551, 546; see also White v. Square, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1019, 1032 [allegations of standing sufficient as a matter of pleading].) The pleadings provide no basis to object to the discovery; plaintiff does not need to make a factual showing of the merits of his claim in order to obtain even broad discovery. The relevance, overbreadth, and “not reasonably particularized” objections are overruled.
The complaint was filed on July 16, 2025. On July 17, 2025, the court set a case management conference for November 19, 2025. According to the proof of service filed with the court on November 6, 2025, the summons and complaint were served on November 5, 2025. On November 19, 2025, the court continued the case management conference to February 4, 2026. On December 5, 2025, Ritz-Carlton filed its answer and request for stay and an early evaluation conference. On December 23, 2025, the court specially set a case management conference for January 7, 2026, to discuss Ritz-Carlton’s request. On January 7, 2026, the court assigned an evaluator, denied the request to stay discovery, vacated the February 4 case management conference, and set a trial date for December 2, 2026. The discovery at issue was not served until April 16, 2026. The circumstances in denying Ritz-Carlton’s request for a discovery stay do not provide a basis for Ritz-Carlton to object to the discovery when and as propounded. To the extent that timing, including the trial date, is an issue, the parties are free to make motions addressing such issues as appropriate.
The privacy objection is the same privacy objection that was found insufficient in Williams. The privacy objection is overruled. Ritz-Carlton has not made any factual showing of burden. The burdensome and harassing objections are overruled.
On its face, the interrogatory only seeks information extending to the date of the response. This is consistent with the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.060, subd. (g).) The objection as to continuing obligations is overruled. Similarly, the interrogatory does not seek information as to the “legal determinations regarding the scope of any putative class, representative group, or allegedly aggrieved employee population,” and so any reservation of a right to dispute such determinations does not limit Ritz-Carlton’s required response.
Ritz-Carlton will be required to provide a further response to SI No. 1.
The same analysis and conclusions apply to SI Nos. 2 through 4. Further responses to SI Nos. 2 to 4 will also be required.
“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)
Plaintiff requests an award of monetary sanctions against Ritz-Carlton, as the unsuccessfully opposing party, in the amount of $4,260.00. (Kuhn decl., ¶ 22.) The court finds this reasonable and will award sanctions in this amount.
(2) Requests for Production of Documents
Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to RFP Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 16, 31 through 35, 41, 42, 44 through 47, 50, 54, 55, 56, 60 and 61.
“On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:
(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.
(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.
“(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a)
“A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with each of the following: [¶] (1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).)
RFP No. 1 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PLAINTIFF’s employment with YOU, including but not limited to the following: (1) the complete contents of PLAINTIFF’s PERSONNEL FILE; (2) the complete contents of ALL files maintained in PLAINTIFF’s name other than the PERSONNEL FILE; (3) applications for employment and hiring; (4) ALL DOCUMENTS signed by PLAINTIFF; (5) qualifications for employment; (6) promotions/demotions; (7) compensation and benefits; (8) performance appraisals/evaluations/reviews; (9) termination and/or other disciplinary action; (10) ALL DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING and COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and PLAINTIFF; (11) job descriptions, duties and responsibilities for all positions held by PLAINTIFF; (12) ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ANY terms or conditions of PLAINTIFF’s employment with YOU; (13) ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO a background check or investigation of PLAINTIFF; (14) ALL DOCUMENTS constituting PLAINTIFF’s time records (including any edits or modifications thereto) in their NATIVE electronic format; (15) ALL DOCUMENTS constituting PLAINTIFF’s payroll records (including any edits or modifications thereto) in their NATIVE electronic format.”
The response to RFP No. 1 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that it is overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably particularized because it seeks ‘ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO’ Plaintiffs employment, including broad categories of documents without limitation to the claims, defenses, time period, or issues actually in dispute. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous because the phrases ‘RELATING TO,’ ‘ALL file maintained in PLAINTIFF’s name,’ ‘terms or conditions of PLAINTIFF’s employment,’ and ‘NATIVE electronic format’ are broad and undefined. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is overbroad. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is unduly burdensome and harassing.”
RFP No. 1 seeks only documents specific to plaintiff. Ritz-Carlton’s opposition suggests that document responsive to this request has or will be produced. (Opposition, at p. 7.) It does not appear that Ritz-Carlton intends to withhold any responsive documents to this request. On that basis, the court will order a further response to RFP No. 1.
RFP No. 2 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING ANY COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and ANY other PERSON REGARDING the claims asserted by PLAINTIFF in this ACTION.”
The response to RFP No. 2 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that it is overbroad and vague because it seeks all communications between Defendant and ‘ANY other PERSON’ regarding Plaintiffs claims, without limitation to nonprivileged communications, relevant custodians, relevant time periods, or communications actually at issue in this action. Defendant further objects to this Demand because it does not describe the documents sought with reasonable particularity.”
The overbroad and vague objection is sustained. The terms are so general that it is impossible for Ritz-Carlton to respond reasonably. No further response to RFP No. 2 will be required.
RFP No. 3 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING YOUR organizational charts (or the functional equivalent), chain of authority, and/or different departments/sections during the COVERED PERIOD.”
The response to RFP No. 3 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that the terms ‘functional equivalent’ and ‘sections’ are vague and ambiguous. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is overbroad. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is unduly burdensome and harassing. Defendant further objects to this Demand because it does not describe the documents sought with reasonable particularity.”
While applicable organizational information may be reasonably inspected, plaintiff has not reasonably particularized documents for inspection nor set forth good cause for this category of documents. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.030, subd. (c)(1).) No further response to RFP No. 3 is required.
RFP No. 5 is: “A clear and legible copy of ANY and ALL insurance policies and/or coverage providing insurance coverage for the claims asserted by PLAINTIFF in this ACTION, including but not limited to the named insured, additional insured, as well as coverage and limits of liability. (Insurance policies are subject to a request for production under CCP §2031.010. CCP §2031.010, subd. (a), permits discovery by a request for production of documents respecting any matter within
the scope of CCP, §2017.010 et seq. CCP § 2017.210, expressly provides for discovery of insurance information, and the Legislature has left the choice of the method of discovery to the party seeking discovery. See Irving-Moore v. Sup. Ct ., 14 Cal.App.4th 733 (1993).)”
The response to RFP No. 5 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that it seeks confidential insurance, claims-handling, coverage, and business information. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the grounds that it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product doctrine, common-interest doctrine, and/or information reflecting counsel’s mental
impressions, legal conclusions, investigation, analysis, or communications concerning insurance coverage, reservation-of-rights issues, or coverage disputes.”
“A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any agreement under which any insurance carrier may be liable to satisfy in whole or in part a judgment that may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. This discovery may include the identity of the carrier and the nature and limits of the coverage. A party may also obtain discovery as to whether that insurance carrier is disputing the agreement’s coverage of the claim involved in the action, but not as to the nature and substance of that dispute. Information concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in evidence at trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.210.)
In the context of this request, plaintiff has shown good cause for the production of insurance policies to which Ritz-Carlton has tendered this action for defense or for indemnity. The request is not reasonably understood as to apply to any documents apart from insurance policies and policy declarations showing coverage. Ritz-Carlton will be required to provide a further response to this request as so limited.
RFP No. 6 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING ANY COMPLAINTS made by COVERED EMPLOYEES during the COVERED PERIOD RELATING TO the claims in this ACTION. (Note: This demand includes, but is not limited to COMPLAINTS COMMUNICATED to YOU or ANY other PERSON (including administrative complaints, claims filed with the California Department of Labor Standard Enforcement, or claims filed with the United States Department of Labor).)”
The response to RFP No. 6 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that it seeks private, confidential, and personnel-related information concerning nonparty employees and their alleged complaints. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous because the phrases ‘COMPLAINTS,’ ‘RELATING TO,’ and ‘claims in this ACTION’ are broad and
undefined. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is overbroad. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is unduly burdensome and harassing.”
Complaints by other employees regarding the types of Labor Code violations asserted by plaintiff are relevant for the same reasons discussed above in the context of the interrogatories. In view of the Belaire-West notice to be sent out to address residual privacy issues of employees with those interrogatories, the parties will be ordered to further meet and confer as to this request.
For the same reasons, the parties will be required to meet and confer further as to RFP Nos. 7 and 14.
RFP No. 11 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS YOU have sent to ANY COVERED EMPLOYEE that RELATES TO this ACTION.”
The response to RFP No. 11 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that the terms ‘ALL DOCUMENTS,’ ‘sent,’ and ‘RELATES TO’ are vague and ambiguous. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects
to this Demand on the ground that it is overbroad. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is unduly burdensome and harassing.”
The court understands this request as pertaining to communications which specifically mention this action. With that understanding and in view of the Belaire-West notice, the parties will be required to meet and confer further as to RFP No. 11.
The same analysis and conclusion applies to RFP No. 50. A further meet and confer will be required as to RFP No. 50.
RFP No. 13 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS that EVIDENCE agreements between YOU and COVERED EMPLOYEES relating to YOUR employment policies and practices.”
The response to RFP No. 13 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that the terms ‘agreements,’ ‘relating to,’ and ‘employment policies and practices’ are vague and ambiguous. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is overbroad. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is unduly burdensome and harassing.”
Ritz-Carlton’s opposition states that it will be producing “Applicable wage and hour policies.” (Opposition, at p. 7.) A further response to RFP No. 13 will be required. The same analysis and result applies to RFP Nos. 16, 31 through 35, 54, and 56.
RFP No. 41 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS that RELATE, REFER TO, OR DESCRIBE, the timekeeping system or software used by DEFENDANT’s COVERED EMPLOYEES during the COVERED PERIOD.”
The response to RFP No. 41 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that the terms ‘policies, practices, and procedures’ and ‘software’ are vague and ambiguous. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is overbroad. Defendant further objects to this Demand because it does not describe the documents sought with reasonable particularity.”
While plaintiff is entitled to understand the underlying timekeeping system so as to understand how accurate entries are made (or not made), reported, and corrected, the request is so overbroad as to include all manuals, emails, and notes regarding the use of the system so as not to be reasonably particular. No further response is required to RFP No. 41.
The same analysis and conclusion applies to RFP No. 42. No further response is required for RFP No. 42.
RFP No. 44 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING the actual time worked by COVERED EMPLOYEES during the COVERED PERIOD. (This data should be produced in its NATIVE format or another usable electronic format such as Excel.)”
The response to RFP No. 44 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that the term ‘actual time worked’ is vague and ambiguous. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is overbroad. Defendant further objects to this Demand because it does not describe the documents sought with reasonable particularity.”
This request seeks electronic data for “actual time worked.” Since the allegations of the complaint are based in part upon failing to maintain accurate records, the phrasing of the request is ambiguous. Plaintiff has shown good cause for the discovery of electronic data. Subject to the discussion in this order regarding the scope of discovery, the parties are ordered to meet and confer further as to what appropriate data would be responsive to RFP No. 44 and the means by which such data may be disclosed.
The same analysis and conclusions apply to RFP Nos. 45, 46, and 47.
RFP No. 55 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING YOUR defenses in this ACTION.”
The response to RFP No. 55 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that it is overbroad and unduly burdensome because it seeks all documents supporting all of Defendant's defenses in this action, without limitation to specific defenses, issues, categories of documents, custodians, or time periods. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous because the phrase ‘SUPPORTING YOUR defenses’ is broad and undefined. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the grounds that it seeks documents protected by the attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product doctrine, and/or information reflecting counsel’s mental impressions, legal conclusions, investigation, analysis, strategy, document selection, or defense theories. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the grounds that it is premature because
Defendant’s investigation and discovery are ongoing.”
While plaintiff is entitled to the production of documents as to particular subjects, the request here is not reasonably particularized, especially since the request is framed so as to include privileged matter. No further response is required to RFP No. 55.
RFP No. 60 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING any internal assessments or audits YOU conducted concerning COVERED EMPLOYEES adhering to YOUR wage and hour policies and procedures.”
The response to RFP No. 60 is: “Defendant objects to this Demand on the grounds that the terms ‘internal assessments or audits,’ ‘adhering,’ and ‘wage and hour policies’ are vague and ambiguous. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects to this Demand on the ground that it is overbroad. Defendant further objects to this Demand because it does not describe the documents sought with reasonable particularity. Defendant further objects to this Demand to the extent that it seeks information that is subject to the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine.”
The terms identified in the objection are not so vague or ambiguous that Ritz-Carlton would not be able to respond reasonably to the request. A further response will be required to RFP No. 60.
The same analysis and conclusion applies to RFP No. 61. A further response will be required to RFP No. 61.
“Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)
Because the court will require further meet and confer as to certain categories of documents, the court will continue the hearing on this motion in part and defer consideration of sanctions to the continued hearing.