Tentative Ruling: Day Witherspoon vs Terence Alemann et al

Case Number

25CV03703

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 04/20/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

1. Motion: Compel re Compelling Responses Special Interrogatories, Set One. Plaintiff And Moving Party Is Requesting Sanctions etc.; 2. Motion: Compel re Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One

Tentative Ruling

Day Witherspoon v. Terence Alemann 

Case No. 25CV03703

           

Hearing Date: April 20, 2026                                                  

HEARING:              (1)       Motion of Plaintiff to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories

                             (2)       Motion of Plaintiff to Compel Further Responses to Production of Documents

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Day Witherspoon: Brian A. Osborne

                                    For Defendant Terence Alemann: Malgorzata Hackett

                                   

TENTATIVE RULING:

1.       The motion of plaintiff Day Witherspoon is granted, in part, to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set one, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, and 18. Defendant Terence Alemann shall serve further verified responses to these interrogatories, in a form complying with the Code of Civil Procedure and without objection except as to privilege, on or before May 5, 2026. To the extent any information is withheld on the grounds of privilege, Alemann shall concurrently serve a privilege log identifying the information withheld and providing sufficient additional information for the court to rule on the issue of privilege; information may not be withheld on the grounds of privilege expressly overruled by this ruling. The court awards monetary sanctions in favor of plaintiff Day Witherspoon and against defendant Terence Alemann and his attorney Malgorzata Hackett, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1560.00, to be paid to counsel for plaintiff on or before May 20, 2026. The motion is in all other respects denied.
2.        The motion of plaintiff Day Witherspoon is granted, in part, to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, set one, Nos. 2 and 6. Defendant Terence Alemann shall serve further verified responses to these requests, in a form complying with the Code of Civil Procedure and without objection except as to privilege, on or before May 5, 2026. To the extent any responsive documents are withheld on the grounds of privilege, Alemann shall concurrently serve a privilege log identifying the documents withheld and providing sufficient additional information for the court to rule on the issue of privilege. Alemann shall concurrently produce all responsive documents to these requests, other than those documents identified as withheld from production on a privilege log. In all other respects, including the request for an award of monetary sanctions, the motion is denied.

Background:

On June 12, 2025, plaintiff Day Witherspoon, previously known as Kirsten Hinrichs, filed this action against defendants Terence Alemann (Alemann), Nicholas Lebrero, and Alejandra Aleman asserting causes of action alleging identity theft and misuse of Witherspoon’s Airbnb account information.

Witherspoon alleges that she purchased a house on De La Vina Street in Santa Barbara in 2006. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) In 2015, Alemann managed several properties defendants owned as AirBnB vacation rentals. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) Witherspoon was at that time moving to Denmark and planned to either rent or sell the house. (Ibid.) Alemann offered to manage the house using Witherspoon’s AirBnB account and would later purchase the house. (Ibid.) Alemann would take over Witherspoon’s AirBnB account, removing her name and social security number. (Ibid.) The house was sold in December 2015 to defendants. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) In May 2024, Witherspoon learned that the California Franchise Tax Board was taking enforcement actions to collect approximately $274,000. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Witherspoon later learned that the IRS was asserting that she owed just under $2 million. (Complaint, ¶ 15.) These amounts of tax were assertedly owed because of AirBnB income was wrongly attributed to Witherspoon through the AirBnB account used by Alemann. (Complaint, ¶¶ 10-15.)

On August 4, 2025, Alemann filed his answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting five affirmative defenses.

On October 20, 2025, Witherspoon served on Alemann, by mail and by electronic service, first sets of special interrogatories (SI) and requests for production of documents (RFP). (Osborne decl. re SI, ¶ 2 & exhibit A; Osborne decl. re RFP, ¶ 2 & exhibit A.)

On November 20, 2025, Alemann served responses to the SI and RFP. (Osborne decl. re SI, ¶ 3 & exhibit B; Osborne decl. re RFP, ¶ 3 & exhibit B.)

Following a brief and unsuccessful meet-and-confer, on December 22, 2025, Witherspoon filed these motions to compel further responses to the SI and RFP. The motions are opposed by Alemann.

In reply, Witherspoon withdrew certain interrogatories and requests for production from the motion so what remains now at issue are: SI Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, and 24; and, RFP Nos. 1, 2, 6, 10, and 11. (Reply, at p. 3.)

Analysis:

(1)       Interrogatories

“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply:

“(1)      An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete.

“(2)      An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate.

“(3)      An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

SI No. 1 is: “Identify each and every parcel of real estate in which YOU, or any entity in which YOU have an ownership interest and/or managerial position, have owned since 2013.”

The response to SI No. 1, following a preliminary statement and general objections, is: “Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome as explained in greater detail in defendant’s[ ] general objection number 2. Defendant objects to these interrogatories on the ground that they seek information that is neither relevant to the subject matter of this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

“[I]f a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on responding party to justify any objection.” (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

Alemann’s first objection is that the interrogatory is overly broad and unduly burdensome, citing Alemann’s second general objection, which states: “Defendant objects to these interrogatories on the grounds that they are overly broad and

unduly burdensome. These interrogatories cast an unmeasurably wide net, requesting information that is immensely difficult and burdensome to collect and largely irrelevant to the issues at hand in this case. C.C.P. § 20 19(b )(2).”

“Overly broad,” as distinct an objection that the discovery exceeds the scope of permissible discovery, is not a proper objection. (See Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 384–385 [“fishing expedition” not inherently improper].) If the discovery is overly broad in the sense of harassing, it may be addressed by motion for protective order but not by objection. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (b) [to protect from “unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense”].) “[B]urden, alone, is not a ground for objection. … The objection of burden is valid only when that burden is demonstrated to result in injustice.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417–418.) Alemann makes no evidence-based showing of the extent of the burden entailed by responding to this, or any other, interrogatory. The objection of overly broad and burdensome is overruled.

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)

Witherspoon asserts that this information is discoverable because Alemann has admitted that he added some of his AirBnB rental properties to plaintiff’s AirBnB account. The information requested is discoverable as potentially relevant detail to the scheme alleged by Witherspoon. The relevancy objection is overruled.

Alemann will be required to provide a further response to SI No. 1. The same analysis applies to SI Nos. 2 and 3, and further responses will be required to these interrogatories as well.

SI Nos. 6, 7, 13, 21, 22, and 24 are identified in the reply as being at issue but are not included in Witherspoon’s separate statement. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).) Because these interrogatories are not included in the separate statement, the court will deny the motion as to these interrogatories. No further responses are required to these interrogatories.

SI No. 8 is: “Was PLAINTIFF’S Airbnb account sold to YOU, either individually or with others, as part of the purchase and sale in late 2015 or early 2016?”

The response to SI No. 8 is: “Defendant objects to plaintiffs’ definition of the term ‘PLAINTIFF’S AIRBNB ACCOUNT’ as vague and ambiguous, and need further clarification of this term in order to accurately respond to these interrogatories as explained in greater detail in defendant’s general objection number 3. Defendant further objects to these interrogatories on the ground that they are uncertain,  ambiguous or confusing. There interrogatories are too vague to understand, don’t clearly state the subject matter or question being asked.”

General objection No. 3 is: “Defendant objects to plaintiffs’ definition of the term ‘PLAINTIFF’S ACCOUNT’ or ‘UNDER PLAINTIFF’S NAME’ as vague and ambiguous and need further clarification of this term in order to accurately respond to these interrogatories. Defendant further objects to these interrogatories on the ground that they are uncertain, ambiguous or confusing. There interrogatories are too vague to understand, don’t clearly state the subject matter or question being asked.”

“Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (a).) “If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (b).) “If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (c).)

“A party may not deliberately misconstrue a question for the purpose of supplying an evasive answer. [Citation.] Indeed, where the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.)

The defined term, PLAINTIFF, refers to plaintiff Witherspoon. The interrogatory plainly requests a response regarding plaintiff’s contention as to the plaintiff’s AirBnB account. It may be reasonably inferred that Alemann has personal knowledge as to what was included in the sale of Witherspoon’s house and either directly or by negative implication whether Witherspoon’s AirBnB account was included. Objections as to vagueness and ambiguity are overruled.

A further response will be required as to SI No. 8. The same analysis applies to SI Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 18 and further responses will be required to these interrogatories as well.

SI No. 15 is: “Is it YOUR contention that all taxes associated with the rental income received under the Airbnb account YOU claim that YOU purchased with 421 De La Vina Street, Santa Barbara, California were paid?”

The response to SI No. 15 is: “Defendant objects to these interrogatories to the extent they seek information that would violate an individual’s right to privacy and/or any other applicable protection as explained in defendant’s general objections number 4 [and] 6. Defendant objects to these interrogatories to the extent they seek confidential Information of tax information that is privileged and protected under California Revenue and Taxation Code § 19542.”

“In Webb v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Cal.2d 509, 512, we construed former Revenue and Taxation Code section 19282. This section provided in part that, except in tax enforcement proceedings, ‘ “… it is a misdemeanor for the Franchise Tax Board, any deputy, agent, clerk, or other officer or employee, to disclose in any manner information as to the amount of income or any particulars set forth or disclosed in any report or return required under this part.” ’ (Although § 19282 has since been amended, the language of the present statute is substantially the same.) In Webb we noted that the purpose of such provisions as section 7056 is ‘to facilitate tax enforcement by encouraging a taxpayer to make full and truthful declarations in his return, without fear that his statements will be revealed or used against him for other purposes.’ [Citation.] In Webb we unanimously held that forcing the taxpayer himself to produce a copy of his state or federal income tax returns, which the opposing party wished to use for impeachment purposes, would effectively defeat this legislative purpose. We continued ‘[t]he effect of the statutory prohibition [of disclosure] is to render the returns privileged, and the privilege should not be nullified by permitting third parties to obtain the information by adopting the indirect procedure of demanding copies of the tax returns.’ [Citation.]” (Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1, 6.)

“Finally, in Webb, we made it clear that attempts to avoid the application of the privilege by indirect means could not be tolerated. [Citation.] Real party in interest’s interrogatory 40 appears to be such an attempt. While not asking either for the return itself or a copy, the question does seek information concerning specific entries in the return. To require petitioner to respond to such an inquiry would render meaningless the privilege recognized in Webb …. Assuming Revenue and Taxation Code section 7056 protects the returns themselves, it is reasonable to conclude that it must also protect the information contained in the returns.” (Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 7.)

SI No. 15 asks for specific information regarding taxes reported. This information falls squarely within the tax return privilege. Witherspoon has not shown that any exception to that privilege applies. No further response will be required for SI No. 15. The same analysis applies to SI No. 16 and a further response will not be required to that interrogatory.

SI No. 17 is: “Who has possession of the tax returns associated with each parcel of real estate identified in response to interrogatory number 9?”

The same privilege objection is asserted as to SI No. 15. However, this interrogatory asks for information about possession of the tax returns rather than the contents of tax returns.

“[T]his statutory tax return privilege is not absolute. The privilege will not be upheld when (1) the circumstances indicate an intentional waiver of the privilege; (2) the gravamen of the lawsuit is inconsistent with the privilege; or (3) a public policy greater than that of the confidentiality of tax returns is involved. [Citation.] This latter exception is narrow and applies only ‘when warranted by a legislatively declared public policy.’ [Citation.] A trial court has broad discretion in determining the applicability of a statutory privilege.” (Weingarten v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 268, 274.)

While Witherspoon has not shown a basis for an exception to the tax return privilege, because the tax return may potentially be found outside the privilege and there is no privilege or privacy right in the location of the returns (as opposed to their contents), the objection is overruled. (See Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1190 [interrogatory as to identification of privileged document not generally privileged even if contents of document are privileged].) A further response will be required to SI No. 17.

Witherspoon requests an award of monetary sanctions.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)

There are multiple competing factors as to an award of sanctions. First, the SI consists of 27 special interrogatories. The notice and motion do not identify which interrogatories are at issue. The separate statement provides information for SI Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, and 25. After the opposition was filed, and with the reply, Witherspoon withdrew the motion as to SI Nos. 4, 5, 12, 14, 19, 20, 23, and 25, but asserted that remaining at issue were SI Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, and 24. (Comparing these lists, SI Nos. 6, 7, 13, 21, 22, and 24 were not addressed in the moving papers but are now asserted as at issue in the reply. As noted above, the court denies the motion as to these interrogatories for the reason that they were not included in the separate statement.) By the time of this hearing, Witherspoon has withdrawn the motion as to 8 of 19 interrogatories initially put at issue in the moving papers. Of the 11 interrogatories now at issue, the court grants the motion as to 9 of the 11—about half the total initially put at issue.

Second, the meet-and-confer was brief, but it is unclear to what extent a more extensive meet-and-confer might have made a difference. One would have expected that a substantial meet and confer process would have at least eliminated from the initial motion those interrogatories that were withdrawn after the opposition. This factor demonstrates a failing of all parties.

Third, the responses to the interrogatories demonstrate that the objections are mostly boilerplate and misuses of the discovery process. “Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: [¶] … [¶] (e) Making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery. [¶] (f) Making an evasive response to discovery.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (e), (f).) The boilerplate nature of the objections is evident in part from the citations used in the objections. In both general objection No. 2 and the specific objection to SI No. 14, for example, Alemann cites to “C.C.P. § 2019(b)(2).” This citation is long outdated; section 2019 as a standalone section was repealed in 2004. (Stats. 2004, ch. 182, § 22.)

The court finds that an award of monetary sanctions is proper based upon Alemann not showing that the responses were substantially justified as to those interrogatories for which the motion is being granted. Witherspoon seeks fees in the total amount of $3,060 for this motion, consisting of 6 hours of attorney time at $500 per hour plus the $60 filing fee. Given the partial success of this matter and the other factors discussed above, the court will award reasonable attorney fees and costs in the amount of $1,560.

Additionally, the court notes that both parties seem to have formatting problems with their respective papers filed with the court. For example, plaintiff’s papers contain multiple fonts and odd extra spacing; defendant’s papers have improper single spacing and odd extra spacing. The parties are reminded to follow the format requirements of the California Rules of Court (e.g., rules 2.100- 2.118). Whether or not the formatting constitutes a violation of a rule, formatting problems are distracting and make reading the papers unnecessarily difficult.

(2)       Requests for Production of Documents

“On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:

“(1)      A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

“(2)      A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

“(3)      An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

“A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with each of the following:

“(1)      The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.

“(2)      The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1), (2).)

RFP No. 1 is: “For each parcel of real estate identified in YOUR response to Special Interrogatory No. 1, produce all documents in YOUR possession including, but not limited to, the Deeds of Title.”

The response to RFP No. 1 is: “Responding party objects on the grounds;

“1.       Defendant objects to request for production on the ground that they seek information that is neither relevant to the subject matter of this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In an action such as this, for alleged violation of identity theft subject to California Penal Code [§] 530.5 the defendant intent is the only issue. Defendant’s business entities and business conduct after the years of 2016-2019 are completely irrelevant to this case. Therefore, any information that plaintiff requests regarding defendant’s business conduct after the years of 2016-2019 and actions are irrelevant, and defendant objects to providing such information.

“2.       Defendant objects to the production of records on the grounds that they are overly broad and unduly burdensome. These production requests cast an unmeasurably wide net, requesting information that is immensely difficult and burdensome to collect and largely irrelevant to the issues at hand in this case.”

“[A]bsent a claim of privilege or attorney work product, the party who seeks to compel production has met his burden of showing good cause simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

As set forth in the separate statement, Witherspoon asserts as the reason for compelling a further response to this RFP: “Plaintiff sold her house at 421 De La Vina in January 2016. She had given defendant Alemann access to the house to rent through Airbnb in or about December 2015 including her Airbnb account number. Thereafter, Alemann—who had a number of other Airbnb rentals— proceeded to charge plaintiff’s [Airbnb] account for his other [rentals] resulting in plaintiff owing over $2.2 million. During a meeting with plaintiff, all defendants, plaintiff’s counsel and Alemann’s CP, Alemann admitted that he added his properties to plaintiff’s Airbnb.”

RFP No. 1 asks for all documents in some way connected to parcels of real estate. Witherspoon does not make a showing of good cause for this RFP. While some documents related to the parcel may be reasonably connected to the issues of this case, this request makes no effort to narrow the request to a showing of good cause. No further response will be required to RFP No. 1. This ruling is without prejudice to Witherspoon requesting narrower documents relating to parcels for which good cause is shown.

RPF No. 2 is: “Produce all documents in YOUR possession, custody or control concerning the Airbnb account that was owned by Plaintiff.”

The response to RFP No. 2 is: “Responding party objects on the grounds:

“1.       Defendant objects to request for production on the ground that they seek information that is neither relevant to the subject matter of this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In an action such as this, for alleged violation of identity theft subject to California Penal Code [§] 530.5 the defendant intent is the only issue. Defendant’s business entities and business conduct after the years of 2016-2019 are completely irrelevant to this case. Therefore, any information that plaintiff requests regarding defendant’s business conduct after the years of 2016-2019 and actions are irrelevant, and defendant objects to providing such information.

            “2.       Defendant objects to the production of records on the grounds that they are overly broad and unduly burdensome. These production requests cast an unmeasurably wide net, requesting information that is immensely difficult and burdensome to collect and largely irrelevant to the issues at hand in this case.

“4.       Defendant objects to the request for production to the extent they seek confidential [i]nformation of tax information that is privileged and protected under California Revenue and Taxation Code [§] 19542.”

There is good cause for production of information regarding the AirBnB account that formerly belonged to Witherspoon because the operation of that account is at the heart of Witherspoon’s claims. All of the time after the sale of the house is relevant as to the use of the account. The objection of relevance is overruled.

Alemann has failed to provide any evidence-based statement of the burden involved in complying with this request. For the same reasons the same objection is overruled as to special interrogatories, the overly broad and unduly burdensome objection is overruled here.

The objection as to confidentiality is overruled. There is a protective order entered by the court to protect the dissemination of confidential information and financial information may be produced subject to that protective order.

To the extent that responsive documents may be protected by the tax return privilege, Alemann is not required to produce such documents, but will be required to provide a privilege log identifying all responsive documents withheld on the grounds of privilege.

A further response will be required as to RFP No. 2. The same analysis applies to RFP No. 6  and a further response will be required to this request.

RFP No. 10 is: “Produce all tax returns in YOUR possession, custody or control concerning each and every parcel of real estate that you added to PLAINTIFF'S Airbnb account number.”

The response to RFP No. 10 is: “Responding party objects on the grounds: [¶] Defendant objects to the request for production to the extent they seek confidential [i]nformation of tax information that is privileged and protected under California Revenue and Taxation Code § 19542 as explained in general objection number 4.”

This request falls squarely within the tax return privilege discussed above. Witherspoon has not shown that an exception applies. No further response is required to this request.

RFP No. 11 is: “Produce all documents in YOUR possession, custody or control UPON WHICH you BASE your defenses to this lawsuit.”

The response to RFP No. 11 is: “Responding party objects on the grounds: [¶] Defendant object to these production requests on the ground that they are uncertain. Ambiguous or confusing. These production requests are too vague to understand, don’t clearly state the subject matter or question being asked as explained in general objection number 3.”

General objection No. 3 is: “Defendant object to these production request on the ground that they are uncertain, Ambiguous or confusing. These production requests are too vague to understand, don’t clearly state the subject matter or question being asked.”

The objection as to uncertainty is sustained. On its face, the request seems to be seeking attorney work product—an objection that is curiously not made to this request—because it appears to seek documents culled by counsel’s assessment that that a claim is “based” on a subset of relevant documents. (See Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 499–500 [witness statements obtained through an attorney-directed interview generally entitled to work product protection].) But the request puts the terms “UPON WHICH” and “BASED” in all capital letters. The use of all caps for these terms would reasonably appear to indicate an intention to give these terms special definitions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.060, subd. (e) [specially defined terms in interrogatories use all capitalized letters]; but see Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.030 [no limitation on definitions for requests for production].) A special definition would also be reasonably expected because of the attorney work product issue raised by the text of the request without considering the words in all caps. Such a definition would be expected to limit the request to avoid the work product issue. However, the definition section of the RFP does not include definitions for either of these terms.

Because it is not reasonably possible to understand the manner in which the apparently defined terms would be narrowed to accommodate (or not) the attorney work product issue, the request is too uncertain to require a further answer. This ruling is without prejudice to subsequent, clearer discovery requests.

Witherspoon requests an award of monetary sanctions. In view of the mixed results of this motion, the court finds that any award of monetary sanctions as to the motion to compel further responses to the RFP would be unjust. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).) The request for sanctions will be denied.