Tentative Ruling: Matter of Nelly Mercado and Albert N Mercado Trust
Case Number
24PR00029
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Thu, 04/30/2026 - 09:00
Nature of Proceedings
1. Motion Petitioner Ryan Mercado's Notice of Motion and Motion for Court-Ordered Mediation; 2. Motion: Compel Petitioner Ryan Mercado to Provide Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set Three)
Tentative Ruling
Appearances are required to discuss the Motion for Court-Ordered Mediation.
Motion to Compel Tentative Ruling:
The motion of Respondent Nelly Mercado to compel Ryan Mercado to provide further responses to form interrogatories, set three, and request for monetary sanctions is granted in part. The motion is denied as moot with respect to further responses. This does not preclude Respondent Nelly Mercado from filing a further motion to compel further responses relative to Ryan Mercado’s amended responses to the form interrogatories. Monetary sanctions are granted in favor of Nelly Mercado and against Ryan Mercado, in the amount of $4,820.00, to be paid to counsel for Nelly Mercado no later than May 28, 2026.
Background:
This action was commenced on January 22, 2024, by the filing of the Petition by Ryan Mercado (“Ryan”), against respondents Nelly Mercado (“Nelly”), Tamara Skov (‘Skov”), and Shannon Dalton (“Dalton”) for: (1) A report and accounting, (2) An order ascertaining trustees and instruction regarding removal of purported trustees, (3) For an order returning trustees fees taken by Skov and Dalton, (4) For damages for breach of fiduciary duty, (5) For adjudication of rights as to trust property, and (6) For an order compelling the trustees to fund the decedent’s trust. (Note: Due to common surnames, some individuals will be referred to by their given names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.)
As alleged in the Petition:
The Nelly Mercado and Albert N. Mercado Trust (the “Trust”) was established on November 5, 1993, and was amended and restated on August 20, 2021. (Pet., ¶ 1 & Exh. A.) Albert N. Mercado (“Albert N.”) died on October 26, 2022. (Id. at ¶ 2.)
Ryan is the grandson of Nelly and Albert N. and a residuary beneficiary of the Trust and was appointed as a successor trustee in the event that his father, Albert William Mercado (“Albert W.”) or Nelly are no longer able to serve as trustees. (Pet., ¶ 3.)
Skov and Dalton of Quinn Fiduciary Services purport to act as co-trustees of the Trust. (Pet., ¶¶ 7, 8.)
Pursuant to the terms of the Trust, on Albert N.’s death, the trustees of the Trust were to divide the assets of the Trust into a Survivor’s Trust, a Marital Trust, and a Decedent’s Trust. (Pet., ¶ 13.) The Survivor’s Trust was to be funded with Nelly’s interest in the community estate and Nelly’s separate property. (Id. at ¶ 14.) The Decedent’s Trust was to be funded with Albert N.’s interest in the community estate and his separate property. (Id. at ¶ 15.) The assets of the Trust were not sufficiently large to trigger the funding of the Marital Trust. (Id. at ¶ 16.)
Despite Albert N. passing away on October 26, 2022, it is not clear whether the division of assets into the sub-trusts occurred. (Pet., ¶ 17.) Upon Albert N.’s passing, The son of Albert N. and Nelly, Giancarlo, became a successor co-trustee with Nelly. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Giancarlo acted as co-trustee in the months following Albert N.’s death until Giancarlo’s death on January 22, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Following Giancarlo’s death, Nelly appointed her son, Albert W., as co-trustee of the Trust, with the effective date of the appointment being January 22, 223. (Id. at ¶ 20 & Exh. B.)
On February 10, 2023, Nelly and Albert W. executed a notarized affidavit of change of trustee and recorded it. (Pet., ¶ 22 & Exh. C.)
On April 4, 2023, Nelly and Albert W. executed a notarized amendment of successor trustee, appointing Ryan as successor trustee upon the death or incapacitation of either Nelly or Albert W. (Pet., ¶ 25 & Exh. D.)
In the summer of 2023, Nelly stopped communicating with Albert W. regarding the Trust. (Pet., ¶ 28.) On September 26, 2023, Nelly purportedly resigned as Trustee and unilaterally appointed private professional fiduciaries Skov and Dalton as successor co-Trustees of the Trust. (Id. at ¶ 29 & Exh. E.)
The appointment of Skov and Dalton was not consistent with the Trust’s procedures for the appointment of a trustee. (Pet., ¶ 33.) Nelly appointed them without Albert W.’s consent or approval, which is not allowed under the terms of the Trust. (Id. at ¶ 34.)
Nelly is declining to fund the Decedent’s Trust based on the advice of her neighbors that have a vested interest in Nelly’s financial decisions. (Pet., ¶ 47.) Without the consent or approval of Albert W., in July 2023, Nelly arranged for the sale of real property located in Sherman Oaks that was held by an entity wholly owned by the Trust. (Pet., ¶ 48.)
Ryan has requested an accounting from Skov and Dalton but has not received one. (Pet., ¶¶ 49-52.)
The respondents have all filed responses to the petition largely disputing Ryan’s allegations and adding additional details regarding the circumstances surrounding the purpose and management of the Trust.
There have been several discovery motions in this matter. The current motion, of Nelly, to compel further responses to form interrogatories, set three, and request for monetary sanctions, was filed on November 4, 2025, and originally scheduled for hearing on February 19, 2026.
On February 19, 2026, the court continued the hearing on the motion to April 30, 2026.
Ryan filed opposition to the motion on March 19, 2026. Nelly requests that the court disregard the opposition as untimely. As Nelly has had the opportunity to substantively address the opposition, the court will exercise its discretion and consider the opposition.
On April 23, 2026, Nelly filed her reply to Ryan’s opposition.
On April 24, 2026, Ryan filed a supplemental declaration in opposition to the motion. There is no authority for Ryan to file the supplemental declaration and it will not be considered.
Analysis:
“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)
“A trial court must be mindful of the Legislature’s preference for discovery over trial by surprise, [and] must construe the facts before it liberally in favor of discovery. . .” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540.)
Ryan argues that the motion is moot because he served supplemental responses to the form interrogatories on March 17, 2026.
To allow a party to unilaterally divest a court of authority to rule on a motion to compel further responses to discovery, by serving a further response while the motion is pending, “would permit a party faced with a motion to compel to delay its adjudication indefinitely by successive supplemental but inadequate responses, each prompting a further motion to compel, each of which in turn would be defeated by piecemeal supplementation. [Citations.]” (County of San Benito v. Superior Court (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 243, 256.)
As noted above Nelly seeks further responses to FIs Nos. 2.5 and 17.1.
As has been previously explained to Ryan:
Code of Civil Procedure, section 2030.010 provides, “(a) Any party may obtain discovery within the scope delimited by Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 2017.010), and subject to the restrictions set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 2019.010), by propounding to any other party to the action written interrogatories to be answered under oath. (b) An interrogatory may relate to whether another party is making a certain contention, or to the facts, witnesses, and writings on which a contention is based. An interrogatory is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.220 provides that, “(a) Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (b) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible. (c) If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.”
FI No. 2.5 requires Ryan to:
“State:
“(a) your present resident ADDRESS;
“(b) your residence ADDRESSES for the past five years; and
“(c) the dates you lived at each ADDRESS.”
Ryan initially responded:
“Objection. This interrogatory is duplicative and harassing, as an identical request was propounded in prior discovery (Form Interrogatories - Set One) and answered in Responding Party’s original and supplemental responses. Propounding Party already possesses this information.
“Subject to and without waiving this objection, Responding Party incorporates by reference his prior responses to Form Interrogatory No. 2.5 in Set One and any supplemental responses thereto.”
The response is evasive and there is no legitimate reason for Ryan to avoid simply answering the interrogatory. Nelly is entitled to this information and there has been a great deal of confusion regarding Ryan’s actual addresses and when he lived at each address, created by Ryan’s prior discovery responses as well as addresses that he has listed in the header of his papers.
As noted above, on March 17, 2026, Ryan served a supplemental response to the form interrogatories. In responding to FI No. 2.5, Ryan modified his response to:
“(a) 1139 E Brickyard Rd #1403 Salt Lake City, UT 84106 and 2549 Veteran Ave Los Angeles, CA 90064
“(b) (c) 1139 E Brickyard Rd #1403, Salt Lake City, UT 84106 – January 2021 to Present (primary residence). 2549 Veteran Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90064 – Jan 2026 to Present”
By way of reply, Nelly claims that the response remains deficient. However, she fails to explain how the response is deficient. If Nelly believes that it is still deficient, a further motion to compel may be filed as to the supplemental response.
FI No. 17.1 asks Ryan:
“Is your response to each request for admission served with these interrogatories an unqualified admission? If not, for each response that is not an unqualified admission:
“(a) state the number of the request;
“(b) state all facts on which you base your response;
“(c) state the names, ADDRESSES, and telephone numbers of all PERSONS who have knowledge of those facts; and
“(d) identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your response and state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each DOCUMENT or thing.”
Ryan initially responded:
“Responding Party objects to the extent this interrogatory seeks responses regarding Requests for Admission that are invalid under CCP §2033.050. Propounding Party’s supporting declaration is deficient because it fails to contain the required statutory language that the excess requests are not propounded for any improper purpose, such as harassment, delay, or needless cost. Accordingly, no response is required as to RFAs beyond No. 35.”
Regarding the deficient declaration for additional discovery, Nelly’s counsel declares: “On October 8, 2025, I addressed Ryan’s objection that Mr. Hellman’s attorney declaration in support of propounding more than 35 requests for admission was insufficient by emailing Ryan an amended version of Mr. Hellman’s declaration.” ( Mitchell decl., ¶ 13 & Exh. F.)
As noted above, Ryan served a supplemental response to FI No. 17.1 on March 17, 2026. As with FI No. 2.5, by way of reply, Nelly claims that the response remains deficient. However, she fails to explain how the response is deficient. If Nelly believes that it is still deficient, a further motion to compel may be filed as to the supplemental response.
While Ryan will not be ordered to provide further responses, as the result of the current motion, the court does not make any representations regarding a ruling on any future motion related to the supplemental responses.
Monetary Sanctions
Nelly seeks sanctions of $4,820.00 for the necessity of bringing the motion.
“The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)
“The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. The court may also impose this sanction on one unsuccessfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on any attorney who advised that assertion, or on both. If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).)
The court does not find any circumstances that make the imposition of sanctions unjust. Rather, the court finds that Ryan continues to willfully avoid directly responding to discovery. As the result of prior rulings on motions to compel, Ryan should be well aware of what is required of him when responding to discovery.
As noted above, Nelly seeks $4,820.00 for fees and costs incurred as a result of bringing the motion.
Nelly’s attorney charges $595 per hour, which this court finds reasonable given her qualifications. Nelly’s attorney declares that she spent in excess of five hours preparing the motion, declaration, and separate statement. At the time of filing the motion, she anticipated at least three hours reviewing opposition, preparing the reply, and attending the hearing on the matter, for a total of eight hours. Nelly also incurred a filing fee of $60.00, for a total amount of $4,820.00. The court finds the time spent reasonable and necessary.
Nelly will be awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,820.00.