Tentative Ruling: Steven Joseph Thomas vs Boys & Girls Club of South San Luis Obispo County et al

Case Number

24CV03448

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 04/17/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion for Approval

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff for preliminary approval of class action settlement and provisional class certification is granted in accordance with this ruling. Counsel shall appear at the hearing and be prepared to discuss all matters remaining at this time.

Background:

On June 18, 2024, plaintiff Steven Joseph Thomas (Thomas or Plaintiff) filed a class action complaint against defendants the Boys & Girls Club of South San Luis Obispo County (the SLO Club), the Boys & Girls Clubs of the Central Coast (the Central Coast Club), and the United Boys & Girls Clubs of Santa Barbara County (the SB Club) (collectively, Defendants), alleging five causes of action: (1) itemized wage statement (check stubs) penalties (Lab. Code, §§ 226, 558 & 558.1); (2) waiting time penalties (Lab. Code, §§ 201-203, 558 & 558.1); (3) meal break violations (Lab. Code, §§ 226.7 & 512, subd. (a)); (4) rest break violations (Lab. Code, § 226.7); and (5) restitution/injunction (unlawful competition in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq. & Lab. Code, § 558.1).

On October 1, 2024, without any response to the complaint having been filed, Plaintiff filed a first amended class action complaint (the FAC), alleging the same five causes of action against Defendants and described above, and adding a sixth cause of action for civil penalties under Labor Code section 2698 et seq. (the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 or PAGA.) As alleged in the FAC:

Defendants own and operate child care and education centers under the name “Boys & Girls Club”. (FAC, ¶ 27.) From 2018 until 2023, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt employee. (FAC, ¶¶ 19 & 29.) During that employment, Defendants required Plaintiff to care for and supervise children without a rest break, and to work shifts longer than 5 hours without a meal break. (FAC, ¶¶ 30-31.) In addition, Defendants deposited pay checks into Plaintiff’s account without providing accurate pay stubs. (FAC, ¶ 35.) Because Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff all earned wages, Plaintiff ended his employment relationship with Defendants. (FAC, ¶ 36.)

On December 20, the SB Club filed an answer to the FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting sixty-three affirmative defenses.

Court records reflect that the SLO Club did not file a response to the FAC.

On November 26, the Central Coast Club filed a motion (the arbitration motion) for an order compelling Plaintiff to submit their individual claims to arbitration, and staying these proceedings pending the completion of arbitration. Plaintiff opposed the arbitration motion.

On February 10, 2025, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties filed in this action by the Central Coast Club, the court continued the hearing on the arbitration motion to May 23, and ordered a temporary stay of this proceeding.

On May 5, the Central Coast Club filed a case management conference statement stating that the parties have reached a tentative settlement and expect to file a motion for preliminary approval. (May 5, 2025, Case Management Statement, ¶ 4(a).)

On May 23, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, the court entered an order continuing the arbitration motion to November 21.

On November 4, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion (or preliminary approval motion) for an order: (1) granting class certification for settlement purposes only; (2) granting preliminary approval of a “Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice” (the Settlement) between Plaintiff and Defendants; (3) appointing Adrian R. Bacon (attorney Bacon) and Todd M. Friedman (attorney Friedman) of the Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman as “Class Counsel”; (4) appointing Plaintiff as the “Class Representative”; (5) approving the use of a proposed notice procedure and related forms; (6) directing the mailing of a class notice to the class; (7) scheduling a hearing date for a final approval hearing; and (8) approving the “PAGA” settlement.

On November 21, the court issued a minute order adopting its tentative ruling on the arbitration motion as follows:

“The present record reflects that the Settlement for which Thomas seeks the court’s preliminary approval has mooted the arbitration motion. For these reasons, the court will order that motion off-calendar, without prejudice to its re-filing at a future time, if appropriate.”

On March 6, 2026, the court issued a minute order (the Minute Order) adopting its tentative ruling on the preliminary approval motion as follows:

““A settlement or compromise of an entire class action, or of a cause of action in a class action, or as to a party, requires the approval of the court after hearing.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(a).) “Any party to a settlement agreement may serve and file a written notice of motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. The settlement agreement and proposed notice to class members must be filed with the motion, and the proposed order must be lodged with the motion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(c).)

Plaintiff has filed the Settlement and the proposed Class Notice with the motion, and lodged a proposed order. For these reasons, the court finds that the motion is procedurally sufficient and appropriate.

California Rules of Court, rule 3.769, sets forth the procedure for settlement of a class action before class certification. “In that case, certification and settlement approval occur simultaneously.” (Luckey v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 81, 93 (Luckey).) Under this procedure, and after a preliminary settlement hearing, the court may make “an order approving or denying certification of a provisional settlement class….” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(d).) If the court grants preliminary approval of the settlement, the court’s order must include “the time, date, and place of the final approval hearing; the notice to be given to the class; and any other matters deemed necessary for the proper conduct of a settlement hearing.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(e).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 authorizes class actions “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) “Class certification requires proof (1) of a sufficiently numerous, ascertainable class, (2) of a well-defined community of interest, and (3) that certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e., that proceeding as a class is superior to other methods. [Citation.]” (Fireside Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1089.)

To determine whether a class is ascertainable, the court examines “(1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying class members.” (Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1271.) “A related inquiry is manageability of the proposed class[.]” (Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 849.) “The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.) “The burden is on the party seeking certification to establish the existence of both an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among the class members.” (Washington Mutual Bank, FA v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 913.)

“Because a court evaluating certification of a class action that settled prior to certification is considering certification only in the context of settlement, the court’s evaluation of the certification issues is somewhat different from its consideration of certification issues when the class action has not yet settled. In some ways, the court’s review of certification of a settlement-only class is lessened; as no trial is anticipated in a settlement-only class case, ‘the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be confronted.’ [Citation.] However, other certification issues, ‘those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions’ require heightened scrutiny in the settlement-only class context ‘for a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold.’ [Citation.]” (Luckey, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 93-94.) To protect absent class members whose rights may not have been considered by the settling parties, and to ensure the absence of fraud and collusion, heightened scrutiny is required if there has been no adversary certification. (Ibid.)

The available evidence and information presented in the motion and described above is sufficient to show, for present purposes, that there exists a numerous, ascertainable class with a well-defined community of interest consisting of approximately 935 employees of Defendants who were subject to the same policies, practices, and procedures governing meal and rest period violations; a purported failure by Defendants to pay Class Members for all hours worked and to provide accurate wage statements; and other claims alleged in these proceedings and described above. There also appears to be sufficient and reliable means available to identify members of the Class from the records of Defendants. Plaintiff, who has agreed to serve as the Class Representative, appears to have claims typical of the Class and to be able to adequately represent the Class. Based on the above, there appears to be reasonable support for provisional certification of the Class for settlement purposes.

To protect the rights of class members including the named plaintiff, the court must determine if the proposed class action settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800–1801 (Dunk).) The court considers relevant factors including “the strength of [the plaintiff’s] case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (Id. at p. 1801.) The court’s inquiry is limited “ ‘to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“[A] presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” (Dunk, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1802.) “Public policy generally favors the compromise of complex class action litigation.” (In re Microsoft I-V Cases (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 706, 723, fn. 14.)

Also relevant here, the court “shall review and approve any settlement of any civil action filed pursuant to” PAGA. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (s)(2).) “[W]hile PAGA does not require the trial court to act as a fiduciary for aggrieved employees,” the court applies the same factors and standards of review to evaluate the fairness of a settlement of PAGA claims. (Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 76-77 (Moniz); Lab. Code, § 2699.) The court’s review and approval of a PAGA settlement acts as a “safeguard” to ensure the negotiated resolution is fair and protects the interests of the public and the LWDA in maximizing the enforcement of state labor laws in consideration of PAGA’s purposes and policies. (Moniz, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 76-77.) Factors useful in evaluating the fairness of a PAGA settlement include “the strength of the plaintiff’s case, the risk, the stage of the proceeding, the complexity and likely duration of further litigation, and the settlement amount….” (Id. at p. 77.)

The available evidence and information shows that Plaintiff engaged in informal and formal discovery to which Defendants have ostensibly responded by providing relevant data and records to enable Plaintiff’s counsel to develop damages calculations, and assess risks. The Settlement also appears to be the product of adversarial discussions and negotiations by the parties, and a mediation. There is no evidence to suggest that the Settlement is the product of collusion. In addition, Plaintiff has presented evidence of the risks and uncertainty associated with protracted litigation of the claims alleged in this case, including with respect to the defenses asserted by Defendant, and potential difficulties in certifying the class, among other things. The risks described in attorney Bacon’s declaration and above appear to be substantial.

Information appearing in attorney Bacon’s declaration also shows or suggests that Class Counsel has sufficient if not substantial experience with similar wage and hour litigation, and PAGA matters. Noted above, Class Counsel believes that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

Though the court has some concerns with the broad definition of Released Parties included in the releases by the Participating Class Members and Aggrieved Employees described above, which includes, without explanation, unidentified “insurers”, “representatives” and “agents”, and other persons or entities who may have separately employed Participating Class Members or Aggrieved Employees, the court understands the releases contained in the Settlement, which include a release of other persons or entities apart from Defendants, to relate only to liability which may attach by virtue of a Participating Class Member or Aggrieved Employee’s employment with Defendants, and not from any claims that may arise from any separate employment or relationships with the Released Parties. The court also understands the release by the Participating Class Members and Aggrieved Employees to be limited to claims based on or reasonably arising from the facts alleged in this action and within the scope of the allegations of the FAC only, including as to those facts which give rise to Plaintiff’s claim for penalties under PAGA. (See Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 538 [general discussion].)

To the extent any party contends that the court’s understanding of the scope of the releases by the Participating Class Members or the Aggrieved Employees contained in the Settlement, as stated herein, is incorrect, that party shall appear at the hearing on the present motion to identify this issue, and to explain why the court’s understanding is incorrect, and the intent of those releases.

The declaration of attorney Bacon also includes counsel’s estimate of the maximum amount of damages counsel believes Plaintiff could substantiate a trial, assuming that Plaintiff were to prevail, and what counsel believes is the realistic value of the viable claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action, after accounting for the risks further discussed above. Attorney Bacon also provides an estimated or average amount that each of the Participating Class Members can expect to receive, including as to the Aggrieved Employees.

The PAGA requires a plaintiff to submit a copy of the proposed settlement to the LWDA “at the same time that it is submitted to the court.” (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (s)(2).) Attorney Bacon represents to the court that Class Counsel will submit the Settlement to the LWDA through its online portal at the same time the motion is filed. Absent information showing that the Settlement was not submitted to the LWDA, it is the court’s understanding, based on attorney Bacon’s representation, that the Settlement was submitted to the LWDA on the same day the present motion was filed with the court.

The court must also examine the notice to be provided to class members to determine whether that notice is “legally sufficient...” and satisfies or complies with due process. (Martorana v. Marlin & Saltzman (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 685, 694–695.) For the reasons discussed herein, there exist deficiencies in the Class Notice which prevent the court from determining whether that notice is legally sufficient and complies with due process.

Though the Settlement appears to include an attachment entitled “Court Approved Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final Court Approval” (see Bacon Dec. at pdf pp. 56-64), the court understands the proposed Class Notice at issue here to consist of the document attached to attorney Bacon’s declaration as exhibit B. (See Bacon Dec., ¶ 3 [stating that a “true and correct copy of the proposed Class Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit B.”].)

Though the Settlement requires that the Class Notice “prominently estimate” the dollar amounts of the Individual Class Payment or Individual PAGA Payment payable to the Class member, as well as the number of Workweeks and PAGA Pay Periods (Bacon Dec., Ex. A, ¶ 7.4.1), exhibit B to attorney Bacon’s declaration does not include any blank spaces showing where the Administrator will insert that information.  

The proposed Class Notice attached as exhibit B to attorney Bacon’s declaration also references the incorrect case number for this case on its first page. (Bacon Dec. at pdf p. 66 [Section II].) Considering that the terms of the Settlement provide that Class Members may lodge objections at the final approval hearing, among other things, the Class Notice must be sufficient to apprise those members of the correct case number of these proceedings.

In addition, though the Settlement provides that the Class Period begins on June 18, 2020, the proposed Class Notice states that the Class Period begins on June 21, 2020. (Bacon Dec. at pdf p. 67 [Section III].)

Furthermore, and notwithstanding that the release by the Class Members provided in the Settlement includes each member’s “former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns” (Bacon Dec., Ex. A, ¶¶ 5.1.2-5.1.3), the release of claims described in the proposed Class Notice is expanded to include each Class Members “current, former, and future heirs, executors, administrators, attorneys, agents, and assigns” (Bacon Dec. at pdf pp. 67-68 [Class Notice at p. 2, Section IV, ¶ 2]). The proposed Class Notice also expands the definition of “Released Parties” contained in the Settlement to include Defendants’ “partners”, “trusts”, and “all of their employees, ... stockholders, fiduciaries, [and] other service providers....” (Ibid.) For these reasons, the proposed Class Notice is insufficient to apprise Class Members of the terms or scope of the releases contained in the Settlement.

The proposed Class Notice also notifies the Class Member that they may exclude themselves from the Settlement by mailing a letter to the Administrator at the address stated in that notice. (Bacon Dec. at pdf p. 69.) Noted above, the terms of the Settlement provide that a Class Member may submit a Request for Exclusion to the Administrator also by fax or email. (Bacon Dec., Ex. A, ¶ 7.5.1.) The proposed Class Notice does not include that information. In addition, the proposed Class Notice suggests to the Class Member that they may object to the Settlement in writing only, notwithstanding that the express terms of the Settlement permit objections to be made, alternatively, by appearing at the final approval hearing, whether or not a Class Member has submitted a written objection. (See Bacon Dec., Ex. A, ¶ 7.7.2.) For these additional reasons, the proposed Class Notice does not appear to reflect, or apprise Class Members, of the terms of the Settlement.

The proposed Class Notice also states that “unclaimed settlement payments will be distributed to Public Justice as a cy pres award.” (Bacon Dec. at pdf p. 67 [Section IV].) Noted above, the Settlement provides that uncashed and cancelled checks will be transmitted to the California State Controller’s Office.

The examples of the deficiencies in the proposed Class Notice provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive. Though, apart from the proposed Class Notice, the factors discussed above indicate that the Settlement may be entitled to preliminary approval based on those factors, the deficiencies in the proposed Class Notice prevent the court from determining that the notice plan is sufficient, apprises Class Members of the terms of the Settlement, or complies with due process.

It appears to the court that the deficiencies in the proposed Class Notice are the result of errors in the drafting of that notice. For these and all further reasons discussed herein, the court will continue the hearing on the motion to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to cure or otherwise explain the deficiencies in the proposed Class Notice and notice plan. Plaintiff may cure or otherwise address those deficiencies in either a supplemental brief or declaration, and by submitting a corrected proposed Class Notice. The court also expects that, to the extent there exist additional deficiencies exist in the proposed Class Notice or notice plan which are not addressed herein, that any such deficiencies will be cured or explained by Plaintiff in their supplemental brief or declaration.”

Pursuant to the Minute Order, the court continued the preliminary approval motion to April 17, and ordered Plaintiff to file and serve a supplemental brief or declaration and the additional materials described in that order.

On April 3, Plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration of attorney Bacon, which asserts a “mixup” in counsel’s prior declaration, which included two class notices, one of which was not the correct version to be distributed to the members of the settlement class. (Supp. Bacon Dec., ¶ 4.) (Ibid.)

Attorney Bacon further states that, based on the court’s comments above, the parties revised the proposed class notice, a copy of which is attached to the supplemental Bacon declaration. (Supp. Bacon Dec., ¶¶ 4-5 & exhibit A.) Attorney Bacon states that the parties agreed to revise the notice to be provided to the settlement class, to include a prominent estimate of the dollar amounts of each Class Member’s Individual Class Payment, Individual PAGA Payment, Workweeks, and the PAGA Period; to reflect the correct case number of this action and Class Period; to conform the release language to the language contained in the Settlement including as to the identification of the parties to be released; to add language informing Class Members that they may submit any Request for Exclusion by fax and email and may raise any objections to the Settlement at the final approval hearing; and to inform the Class Members that any uncashed checks will be transmitted to the California State Controller’s Office in that member’s name. (Supp. Bacon Dec., ¶¶ 5-6.)

Analysis:

For reasons further discussed in the Minute Order set forth above and incorporated here, the court has determined that the preliminary approval motion is procedurally sufficient and appropriate.

In addition, and as further discussed in the Minute Order, Plaintiff has presented information and evidence which is sufficient to show the existence of a numerous, ascertainable class with a well-defined community of interest consisting of approximately 935 employees of Defendants who were subject to the same policies, practices, and procedures governing meal and rest period violations; a purported failure by Defendants to pay Class Members for all hours worked and to provide accurate wage statements; and other claims alleged in these proceedings and described above. The court also determined that there appears to be sufficient and reliable means available to identify the members of the Class from the records of Defendants. Noted above, Plaintiff also appears to have claims typical of the Class and to be able to adequately represent the Class. For these and all further reasons discussed in the Minute Order, there appears to be reasonable support for provisional certification of the Class for settlement purposes.

As further discussed in the Minute Order, Plaintiff has also presented information and evidence showing that the parties engaged in informal and formal discovery which was sufficient to permit Plaintiff’s counsel to develop damages calculations, and assess risks. The Settlement, for reasons further discussed in the Minute Order, also appears to be the product of adversarial discussions and negotiations by the parties. There is also no evidence showing or suggesting collusion. There also exists evidence of the risks and uncertainty associated with protracted litigation of Plaintiff’s claims, including with respect to defenses asserted by Defendant, and in certifying the class, among other things. The risks described in the preliminary approval motion and the Minute Order appear to be substantial.

The declaration of attorney Bacon submitted in support of the preliminary approval motion, also shows that Class Counsel, who believes that the Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, has sufficient experience with similar litigation, including PAGA matters.

Though the Minute Order expresses the court’s concerns with the broad definition of Released Parties included in the Settlement as further described above, and its understanding of the releases contained in the Settlement, no party has appeared to identify any issues with the court’s expressed understanding, or has indicated in any manner that the court’s understanding is incorrect. For these reasons, the preliminary approval motion is sufficient to show that releases contained in the Settlement relate only to liability which may attach by virtue of a Participating Class Member or Aggrieved Employee’s employment with Defendants, and not from any claims that may arise from any separate employment or other relationships with the Released Parties. The court also confirms that the release by the Participating Class Members and Aggrieved Employees is limited to claims based on or reasonably arising from the facts alleged in this action and within the scope of the allegations of the FAC only, including as to those facts which give rise to Plaintiff’s claim for penalties under PAGA. (See Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 538.)

Plaintiff’s counsel has also provided an estimate of the maximum amount of damages Plaintiff could substantiate at a trial, and what counsel believes is the realistic value of the viable claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action, after accounting for the risks, as further discussed in the Minute Order. The motion also includes an estimated or average amount that each of the Participating Class Members can expect to receive, including as to the Aggrieved Employees.

As attorney Bacon has represented to the court that Class Counsel will submit the Settlement to the LWDA through its online portal at the same time the motion is filed. Absent information showing that the Settlement was not submitted to the LWDA as stated by attorney Bacon, the court confirms its understanding that the Settlement was submitted to the LWDA on the same day the preliminary approval motion was filed with the court.

As further discussed in the Minute Order, the court must also examine the notice to be provided to class members to determine whether that notice is “legally sufficient...” and satisfies or complies with due process. (Martorana v. Marlin & Saltzman (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 685, 694–695.) The revised “Court Approved Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final Court Approval” (the Revised Notice) attached to the supplemental declaration of attorney Bacon and discussed above, now references the correct case number for this action; includes spaces where the Administrator may insert the estimated Individual Class Payment and Individual PAGA Payment payable to each Class Member, and each Class Member’s Workweeks and PAGA Pay Periods.

The Revised Notice also reflects the correct Class Period, which begins on June 18, 2020. The releases set forth in the Revised Notice also appropriately apprise the Class Members of the terms and scope of the releases contained in the Settlement, as further discussed above. The Revised Notice also appropriately informs the Class Members that they may object to the Settlement by attending the final approval hearing, whether or not the Class Member has submitted a written objection.

The Revised Notice also notifies each Class Member that uncashed and cancelled checks will be transmitted to the California State Controller’s Office in that Class Member’s name.

For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that the Revised Notice is sufficient, apprises Class Members of the terms of the Settlement, and complies with due process.

Based on the evidence presented, including the matters further discussed in the Minute Order and above, the court finds that the Settlement is in all respects fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interests of the putative class. The court further finds that the Revised Notice to be distributed to the Class Members by the Administrator and pursuant to the notice plan set forth in the Settlement, provides sufficient notice to the Class Members of this action and the terms of the Settlement, as well as the date of the final settlement hearing. The court will determine the reasonableness of the Class Representative Service Payment, the Class Counsel Fees Payment, the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administrator Expenses Payment, upon noticed motion at the final approval hearing.

For all reasons discussed herein and in the Minute Order, the court determines that the Settlement is entitled to preliminary approval, that the settlement class should be provisionally certified, that Plaintiff should be appointed as the Class Representative, that Plaintiff’s counsel should be appointed as counsel for the settlement class, and that the Revised Notice to be distributed to the Class pursuant to the notice plan and administration of the Settlement should be approved as set forth herein and in the Minute Order. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will grant the preliminary approval motion. Counsel shall appear at the hearing and be prepared to discuss scheduling for the final approval hearing and any other matters remaining at this time.