Tentative Ruling: Hyelim Cho v. County of Ventura, et al
Case Number
23CV01752
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 06/01/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
1. Motion for Protective Order, Request for Monetary Sanctions; 2. Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff, Request for Monetary Sanctions
Tentative Ruling
Hyelim Cho v. County of Ventura, et al.
Case No. 23CV01752
Hearing Date: June 1, 2026
HEARING:
- Plaintiff Hyelim Cho’s Motion for Protective Order; Request for Monetary Sanctions
- Defendant County of Ventura’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff; Request for Monetary Sanctions
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Hyelim Cho: Gregory W. Smith, Diana Wang Wells, Law Offices of Gregory W. Smith, LLP; Boris Koron, Daniel J. Podolsky, Koron & Podolsky, LLP
For Defendants County of Ventura, Andrew Sullivant, and Rachelle H. Dean: Elizabeth T. Arce, Jessica Neighbors, Liebert Cassidy Whitmore
TENTATIVE RULING:
(1) The motion for protective order of plaintiff Hyelim Cho is granted in part.
(2) The motion to compel of defendant County of Ventura is granted in part.
(3) Defendant County of Venture may take a fourth deposition session of plaintiff Hyelim Cho of no more than two hours pertaining to the issue of emotional distress, exclusive of breaks, objections, and discussions by counsel. This deposition shall take place remotely.
(4) The court declines to award monetary sanctions in favor of any party.
Background:
On April 20, 2023, plaintiff Hyelim Cho (Cho) initiated this action by filing a complaint against defendants County of Ventura (County), Blake D. Heller, Miles Weiss, Lisa O. Lyytikainen, Andrew Sullivant, and Rachell H. Dean.
On November 14, 2023, Cho filed her operative second amended complaint (SAC) setting forth six causes of action for: (1) pregnancy discrimination; (2) disability discrimination; (3) harassment based upon pregnancy disability; (4) retaliation; (5) failure to take reasonable steps to prevent harassment, discrimination, or retaliation; and (6) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. The third cause of action for harassment was asserted against all defendants. The remaining causes of action were asserted against the County only.
As alleged in Cho’s SAC:
On September 7, 2021, Cho was hired by the County as a Deputy District Attorney III. (SAC, ¶ 14.) In March 2022, Cho received a merit raise. (Ibid.)
On July 6, 2022, Cho informed County’s management that she had a high-risk pregnancy and requested workplace accommodations. (SAC, ¶ 15.)
On July 8, 2022, Cho had a meeting with Terri Anderson from Human Resources and Weiss relating to plaintiff’s work restrictions and need for accommodation. (SAC, ¶ 16.) During the meeting, Weiss continuously insinuated that plaintiff’s work restrictions would not be accommodated. (Ibid.)
On July 11, 2022, Heller “suddenly and abruptly” issued Cho an untimely and punitive performance evaluation. (SAC, ¶ 17.) Cho was the only member in her unit to receive a performance evaluation at that time. (Ibid.) Heller pressured Cho into signing the evaluation without giving her ample time to review and discuss it. (Ibid.)
On July 12, 2022, Cho requested another meeting with Anderson and Weiss to discuss Cho’s pregnancy related work restrictions. (SAC, ¶ 18.) During the meeting, Weiss made “rude, snarky, and unprofessional comments” towards Cho’s pregnancy restrictions and an inability to accommodate such restrictions. (Ibid.)
On July 13, 2022, defendants issued Cho a negative performance evaluation containing numerous “Needs Improvement” ratings. (SAC, ¶ 19.) As a result, Cho’s probationary period was extended by the maximum number of hours it could have been extended (for approximately six months). (Ibid.) Cho immediately protested this evaluation. (Ibid.) Within 30 minutes after issuing Cho the negative performance evaluation on July 13, 2022, defendants placed Cho on unpaid leave claiming her work restrictions could not be accommodated. (SAC, ¶ 20.)
On July 28, 2022, Heller held a unit meeting to discuss Cho’s work restrictions and accommodations. (SAC, ¶ 21.) Cho’s private health information was discussed among the unit members during the meeting, which was embarrassing and humiliating to Cho. (Ibid.)
On August 1, 2022, Cho was permitted to return to work with workplace accommodations. (SAC, ¶ 22.)
On October 31, 2022, Cho received an amended performance evaluation including new and different reasons for her “Needs Improvement” ratings. (SAC, ¶ 23.) All the reasons provided by defendants to substantiate the “Needs Improvement” ratings were pretext to its discriminatory or retaliatory motive. (Ibid.) Defendants’ handling of Cho’s performance evaluations and probation extension was against policy and the applicable Memorandum of Understanding. (Ibid.) Almost immediately after receiving the amended negative performance evaluation, Cho complained that defendants’ conduct towards her was in violation of the law. (SAC, ¶ 24.)
Heller would get upset and talk down to Cho for asking for assistance when she felt ill. (SAC, ¶ 25.) Heller also prevented unit members from helping Cho, while requiring Cho to help others under similar circumstances. (Ibid.) Heller also intentionally made false representations to Cho relating to her flex benefits, telling her that due to her work restrictions she was no longer entitled to them. (Ibid.)
Heller “constantly” gave Cho a “hard time” related to Cho’s doctor appointments, including creating guidelines that only applied to Cho. (SAC, ¶ 26.) Heller would abruptly change the guidelines making it even more difficult for Cho to ask for accommodations relating to her doctor appointments. (SAC, ¶ 26.)
Defendants would exclude Cho from unit meetings and unit members would ask Cho why she was not at meetings. (SAC, ¶ 27.) Lyytikainen and Heller attempted to persuade Cho’s unit members to make disparaging allegations against Cho that they could use as a pretext to terminate Cho. (SAC, ¶ 28.)
On December 20, 2022, defendants terminated Cho’s employment because of her pregnancy, pregnancy related disability, request for workplace accommodations, and complaining about unlawful employment practices, including pregnancy discrimination. (SAC, ¶ 29.)
Defendants left Cho unemployed and without income when Cho was eight months pregnant. (SAC, ¶ 30.)
On February 2, 2024, the court sustained a demurrer to the third cause of action in the SAC for harassment with leave to amend as to defendants Sullivant and Dean. After the ruling on this demurrer, there were no remaining causes of action against Sullivant and Dean.
On March 18, 2024, defendants County, Heller, Weiss, and Lyytikainen (collectively, Remaining Defendants) filed an answer to the SAC generally denying the allegations therein as to all Remaining Defendants and setting forth 20 affirmative defenses.
On February 6, 2026, Cho filed a motion for protective order seeking to preclude the County from taking a fourth session of her deposition. The County opposes this motion.
On March 5, 2026, the County filed a motion to compel a fourth session of Cho’s deposition for a period of three hours pertaining solely to emotional distress. Cho opposes this motion.
Analysis:
The parties agree that the County has already deposed Cho in this action in excess of thirteen hours over three sessions. The parties dispute whether the County is entitled to take a fourth session of Cho’s deposition. The County requests a fourth session of no more than three hours pertaining solely to the issue of emotional distress. The County argues that Cho’s claims are complex, involve a substantial number of documents, and that the County has been efficient. The County argued in meet and confer communications that the County was not at fault for the additional deposition time needed in this action and that Cho’s demeanor in one of the sessions was also a primary cause. Cho argues that the County has been inefficient and should have asked questions about emotional distress issues at prior deposition sessions. Cho requests that the court preclude further deposition testimony from Cho in this action because the County has already had ample opportunity to ask Cho questions in deposition.
“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (a).) “If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action … fails … to proceed with it … the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).) “The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Id., § 2025.420, subd. (b).)
The court has reviewed the arguments and evidence presented by the parties. The court agrees with Cho that the County has had a fair opportunity to ask her questions in deposition. (Neighbors Decl., Exs. A-D.) However, the County is also correct that the seven-hour deposition limit does not generally apply to employment cases. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.290, subd. (b)(4).) The questioning pertaining to emotional distress appears to have been limited to less than an hour in the third deposition session on May 22, 2025. (Neighbors Decl., Ex. D at pp. 236-247; see also id., Exs. A-D.) Counsel for plaintiff indicated that the deposition would “have a hard stop” at 4:35 p.m., and “I’m going to tell my client to exit out.” (Neighbors Decl., Ex. D at p. 243.) The deposition appears to have concluded around this time. (Id. at pp. 585-589.)
Under these circumstances, the court will permit a fourth deposition session of Cho by the County for no more than two hours pertaining solely to issues of emotional distress. This deposition shall take place remotely. The court notes that the third session appears to have taken place by zoom. (Neighbors Decl., Ex. D.) This should reduce the burden associated with Cho’s attendance while ensuring the County has a fair opportunity for discovery as to alleged emotional distress.