Tentative Ruling: Sean Wilczak v Brian Gooch
Case Number
22CV01201
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 06/01/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
1. Motion of Judgment Creditor for an Order to Impose Liability upon Scott J. Esparza & Co. Bail Bonds, Inc.; 2. Motion of Judgment Creditor for Appointment of Receiver; 3. Request of Judgment Creditor to Extend Lien; 4. Debtors’ Examinations
Tentative Ruling
Sean Wilczak v Brian Gooch
Case No. 22CV01201
Hearing Date: June 1, 2026
HEARING:
- Motion of Judgment Creditor for an Order to Impose Liability upon Scott J. Esparza & Co. Bail Bonds, Inc.
- Motion of Judgment Creditor for Appointment of Receiver
- Request of Judgment Creditor to Extend Lien
- Debtors’ Examinations
ATTORNEYS: For Judgment Creditor-Assignee Gretchen D. Lichtenberger dba Justice Matters: Self-Represented
For Third Party Scott J. Esparza & Co. Bail Bonds, Inc.: C. Matthew Missakian, Hogle & Missakian LLP
TENTATIVE RULING:
- The motion of judgment creditor Gretchen D. Lichtenberger dba Justice Matters for an order to impose liability upon third party Scott J. Esparza & Co. Bail Bonds, Inc., is denied.
- The motion of judgment creditor for an order appointing a receiver is denied.
- The request of judgment creditor for an order extending the personal property lien is granted.
- The judgment debtor and third party examinations set for this hearing will be addressed at the hearing.
Background:
On March 29, 2023, the court entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiff Sean Wilczak and against defendant Brian Gooch (Judgment Debtor) in the amount of $204,375.21. On June 2, 2023, Wilczak filed an acknowledgement of assignment of judgment assigning the judgment to judgment creditor-assignee Gretchen D. Lichtenberger dba Justice Matters (Creditor).
(1) Procedural History re Scott J. Esparza & Co. Bail Bonds, Inc.
On June 8, 2023, the court issued an order for Scott J. Esparza & Co. Bail Bonds, Inc. (SJEBB) to appear for examination on August 7, 2023, concerning property of the Judgment Debtor in SJEBB’s possession or concerning a debt owed to the Judgment Debtor. There was no appearance for SJEBB on August 7 and the examination was then continued to September 18, 2023. The examination took place on September 18.
On June 24, 2025, the court issued a second order for SJEBB to appear for examination on August 18, 2025.
On August 1, 2025, Creditor filed a “Notice of Duty to Appear and to Produce Documents at the Hearing on August 18, 2025,” asserting various obligations of SJEBB with respect to the August 18 examination.
On August 11, 2025, SJEBB filed an ex parte application to vacate the order to appear and quashing a concurrently served subpoena duces tecum. The application was opposed by Creditor. On August 13, the court denied the application without prejudice to future objections raised and continued the examination to September 15.
On September 9, 2025, on the stipulation of the parties, the court entered its order continuing the examination to October 6. On October 6, the examination was continued to November 17. On November 17, the examination commenced as to Kent Morrell for SJEBB. The examination did not conclude and was continued to January 26, 2026.
On January 2, 2026, Creditor filed a “Request Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1987(b) & (c) for Attendance and Appearance of Scott J. Esparza, as CEO of Scott J. Esparza & Co. Bail Bonds, Inc., at Court and for Production of Documents, Electronically Stored Information and Other Things.”
On January 26, 2026, Creditor filed this motion for an order to impose liability upon SJEBB for breach of garnishee and examinee duties. Also on January 26, the examination was continued to February 2.
On February 2, 2026, the further examination was conducted and then continued to March 2. On March 2, the further examination was conducted and then continued to March 30.
On March 17, 2026, SJEBB filed opposition to the motion to impose liability.
On March 23, 2026, Creditor filed a reply to the opposition to the motion to impose liability.
On March 26, 2026, Creditor filed a motion for an order to appoint a receiver. The motion was originally noticed for hearing on July 20.
On March 30, 2026, the motion to impose liability was continued to May 18, with further responses and reply permitted. Also on Mach 30, the examination was conducted and then continued to May 18. Also on March 30, the court advanced the hearing on Creditor’s motion for an order to appoint a receiver to this hearing date of June 1.
On May 4, 2026, SJEBB filed supplemental opposition.
On May 11, 2026, Creditor filed a supplemental reply.
On May 18, 2026, the examination was conducted and matters continued to June 1.
Analysis:
(1) Motion to Impose Liability on SJEBB
Creditor seeks to impose liability against SJEBB on the grounds that: (i) Creditor served a notice of levy on SJEBB which then failed without good cause to comply with its duties as a garnishee; (ii) SJEBB caused an altered, non-compliant response to be emailed to Creditor in lieu of a properly executed memorandum of garnishee; (iii) Creditor served an application and order to appear for examination and a civil subpoena on SJEBB but failed to appear when agreed; and (iv) SJEBB had a duty to designate the correct person to appear at the November 17, 2025, hearing in response to the order to appear and civil subpoena and failed to do.
The evidence and argument discussed herein are intended to provide a sufficient summary to explain the court’s reasoning. The summary is not intended to be comprehensive. The court has reviewed and considered all of the arguments and admissible evidence of the parties in reaching this ruling.
(Note: Both parties have failed to comply with formatting requirements of the California Rules of Court and are reminded of their obligation to follow those requirements. Because Creditor has failed to consecutively paginate her papers, citations to pages herein are clarified to refer to the pdf page number of the electronic document filed with the court.)
(A) Garnishee Duties
In support of the first two grounds for the motion, Creditor presents evidence that on July 14, 2025, SJEBB was served in an Application and Order for Appearance and Examination (Order for Appearance) and a Civil Subpoena Duces Tecum (SDT) addressed to the person most qualified at SJEBB. (Lichtenberger decl., ¶ 3 & exhibit 1.) On page 3 of the Order for Appearance there is a notice to Judgment Debtor that states:
“NOTICE TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR The person in whose favor the judgment was entered in this action claims that the person to be examined under this order has possession or control of property that is yours or owes you a debt. This property or debt is as follows (describe the property or debt):
“All money or other property belonging to Biker Bail Bonds, including, but not limited to, all money received as a result of calls to any telephone number belonging to Brian Gooch or Brian Gooch dba Biker Bail Bonds or Brian Gooch dba Santa Barbara Bail Bonds or any other company in which Brian Gooch does business, as well as all income, money or other renumeration related to any bail bonds written since June 14, 2023[.]
If you claim that all or any portion of this property or debt is exempt from enforcement of the money judgment, you must file your exemption claim in writing with the court and have a copy personally served on the judgment creditor not later than three days before the date set for the examination. You must appear at the time and place set for the examination to establish your claim of exemption or your exemption may be waived.” (Lichtenberger decl., ¶ & exhibit 1, p. 25 [Order for Appearance], capitalization altered.)
Creditor also provides evidence that a notice of levy was served on SJEBB as an “Account Debtor, person in possession or to be in possession of personal property of, or owed to, the Debtor.” (Lichtenberger decl., ¶ 11 & exhibit 5, p. 69, ¶ 4(b) [Notice of Levy].) The Notice of Levy includes the following:
“Item lb. The property to be levied upon is described as follows:
“Any and all property of, or for the benefit of, Judgment Debtor BRIAN GOOCH, held, or owed to Judgment Debtor, in any variation of his name. Includes all tangible personal property (‘Tangible personal property’ includes chattel paper, documents of title, instruments, securities, and money) and intangible personal property of Judgment Debtor, or in which Judgment Debtor has an interest, or held
for the benefit of Judgment Debtor currently in the Garnishee’s possession or to be in its possession or control including but not limited to:
“1) Any and all ‘Accounts Receivable and/or General Intangibles’ pursuant to CCP §700.170 and/or money and/or any proceeds from any transaction, in the name of the Judgment Debtor as listed or in any variation of the Judgment Debtor’s name, including but not limited to any property the Judgment Debtor has rights to and/or a claim to in Garnishee’s possession and/or to be in Garnishee’s possession under any agreement between the Garnishee and the Judgment Debtor, or for the benefit of the Judgment Debtor pertaining to ‘Biker Bail Bonds’ and/or ‘Santa Barbara Bail Bonds’ and/or ‘Brian Gooch’ and/or any other name variation of BRIAN LLOYD GOOCH. This levy is upon any and all money/funds payable to, or owed, to Judgment Debtor for any reason.
“ ‘Account receivable’ means ‘account’ as defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 9102 of the Commercial Code and ‘General intangibles’ means ‘general intangibles,’ as defined in paragraph (42) of subdivision (a) of Section 9102 of the Commercial Code, both consisting of rights to payment.
“2) Any and all ‘Cash Proceeds’. ‘Cash proceeds’ means proceeds that are money, checks, deposit accounts, or the like as defined in paragraph (9) of subdivision (a) of Section 9102 of the Commercial Code.
“3) Any and all ‘Proceeds’ from any transactions involving Judgment Debtor. ‘Proceeds’ is defined in paragraph (64) of subdivision (a) of Section 9102 of the Commercial Code.” (Notice of Levy, p. 71.)
(i) Procedural Requirements
“If a third person is required by this article to deliver property to the levying officer or to make payments to the levying officer and the third person fails or refuses without good cause to do so, the third person is liable to the judgment creditor for whichever of the following is the lesser amount:
“(1) The value of the judgment debtor’s interest in the property or the amount of the payments required to be made.
“(2) The amount required to satisfy the judgment pursuant to which the levy is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 701.020, subd. (a).)
“If a third person has possession or control of property in which the judgment debtor has an interest or is indebted to the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor may bring an action against the third person to have the interest or debt applied to the satisfaction of the money judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.210.)
Creditor asserts that Creditor may adjudicate the disputed interests by this motion and is not required to bring a separate creditor’s action. SJEBB argues that a creditor’s action is required.
“When a judgment creditor alleges that a third person has possession or control of property in which the judgment debtor has an interest or is indebted to the judgment debtor in an amount exceeding $250, and the third person claims an interest in the property adverse to the judgment debtor or denies the debt, section 780.180 authorizes the trial court to (1) decide whether the third person has made a good faith claim to an interest in the property adverse to the judgment debtor or has made a good faith denial of a debt to the judgment debtor, and (2) if the third person’s claim is not made in good faith, to determine the interests in the property or the existence of the debt. These determinations are conclusive as to the parties to the proceeding and the third person.” (Evans v. Paye (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 265, 277–278 (Evans).)
“Subject to subdivision (b), if a third person examined pursuant to Section 708.120 claims an interest in the property adverse to the judgment debtor or denies the debt, the court may, if the judgment creditor so requests, determine the interests in the property or the existence of the debt. The determination is conclusive as to the parties to the proceeding and the third person, but an appeal may be taken from the determination. The court may grant a continuance for a reasonable time for discovery proceedings, the production of evidence, or other preparation for the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.180, subd. (a).)
“The court may not make the determination provided in subdivision (a) if the third person’s claim is made in good faith and any of the following conditions is satisfied:
“(1) The court would not be a proper court for the trial of an independent civil action (including a creditor’s suit) for the determination of the interests in the property or the existence of the debt, and the third person objects to the determination of the matter under subdivision (a).
“(2) At the time an order for examination pursuant to Section 708.120 is served on the third person a civil action (including a creditor's suit) is pending with respect to the interests in the property or the existence of the debt.
“(3) The court determines that the interests in the property or the existence of the debt should be determined in a creditor’s suit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.180, subd. (b).)
“Thus, despite a third person’s denial of an obligation owed to the judgment debtor, section 708.180 expressly authorizes the trial court, in a hearing outside the framework of a creditor’s suit, to determine whether the third person in fact owes money to a judgment debtor, unless the court finds the third person’s denial of the debt is made in good faith and any of the conditions specified in section 708.180, subdivisions (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) is satisfied. [Citation.] The third person is afforded due process in a section 708.180 hearing by its provision giving the court discretion to grant a continuance for discovery, the production of evidence, or other preparation for the hearing.” (Evans, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 280.)
“Even when the third person claims an interest in the property that is claimed to be owed to the judgment debtor, the court in certain circumstances may still determine the judgment creditor’s and the third person’s respective interests without a separate creditor’s suit—but only when no adjudication of competing claims is required. When the claims require a contested adjudication, the parties are entitled to have the issues determined in an independent creditor’s action, rather than by the motion procedure under section 708.120, subdivision (d).” (Ilshin Investment Co., Ltd. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 612, 626–627 (Ilshin).)
“A creditor’s suit, rather than the motion procedure, is required if the court finds that the third person's claim is made in good faith, and that at least one of the following three conditions exists: (1) that court is not a proper forum for adjudication of the claim; (2) another action is pending with respect to the claim; or (3) the court believes the claim should be tried as an independent creditor’s suit.” (Ilshin, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 626–627.)
“[O]nce the judgment creditor has presented prima facie evidence of the existence of a debt by the third person to the judgment debtor, the burden shifts to the third person to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her denial of the debt is made in good faith.” (Evans, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 282.)
(ii) Property at Issue
In Creditor’s moving papers, Creditor identifies property subject to this motion as the payment of $4,000 per week for the use of the name “Biker Bail Bonds.” (Motion, at pp. 5-6; Lichtenberger decl., ¶ 12.) In support of this claim, Creditor’s counsel summarizes testimony of Kenton L. Morrell, as Chief Financial Officer for SJEBB that Morrell paid whatever bills Morrell was told to pay on behalf of SJEBB, but had no other knowledge of the operations of SJEBB. (Lichtenberger decl., ¶ 12.) Morrell is said to have testified that SJEBB was paying Biker Bail Bonds $4,000 per week for the use of the name “Biker Bail Bonds.” (Ibid.) Morrell also testified that he had signed a letter dated March 13, 2025, stating that SJEBB “is currently paying a $16,000 monthly referral fee to Biker Bail Bonds, for the use of its phone numbers and other marketing benefits.” (Ibid.) The motion seeks payment of $4,000 per week for 19 weeks (totaling $76,000) as of March 30, 2026. (Ibid.)
In opposition, Scott J. Esparza, the CEO and principal of SJEBB, and stepfather to Judgment Debtor Gooch, states in his declaration that Gooch had been having serious issues in his personal life which created serious problems for his business, Biker Bail Bonds. (Esparza decl., ¶ 2.) By 2020, Esparza was paying $3,000 a month so that Gooch and his family would have health insurance. (Ibid.) By no later than early 2023, Esparza had taken control and possession of Biker’s phone numbers and believes at some point that SJEBB registered Biker Bail Bonds as a dba of SJEBB. (Esparza decl., ¶ 4.) SJEBB has not been paying Biker Bail Bonds $4,000 a week for the use of Biker Bail Bonds assets. (Esparza decl., ¶ 5.) For some time, Esparza’s wife (i.e., Gooch’s mother) has been gifting money to Gooch so that he does not become destitute. (Ibid.) Gooch does not do anything to earn the money and nothing is paid for the use of Biker assets. (Ibid.) Payments are not always made every other week, are not always made from the same account, are sometimes made in cash, and are sometimes made by Gooch’s mother. (Ibid.) The letter apparently signed by Morrell was not authorized and is factually false. (Esparza decl., ¶ 6.)
In reply, Creditor for the first time attached excerpts from transcripts of the testimony of Morrell and Gooch. Morrell states that he was not privy to any agreement between SJEBB and Gooch regarding phones. (Lichtenberger decl., exhibit 1, p. 26.) Morrell further states that it was a “family transaction” and that there is a lot of family transactions in the company. (Ibid.) Morrell repeatedly stated that SJEBB was paying Biker Bail Bonds and not Gooch personally. (Ibid.) Morrell also stated with respect to the letter that he doesn’t know about phone numbers or marketing benefits, but SJEBB does pay a referral fee. (Id., p. 30.) Morrell confirmed that Gooch was not employed by SJEBB. (Ibid.) Gooch provided inconsistent testimony, both identifying income of $16,000 a month and stating that it was a loan. (Id., pp. 59, 64, 66-68.)
In reply, Creditor also asserts having found additional money that was subject to the execution lien but not paid. The court does not consider in this motion issues not raised in the moving papers. The court expresses no opinion regarding such issues herein.
(iii) Creditor’s Suit
A core misunderstanding between the parties is whether payments made by SJEBB were subject to Creditor’s levy. Creditor asserts that any payment made is necessarily subject to levy. This, however, overstates the case and explains the nature of the dispute that the court needs to resolve.
“Except as otherwise provided by law, all property of the judgment debtor is subject to enforcement of a money judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 695.010, subd. (a).) “Except as otherwise provided by law, all property that is subject to enforcement of a money judgment pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 695.010) of Chapter 1 is subject to levy under a writ of execution to satisfy a money judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 699.710.) “The following types of property are not subject to execution: [¶] … [¶] (9) A contingent remainder, executory interest, or other interest in property that is not vested.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 699.720, subd. (a)(9).)
Here there is a factual and legal dispute as to whether amounts paid to Biker Bail Bonds constitutes property subject to the execution lien as property that was payable to Gooch (dba Biker Bail Bonds) as opposed to a voluntary payment to Gooch (dba Biker Bail Bonds). A voluntary payment is in the nature of a gift. (Civ. Code, § 1146 [“A gift is a transfer of personal property, made voluntarily, and without consideration.”].) A gift is not effective until there has been delivery and divestment of control by the donor. (Jaffe v. Carroll (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 53, 59.) Consequently, property of a third party to be gifted to a judgment debtor does not become property of a judgment debtor until the gift is effective.
“It is a well settled rule that an attaching creditor, seeking to subject the property of a debtor to the payment of his debt, obtains a lien only upon the title or interest which the debtor has, and when no actual interest is shown the attaching creditor gets nothing by virtue of his levy. The lien attaches to the real and not the apparent interest of the other.” (Santens v. Los Angeles Finance Co. (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 197, 201.) “[P]ure expectancies or contingencies are not property rights subject to execution.” (Equico Lessors, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 8.)
SJEBB asserts that the payments made were in whole, or at least in part, gifts and not subject to levy because at the time SJEBB had possession of the money at issue, that money was the property of SJEBB over which the judgment debtor had no right or interest. Needless to say, Creditor disagrees with this characterization, which is in large part the basis for the present dispute.
A third party required to make payments to a levying officer who fails to do so is generally liability to the judgment creditor for the payments required to be made. (Code Civ. Proc., § 701.020, subd. (a).) As explained in Evans, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 265, and Ilshin, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th 612, disputes concerning this liability may be determined and enforced by the summary procedure under section 708.180, subdivision (a), or by a creditor’s suit under section 708.210.
Creditor has the initial burden to present prima facie evidence of the existence of a debt by the third person to the judgment debtor, i.e., a property interest of the judgment debtor held by a third person. Creditor has met this initial burden. There is sufficient evidence to support Creditor’s claim that some or all of the $4,000 weekly payments were part of a financial transaction by which SJEBB obtained use of phone numbers or referrals for which the payments constituted consideration owing to Gooch dba Biker Bail Bonds.
Without more, the court would determine the competing claims under the summary procedure of section 708.180. To require a creditor’s suit, the burden shifts to SJEBB to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its denial of the debt is made in good faith. SJEBB has presented evidence which meets its burden on the issue of good faith. The evidence presented shows a family business from which family non-business financial transactions are made. Esparza has presented evidence to the effect that payments made to Biker Bail Bonds were in the nature of a gift from which little or no business benefit was received in return. Morrell’s testimony is that there are many family transactions in this business. It may be reasonably inferred from this testimony that that the statements made as to the particular purposes of payments in accounting terms may be inaccurate or exaggerated. This is sufficient evidence to persuade the court that the denial of a debt to Gooch is made in good faith and the court so finds.
SJEBB also has the burden to show one of the three conditions of section 708.180, subdivision (b) is satisfied. Subdivisions (b)(1) and (2) are on their face inapplicable here. The third condition is that “[t]he court determines that the interests in the property or the existence of the debt should be determined in a creditor’s suit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.180, subd. (b)(3).) The circumstances here show that the interests in the property or the existence of the debt should be determined in a creditor’s suit. Although it appears that Esparza believes in good faith that payments to Gooch via Biker Bail Bonds are payments to family, the evidence is mixed as to the merits of the Creditor’s claim. By not accounting for such payments clearly as family payments (which may or may not have external accounting consequences), the nature and extent of payments made and for what consideration, if any, are muddled. The determination of whether some or all of these amounts were owing to Gooch instead of voluntary payments, and hence subject to the levy, requires substantially more involved litigation and consideration than the summary procedure of section 708.180, subdivision (a) reasonably permits. The court determines that the interests in the property or the existence of the debt should be determined in a creditor’s suit.
The motion to impose liability under section 701.020, subdivision (a), is therefore denied without prejudice to the bringing of a creditor’s action. For the same reasons, the court denies Creditor’s requests for attorney fees and costs against SJEBB in connection with this aspect of this motion.
(B) Other Bases for Liability
Creditor’s other bases for liability are separate from the garnishee duties discussed above. Creditor has improperly combined what are effectively multiple motions in a single document relating to the failure to appear for examination, the failure to designate the proper person, and the failure to produce responsive documents. Each of these motions require the separate payment of a motion fee. Because no additional separate fees have been paid and the issues in these motions are distinct from the principal issues, the court will deny these motions without prejudice to the subsequent bringing of separate renewed motions as to each basis for relief.
(2) Motion for Appointment of Receiver
Creditor concurrently moves for an order appointing a receiver “to take possession of all bail bond business assets belonging to [Gooch], including, but not limited to, his doing business names of ‘Biker Bail Bonds’ and ‘Santa Barbara Bail Bonds’, and all of Gooch’s other doing business as names related to bail bonds, if any are uncovered, as well as any and all intellectual property related thereto (the ‘Business’). This includes: taking possession of all physical tangible property located at 51 S. Victoria Ave., Suite 101, Ventura, CA 93003 and at 1129 State Street, Suite 21, Santa Barbara, CA 93101 or any other physical location discovered by the Receiver; all websites, including, but not limited to, www.bikerbailbonds.com; any and all social media sites and any other internet presence; any and all trademarks belonging to the Business, including, but not limited to, any and all logos used in advertising the Business; any and all bank accounts at any financial institutions belonging to and/or containing money belonging to the Business under any tax identification number; all telephone numbers for the Business, including, but not limited to (805) 658-0404, (805) 564-0864, (661) 322-2252, (805) 966- 0959, (805) 339-6711, (805) 659-5800; any and all accounts receivable owed to the Business; and, to manage, control, care for, maintain, and incur the expenses necessary for the management, control, care, preservation, and maintenance of the Business, and specifically, to pay any and all business expenses and business taxes falling due during the period of receivership, and to otherwise employ a licensed bail agent to manage the placement of bail bonds for the Business and/or to employ any other necessary labor as may be necessary, purchase supplies, and incur the risks and obligations ordinarily incurred by owners, managers, and operators of similar businesses.” (Motion, at p. 2.)
“The court may appoint a receiver to enforce the judgment where the judgment creditor shows that, considering the interests of both the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor, the appointment of a receiver is a reasonable method to obtain the fair and orderly satisfaction of the judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.620.)
“The court may appoint a receiver or order the levying officer to take any action the court orders that is necessary to preserve the value of property levied upon, including but not limited to selling the property, if the court determines that the property is perishable or will greatly deteriorate or greatly depreciate in value or that for some other reason the interests of the parties will be best served by the order. An order may be made under this subdivision upon application of the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor, or a person who has filed a third-party claim pursuant to Division 4 (commencing with Section 720.010).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 699.070, subd. (a).)
“A receiver may be appointed, in the manner provided in this chapter, by the court in which an action or proceeding is pending in any case in which the court is empowered by law to appoint a receiver.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 564, subd. (a).)
“A receiver may be appointed by the court in which an action or proceeding is pending, or by a judge of that court, in the following cases: [¶] … [¶] (3) After judgment, to carry the judgment into effect. [¶] (4) After judgment, to dispose of the property according to the judgment, or to preserve it during the pendency of an appeal, or pursuant to the Enforcement of Judgments Law (Title 9 (commencing with Section 680.010)), or after sale of real property pursuant to a decree of foreclosure, during the redemption period, to collect, expend, and disburse rents as directed by the court or otherwise provided by law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 564, subd. (b)(3), (4).)
Creditor supports this motion with evidence that Gooch dba Biker Bail Bonds had accounts receivable and other assets which had not been paid to the levying officer and for which a judgment lien attached. (E.g., Lichtenberger decl., ¶¶ 10, 50.) Creditor argues that the judgment lien applies to business conducted by SJEBB in using the name “Biker Bail Bonds.” (Id., ¶ 24.) Creditor believes that is better to have a receiver appointed to marshal, identify, and sell all of the assets of the Business.
SJEBB filed an opposition to the motion to appoint a receiver stating that there is a dispute as to the business and assets of Gooch dba Biker Bail Bonds and that, in SJEBB’s assessment, Creditor incorrectly asserts that SJEBB assets are Gooch assets subject to the execution lien.
In reply, Creditor challenge’s SJEBB’s standing to oppose the motion and notes that there is no opposition filed from Gooch.
As discussed in the Creditor’s motion to impose liability on SJEBB, what constitutes assets of Gooch dba Biker Bail Bonds in the possession of SJEBB and what constitutes assets of SJEBB not subject to the execution lien is muddled and the evidence is conflicting. Whether or not SJEBB has standing to oppose the motion, Creditor has the burden to show that the appointment of a receiver is a reasonable method to obtain the fair and orderly satisfaction of the judgment.
Creditor has not made the required showing at this time. There is a substantial dispute regarding the nature and legal characterization of the transactions between SJEBB and Gooch dba Biker Bail Bonds. At the same time, Creditor asserts that assets of Gooch dba Biker Bail Bonds have been improperly usurped by SJEBB. Appointing a receiver at this time would cause this dispute to be a dispute between the receiver and SJEBB, rather than a dispute that may be litigated directly by Creditor and SJEBB through a creditor’s action. The assets to be subject to the receivership cannot be sold while this dispute is ongoing. The evidence presented shows that these assets are not being dissipated, but, Creditor asserts, are being improperly used by SJEBB for its benefit. As someone who is no longer licensed, Gooch would be unable to conduct bail bond business and the conduct of such business now under the Biker Bail Bonds name by a properly licensed person may not only preserve the value of such assets but enhance such value while the dispute is being resolved. Moreover, depending upon what is ultimately shown, Creditor may be entitled to appropriate additional remedies arising from SJEBB’s use of such assets.
Another facet of this motion is that the type of business at issue is specialized and subject to specialized regulations. While the propose receiver Lindsay F. Nielson is qualified as a receiver generally, if the court were to grant the motion (now or in the future), the lack of experience or knowledge regarding the bail bond business is concerning and a further showing would be required as to why Nielson would be an appropriate receiver under the totality of the circumstances here.
Based upon the evidence and arguments presented, the court finds that Creditor has not shown that appointment of a receiver is now a reasonable method to obtain the fair and orderly satisfaction of the judgment. The motion will be denied.
(3) Extension of Lien
For the same reasons discussed above, the request to extend the personal property lien for an additional year will be granted. Without determining the extent of the lien created, the existing disputes warrant such an extension.
(4) Examinations in Aid of Judgment
The court will address the judgment debtor and third party examinations at the hearing.