Tentative Ruling: Ana Miranda Mendoza et al vs Rich & Famous Inc et al
Case Number
20CV04009
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Fri, 04/17/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion: Approval
Tentative Ruling
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of plaintiffs Ana Miranda Mendoza and Maria Garcia for an order granting preliminary approval is continued until May 29, 2026. On or before May 8, 2026, plaintiffs shall file and serve a supplemental declaration from counsel pertaining to the incentive awards to the 47 putative class members who are not acting as a class representative in this action.
Background:
On December 3, 2020, Ana Miranda Mendoza (Mendoza) initiated this action by filing a class action complaint against Rich & Famous, Inc., dba Big Green Cleaning Company, Inc. (Big Green). The complaint sets forth nine causes of action based on alleged violations of the Labor Code, including minimum wage violations, overtime violations, rest and meal period violations, failure to reimburse business expenses, failure to pay timely wages, and failure to provide accurate wage statements.
On March 17, 2021, Mendoza filed a first amended complaint, adding a cause of action for penalties pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).
On October 26, 2021, Allen Paul Williams (Williams) was added as a defendant in place of Doe 1.
On September 28, 2022, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, Mendoza filed the operative second amended complaint (SAC) adding Maria Garcia (Garcia) as an additional named plaintiff and class representative. The primary putative class is defined in the SAC as “[a]ll individuals who are or were employed by Defendants in California as a nonexempt employee December 3, 2016 through the date of trial.” (SAC, ¶ 46.) Williams was not named as a defendant in the SAC.
On October 28, 2022, Big Green filed an answer to the SAC, generally denying the allegations therein and setting forth 42 affirmative defenses.
Following both informal and formal discovery, as well as two separate private mediation sessions occurring on October 12, 2021, and October 2, 2024, the parties executed a long-form settlement agreement on December 16, 2025 (Settlement Agreement). (Melmed Decl., ¶¶ 7-10, Ex. A.)
On January 9, 2026, the court denied without prejudice the plaintiffs’ initial motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement.
On March 25, 2026, plaintiffs filed a revised motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement at issue in this hearing. The motion seeks preliminary certification of a settlement class, preliminary appointment of plaintiffs as class representatives, preliminary appointment of plaintiffs’ counsel as counsel for the settlement class, preliminary approval of notice to the settlement class, preliminary appointment of the settlement administrator, preliminary approval of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and preliminary approval of attorney fees, litigation costs, incentive awards, PAGA penalties, and settlement administration costs. There is no opposition to the motion.
Analysis:
(1) Procedures for Approval of Class Action Settlement
“Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court (CRC) sets forth the procedures for settlement of class actions in California. [Citation.] A two-step process is required. First, the court preliminarily approves the settlement and the class members are notified as directed by the court. [Citation.] ‘The notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for class members to follow in filing written objections to it and in arranging to appear at the settlement hearing and state any objections to the proposed settlement.’ [Citation.] Second, the court conducts a final approval hearing to inquire into the fairness of the proposed settlement. [Citation.] If the court approves the settlement, a judgment is entered with provision for continued jurisdiction for the enforcement of the judgment. [Citation.]” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(c)-(f).)
The court may make an order approving or denying certification of a provisional settlement class after the preliminary settlement hearing.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(d).) “If the court grants preliminary approval, its order must include the time, date, and place of the final approval hearing; the notice to be given to the class; and any other matters deemed necessary for the proper conduct of a settlement hearing.” (Id., rule 3.769(e).)
(2) Requirements of Class Certification for Purposes of Settlement
Code of Civil Procedure section 382 authorizes class actions “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) “Class certification requires proof (1) of a sufficiently numerous, ascertainable class, (2) of a well-defined community of interest, and (3) that certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e., that proceeding as a class is superior to other methods. [Citation.]” (Fireside Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1089.)
To determine whether a class is ascertainable, the court examines “(1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying class members. [Citation.]” (Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1271.) “A related inquiry is manageability of the proposed class[.]” (Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 849.) “The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)
(3) Standards for Preliminary Evaluation of Fairness of Class Action Settlement
“Before final approval, the court must conduct an inquiry into the fairness of the proposed settlement.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769.) “The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the settlement is fair. [Citation.] It should consider relevant factors, such as the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. [Citation.] The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties. The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.’ ” (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (Dunk).)
“[A] a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” (Dunk, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1802.) The involvement of a mediator strongly weighs in favor of finding that the Settlement Agreement represents a non-collusive and arm’s-length agreement. (See Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128-129.) “The court undoubtedly should give considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arm’s length transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct.” (Id. at p. 129.)
(4) Additional Evidence Needed to Support Incentive Awards to the 47 Putative Class Members Who Are not Named Plaintiffs or Class Representatives
The Settlement Agreement provides for each of the named class representative plaintiffs to receive an incentive award of up to $10,000. (Melmed Decl., Ex. A at ¶ 5.2.) The named plaintiffs submitted declarations in support of the incentive awards to the named plaintiffs. (Mendoza Decl.; Garcia Decl.) Additionally, the Settlement Agreement provides for incentive awards to 47 putative class members who are not named plaintiffs or class representatives of up to $1,000 each. (Ibid.) The maximum amount of incentive awards totals $67,000. (Ibid.) According to the moving papers, the 47 class members who are not class representatives assisted in the investigation, provided factual background, participated in lengthy interviews, and provided critical documents. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 51.)
Courts have determined an “incentive award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit,’ and have noted ‘relevant factors’ to consider in deciding whether such an award is warranted. [Citation.] Those factors include ‘the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions, and the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation.’ [Citation.] Federal district courts have identified other factors as well, including ‘the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise,’ ‘the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative,’ the duration of the litigation, and ‘the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804 (Clark).)
“Incentive awards to class representatives are intended to compensate class representatives for the work and risk undertaken on behalf of the class, to reimburse expenses incurred in the class litigation, and sometimes to recognize the willingness of class representatives to act as a private attorney general. [Citation.] An incentive award may be appropriate to induce someone to serve as a class representative. In determining whether to make an incentive award, the court may consider (1) the risk, both financial and otherwise, the class representative faced in bringing the suit; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit received by the class representative as a result of the litigation. [Citation.]” (Golba v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1272 (Golba).)
Plaintiffs have not cited the court to California appellate law pertaining to incentive awards to participating members of a putative settlement class who are not named class representatives. The court has not independently located any such case. “Where California courts have not addressed an issue, they look to federal cases as persuasive authority on class action questions.” (Collins v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 62, 73, fn. 6.)
An appellate decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit evaluated whether incentive awards to participating, non-representative class members could be appropriate. (Staton v. Boeing Co. (9th Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 975 (Staton).) “[C]lass members can certainly be repaid from any cost allotment for their substantiated litigation expenses, and identifiable services rendered to the class directly under the supervision of class counsel can be reimbursed as well from the fees awarded to the attorneys.” (Id. at p. 977.) However, the court raised concerns about providing incentive awards to participating, non-representative class members because “singling out a large group of non-named plaintiff class members for higher payments without regard to the strength of their claims eliminates a critical check on the fairness of the settlement for the class as a whole.” (Ibid.) The court noted, “if those individuals rendered compensable services to the lawyers, then the lawyers should pay for those services from the amount of the fund properly awarded for costs or fees, as appropriate.” (Id. at p. 978.) But the court appeared to accept without affirmatively ruling that an award to non-representative class members might be appropriate if supported with evidence and otherwise appropriate as part of the overall settlement. (Ibid. [“If, alternatively, an individual’s class membership is debatable, then the award to him or her can be considered an element of the compromise.”].) The matter was ultimately remanded for further proceedings.
Federal district courts have applied Staton in various contexts. In Wren v. RGIS Inventory Specialists (N.D.Cal., Apr. 1, 2011) 2011 WL 1230826 (Wren), at pages 31 to 38, the court analyzed whether a participating opt-in, non-representative class member was eligible to receive an incentive award in the amount of $2,500. Applying Staton, the court evaluated the participating class member’s time and effort expended, the benefits provided to the class by way of his participation, the risks associated with the participation, and the amount and number of incentive awards in relation to the overall settlement amount. (Ibid.) After considering these factors, the court approved the incentive award. (Ibid.)
Other federal courts have entertained applications for or approved incentive awards without substantial analysis. For example, in Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc. (E.D.Cal., Nov. 14, 2007) 2007 WL 3492841, at page 4, the court summarily approved incentive awards to non-representative settlement class members who were deposed in the action. In Satchell v. Federal Express Corp. (N.D.Cal., Apr. 13, 2007) 2007 WL 1114010, at page 9, the court stated it would entertain a petition for an award to participating class members who provided declarations in the action.
On other hand, some federal courts applying Staton have found incentive awards to non-representative, participating class members inappropriate. In Roe v. SFBSC Management, LLC (N.D.Cal., Nov. 29, 2022) 2022 WL 17330847, at page 21, applying Staton, “[t]he court denie[d] the requested $3,000 payments [to participating class members] … because they are not Class Representatives.” In Morales v. Stevco, Inc. (E.D.Cal., May 16, 2012) 2012 WL 1790371, at page 20, applying Staton, the court ruled that “the Ninth Circuit has determined only ‘named plaintiffs, as opposed to designated class members who are not named plaintiffs, are eligible for reasonable incentive payments.’ [Citation.] Consequently, [the non-representative, participating class members] are not eligible for incentive payments for their participation in this action.” The court noted, however, under Staton, “identifiable services rendered to the class directly under the supervision of class counsel can be reimbursed ... from the fees awarded to the attorneys.” (Id. at p. *20, fn. 16.)
Having reviewed the case law addressing these issues, the court will follow the approach in Wren, supra, 2011 WL 1230826, at pages 31-38. The court will require plaintiffs to support the proposed incentive awards to participating, non-representative class members with sufficient evidence that permits the court to apply the factors set forth in Clark and Golba as to each award. The court will require a supplemental filing with evidence demonstrating as to each such non-representative class member: (1) that the non-representative class member falls within the class definition; (2) the risk, both financial and otherwise, the non-representative class member faced in providing support in this action; (3) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the non-representative class member; (4) the amount of time and effort spent by the non-representative class member; (5) the anticipated personal benefit received by the non-representative class member as a result of the litigation in comparison to class members who will not receive an incentive award; and (6) any other information bearing on the appropriateness of the incentive awards. This evidence shall be compiled in a single, supplemental filing in the form of a declaration from counsel attaching the necessary evidence in support these proposed incentive awards. (See Wren, supra, 2011 WL 1230826, at pp. 31-38; Clark, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 804; Golba, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272.)
The court will not approve incentive awards absent a sufficient evidentiary record. Rather, the “quantification of time and effort expended on the litigation, and in the form of reasoned explanation of financial or other risks incurred … is required in order for the trial court to conclude that an enhancement was “necessary to induce [the non-representative members] to participate in the suit….” (Clark, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 807.)