Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al

Case Number

18CV05728

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 05/15/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motions for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

1. (1) For the reasons stated herein, the motions of defendant The Regents of the University of California for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against plaintiff Mark Signa’s complaint (filed on January 22, 2026), and for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against plaintiff Jonathan Lee Reyes’ complaint (filed on February 13, 2026), are each continued to June 5, 2026.
2. (2) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant Dustin Olson for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against the first amended complaint of plaintiff Mark Signa is granted, in part as to the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted against defendant Dustin Olson, only. Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied.
3. (3) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant David Millard for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Matthew Stern is granted, in part as to the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted against defendant David Millard, only. Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied.
4. (4) All parties are ordered to appear at the hearing to discuss the procedural matters described herein.

Background:

Plaintiff Mark Signa (Signa) filed their original complaint in this case against defendants The Regents of the University of California (the Regents) and the University of California Santa Barbara Police Department (UCSB-PD) Chief Dustin Olson (Olson) on November 21, 2018, asserting four causes of action: (1) violation of Title 42 United States Code section 1983 – denial of first amendment rights; (2) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. Briefly, in the complaint, Signa alleges that they have been employed as a police officer by the Regents since 1990, and that they were retaliated against after voicing concerns about purportedly illegal or improper conduct within the UCSB-PD.

On February 4, 2019, Signa filed their operative first amended complaint (the Signa FAC), alleging two causes of action: (1) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act and (2) violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5.

On February 22, 2019, the Regents and Olson filed an answer to the Signa FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-seven affirmative defenses.

On May 22, 2019, the court ordered a stay of this case pending Signa’s exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court lifted the stay on January 21, 2021.

On September 17, 2021, the court adopted its tentative ruling on the motion of the Regents to transfer to this department and consolidate with this case (the Signa Action) for pre-trial purposes only, the following matters: (1) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01431 entitled Michael Little, et al. v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Little Action); (2) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV04418 entitled Matthew Stern v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Stern Action); (3) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV02586 entitled Jonathan Lee Reyes v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Reyes Action); (4) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01625 entitled John Doe v. The Regents of the University of California Santa Barbara, et al. (the Smith Action); and (5) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 21CV01256 entitled Ryan Hashimoto v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Hashimoto Action).

On February 26, 2025, the court entered judgment in favor of the Regents, the UCSB-PD, and the University of California Santa Barbara, and against plaintiff Ryan Hashimoto, as to the complaint filed in the Hashimoto Action.

The lengthy procedural history of these actions reflects that on January 22, 2026, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the Signa FAC (the Regents Signa Motion), and separately filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Matthew Stern (Stern) in the Stern Action (the Regents Stern Motion). The Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Stern Motion were calendared for hearing on April 24, 2026.

On January 26, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Tiffany Little (T Little) in the Little Action, and separately filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Michael Little (M Little) in the Little Action (collectively, the Regents Little Motions). The Regents Little Motions were calendared for hearing on May 1, 2026. T Little and M Little have filed opposition to the Regents Little Motions.

On February 10, Olson filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the Signa FAC (the Olson Motion).

On February 11, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Ryan Smith (Smith) in the Smith Action (the Regents Smith Motion).

On February 13, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Jonathan Lee Reyes (Reyes) in the Reyes Action (the Regents Reyes Motion).

On February 19, defendant David Millard (Millard) filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the complaint filed by Stern in the Stern Action (the Millard Motion.)

The Olson Motion, the Regents Smith Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion were calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026.

On March 16, the Regents filed an ex parte application for an order to set the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 8, 2026, to allow that motion to be heard no later than 30 days before trial. On March 18, the court signed and entered an order granting that application, moving the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 8, 2026.

On April 3, Stern filed their opposition to the Regents Stern Motion.

On April 11, the court signed, and on April 13 filed, an order approving a stipulation by the parties to continue the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to May 8, 2026, and the hearing on the Regents Signa Motion to May 15, 2026. The Regents Smith Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 8. The Olson Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026.

On April 17, Smith filed their opposition to the Regents Smith Motion.

On April 21, Signa filed their opposition to the Regents Signa Motion.

On April 24, Signa filed opposition to the Olson Motion, Reyes filed opposition to the Regents Reyes Motion, and Stern filed opposition to the Millard Motion.

On May 1, the court issued a minute order (the May 1 Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Little Motions to June 12, 2026, due to the lodging by the Regents of material submitted as a basis for adjudication of those motions conditionally under seal without having filed an appropriate motion to seal those materials, or the entry of a sealing order. Pursuant to the May Order, the court set a hearing on any motion for an order to file those lodged materials under seal on May 29, 2026. The court also set a briefing schedule, requiring that any sealing motion be filed and served on or before May 11, among other things.

On May 8, the court issued a minute order (the May 8 Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 29, 2026, and the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to June 12, 2026, also due to the lodging by the Regents of material submitted as a basis for adjudication of those motions conditionally under seal without filing an appropriate motion to seal those materials. Among other things, the court ordered that any motion for an order sealing materials lodged conditionally under seal as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion must be filed and served on or before May 11, 2026, and calendared any such motion for hearing on May 22, 2026. As to the Regents Stern Motion, the court ordered that any motion for an order sealing any material lodged conditionally under seal as a basis for adjudication of that motion be heard on May 29, 2026.

On May 11, the Regents separately filed: (1) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Signa Motion (the Signa Motion to Seal); (2) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Reyes Motion (the Reyes Motion to Seal); (3) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Little Motions (the Little Motion to Seal); (4) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Smith Motion (the Smith Motion to Seal); and (5) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Stern Motion (the Stern Motion to Seal).

The Signa Motion to Seal, and the Reyes Motion to Seal are calendared for hearing on May 29, 2026.

Analysis:

(1)       The Regents Signa Motion and Regents Reyes Motion

As the materials which are the subject of the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal were lodged conditionally under seal by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Reyes Motion, the court will need to resolve the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal first. For these reasons, and to allow sufficient time to resolve those motions, the court will continue the hearing on the Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Reyes Motion to June 5, 2026.

(2)       The Olson Motion

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) “A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. [¶] A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. “ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1)-(2).)

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) The party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 845.) Relevant here, a defendant meets that burden by showing “that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

“In reviewing a defense summary judgment, we apply the traditional three-step analysis ..., that is, we (1) identify the pleaded issues, (2) determine if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff’s case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact.” (Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. omitted.)

The notice of the Olson Motion identifies four issues of which adjudication is sought by Olson. (Notice at pp. 3-4.) “Issue One” is stated as “Signa’s first cause of action under Government Code [section] 8547.10 ... fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Olson undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law.” (Notice at p. 3, ll. 20-23.) “Issue Two” is stated as “Signa’s second cause of action under Labor Code [section] 1102.5 ... fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Olson undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law.” (Notice at p. 3, ll. 24-26.)

“Issue Three” is stated as “Signa’s first cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Government Code section] 8547.10 fails because even if Signa could state a prima facie case, clear and convincing evidence confirms that Olson reasonably believed that all personnel actions he took in relation to Signa were justified by the evidence they had before him so Olson is entitled to judgment pursuant to [section] 8547.10, [subdivision] (d)”. (Notice at p. 3, l. 27-p. 4, l. 3.) “Issue Four” is stated as “Signa’s second cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Labor Code section] 1102.5 fails because this claim cannot be asserted against an individual defendant as a matter of law.” (Notice at p. 4, ll. 4-6.)

            (a) Issue Two and Issue Four

“[T]he operative pleading frames the issues for purposes of summary judgment and a defendant need address only the claim(s) alleged and need not anticipate new, unpled claim.” (Restivo v. City of Petaluma (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 267, 279.) In the Signa FAC, Signa asserts a second cause of action against Olson for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. Noted above, Issue Two and Issue Four seek summary adjudication of the issues described above in regard to that cause of action.

In the Olson Motion, Olson argues that the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Signa FAC arises from, or is premised exclusively on, fundamental or traditional personnel management actions, decisions, or functions, and that the complaints of Signa are directly aimed at Olson’s management of the UC-PD, for which Olson, as an individual supervisor, cannot be held personally liable under the plain language of Labor Code section 1102.5.

The opposition of Signa to the Olson Motion asserts that the plain text of Labor Code section 1102.5, as amended effective January 1, 2014, and pursuant to other enactments in 2021, shows that personal liability may be imposed upon supervisory agents such as Olson under that statute.

Based on the undisputed material facts (the UMF) set forth in the supporting separate statement of Olson, and Signa’s responding separate statement, it is undisputed that Signa was employed with the UCSB-PD from March 12, 1990, until March 1, 2019. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 1 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Olson served as the UCSB-PD Chief of Police from November 2, 2009, to March 14, 2019. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 2 & evidence cited therein.) On April 16, 2014, Signa was promoted to Lieutenant at UCSB-PD. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 3 & evidence cited therein.)

As a Lieutenant, Signa reported to Assistant Chief Cathy Farley, who was his direct supervisor. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 4 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Farley directed Signa to “cc” Farley on all emails to Olson. (Resp. Sep. Smt., UMF no. 34 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

Allegations of wrongdoing by Olson are included in paragraph 59 of the Signa FAC. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 25 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

In April 2016, UCSB filed a complaint against two officers who had provided alcohol to a minor at UCSB and engaged in a sexual assault, and the allegation was investigated by UCSB-PD’s Internal Affairs (IA) Department (the IA Investigation). (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 8 & evidence cited therein.) A Sergeant whom Signa supervised and who became “close personal friends” with Olson (the Favored Sergeant), was also a “close friend” of those two officers, and even though he was “intimately familiar with” their conduct with the underage student, the Favored Sergeant was not investigated because he was friends with “the highest levels of UCSB-PD leadership.” (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 6, 8 & evidence cited therein.)

Olson “openly expressed that he desired the ... IA Investigation to go away as quietly as possible.” (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 12 & evidence cited therein.) Signa “vocalized concerns” about certain officers such as the Favored Sergeant receiving favored treatment. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 13 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Officers confided in Signa that they were afraid to express concerns about the Favored Sergeant’s “improper and possibly illegal” conduct to upper management for fear of retaliation. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 14 & evidence cited therein.)

In August 2016, Signa had lunch with Olson and others during which Romero criticized Signa’s leadership style. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 26 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

Signa also “vocalized concerns” about “dick jokes” made at a meeting on May 21, 2017, the Favored Sergeant’s improper use of UCSB-PD’s funds and resources, leadership’s obstruction of investigation into the Favored Sergeant’s misconduct, supervisor meetings that took too long, and January 17, 2017 approval of expenses for members of the “Good Ole Boys” club but not for non-members. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 22 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

On May 25, 2017, Signa reported to Olson that in January 2017, certain members of UCSB-PD attended a gun show without receiving the required approval, thus their attendance was a misappropriation of public funds in violation of Penal Code section 424; and that UCSB-PD was engaging in sexual discrimination against a female officer, but Olson took no action. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 15 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) On May 30, 2017, Signa made the same reports to Farley that he made to Olson on May 25, 2017, but claims nothing was done. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 16 & evidence cited therein.)

On June 19, 2017, a female officer submitted a “letter of complaint” regarding Smith’s extramarital affair, hit-and-run coverup, improper Code 3 driving orders, and misuse of UCSB-PD’s resources to visit his extramarital lover. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 17 & evidence cited therein.) On June 19, 2017, Signa reported to Farley that the Favored Sergeant had lied about his extramarital relationship and complained that Signa had not been involved in the 2017 investigation of the Favored Sergeant even though Signa had information to offer. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 18 & evidence cited therein.)

In late 2017, the IA investigation of the Favored Sergeant was closed, and Signa alleges the investigation was done quickly so the Favored Sergeant’s next employer (the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services) would not learn of it. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 19 & evidence cited therein.) Signa alleges that Olson and upper management believed the Favored Sergeant getting alternative employment was the “easiest solution” and that Olson and others made “several negative comments” about the Favored Sergeant. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 20 & evidence cited therein.)

On December 13, 2017, Signa met with Olson, Farley, and Millard and told them that the Favored Sergeant’s continued presence at UCSB-PD was viewed as intimidation, but nothing was done. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 23 & evidence cited therein.)

Signa was “falsely accused of creating conflict” because Olson spoke to a subordinate of Signa then invited her to lunch while excluding Signa, and was excluded from UCSB-PD social events. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 38, 40 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

The above summary is not intended to be exhaustive, and the court has considered all admissible evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the Olson Motion.

Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), provides: “An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information …to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance ….” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).) The Olson Motion presents a legal issue in regard to whether that statute imposes liability for damages in a civil action for clams brought by employees, such as Signa, against supervisors acting on behalf of their employers in their individual capacity, such as Olson.

There exists no clear definition of the phrase, “any person acting on behalf of the employer,” to determine whether individual liability may be imposed in a civil action seeking monetary damages brought pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5. The court finds it helpful to examine the implementing provisions of that statute, which are contained in the same chapter. “We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment….” (People v. Porter (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 927, 934-935.)

As to civil penalties under Labor Code section 1102.5, “an employer is liable for a civil penalty … for each violation of this section to be awarded to the employee who was retaliated against.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (f)(1).) That language suggests that only employers may be liable for civil penalties.

As to the burden of proof in civil actions for damages, “once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity proscribed by [s]ection 1102.5 was a contributing factor in the alleged prohibited action against the employee, the employer shall have the burden of proof to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in activities protected by Section 1102.5.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.6.) These provisions demonstrate that the employer is the party with the burden of proof in a civil action for damages.

As to the recovery of civil damages, “[n]othing in this chapter shall prevent the injured employee from recovering damages from his employer for injury suffered through a violation of this chapter.” (Lab. Code, § 1105.) This provision, by its plain language, applies in the context of civil litigation as between an employee and employer only.

By comparison, as to criminal penalties, “[a]n employer or any other person or entity that violates this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable, in the case of an individual, by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year or a fine ….” (Lab. Code, § 1103.) The text of Labor Code section 1103 indicates that, as to criminal penalties, other persons or entities, in addition to the employer, can be found guilty of such misdemeanors and subject to fines and imprisonment. (Ibid.)

The parties do not cite, and the court is unaware of, any published California decision addressing whether supervisors may be held individually liable for their own violations of Labor Code section 1102.5, in a civil action for damages. However, “most district courts that have addressed the issue have held that section 1102.5 does not impose individual liability on supervisors.” (Mewawalla v. Middleman (N.D. Cal. 2022) 601 F.Supp.3d 574, 608.) According to one district court, “the alleged violations under Section 1102.5 are predicated upon an employer/employee relationship … [and] [t]he relevant portions of the statute clearly indicate that the statute is meant to establish prohibited activity by employers, rather than individuals.” (Vierria v. California Highway Patrol (E.D. Cal. 2009) 644 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1244.)

Another district court concluded: “The language of the statute on which plaintiff relies does not include clear language imposing individual liability, but rather uses the kind of language consistently associated with imposition of liability on an employer alone.” (Tillery v. Lollis (E.D. Cal., Aug. 13, 2015) 2015 WL 4873111, at *10; see also Vera v. Con-way Freight, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Apr. 6, 2015) 2015 WL 1546178, at *1 [“The statutory text, structure, and legislative history all indicate that only employers—not individual employees—are liable for violations of the statute.”]; Conner v. Aviation Serv. of Chevron U.S.A. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014) 2014 WL 5768727, at *5 [“Plaintiffs have failed to point to any authority that establishes that individual liability exists for violations of Section 1102.5 ….”].)

The motion cites cases which interpret the term “person” in the context of retaliation and discrimination claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). In Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines P’ship (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1173, the court held in the context of FEHA that an “employer is liable for retaliation under section 12940, subdivision (h), but nonemployer individuals are not personally liable for their role in that retaliation.” Similarly, in Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 643, the court held that “FEHA, like similar federal statutes, allows persons to sue and hold liable their employers, but not individuals.”

Noted above, Signa argues that certain amendments to or enactments of Labor Code section 1102.5 operate to expand liability under the statute to the employer’s supervisory agents acting on behalf of that employer. Signa contends that any other interpretation would render amendments to the statute surplusage.  

The court has carefully considered the points and arguments advanced by the parties in support of and in opposition to the Olson Motion, and the text of the relevant statutes as further discussed above. After considering the parties’ respective arguments, relevant legal authorities, and the statutory language, the court concludes that Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1102.6, do not authorize civil actions by employees against non-employer-supervisors in their individual capacities. The court further notes that Labor Code section 1102.6, which addresses the burden of proof in civil actions only, speaks in terms of suits by employees against employers. (See Lab. Code, § 1102.6.) As further discussed above, that statute does not mention a burden of proof in a civil action brought against a nonemployer individual who is alleged to have violated Labor Code section 1102.5.

In addition, though the provision addressing criminal penalties was amended in 2013 to include liability for “[a]n employer or any other person or entity,” the civil action provision under Labor Code section 1102.6 and the civil damages provision under Labor Code section 1105 were not similarly amended. (See, e.g., Lab. Code, §§ 1102.6, 1103, & 1105.) In each instance, civil liability is discussed in terms of liability of the employer, and not of a supervisory employee acting in their individual capacity. (See Lab. Code, §§ 1102.5, subd. (f)(1),1102.6, 1105.)

To evaluate a statutory amendment, the court “must explore whether the amendment changed or merely clarified existing law.” (Carter v. California Dep’t of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922.) “While an intention to change the law is usually inferred from a material change in the language of the statute, a consideration of the surrounding circumstances may indicate, on the other hand, that the amendment was merely the result of a legislative attempt to clarify the true meaning of the statute.” (Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 911, 917-18.) “[T]he plain language of [section] 1102.5 and the legislative history of the 2013 amendment do not demonstrate an expansion of liability to permit whistleblowers to seek money damages from non-employers. To the contrary, the legislature’s decision not to amend [section] 1105 to allow recovery of damages from anyone other than employers forecloses Plaintiff’s theory, particularly when the legislature did amend [section] 1103 to impose criminal liability on non-employer individuals.” (Dawson v. Caregard Warranty Service, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Jan. 12, 2024) 2024 WL 661198, at *6.)

For all reasons discussed above, the Olson Motion shows that the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Signa FAC, to the extent that cause of action is directed to Olson in an individual capacity, fails as a matter of law. Therefore, the court will grant the Olson Motion as to the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Signa FAC as to Olson, only. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

            (b) Issue One and Issue Three

Issue One and Issue Three are relevant to the first cause of action for violation of Government Code section 8547, et seq., asserted against Olson in the Signa FAC. “The California Whistleblower Protection Act [the Act] … prohibits retaliation against state employees who ‘report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to public health’ [Citation.] The Act authorizes ‘an action for damages’ to redress acts of retaliation. [Citation.]” (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 882.)

Relevant here, the section 8547.10 of the Act provides that “any person who intentionally engages in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar acts against a university employee, including an officer or faculty member, or applicant for employment for having made a protected disclosure shall be liable in an action for damages brought against him or her by the injured party.” (Gov. Code, § 8547.10, subd. (c).) “This section is not intended to prevent a manager or supervisor from taking, directing others to take, recommending, or approving any personnel action or from taking or failing to take a personnel action with respect to any university employee, including an officer or faculty member, or applicant for employment if the manager or supervisor reasonably believes any action or inaction is justified on the basis of evidence separate and apart from the fact that the person has made a protected disclosure.” (Gov. Code, § 8547.10, subd. (d).)

“In any civil action … once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity protected by [the Act] was a contributing factor in the alleged retaliation against a former, current, or prospective employee, the burden of proof shall be on the supervisor, manager, or appointing power to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in protected disclosures or refused an illegal order.” (Gov. Code, § 8547.10, subd. (e).) “Government Code section 8547.10, subdivision (e), rather than McDonnell Douglas, provides the relevant framework for analyzing claims under Government Code section 8547.10.” (Scheer v. Regents of the University of California (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 904, 916 (Scheer).)

Though, unlike Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1102.6, Government Code section 8547.10 expressly provides for supervisor liability in an action brought by an affected employee, the present record shows, for all reasons discussed below, the existence of triable issues of material fact that preclude summary adjudication as to the first cause of action asserted against Olson in the Signa FAC.

In evaluating the evidence presented by the parties on summary judgment, “ ‘[w]e accept as true the facts ... in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.’ [Citation.] And we must ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff[ ] …’ and ‘liberally construe plaintiff[‘s] evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant’s own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff[‘s] favor.’ ” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 254 (Nazir).) To resolve a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the court may not weigh the evidence to determine whose version is more likely true. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.)

The material facts set forth in the supporting separate statement include that in August 2016, Signa had lunch with Olson and others, during which Signa’s leadership style was criticized. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 26.) Though Signa does not effectively dispute that fact, the supporting separate statement also includes the following material fact: “In written discovery, Signa admitted that Olson ‘did not say anything’ during the August 2016 lunch.” (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 27.)

The responding separate statement of Signa shows that, though at the time of Signa’s written discovery responses, it was Signa’s recollection that Olson did not speak at the August 2016 lunch described above, there exists evidence, including that submitted in support of the Olson Motion, which shows that Olson “discussed Signa’s leadership style” during the August 2016 lunch, and that “[a]ny comments that we made were part of our efforts to improve management of the officers at UCSB-PD.” (Olson Appendix of Evidence, Olson Dec., ¶ 8.)

Furthermore, to the extent the Olson Motion relies on the responses of Signa to written discovery, “summary judgment law in California requires the defendant to present evidence, and not simply point out through argument, that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain the needed evidence.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 110, original italics.)

The facts set forth in the supporting separate statement also include that written discovery shows that what Signa alleges to be “verbally abusive” conduct by Olson during a December 13, 2017, meeting “amounted to Olson interrupting, raising his voice, and being argumentative.” (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 31.) In support of their opposition to the Olson Motion, Signa submits a declaration of their counsel, Jaime Keeton (attorney Keeton). Attached to the Keeton declaration is a “Confidential Personnel Investigation Report” ostensibly authored by Kramer Workplace Investigation, and dated May 26, 2022. That report notes that “during the management meeting on December 13, 2017, when [Signa] started to explain to Chief Olson what some of the Officers were saying about Sergeant Smith, Chief Olson yelled at Lieutenant Signa and talked over him.” (Keeton Dec., exhibit A at p. 8.)

Under the totality of the circumstances present here, the evidence and information described above gives rise to conflicting inferences as to whether Olson intentionally engaged in any reprisals, threats, or coercion of Signa. (Gov. Code, § 8547.10, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c) [“summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.”].)

The court also notes that the appendix of evidence filed by Olson in support of the Olson Motion contains redactions, without Olson having lodged any unredacted documents conditionally under seal, and without a pending motion to seal or entry of an order sealing any redacted material. (See, e.g., Olson Dec., ¶¶ 7 & 9-10; Appendix of Evidence, exhibit 1 at pdf pp. 17-24 & 26; exhibit 4 at pdf pp. 60-61, 65-71, 73-79; exhibit 5 at pdf pp. 115-119, 123-126, 128, 130-132, 134-151, 156-167, 173.) The court does not consider any redacted material.

“ ‘[T]he separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included. Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in your separate statement, the motion must be denied!’ [Citation.]” (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 252, original italics.) Though the examples provided above are intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive, the existence of triable issues of material fact as further discussed above, requires the court to deny summary adjudication of the first cause of action asserted in the Signa FAC as to Olson.

The available evidence and information also shows that, after Signa reported concerns about the IA investigation, the Favored Sergeant’s status, purportedly unsafe practices, an alleged romantic relationship with a subordinate officer, and a purported cover up of a hit and run, among other concerns, Signa was transferred or reassigned from Patrol Lieutenant to Administrative Lieutenant. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 13, 15, 16, 18, 22, 24, & 28; Resp. Sep. Stmt., Additional Material Fact no. 6 & 7.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, including the timing of the events at issue, a reasonable trier of fact could find, based on competing inferences that arise from the evidence and information presented by the parties, and notwithstanding whether Olson can show that any adverse employment action was based on a legitimate reason or whether Olson reasonably believed their actions were justified, that the evidence is sufficient to suggest an intent to retaliate. (Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 917–918 [general discussion].) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Olson Motion to the extent that motion seeks summary adjudication of the second cause of action asserted in the Signa FAC.

The court will also, for all reasons discussed above, deny the Olson Motion to the extent it seeks summary judgment as to entirety of the Signa FAC. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845; Gov. Code, § 8547.10, subd. (e).)

            (c) Evidentiary Objections

Olson has filed objections to material contained in the Signa declaration filed in support of Signa’s opposition to the Olson Motion. “In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) As the Olson Motion fails, for all reasons discussed above, to shift the burden to Signa, the court need not consider the material to which Olson has asserted objections.

Furthermore, written objections to evidence must follow the format set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b). Though the written objections of Olson identify the document at issue, cite the location of each of the matters to which Olson asserts an objection, and quote or set forth the objectional material, the same objections are asserted to multiple statements appearing in each paragraph of the Signa declaration objected to by Olson. The manner in which the purportedly objectionable material is set forth forces the court to effectively guess whether Olson objects to the cited matters as a whole or only in part, and which objection is directed to which statement within each stated paragraph number. For these reasons, there exists sufficient grounds for the court to disregard those objections. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [a trial court may decline ruling on improperly formatted objections].)

(3)       The Millard Motion

The Millard Motion is directed to the complaint filed by Stern in the Stern Action (the Stern Complaint), which asserts the same two causes of action against Millard for violation of the Act and for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.

The Millard Motion also identifies four issues of which adjudication is sought. (Notice at pp. 3-4.) “Issue One” is stated as “Stern’s first cause of action under [sic] fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Millard undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law.”(Notice at p. 3, ll. 20-22.)

“Issue Two” is stated as “Sterns’s second cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Labor Code section] 1102.5 fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Millard undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law.” (Notice at p. 3, ll. 23-25.)

“Issue Three” is stated as “Stern’s first cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Government Code section] 8547.10 fails because even if Stern could state a prima facie case, clear and convincing evidence confirms that Millard reasonably believed that all personnel actions he took in relation to Stern were justified by the evidence they had before him so he is entitled to judgment pursuant to [section] 8547.10, [subdivision] (d)”. (Notice at p. 3, l. 26-p. 4, l. 2.)

“Issue Four” is stated as “Stern’s second cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Labor Code section] 1102.5 fails because this claim cannot be asserted against Millard defendant as a matter of law.” (Notice at p. 4, ll. 3-4.)

As a threshold matter, the court notes that the appendix of evidence filed by Millard in support of the Millard Motion also includes redactions, without an unredacted copy of the appendix having been lodged or any motion to seal having been filed as to that evidence. For the reasons further discussed above, the court does not consider redacted material.

Based on the supporting and responding separate statements, respectively, of Millard and Stern, it is undisputed that Stern was employed as a law enforcement officer at the UCSB-PD from May 2005 to the present. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 1 & evidence cited therein.) Millard began his employment with UCSB-PD on January 16, 2001, and served as Lieutenant at UCSB-PD from October 2013 to March 22, 2021. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 4 & evidence cited therein.) Stern’s past and current managers and supervisors at UCSB-PD include Millard. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 2 & evidence cited therein.)

As to Issue Two and Issue Four stated in the Millard Motion and described above, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For the same reasons discussed above, the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Stern Complaint against Millard in an individual capacity, fails as a matter of law. Therefore, the court will grant the Millard Motion as to the request for summary adjudication of the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Stern Complaint as against Millard, only. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

As to Issue One and Issue Three, there exist triable issues of material fact precluding summary adjudication as to those issues.

The material facts set forth in the Millard supporting separate statement include that “Millard played no role in the March 2017 process for the selection of officers for the corporal specialty assignments and instructor positions, including the Taser Instructor.” (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 32.) In support, Millard states that they “played no role in evaluation and ranking of the letters of interest for the Corporal specialty assignment”, that “Sergeants reviewed the letters of interest and made their recommendations to ... Olson”, and that Millard “played no role in the evaluation and ranking of the letters of interest for the taser instructor position....” (Millard Dec., ¶¶ 24-25.)

Stern presents evidence showing that Millard compiled scores of applicants for corporal specialty assignments on August 15, 2017. (Olson Dec., ¶ 22.) That evidence is sufficient to give rise to a competing inference as to whether Millard played a role in process of selecting officers for corporal specialty assignments prior to that date. The same reasoning and analysis apply in regard to UMF nos. 33 and 38 contained in Millard’s supporting separate statement.

The available information and evidence also indicates or suggests that when or after Stern reported alleged officer misconduct, among other things, and reported what Stern alleges to be retaliatory conduct towards Stern, the UCSB-PD initiated an internal investigation of Stern; placed Stern on administrative leave; and suspended Stern. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 10-25.) There is also information or evidence which shows or suggests that, after a union meeting led by Stern during which concerns about Millard’s leadership were raised, Millard publicly berated Stern and accused him of being out of uniform. (Sep. Stmt. UMF nos. 58 & 60; Resp. Sep. Stmt., Additional Material Fact no. 4 & evidence cited therein.)

“We view the evidence in a light favorable to the party opposing summary judgment or summary adjudication, liberally construing that party’s evidence while strictly scrutinizing the moving party’s showing, and we resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of the opposing party.” (Bakos v. Roach (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 390, 396.) The same or similar reasoning and analysis apply. Though the above is not provided as an exhaustive list, for all reasons discussed above, the evidence offered by the parties is sufficient to give rise to a triable issue, based on competing or conflicting inferences, in regard to whether there existed a retaliatory motive. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Millard Motion to the extent it seeks summary adjudication of the first cause of action for violation of the Act alleged in the Stern Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

The same reasoning and analysis applies to the request for summary judgment as to the Stern Complaint.

Evidentiary objections:

Millard has filed objections to material contained in the Stern declaration and attorney Keeton’s declaration. The same reasoning and analysis apply.

(4)       Procedural Matters

Court records reflect that, pursuant to the court’s minute order dated September 17, 2021, this case (the Signa Action) is consolidated with the Little Action, the Stern Action, the Reyes Action, and the Smith Action, for pre-trial purposes only, with all documents to be separately filed in any case files to which they might relate. The court further ordered that, “[f]or the motions or other matters requiring hearings, the moving party is directed to include the following language below the document title: [¶] ‘This matter is being calendared and heard in the lead case only. Cases are consolidated for pretrial and not all purposes.’” (Sept. 17, 2021, Minute Order.)

The court’s minute order dated August 8, 2025, reflects that, at the trial confirmation conference held on that day, defendant’s counsel informed the court that they have contemplated consolidating the cases in which the plaintiffs are represented by the Dre Law firm. The court also noted in that minute order, that the cases were consolidated for pretrial purposes only, and that no documents have been submitted to make it a true consolidation for trial. Based on the parties’ agreement, the court set the Smith Action for jury trial to commence on June 8, 2026, and the Signa Action for a 15 day jury trial to commence on June 18, 2026.

Court records reflect that, though the matters described above were consolidated for pretrial purposes only, no party has filed a motion to consolidate the matters for all purposes, including trial. (See Villa Zinfandel, LLC v. Bearman (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 848, 862–863 [general discussion].) As a result, there appears to be some confusion as to what cases, apart from the Smith Action and the Signa Action, will proceed to trial and when. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will order the parties to appear at the hearing to discuss the status of trial.