Tentative Ruling: County of Santa Barbara vs Lexington National Insurance Corp
Case Number
26CV01847
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 10/12/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion: Set Aside re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARYJUDGMENT, VACATE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE BAIL BOND
Tentative Ruling
County of Santa Barbara v. Lexington National Insurance Corp.
Case No. 26CV01847
Hearing Date: October 12, 2026
HEARING: Motion of Defendant Lexington National Insurance Corp. to Set Aside Summary Judgment on Bond Forfeiture and for Related Orders
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff County of Santa Barbara: Rachel Van Mullem, Kristen M. Cortez, Office of the County Counsel
For Defendant Lexington National Insurance Corp. and Bail Agent Superior Bail Bonds: Daniel Moaddel
TENTATIVE RULING: The motion of defendant Lexington National Insurance Corp. to set aside summary judgment on bond forfeiture and for related orders is denied.
Background:
This action pertains to the forfeiture of Bail Bond No. 2023DD010349 (Bail Bond) in favor of plaintiff County of Santa Barbara (County) related to the failure to appear by Nautica Singleton (Singleton), defendant in the underlying criminal matter, People of the State of California v. Nautica Singleton, Santa Barbara Superior Court, Case No. 23CR08667 (Criminal Case). Summary judgment on Bail Bond forfeiture (Judgment) was entered in this civil action on March 20, 2026, against Lexington National Insurance Corp. (Lexington) and in favor of the County.
As indicated by the filings in this action including those attached to the motion to set aside Judgment filed by Superior Bail Bonds (SBB) on April 9, 2026 (SBB Motion), previously denied, and this current motion to set aside Judgment filed by Lexington on August 20, 2026 (Lexington Motion):
On October 22 and October 27, 2023, respectively, SBB as bail agent of Lexington issued and filed the Bail Bond in the Criminal Case. (Judgment, attach.) The Bail Bond states that Singleton was ordered to appear in the Criminal Case on December 22, 2023, pertaining to charges against Singleton under Penal Code section 182 [conspiracy], Penal Code section 459 [burglary], and Penal Code section 475 [forgery], and Penal Code section 529 [false personation]. (Ibid.) The charges against Singleton are referenced with the suffix “—F” and appear to be described in the Bail Bond as felony charges. (Ibid.)
On May 8, 2024, Singleton appeared in person at a preliminary hearing setting in the Criminal Case. (Lexington Motion, Ex. B.) The court set a continued preliminary hearing on June 6, 2024 (June 6 Hearing), and ordered that Singleton “must be present in court … at 1:30.” (Id. at p. 3, l. 21 – p. 5, l. 10.)
The court minutes indicate Singleton was not present at the June 6 Hearing but was represented by a public defender at that hearing. (SBB Motion, Ex. A.) The minutes indicate this hearing and the Bail Bond obligations were continued to July 25, 2024. (Ibid.) The minutes note that “good cause [was] found to continue.” (Ibid.)
The transcript for the June 6 Hearing indicates the court stated good cause findings on the record: “MS. ZARHAGA: And, Your Honor, our request is going to be to continue the matter to July 25th for preliminary hearing. We had a chambers conference about Ms. Singleton’s childcare issues and transportation issues, and thus our request to push it out a few weeks.” (Lexington Motion, Ex. C at p. 3, ll. 15-20.) “THE COURT: All right. And I will find good cause to continue the preliminary hearing based on those issues, but she has plenty of notice. I’ve also invited her to bring the child to court if she’s unable to find childcare, that this matter really needs to take priority. So good cause this time.” (Id. at p. 3, ll. 21-26.) The parties do not present evidence of what occurred at the continued hearing on July 25.
On September 11, 2024, a hearing (September 11 Hearing) regarding arraignment on information was scheduled in the Criminal Case. (Lexington Motion, Ex. D.) The minutes indicate Singleton was not present. (Ibid.) The minutes note that bail bond was continued. (Ibid.) The minutes state that “977 granted for today’s hearing ONLY, per the court.” (Ibid.) Per the minutes, the September 11 Hearing was continued to October 2, 2024. (Ibid.) It appears Singleton was ordered to be present at the continued October 2 hearing but a remote Zoom appearance was authorized for the October 2 appearance. (Ibid.) There is no transcript submitted by the parties of the September 11 Hearing. The court does not have further evidence of what was discussed at the September 11 Hearing.
On October 2, 2024, the continued arraignment on information (October 2 Hearing) was held in the Criminal Case. (Lexington Motion, Ex. E.) It appears based on the minutes that Singleton appeared remotely by Zoom. (Ibid.) The court’s October 2 minutes note that the Bail Bond was again continued. (Ibid.) Per the minutes, the October 2 Hearing was continued to November 6, 2024, and Singleton was ordered to be personally present at this continued hearing. (Ibid.) The parties did not submit a transcript of the October 2 Hearing for the court’s review. There is no evidence presented by the parties as to the continued hearing on November 6.
On January 15, 2025, Singleton failed to appear at a court hearing (January 15 Hearing) in the Criminal Case, a bench warrant was ordered, and the Bail Bond was forfeited as of January 15, 2025. (Judgment, attach; SBB Motion, Exs. B-C.)
The transcript for the January 15 Hearing indicates the Bail Bond was forfeited for Singleton’s failure to appear:
“THE COURT: Ms. Singleton was ordered to be present. Because she lived in the Los Angeles area, the Court has allowed her to appear over Zoom. But today she is not here over Zoom. I'm inclined to revoke her O.R. -- excuse me, inclined to issue a
warrant. She has a bail bond, so that would require me to forfeit the bond.” (Lexington Motion, Ex. F at p. 4, ll. 21-27.)
“MS. ZARRAGA: Your Honor, if I may just make a request. I know Ms. Singleton was ordered to be personally present. I know she lives in Lancaster.” (Lexington Motion, Ex. F at p. 4, l. 28 – p. 5, l. 3.)
“THE COURT: Well, she was ordered to be present. I’m not sure that it was personally. I have shown a great deal of leeway as far as appearing over Zoom because transportation issues have been reported to me. And I know she’s suggested in the past she didn’t have a ride here, and so she’s been allowed to appear by Zoom. But she didn’t even do that today. So I have great concerns.” (Lexington Motion, Ex. F at p. 5, ll. 4-12.)
[FURTHER DISCUSSION]
“THE COURT: I am going to forfeit the bond and issue a warrant. Bond forfeited. Bench warrant, $50,000. Off the record.” (Lexington Motion, Ex. F at p. 5, ll. 13-15.)
On January 17, 2025, a notice of forfeiture of surety bond was issued in the Criminal Case as to the Bail Bond. (Judgment, attach; see also, SBB Motion, Ex. B.) The notice states in part, “[y]ou are hereby notified that the surety bond posted by you on behalf of the above-named defendant has been ordered forfeited by the Court for failure to appear on [January 15, 2025].” (Judgment, attach; SBB Motion, Ex. B.)
According to the County, the 180-day appearance period, extended by five days for mailed notice, expired on July 21, 2025, and no motion to vacate forfeiture or request for extension was filed in the Criminal Case by SBB or Lexington. (Opp. to SBB Motion, p. 3, ll. 3-7.)
On February 17, 2026, a Bail Bond demand letter was issued in the Criminal Case. (Judgment, attach; see also SBB Motion, Ex. C.) The demand letter states in part, “[t]his is to advise you that the forfeiture for the bond specified below was not aside within the 180-day, plus 5-days for mailing, period set forth in Penal Code [section] 1305. Your contractual promise to pay has become absolute.” (Judgment, attach; SBB Motion, Ex. C.) As stated on this demand letter, the date of forfeiture on the Bail Bond is January 15, 2025. (Judgment, attach; SBB Motion, Ex. C.)
On March 20, 2026, in this action, the court entered Judgment on Bail Bond forfeiture in favor of the County and against Lexington in the amount of $50,000 plus intertest and costs. (Judgment.) The Judgment provided that Lexington issued the Bail Bond, Singleton failed to appear at the January 15 Hearing, the Bail Bond was forfeited pursuant to Penal Code sections 1305 or 1306, and that this forfeiture was not set aside within the period allowed by Penal Code section 1305. (Ibid.) Therefore, “pursuant to Penal Code [section] 1306, it [was] ordered and adjudged that the County … recover from [Lexington] the sum of $50,000.00 together with the interest … plus costs … pursuant to Government Code [section] 1603.5.” (Ibid.)
On April 9, 2026, SBB filed the SBB Motion to set aside the Judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). SBB argued that (1) the court failed to comply with Penal Code section 977, subdivision (b), regarding Singleton’s waiver of appearance, (2) the court failed to make sufficient findings of good cause for Singleton’s non-appearance at the June 6 Hearing, (3) the court lost jurisdiction when it failed to properly declare forfeiture in accordance with Penal Code section 1305, and (4) the public defender failed to state or file a proper waiver under Penal Code section 977, subdivision (b), pertaining to Singleton’s absence at the June 6 Hearing. (SBB Motion, p. 2, ll. 6-17.) According to SBB, these failures rendered the Judgement void for lack of jurisdiction. This motion was denied in part because there was insufficient evidence of what was discussed on the record at the June 6 Hearing including evidence of the court transcript. (Minute Order, Aug. 3, 2026.)
On August 20, 2026, Lexington filed the current motion to set aside Judgment at issue in this hearing. As argued by Lexington, “[p]ursuant to California Penal Code section 1305(a) [the court] should have forfeited bond at the first non-appearance that did not meet the requirements of an attorney appearance where the criminal defendant was ordered to appear in a felony preliminary matter.” (Lexington Motion, p. 2, ll. 6-9.) As argued by Lexington, the court improperly “allowed Counsel to appear on behalf of [Singleton] under California Penal Code section 977(b) up until Defendant missed the third hearing on January 15, 2025 where bond was finally forfeited after 3 failures to appear.” (Id. at p. 5, ll. 1-5.) “Under Penal Code [section] 1305(a) and well-established case law, the court was required to expressly declare on the record while the court was in session that the bond was forfeited at FIRST non-appearance. Court Minutes do not include any declaration regarding forfeiture on a mandatory appearance hearing, the bond must be exonerated.” (Id. at p. 5, ll. 6-9.) Lexington “request[s] that the summary judgment set aside, forfeiture vacated and the bond reinstated and exonerated.” (Id. at p. 6, ll. 6-9.)
Analysis:
(1) Personal Appearance Under Penal Code Sections 977 and 1305
“Except as provided in subdivision (c), in all cases in which a felony is charged, the accused shall be physically present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused shall be physically or remotely present at all other proceedings unless they waive their right to be physically or remotely present, with leave of court and with approval by defendant’s counsel.” (Pen. Code, § 977, subd. (b)(1).) “[T]he felony defendant [must] be present at case-related proceedings that occur in open court.” (People v. Safety National Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703, 716 (Safety National).)
“A court shall in open court declare forfeited the undertaking of bail or the money or property deposited as bail if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear for any of the following: [¶] (A) Arraignment. [¶] (B) Trial. [¶] (C) Judgment. [¶] (D) Any other occasion prior to the pronouncement of judgment if the defendant’s presence in court is lawfully required. [¶] (E) To surrender himself or herself in execution of the judgment after appeal.” (Pen. Code, § 1305, subd. (a)(1).) “Whenever a defendant fails to appear in court on one of the occasions enumerated in section 1305, the court must declare a forfeiture, unless ‘the court has reason to believe that sufficient excuse may exist for the failure to appear.’ ” (People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 45, 48–49 (Indiana Lumbermens).) “[C]onstrued together section 977(b)(1) and section 1305 ‘are not only compatible with the constitutional guarantee of due process, but also constitute an appropriate legislative design to assure the orderly administration of the judicial process.’ ” (Safety National, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 715–716.)
(2) Continuance of Bail Obligations Under Penal Code Section 1305.1
“If the defendant fails to appear for arraignment, trial, judgment, or upon any other occasion when his or her appearance is lawfully required, but the court has reason to believe that sufficient excuse may exist for the failure to appear, the court may continue the case for a period it deems reasonable to enable the defendant to appear without ordering a forfeiture of bail or issuing a bench warrant. [¶] If, after the court has made the order, the defendant, without sufficient excuse, fails to appear on or before the continuance date set by the court, the bail shall be forfeited and a warrant for the defendant’s arrest may be ordered issued.” (Pen. Code, § 1305.1.)
“If the court has reason to believe that a sufficient excuse may exist, it may continue the case for a reasonable period to enable the defendant to appear without ordering forfeiture of the bond. [Citation.] If the court has no information that a sufficient excuse may exist so as to justify a continuance pursuant to section 1305.1, the court must declare a forfeiture.” (Indiana Lumbermens, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 49.)
“In most situations involving a section 1305, subdivision (b) [now section 1305.1] determination[,] the only reasons before the trial court are the evidence or representations furnished by defendant’s counsel. The cases demonstrate that the courts have cooperated with defense counsels’ requests and have liberally relied on their representations.” [Citation.] [¶] By way of example, sufficient excuse has been found where defense counsel represented that defendant’s mother was dying of cancer [citation]; in a situation where ‘there may be an emergency [defendant] attended to, and he may be ... available tomorrow morning’ [citation]; where defense counsel’s ‘client had told him that he had gone to Stockton for medical treatment due to severe internal bleeding’ [citation]; and where defense counsel stated, ‘[T]here’s a possibility [defendant] might be in the San Francisco area’ because ‘[t]here’s also another action pending in San Francisco’ [citation]. Even vague representations by counsel have been found sufficient—i.e., where a defendant had never previously failed to appear and defense counsel was ‘concerned something has happened.’ ” (People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 473, 479–480 (Bankers), internal quotation marks omitted.) However, “[t]he factual basis for the sufficient excuse finding must appear somewhere in the trial court record—in the minutes or in the reporter’s transcript.” (Id. at p. 478.)
However, “[b]y its terms, the [statute] all[]ows the court to continue the hearing without declaring a forfeiture if it ‘has reason to believe that sufficient excuse [m]ay exist for his neglect to appear . . ..’ It does [n]ot require the court to make an immediate determination as to whether sufficient excuse exists. This specific authorization to continue the hearing reflects a vital change from the pre-existing law …. By conspicuously deleting from subdivision (b) the express provisions retained in subdivision (a) to the effect that ‘the court shall direct the fact (of failure to appear) to be entered upon its minutes, . . .’ the Legislature intended the very simple alternative of a reasonable continuance without any specific minute order. Since the court is thus specifical[y]-authorized by the amendment to postpone its decision, it certainly retains jurisdiction to declare a forfeiture at a later time.” (People v. Surety Ins. Co. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 197, 201.)
(3) Forfeiture Under Penal Code Section 1306
“When a defendant released on bail fails to appear as required, the trial court must declare a forfeiture of the bail bond in open court. [Citation.] Within 30 days of the forfeiture, a notice of forfeiture is served by the court clerk. If the amount of the bond exceeds $400, the notice of forfeiture must be served by mail on the surety. [Citation.] Thereafter, the surety has a 180-day period, plus five days for service by mail (i.e., 185 days), within which to obtain relief from the forfeiture on certain statutory grounds … including that the criminal defendant has appeared in court or has been surrendered into custody by the bail agent within the 185-day period. [Citations.] This 185–day period is commonly known as the exoneration period or the appearance period….” (People v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 991, 999–1000 (US Fire).)
“Under section 1306, subdivision (a), when ‘the period of time specified in Section 1305 has elapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside, the court which has declared the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment’ against the surety in the amount of the forfeited bail bond plus costs. Section 1306, subdivision (c), sets forth the 90–day time frame within which the summary judgment must be entered: ‘If, because of the failure of any court to promptly perform the duties enjoined upon it pursuant to this section, summary judgment is not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated.’ ” (US Fire, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1000.)
(4) Strict Construction of Bail Statutes
“The law traditionally disfavors forfeitures and this disfavor extends to forfeiture of bail. Thus, Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306 dealing with forfeiture of bail bonds must be strictly construed in favor of the surety to avoid the harsh results of a forfeiture. [¶] The standard of review, therefore, compels us to protect the surety, and more importantly the individual citizens who pledge to the surety their property on behalf of persons seeking release from custody, in order to obtain the corporate bond. Sections 1305 and 1306 are said to be ‘jurisdictional prescriptions.’ Failure to follow the jurisdictional prescriptions in sections 1305 and 1306 renders a summary judgment on the bail bond void.” (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 945, 950–951.)
(5) Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, Subdivision (d)
“The court may … on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) “ ‘A trial court has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a judgment that is not void.’ [Citation.]” (Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 563–564.) “Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.” (Evid. Code, § 500.) “While the provisions of Penal Code section 1305 ‘must be strictly followed or the court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction’ … ‘[t]he burden is upon the bonding company seeking to set aside the forfeiture to establish by competent evidence that its case falls within the four corners of these statutory requirements.” (Safety National, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 974.)
(6) Lexington Did Not Carry Its Burden to Establish Non-Compliance with Penal Code Sections 977, 1305, and 1305.1
“When a criminal defendant fails to appear at a required court appearance without sufficient excuse, the trial court is required to forfeit bail at that time.” (People v. American Surety Co. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 71, 73.) “When [a] defendant fail[s] to appear [at a required appearance] without excuse, the court [is] required to declare ‘in open court’ that the bond was forfeited. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 77.) If the court does not do so, the court “no longer retain[s] ‘statutory control and jurisdiction over the bond’ [citation], which was exonerated by operation of law.” (Ibid.) “The court’s later entry of summary judgment on the bond is void, not merely voidable, and is subject to collateral attack at any time.” (Ibid.)
Here, the evidence indicates that Singleton did not appear at the June 6 Hearing but the court found good cause excusing this appearance. (Lexington Motion, Ex. C at p. 3, ll. 15-26.) The court noted on the record that Singleton’s child care and related transportation issues constituted good cause. (Ibid.) The court’s minutes reflect that good cause was found to continue the hearing and bail obligations. (SBB Motion, Ex. A.) “The factual basis for the sufficient excuse finding must appear somewhere in the trial court record—in the minutes or in the reporter’s transcript.” (Bankers, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 479–480, internal quotation marks omitted.) The discussion on the record regarding child care and related issues, together with the minutes, are a sufficient finding of good cause under Penal Code section 1305.1. (Id. at pp. 479–480.) The evidence indicates the actions at the June 6 Hearing did not violate Penal Code sections 977, 1305, or 1305.1.
As to the September 11 Hearing on arraignment on information, the minutes indicate Singleton did not appear at this hearing. The minutes indicate “977 granted for today’s appearance ONLY, per the court.” (Lexington Motion, Ex. D.) Per the minutes, this hearing and the bond obligations were continued. (Ibid.) There is no transcript. Without a transcript, it is unclear on what specific basis the court permitted Singleton to appear by counsel only. It is unclear what occurred at this September 11 Hearing or the preceding hearing. The court may have found good cause on the same grounds as the June 6 Hearing or some other grounds, may have continued the hearing without appearance based on an exception in Penal Code section 977, subdivision (c), may have addressed the issue of continuance before the arraignment hearing was called, or may have acted on some other basis. Lexington presented insufficient evidence to evaluate these actions. (See Penal Code §§ 977, subds. (b)-(c), 1305, subd. (a)(1), 1305.1.) Under these circumstances, “[i]t is presumed that official duty [undertaken by the court] has been regularly performed.” (Evid. Code, § 664.)
As to the October 2 Hearing on continued arraignment on information, the minutes for the September 11 Hearing indicate Singleton was permitted in advance by the court to appear remotely by Zoom at the October 2 Hearing. (Lexington Motion, Ex. D.) It appears from the record that Singelton waived her right to appear personally as to this hearing. (Lexington Motion, Exs. D, E.) “Upon waiver of the right to be physically present by the defendant, criminal proceedings may be conducted through the use of remote technology ….” (Pen. Code, § 977, subd. (c)(1)(A).) The parties did not present a transcript of this hearing. A presumption of regularity also applies to this hearing. (Evid. Code, § 664.)
As to each of these hearings and issues raised by Lexington’s motion, Lexington did not carry its burden to demonstrate that Singleton was required to appear in person but failed to do so without excuse or permission under the law. (Safety National, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 974; Evid. Code § 500.) Lexington has not demonstrated a lack of jurisdiction over the Bail Bond. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) The parties do not appear to dispute that the court forfeited the Bail Bond in open court on January 15, 2025, when Singleton did not appear for this January 15 Hearing.
(7) Lexington Fails to Submit Competent Evidence to Support Its Arguments
The burden is on Lexington to support its arguments “by competent evidence.” (Safety National, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 974.) “Evidence received at a law and motion hearing must be by declaration or request for judicial notice … unless the court orders otherwise for good cause shown.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(a).) Lexington does not submit evidence by declaration or request for judicial notice in support of its motion. The court has no reason to conclude the attachments submitted by Lexington are not genuine, but Lexington has the burden of proof and the court must hold Lexington to that standard.
(8) Lexington Failed to Comply with Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008
“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)
“A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. For a failure to comply with this subdivision, any order made on a subsequent application may be revoked or set aside on ex parte motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (b).)
Here, the SBB Motion was filed on April 9, 2026, and the Lexington Motion was filed on August 20, 2026. These motions both seek to set aside the Judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the Bail Bond based on the same or similar facts and legal theories.
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), permits a motion by an injured party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) Lexington is the judgment debtor and defendant in this action. (See Judgment.) SBB is not a distinct moving party for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subdivision (d), and 1008. (See Judgment, attach.) SBB is the bail agent of Lexington for the Bail Bond and its role in this civil action is derived by Lexington’s status as a party. (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, the Lexington Motion is a renewed motion of the SBB Motion by the same party or party in privity. However, Lexington did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. (See SBB Motion; Order denying SBB Motion, August 3, 2026; Lexington Motion; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, subd. (d), 1008, subd. (b).)
For all these reasons, the court finds that Lexington failed to establish based on the arguments and evidence presented that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the Judgment or that the Judgment is otherwise void. The court will deny Lexington’s motion to set aside the Judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, subd. (d), 1008; Evid. Code, § 500; Safety National, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 974.)