City of Santa Barbara vs Santa Barbara Harbor Restaurant Inc

Case Number

26CV00694

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 02/20/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Consolidation

Tentative Ruling

(1) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of defendant Santa Barbara Harbor Restaurant, Inc., to consolidate civil and unlawful detainer actions and stay unlawful detainer action with interim court payments, is denied.

(2) For the reasons set forth herein, the same motion to consolidate civil and unlawful detainer actions and stay unlawful detainer action with interim court payments, that was filed by defendant on February 6, 2026, in case no. 25CV07609, shall be heard on February 20, 2026, and denied.

Background: 

On January 30, 2026, plaintiff City of Santa Barbara (the City) filed a complaint in this action (the UD Case), alleging one cause of action for unlawful detainer against defendant Santa Barbara Harbor Restaurant, Inc., (Harbor Restaurant). As alleged in the complaint:

Harbor Restaurant is in possession of premises located at 210 Stearns Wharf (the Premises), which is owned by, and located within the limits of, the City. (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 3(a), 3(b)(1) & 4.) On February 7, 2002, the City entered into a written lease agreement (the Lease) with Harbor Restaurant’s predecessor in interest, that was assigned to Harbor Restaurant on October 13, 2021. (Compl., ¶¶ 6(a), 6(b)(1), 6(c)(3), 6(e) & Exh. 1 [Lease].) Pursuant to the Lease, Harbor Restaurant’s predecessor agreed to rent the Premises as a commercial tenancy of approximately 27 years, and to pay rent of $36,000 payable monthly on the first of each month. (Compl., ¶¶ 6(a)(1)-(3) & 7(a).) The Lease was later changed by rent increases to the current base rent of $61,403.70, plus percentage rents. (Compl., ¶ 6(d).)

On January 13, 2026, the City served Harbor Restaurant with a ten-day notice to pay or quit (the Notice To Quit), by leaving a copy of the Notice to Quit with an employee at the Harbor Restaurant’s business, and by mailing a copy to Harbor Restaurant. (Compl., ¶¶ 9(a)(8), 9(e), 10(a)(2), 10(d) & Exhs. 2-3 [Notice to Quit & proof of service].) At the time of service of the Notice to Quit, the amount of rent due from Harbor Restaurant was $307,018.50. (Comp., ¶ 13.) The Notice to Quit includes an election of forfeiture. (Compl., ¶ 9(d).)

On January 28, 2026, the period stated in the Notice to Quit expired at the end of the day, and Harbor Restaurant failed to comply with its requirements by that date. (Compl., ¶ 9(b)(1)-(2).) The City seeks, among other things, possession of the Premises, past-due rent, and forfeiture of the Lease. (Compl., ¶ 20(a)-(i).)

On February 3, Harbor Restaurant filed in the UD Case, a motion for an order consolidating that case, for all purposes, with Santa Barbara Superior Court case number 25CV07609 entitled Santa Barbara Harbor Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Santa Barbara (the Harbor Action). The Harbor Action was filed by Harbor Restaurant on December 5, 2025. The present motion (or motion to consolidate) also requests an order staying the UD Case, and setting an amount of reasonable rent to be paid to the court by Harbor Restaurant pending the resolution of the Harbor Action. The motion to consolidate was calendared for a hearing in the UD Case on May 29, 2026.

On February 4, Harbor Restaurant filed in the UD Case, a notice of related case identifying the Harbor Action as related to that case.

Court records also reflect that on February 5, Harbor Restaurant filed in the Harbor Action, a notice of related case identifying the UD Case as related to that action.

On February 5, the City filed in the UD Case, its opposition to the motion to consolidate.

On February 6, Harbor Restaurant filed a copy of the motion to consolidate in the Harbor Action, resulting in that motion being calendared for a hearing in the Harbor Action on May 29.

Also on February 6, Harbor Restaurant filed in the UD Case only, an ex parte application (the application) for an order shortening time to hear the motion to consolidate.

On February 9, after a hearing, the court entered an order in the UD Case, granting the application; ordering that the motion to consolidate be heard on February 20; and staying the UD Case pending that hearing.

Also on February 9, Harbor Restaurant filed in the UD Case only, an amended notice of related case identifying the Harbor Action as related to that case.

Analysis:

The court’s docket reflects that the hearing on the motion to consolidate remains calendared for a hearing in the Harbor Action on May 29, 2026. The court will correct its docket by ordering that the motion to consolidate, which was not filed in the Harbor Action until February 6, 2026, shall be heard on February 20, 2026, in both the UD Case and the Harbor Action. The court will further order this ruling to be issued and filed in both the UD Case and the Harbor Action.

“When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd. (a).) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 [also stating that “[c]onsolidation under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 is permissive, and it is for the trial court to determine whether the consolidation is for all purposes or for trial only”].)

The grounds for the motion to consolidate appear in the notice of that motion, in the “Statement of Facts” section of the opening memorandum, and in a declaration by Harbor Restaurant’s counsel, John J. Thyne III (attorney Thyne), submitted in support of that motion. Though Harbor Restaurant does not submit a copy of the complaint filed in the Harbor Action with the motion to consolidate, that motion includes a general description of the subject matter of, and issues raised in, the Harbor Action.

In the present motion, Harbor Restaurant contends that the subject of the UD Case and the Harbor Action (collectively, the Actions) is the Lease and rent that remains unpaid under the Lease from February through June of 2025. Harbor Restaurant further contends that, in the Harbor Action, it seeks to reform the Lease in regard to the rent charged by the City retroactive to December 2021 because, according to Harbor Restaurant, the Lease was entered into under different economic conditions and, as a result, includes rent provisions which are economically obsolete, unconscionable, commercially impractical or impossible, and based upon a mutual mistake between Harbor Restaurant’s prior owner and the City.

The motion to consolidate also shows that the Harbor Action alleges that the original parties to the Lease could not foresee that its terms, which require Harbor Restaurant to pay a minimum base rent plus annual increases that are not correlated to or limited by a reduction in gross sales of the business and do not consider market rate rents, could result in a minimum base rent of more than 20 percent of the gross receipts of the business, which Harbor Restaurant contends is unsustainable for a restaurant. The Harbor Action further alleges in the Harbor Action, that the actions of the City have dramatically impacted and decreased its gross sales and gross receipts, and rendered the terms of the Lease economically oppressive, resulting in a frustration of its purpose and commercial impossibility.

Harbor Restaurant also contends in the Harbor Action that the City has demanded an acceleration of deferred rent before engaging in any negotiations to revise the Lease, and that the City refuses to modify the Lease by limiting the base rent to relate to gross sales and deducting mandatory expenses from gross receipts before calculating the rent due under the Lease. For these and further reasons discussed above, Harbor Restaurant contends, the Harbor Action seeks to reform the Lease, including rent provisions at issue in the UD Case.

Harbor Restaurant further asserts that if it prevails in the Harbor Action and successfully challenges the rent due for the Premises, those circumstances may result in an overpayment of rent by Harbor Restaurant for the time period at issue in the UD Case. For this reason, the motion to consolidate argues, there exist common questions of fact and law in regard to the amount of rent that should have been charged by the City from December 2021, such that consolidation of the Actions is necessary to ensure that the disputes between the parties to each of the Actions are fully adjudicated. Harbor Restaurant also claims that it will suffer significant prejudice if the UD Case is resolved first, and will be denied due process if it is unable to challenge the claims asserted by the City in the UD Case, including by reaching the issue of whether the rent due for the Premises pursuant to the Lease is commercially impracticable, impossible, or unconscionable.

For the reasons described above, Harbor Restaurant contends that consolidation will also ensure judicial efficiency and fairness, and prevent the possibility of inconsistent rulings if the UD Case proceeds on an expedited basis and concludes prior to the Harbor Action.

In its opposition to the motion, the City contends that the only triable issue in the UD Case is the right to possession of the Premises and incidental damages resulting from any unlawful detainer by Harbor Restaurant; that the only matter at issue in the Harbor Action is whether the Lease should be reformed to reflect a lower rental rate for the Premises; that absent the mutual consent, consolidation of an unlawful detainer action with an action seeking declaratory relief or damages is generally disfavored; that the only exception to this general rule is where the actions at issue both concern or involve a dispute as to title to property; and that staying the UD Case would frustrate the purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes which govern that case.

A discussion of the statutory procedures governing unlawful detainer actions is useful here. “ ‘An unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding, the primary purpose of which is to obtain the possession of real property in the situations specified by statute. [Citations.] The statutory procedure must be strictly followed. [Citation.] The sole issue before the court is the right to possession; accordingly, a defendant is not permitted to file a cross-complaint or counterclaim and, “a defense normally permitted because it ‘arises out of the subject matter’ of the original suit is generally excluded ... if such defense is extrinsic to the narrow issue of possession....” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Underwood v. Corsino (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 132, 135.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 defines circumstances where a tenant of real property is guilty of “unlawful detainer”. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (1)-(5).) Relevant here, a tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer where that tenant “continues in possession ... without the permission of the landlord ... after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under which the property is held, and three days’ notice ... in writing....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (2).) The statutory scheme is “intended and designed to provide an expeditious remedy for the recovery of possession of real property.” (Larson v. City and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1297.)

There also exist “limitations on the issues that may be raised by a defendant in [unlawful detainer] proceedings.” (Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 387 (Martin-Bragg).) For example, “ ‘[a]ffirmative defenses may be asserted only to the extent they might defeat the landlord’s right to possession.’ [Citations.]” (Coyne v. De Leo (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 801, 805 (Coyne).) Relevant here, “a landlord of commercial real property may prevail in an unlawful detainer action even if the demand for rent is incorrect...” provided that “the amount stated in the notice [is] clearly identified as an estimate. If there is a subsequent judicial determination that rent was in fact owed and that the amount claimed was reasonably estimated, the landlord may prevail.” (WDT-Winchester v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 516, 526; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1161.1 [addressing the “application of [Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 1161 in cases of possession of commercial property after default in the payment of rent....”].)

Information and evidence appearing in the motion to consolidate shows that Harbor Restaurant does not allege in the Harbor Action that the City has failed to strictly follow statutory procedures governing unlawful detainer, or that the essential prerequisites for maintaining an unlawful detainer action are not present here. For example, the description of the issues and allegations raised in the Harbor Action contained in that motion shows that the Harbor Action does not arise from any question, issue, or dispute as to whether there exists a landlord-tenant relationship between Harbor Restaurant and the City, or whether the relationship between those parties precludes the City from proceeding with the UD Case. (See, e.g., Castaic Studios, LLC v. Wonderland Studios LLC (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 209, 217 (Castaic Studios) [noting that unlawful detainer statute concerns landlord-tenant relationships]; Taylor v. Nu Digital Marketing, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 283, 289 [the court must determine whether the agreement between the parties “created a landlord-tenant relationship”]; Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1032, fn. 3 [general discussion of different types of tenancies].)

The motion to consolidate also shows that the Harbor Action does not raise any issue of whether the City complied with notice requirements set forth in the unlawful detainer statutes, such as whether the Notice to Quit is invalid. (Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1040–1041 [general discussion of notice requirements appliable to commercial tenancies].)

The motion to consolidate also does not show that the Harbor Action raises any claim or issue in regard to whether the City has in some manner waived the remedy of unlawful detainer. (See Castaic Studios, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 215–216 [agreement at issue waived remedy of unlawful detainer].)

Instead, the motion to consolidate shows that, though Harbor Restaurant contends in the Harbor Action that the provisions of the Lease governing the payment of rent for the Premises are unconscionable and should be reformed, that action does not appear to raise any question or dispute as to whether the amount of rent alleged to be in default in the UD Case is the amount of rent due pursuant to the Lease for the time period at issue in that case.  

For example, a reasonable interpretation of the complaint filed in the UD Case and described above shows that, under the terms of the Lease, the monthly rent due for the Premises from February through June of 2025 is $61,403.70. (Compl., Exh. 2 [Notice to Quit asserting rent due in the amount of $61,403.70 per month from February to June 2025].) The motion to consolidate asserts that the “current minimum base rent pursuant to the Lease, as of January 1, 2025, is $61,403.70/month....” (Motion at p. 5, ¶ 33.) That motion also shows or suggests that Harbor Restaurant began paying that minimum base rent in July 2025. (Motion at p. 7, ¶ 49.) Though Harbor Restaurant contends that the parties have been unsuccessful in their attempts to resolve issues concerning the Lease by adjusting the rent due for the Premises to correlate to gross receipts or reflect a market rate rent instead of the current rate of $61,403.70 (Motion at p. 8, ¶ 52), the motion to consolidate does not show that Harbor Restaurant disputes, either in the UD Case or in the Harbor Action, that the Lease required Harbor Restaurant to pay, from February through June of 2025, monthly rent of $61,403.70 for the Premises. (See also Notice at p. 2, ll. 13-18.)

Considering that the subject matter of UD Case is limited to whether the City may recover possession of the Premises and any incidental damages arising from the alleged unlawful detention of the Premises by Harbor Restaurant (Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 433, 445), and that Harbor Restaurant does not appear to dispute that the Lease requires the payment of rent alleged to be in default in the UD Case, the motion to consolidate fails to show why consolidation of the Actions will enhance efficiency, or prevent Harbor Restaurant from having to argue inconsistent or contradictory positions. (Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978-980; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 431.)

Harbor Restaurant also argues that any judgment entered in the UD Action could have an unintended collateral estoppel or res judicata effect on the Harbor Action.

“Res judicata ... is an umbrella term encompassing issue preclusion and claim preclusion, both of which describe the preclusive effect of a final judgment.” (Guerrero v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1098.) “In general, under claim preclusion, a prior judgment bars a new legal action between the same parties on the same cause of action. Under issue preclusion, a prior judgment bars relitigating issues in a new legal action that were fully litigated and decided against one of the new action’s parties.” (Schneider v. Lane (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 39, 48.)

As further discussed above, the UD Case is limited in its sole cause of action and subject matter to the narrow issue of possession of the Premises. Though the Harbor Action seeks to reform the terms of the Lease governing the payment of rent, the motion to consolidate fails to explain why that action involves the same cause of action as the UD Case, or why a judgment in the UD Case would bar litigation of the issues raised in the Harbor Action. (Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 489–491 [general discussion of “limited res judicata effect” of an unlawful detainer judgment and “the category of claims that a court has limited power to decide” in a proceeding alleging a default in the payment of rent].) For these reasons, the motion fails to show why claim or issue preclusion would operate to bar Harbor Restaurant from litigating the causes of action or issues raised in the Harbor Action even if the UD Case is litigated and resolved first.

In addition, to the extent Harbor Restaurant prevails in the Harbor Action and obtains a reformation of the Lease in regard to the amount of monthly rent due for the Premises, Harbor Restaurant also fails to address whether or why it would be barred from raising a claim for restitution even if the City were to prevail in the UD Case before the Harbor Action is resolved. (Jones v. First American Title Ins. Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 381, 388 [general discussion of remedy of reformation]; McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 388–389 [discussing restitution].)

The cases cited in the motion to consolidate are also distinguishable. For example, the factual and legal issues ostensibly raised in the Harbor Action, and described above, do not “interpose [a] claim of equitable ownership of the [Premises] as a defense to [the City’s] claim of unlawful detainer....” (Martin-Bragg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 388; see also Coyne, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 818 [noting that “[i]n the usual unlawful detainer case, the tenant is estopped from challenging his or her landlord’s title....”].) As further discussed above, the motion to consolidate also fails to explain, with reasoned argument, why the claims or cause of action alleged in the Harbor Action are “related directly to the issue of possession....” (Martin-Bragg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 388.)

For all reasons discussed above, the present record does not show why the Actions involve common issues of law or fact in regard to the right of possession of the Premises or any incidental damages resulting from any unlawful detention by Harbor Restaurant. For these reasons, the court will deny the motion to consolidate to the extent it seeks an order consolidating the Actions for all purposes, the effect of which would “prevent the [City] from employing the summary remedies to which [it] is entitled under the unlawful detainer statutes [citation]. If such were the rule, it would be within the power of [Harbor Restaurant] to render nugatory the statutorily prescribed unlawful detainer procedures.” (Childs v. Eltinge (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 843, 854.)

The motion to consolidate also requests an order staying the prosecution of the UD Case pending the resolution of the Harbor Action. The court notes that, to the extent the Lease is reformed in the Harbor Action in a manner which requires the payment of monthly rent for the Premises in an amount which is less than the rent alleged to be in default in the UD Case, there exists some question as to whether Harbor Restaurant may, under those circumstances, retain possession of the Premises. (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 633 [general discussion of defenses which, “if established, would result in the tenant’s retention of the premises.”].) Though this court presently makes no findings as to that issue, the court acknowledges that, under appropriate circumstances, a court may stay unlawful detainer proceedings pending a trial of a another action which raises issues on which the remedy of unlawful detainer depends “based on the authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 526 which permits a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo on such grounds as irreparable injury, multiplicity of legal actions, or unconscionable relative hardship.” (Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141, 146–147 & fn. 1 (Asuncion).)

Though the stay requested in the motion to consolidate would effectively enjoin the prosecution of the UD Case by the City pending a trial of the Harbor Action, that motion is not styled or appropriately presented as a request for a preliminary injunction for reasons further discussed below.

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits. [¶] Past California decisions further establish that, as a general matter, the question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.... ‘The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554, original italics.)

Wholly absent from the motion to consolidate is any reasoned legal or factual argument showing the likelihood that Harbor Restaurant will prevail on the merits of the claims or causes of action alleged in the Harbor Action, or the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of a preliminary injunction enjoining the prosecution of the UD Case. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the motion to consolidate fails to show sufficient grounds to stay the UD Case. Therefore, the court will deny the motion to consolidate to the extent it requests an order staying the UD Case, which would impose a “heavy burden on [the City] by delaying [that] action.” (Asuncion, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 147, fn. 1.)

The court’s ruling herein is without prejudice to any future motion for a preliminary injunction that may be filed by Harbor Restaurant, if appropriate. Nothing herein shall be interpreted or construed to reflect the manner in which the court might rule on any motion for a preliminary injunction that may be filed by Harbor Restaurant in the future.