William C Turner, III vs Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal et al

Case Number

26CV00309

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 03/09/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Shall Not Issue

Tentative Ruling

William C. Turner III v. Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal 

Case No. 26CV00309

           

Hearing Date: March 9, 2026                                                 

HEARING:              Order to Show Cause re Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff William C. Turner III: Geoff Newlan

                                    For Defendant Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal: Self-represented

                                   

TENTATIVE RULING:

The application for issuance of a preliminary injunction is granted to enjoin defendant Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal from driving or otherwise operating the subject 2007 Chrysler Aspen (VIN ending in 15890) pending disposition of this action or further order of the court. Plaintiff William C. Turner III shall present to the court for signature a written order granting the preliminary injunction as set forth herein, and shall file the undertaking ordered herein, on or before March 16, 2026. The temporary restraining order shall remain in effect until the written order for preliminary injunction is entered.

Background:

On January 13, 2026, plaintiff William C. Turner III filed his original complaint in this action asserting five causes of action against defendant Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal: (1) ejectment; (2) declaratory relief; (3) conversion; (4) waste/ trespass to chattels; and (5) fraud and deceit. 

 

On January 20, 2026, Turner filed his first amended complaint (FAC), the operative complaint, asserting the same five causes of action against Dayal, and adding a cause of action for negligence against defendant Voigt Inc. dba Smitty’s Towing West & Storage. 

 

On February 3, 2026, Turner filed his ex parte application (Application) for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re preliminary injunction. The Application requested a temporary restraining order against Dayal from operating a certain 2007 Chrysler Aspen (the Vehicle) and ordering the immediate surrender of all keys to Turner. (Application, at p. 1.) 

 

On February 4, 2026, Dayal filed opposition to the Application. 

 

On February 5, 2026, the court heard the application but did not rule on the ex parte request, continuing the matter to this hearing on February 23. 

 

On February 17, 2026, Turner filed a memorandum in support of the motion for preliminary injunction and order compelling turnover of vehicle keys, as well as other supporting documents.

On February 20, 2026, Dayal filed supplemental opposition to the Application.

On February 23, 2026, the court heard the Application and issued a TRO limited to requiring Dayal not to operate the Vehicle unless Dayal has a valid driver’s license and evidence of insurance (or other satisfaction of the financial responsibility requirements of the Vehicle Code). The court also set this hearing on an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue (OSC).

In setting this hearing on the OSC, the court gave Turner leave to file additional papers in support of the OSC on or before noon on February 25, 2026. Turner instead filed a supplemental declaration on February 27 that was served by mail on February 26. The court does not consider the untimely supplemental declaration. The court also gave Dayal leave to file opposition papers on or before noon on March 4. Dayal has not filed any papers subsequent to the hearing on February 23.

 

Analysis: 

 

Notwithstanding the issuance of the TRO, the burden is on plaintiff, as the party seeking injunctive relief, to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction. (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.) A preliminary injunction is available “[w]hen it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(2).)

“The trial courts consider two interrelated questions in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) are the plaintiffs likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant; and 2) is there a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. [Citations.] ‘[By] balancing the respective equities of the parties, [the court] concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him.’ [Citations.]” (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.) 

Turner’s FAC asserts a cause of action for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that Dayal has no legal right to operate or possess the Vehicle and that any alleged Use Agreement is void. (FAC, at p. 7.) The orders sought by Turner depend upon the success of this declaratory relief action, at least to the extent that Turner obtains declaratory relief that Dayal has no continuing right to operate the Vehicle. As the court explained in ruling on the TRO, pre-judgment possession of the Vehicle falls within an action for claim and delivery which is not pleaded in the FAC and is not addressed in the Application. For the same reasons discussed in the TRO ruling, the court does not consider that part of the Application that requests possession of the Vehicle by obtaining return of all keys to the Vehicle.

(1)       Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The evidence presented by the parties shows Turner is the owner of the Vehicle and that both parties entered into an agreement for the use of the Vehicle, entitled “Private Automobile Use Agreement” (Use Agreement). (Turner decl., dated Feb. 16, 2026, ¶¶ 2 & exhibit A; Dayal decl., ¶ 2 & exhibit A.)

The Use Agreement includes the following provisions (bolding omitted):

“The Owner [(Turner)] hereby grants full permission to the User [(Dayal] to use the Owner’s privately owned automobile [(the Vehicle)]. [¶] … [¶] This use shall be in a private, non-commercial capacity only.” (Use Agreement, § 1.)

“The User may use the automobile at any time, for any duration, and with no restriction or limitation, so long as the use remains non-commercial. This grant of use is made voluntarily and without. monetary consideration, as a private arrangement between the parties.” (Use Agreement, § 2.)

“This contract does not transfer title or ownership of the automobile. The automobil[e] remains the sole property of the Owner.” (Use Agreement, § 3.)

“This private agreement shall be governed by the principles of common law, applicable to private contracts made between living men and women, outside the scope of commercial regulation. This document is intended to reflect mutual understanding and does not constitute a commercial lease, rental, or sale.” (Use Agreement, § 10.)

The Use Agreement does not contain any express termination provision. Dayal argues that the Use Agreement gives her unrestricted use of the Vehicle with no ability of Turner to terminate the Use Agreement or revoke permission to use the Vehicle. Turner argues that he owns the Vehicle and has the right to control the use of the Vehicle by revoking permission for Dayal to use it, whether or not the Use Agreement constitutes an agreement of the parties.

By its terms, the Use Agreement disclaims that the Use Agreement constitutes a lease, rental, or sale of the Vehicle. At the same time, the Use Agreement confirms that Turner remains the owner of the Vehicle, and therefore the Use Agreement does not constitute a gift of the Vehicle. (See Gordon v. Barr (1939) 13 Cal.2d 596, 602 [gift requires intent to divest ownership of the property].) Because the Use Agreement does not cause a change in ownership, and is not a lease or rental, the Use Agreement can best be described as evidencing a “loan for use.”

“A loan for use is a contract by which one gives to another the temporary possession and use of personal property, and the latter agrees to return the same thing to him at a future time, without reward for its use.” (Civ. Code, § 1884.)

“A loan for use does not transfer the title to the thing; and all its increase during the period of the loan belongs to the lender.” (Civ. Code, § 1885.)

“The borrower of a thing for use may use it for such purposes only as the lender might reasonably anticipate at the time of lending.” (Civ. Code, § 1890.)

“The lender of a thing for use may at any time require its return, even though he lent it for a specified time or purpose.” (Civ. Code, § 1894.)

“If a thing is lent for use for a specified time or purpose, it must be returned to the lender without demand, as soon as the time has expired, or the purpose has been accomplished. In other cases it need not be returned until demanded.” (Civ. Code, § 1895.)

The Use Agreement is consistent with this legal framework. Under the law of a loan for use, a lender may require the return of the property at any time upon demand regardless of whether the specified time for use has expired or the purpose for the use has been accomplished. Thus, under the law of a loan for use, even if the Use Agreement contemplates unlimited use, Turner may still obtain return of the Vehicle.

Turner has presented evidence that he demanded return of the Vehicle by demanding return of all keys. (Turner decl., dated Jan. 31, 2026, ¶ 17.) The court concludes on the evidence presented that Turner is likely to prevail on his declaratory relief claim that Turner is the owner of the Vehicle and, following demand, is entitled to exclusive use of the Vehicle. (See Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 731 [“[a]n essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it”].) As a consequence, Turner appears likely to prevail in obtaining an order to prevent Dayal from using the Vehicle.

(2)       Relative Hardships

In the event that the court erroneously denied the injunction, Turner would be deprived of his rights as an owner to preclude Dayal from using the Vehicle. Turner has presented evidence of his concern that Dayal would use the Vehicle in such a manner as to expose him to liability as its owner. (Turner decl., dated Feb. 16, 2026, ¶¶ 3 -7; see Veh. Code, § 17150.) Taken together the deprivation of Turner’s right to exclude Dayal is a substantial irreparable harm to Turner.

In the event that the court erroneously granted the injunction, Dayal would be precluded from using the Vehicle contrary to her asserted rights under the Use Agreement. Dayal has presented evidence that the use of the Vehicle has since late 2024 been her primary and often sole means of transportation. (Dayal decl., dated Feb. 20, 2026.) This deprivation constitutes substantial irreparable harm to Dayal.

Deprivation of use of a primary means of transportation by Dayal is a substantial hardship, but that hardship is mitigated by Dayal’s insurance coverage issue. Dayal’s February 20 declaration strongly implies that she did not, as of February 20, have insurance coverage to meet the financial responsibility provisions of the Vehicle Code. (See Dayal decl., ¶ 7.) The court conditioned use of the Vehicle under the TRO upon Dayal filing such proof with the court. The TRO was issued on February 23; as of March 5, 2026, Dayal had not filed any such proof, implying that either Dayal has no insurance to legally operate the vehicle or has not had need to use the Vehicle since the issuance of the TRO. At the same time, Turner’s inability to control the use of his own Vehicle exposes Turner to liability, or to the threat of liability, by Dayal’s use, and prevents Turner from taking other actions as to the Vehicle, such as repair or sale. The court finds that the balance of harms tips in favor of Turner, but not strongly so.

(3)       Balance of Equities
 

On the evidence before the court, the court finds that Turner has a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his action relative to the Vehicle and that the relative harms favor issuance of an injunction. Balancing the relative harms of the parties and the likelihood of Turner’s success on the merits, the court finds that the balance of equities favors issuance of an injunction.

As noted above, this injunction addresses use of the Vehicle, not possession of the Vehicle. The court will therefore issue a preliminary injunction as follows:

Dayal shall not drive or otherwise operate the Vehicle pending disposition of this action or further order of the court.

(4)       Bond and Written Order

“On granting an injunction, the court or judge must require an undertaking on the part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party enjoined any damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, the party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction. Within five days after the service of the injunction, the person enjoined may object to the undertaking. If the court determines that the applicant’s undertaking is insufficient and a sufficient undertaking is not filed within the time required by statute, the order granting the injunction must be dissolved.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 529, subd. (a).)

Under the evidence presented here, the court finds that an undertaking in the amount of $1,000 is appropriate and will be ordered, subject to an application of either party to increase or decrease the amount of the undertaking.

“Notwithstanding rule 3.1312, whenever an application for a preliminary injunction is granted, a proposed order must be presented to the judge for signature, with an undertaking in the amount ordered, within one court day after the granting of the application or within the time ordered. Unless otherwise ordered, any restraining order previously granted remains in effect during the time allowed for presentation for signature of the order of injunction and undertaking. If the proposed order and the undertaking required are not presented within the time allowed, the TRO may be vacated without notice. All bonds and undertakings must comply with rule 3.1130.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1150(f).)

The court will require plaintiff to present to the court a written order for signature.