William C Turner, III vs Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal et al

Case Number

26CV00309

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 02/23/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Hearing re Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction; Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Tentative Ruling

William C. Turner III v. Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal

Case No. 26CV00309

           

Hearing Date: February 23, 2026                                                      

HEARING:              Hearing re Temporary Restraining Order and Issuance of OSC re Preliminary Injunction

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff William C. Turner III: Geoff Newlan

                                    For Defendant Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal: Self-represented

                                   

TENTATIVE RULING:

(1)       The application of plaintiff William C. Turner III for issuance of a temporary restraining order is granted in part. Until determination by the court of the Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Shall Not Issue, defendant Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal is restrained and enjoined from driving or otherwise operating the 2007 Chrysler Aspen, VIN ending in 15890 (the Vehicle), unless all of the following are met at the time of driving or operation: (a) defendant Dayal first files with the court evidence of insurance, as described in Vehicle Code section 16055, or files other evidence of financial responsibility by which defendant Dayal complies with Vehicle Code section 16050 in her operation of the Vehicle; (b) defendant Dayal establishes and maintains financial responsibility as provided in Vehicle Code sections 16020 and 16021; and (c) defendant Dayal possesses a valid driver’s license permitting defendant Dayal to operate the Vehicle in California.

(2)       The court will issue an Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Shall Not Issue (OSC) to be heard on Monday, March 9, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff Turner may file and serve any additional papers in support of the OSC on or before noon on Wednesday, February 25, 2026. Defendant Dayal may file and serve any papers in opposition to the OSC on or before noon on Wednesday, March 4, 2026. Plaintiff Turner may file and serve any reply papers in response to the opposition on or before noon on Friday, March 6, 2026.

Background:

On January 13, 2026, plaintiff William C. Turner III filed his original complaint in this action asserting five causes of action against defendant Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal: (1) ejectment; (2) declaratory relief; (3) conversion; (4) waste/ trespass to chattels; and (5) fraud and deceit.

On January 20, 2026, Turner filed his first amended complaint (FAC), the operative complaint, asserting the same five causes of action against Dayal, and adding a cause of action for negligence against defendant Voigt Inc. dba Smitty’s Towing West & Storage.

On February 3, 2026, Turner filed his ex parte application (Application) for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re preliminary injunction. The Application requests a temporary restraining order against Dayal from operating a certain 2007 Chrysler Aspen (the Vehicle) and ordering the immediate surrender of all keys to Turner. (Application, at p. 1.)

On February 4, 2026, Dayal filed opposition to the Application.

On February 5, 2026, the court heard the application but did not rule on the ex parte request, continuing the matter to this hearing on February 23.

On February 17, 2026, Turner filed a memorandum in support of the motion for preliminary injunction and order compelling turnover of vehicle keys, as well as other supporting documents.

Analysis:

This is a continued hearing on Turner’s ex parte application for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and an order to show cause re preliminary injunction. By this application, Turner seek an order enjoining Dayal from operating the Vehicle and an order of immediate surrender of all keys to the Vehicle to plaintiff. Turner makes this application on the grounds that “Defendant’s unauthorized possession of Plaintiff's vehicle poses an immediate threat to public safety and Plaintiff's property.” (Ex Parte Application, at p. 2.)

With respect to the Vehicle, Turner’s complaint includes causes of action for declaratory relief, conversion, and waste/ trespass to chattels. There are two issues presented in this application, one is possession of the Vehicle (particularly by possession of keys) and the other is the risk posed by Dayal’s use of the Vehicle pending disposition of this action.

Possession of personal property is addressed by an action to recover possession, i.e., for claim and delivery. (Waffer Internat. Corp. v. Khorsandi (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1271 [“Claim and delivery is a remedy by which a party with a superior right to a specific item of personal property … may recover possession of that specific property before judgment.”]; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 511.010 et seq., 667.) Turner has not pleaded an action asserting claim and delivery and has not asserted a prejudgment remedy for writ of possession under the claim and delivery statutes by this application. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010.) Turner also has not sought a temporary restraining order under the claim and delivery statutes. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 513.010, 513.020.) These statutes provide specific requirements for prejudgment possession. Because there is no showing under those statutes, the request for turnover of keys—and with such turnover the pre-judgment possession of the Vehicle—is denied without prejudice to the making of a procedurally appropriate application under the claim and delivery statutes.

The relief sought in the Application therefore depends upon Turner’s claim relating to the threat of damage to the Vehicle. The standards for issuance of a TRO are the same as for issuance of a preliminary injunction, taking into account that the TRO remains in effect only until the disposition of an OSC re preliminary injunction. Because this is only a determination of the TRO, the court does not consider papers filed in support of the preliminary injunction for which Dayal has not had a reasonable opportunity to respond.

“The trial courts consider two interrelated questions in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) are the plaintiffs likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant; and 2) is there a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. [Citations.] ‘[By] balancing the respective equities of the parties, [the court] concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him.’ [Citations.]” (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.)

In support of the application for TRO, Turner has presented evidence that he is the registered owner of the Vehicle and is reasonably concerned about the use of the Vehicle by Dayal. (Turner decl. ¶¶ 1-54.) Dayal opposes the TRO but filed no declaration or other evidence in opposition to the application.

Turner has presented sufficient evidence for the court to find that Turner has a reasonable probability of success on his claim for waste/ trespass to chattels. Turner presents evidence of a reasonable concern of damage to the Vehicle or liability to himself in the event Dayal is permitted to continue to use the Vehicle. Dayal has not presented evidence of hardship to her by restrictions on the use of the Vehicle.

In considering these issues, the court notes that Turner has expressly, and in the records of this court, withdrawn permission for Dayal to use the Vehicle. This partially addresses Turner’s concerns for liability as an owner of the Vehicle. (See Veh. Code, § 17150 [“Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.”].)

Balancing the equities of the parties, the court will issue a TRO and an order to show cause re preliminary injunction, as follows:

1.         Dayal shall not drive or otherwise operate the Vehicle without a valid driver’s license permitting Dayal to operate the Vehicle in California.

2.         Dayal shall not drive or otherwise operate the Vehicle without establishing and maintaining financial responsibility as provided in Vehicle Code sections 16020 and 16021.

3.         Dayal shall not drive or otherwise operate the Vehicle without first filing with the court evidence of insurance as described in Vehicle Code section 16055 or filing other evidence of financial responsibility by which Dayal complies with Vehicle Code section 16050 in operating the Vehicle.

No undertaking is required for this TRO. (See City of South San Francisco v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Assn. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920.)

The court will issue an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction shall not be issued.