Matter of the Osiris Living Trust

Case Number

25PR00637

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Tue, 02/03/2026 - 08:30

Nature of Proceedings

Petition to Determine Claim to Real Property

Tentative Ruling

Probate Notes:

Appearances required. 

James Wright petitions the court pursuant to Probate Code section 850, to Determine a Claim to Real and Personal Property currently titled to Charles E. Osiris, deceased.  Petitioner alleges he accepted the role as successor trustee of the subject trust (Pet. ¶5) upon the death of Charles E. Osiris.  The Petition received written objection by Paris LaShell York, who alleges to be the biological daughter of Decedent. (Obj. to Pet., at p. 1, lns. 26-7.)  This objection places the matter at issue, requiring evidentiary hearing to resolve.  (In re Estate of Lensch (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 667, 676; Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 370, 377.)

Parties are required to appear at the hearing and come ready to discuss discovery needs and dates for trial.

The following is noted for the Court at the hearing:

James Wright has to overcome a judicial admission contrary to his assertion of trusteeship.  Mr. Wright’s allegation that he serves as the current trustee is contrary to the allegations made by Francine Rios-Osiris in a previous petition that she was serving as the successor trustee after the death of the co-settlor. (Pet. at ¶3, case no. 25PR00494.)  Furthermore, there is no document or other evidence on file showing Mr. Wright followed the procedure outlined in the trust to accept the trusteeship and become successor trustee.

The trust appears void.  As was extensively outlined in the probate notes in the previous case where the Court denied a similar petition brought by Francine Rios-Osiris, the orders made in the dissolution of marriage case between Francine and Decedent appear to have removed all the property at issue in this matter out of the trust, thus effectively voiding the trust.

Probate Code section 850 cannot be used to resurrect a void trust.  From the allegations and admissions in the petition and supplement in the previous trust case (25PR00494) and related dissolution case (18FL01568) the following facts are verified and plainly before the Court:

1. Francine Rios-Osiris and Decedent, Charles E. Osiris executed the subject trust in 2014, six years before their dissolution. (Pet. at ¶1.)

2. The subject trust made Petitioner and Charles E. Osiris co-trustees (Pet. at exh. A, Art. III, A, dgtl. p. 2), made the surviving co-trustee the sole trustee upon the first co-trustee’s death (Ibid.), and named James Wright first successor trustee, and Kevin D. Rome as second co-trustee in the event neither co-trustee could serve in that role. (Id. at Ovrview, Art. III, dgtl. p. 7.)

3. Like Francine Rios-Osiris in the previous case, James Wright in this case prays for an order that confirms title to real property at 2547 Village Green, in Santa Maria, and two specific financial accounts, are held in the name of the subject trust “under the management and control of the Trustee, James Wright.”  (Pet. at Pryrs. 1-3.)

4. The subject real property and accounts were adjudicated to be the separate property of Charles E. Osiris.  (Jdgmnt. on Res. Issues, filed May 18, 2023, case no. 18FL01568.)

5. The recorded title of the subject real property shows it is held in the name of “Charles Emmanuel Osiris, a married man as his sole and separate property,” and the financial accounts are held also solely in his name.  (Pet. at ¶9.)

From the above verified facts, it appears the trust is altogether void, because the property at issue in this petition was transferred out of trust, and all other property that could be held in the subject trust’s name was distributed to Francine Rios-Osiris per the same court order in the dissolution case that transferred the property in this case out of the trust.

As was outlined previously:

Subdivision (c) of Probate Code section 5040 expressly states that “the instrument making the nonprobate transfer shall be treated as it would if the former spouse failed to survive the transferor.” (Emphasis added.)  This language refers to how the Court must treat the entire instrument, as it relates to the surviving spouse, not just the distribution of property clauses in the instrument, as argued by Petitioner.  This, in practice, means that in every respect throughout the entire trust instrument, Petitioner must be treated as predeceased.  A deceased person cannot logically serve as fiduciary.

Probate Code section 6122 prohibits similar provisions in a will executed before a dissolution from nominating the former spouse from serving as trustee or executor of the will.  The case of Estate of Coleman (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 380, also confirms this outcome, where the argument being made is substantially similar to the argument Petitioner makes here:

Barlow argues that the only part of the will that contravenes section 6122 is the nomination of Jean Coleman as executor of the will. He argues the will gives decedent's estate to the trustee of the trust, not to Jean Coleman, and this bequest is not revoked by section 6122. He claims the nomination of Jean Coleman as the trustee by the trust document is not affected by section 6122 because it is not a “provision of the will” as required by section 6122. He claims the transfer of property to Jean Coleman under the trust was not invalidated by section 6122. We disagree.

(Estate of Coleman (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 380, 387 [“emphasis added”].)  Even more persuasive was the court’s rationale, which contemplated the effect of a marital settlement agreement on the trust contained within the will:

A revocation occurs where the settlor makes a conveyance of the trust property out of the trust. (Bogert, Trusts & Trustees (2d rev. ed.1983) § 1001, p. 336.) If the trust reserves the power in the settlor to withdraw trust property from the trust, as here, the withdrawal terminates the trust as to the property withdrawn. (IV Scott on Trusts (4th ed.1989) § 330.11, pp. 370–371.) Where the property of the trust ceases to exist, there is nothing to which the trustee may hold legal title, nothing in which the beneficiaries may hold a beneficial interest, and there is no longer a trust. (IA Scott on Trusts (4th ed.1987) § 74.2, p. 434.) It follows that the complete withdrawal of the trust property terminates the entire trust.

(Id. at p. 388 [emphasis added].) 

In this case, it appears from the May 15, 2023, Judgment on Reserved Issues that Petitioner and Decedent divided the marital estate pursuant to just such a marital settlement agreement as the one at issue above.  (Jdgmnt. on Res. Issues, at ¶2, case no. 18FL01568 [“agreement in court”].)  Thus, the trust ceased to exist due to both the operation of Probate Code section 5040, and the fact that the judgement in case no. 18FL01568 withdrew all the property in the trust.

As a result of the above facts and authority cited, this petition, like the last one, should be denied.  While the grounds for denial are not like the last petition (i.e. standing), the Petition should be denied because Probate Code section 5040 requires this court to treat the trust as ceasing to exist. (Estate of Coleman, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th, at p. 388.)