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Matter of The Osiris Living Trust

Case Number

25PR00494

Case Type

Trust

Hearing Date / Time

Tue, 12/09/2025 - 09:00

Nature of Proceedings

Petition to Determine Title to Property

Tentative Ruling

Probate Notes:

Appearances required. 

After supplement to the petition filed on November 6, 2025, the following is noted for the Court at the hearing:

The petition is recommended for denial, and an Order to Show Cause why Sanctions should not be issued should be made.

The petition should be denied, because the Petitioner has no standing.

Petitioner brought this petition pursuant to Probate Code section 850.  That section grants authority to 1) any claimant of property relating to a guardianship, conservatorship, or property owned by a minor (subd. (a)(1)); 2) a personal representative of a decedent’s estate (subd. (a)(2)); or 3) a trustee or person with a claim to the subject property.

From the allegations and admissions in the petition and supplement, and the record of this Court in case no. 18FL01568, the following facts are verified:

  1. Petitioner is the former spouse of the deceased co-settlor of the trust. (Not. of Ent. of Jdgmnt., filed Oct. 2, 2020, case no. 18FL01568.)
  1. Petitioner and Decedent, Charles E. Osiris executed the subject trust in 2014, six years before their dissolution. (Pet. at ¶1.)
  1. The subject trust made Petitioner and Charles E. Osiris co-trustees (Pet. at exh. A, Art. III, A, dgtl. p. 2), made the surviving co-trustee the sole trustee upon the first co-trustee’s death (Ibid.), and named James Wright first successor trustee, and Kevin D. Rome as second co-trustee in the event neither co-trustee could serve in that role. (Id. at Ovrview, Art. III, dgtl. p. 7.)
  1. Petitioner prays this court for an order that confirms title to real property at 2547 Village Green, in Santa Maria, and two specific financial accounts, are held in the name of the subject trust “under the management and control of the Trustee, Francine Rios.”  (Pet. at Pryrs. 1-3.)
  1. The subject real property and accounts were adjudicated to be the separate property of Charles E. Osiris.  (Jdgmnt. on Res. Issues, filed May 18, 2023, case no. 18FL01568.)
  1. The recorded title of the subject real property shows it is held in the name of “Charles Emmanuel Osiris, a married man as his sole and separate property,” and the financial accounts are held also solely in his name.  (Pet. at ¶9.)

From the above verified facts, it is clear that Petitioner has no standing to petition for the relief requested, because 1) the facts show the subject property does not belong to a guardianship, conservatorship, or minor; 2) the Petitioner is not the Personal Representative of Charles E. Osiris’ estate; 3) Probate Code section 5040, subdivision (c), requires the Court to treat the Petitioner as predeceased, 4) a deceased person (factual or legal) cannot serve as trustee; and 5) Petitioner has no intestate rights to the subject property (Prob. Code, §78(a)).

Petitioner argues she can still serve as the trustee of “The Osiris Living Trust,” because “Probate Code section 5040 addresses beneficial interests passing to a former spouse; it says nothing about the role of a former spouse as trustee.”  Petitioner sites no authority supporting or codifying that proposition.

Subdivision (c) of Probate Code section 5040 expressly states that “the instrument making the nonprobate transfer shall be treated as it would if the former spouse failed to survive the transferor.” (Emphasis added.)  This language refers to how the Court must treat the entire instrument, as it relates to the surviving spouse, not just the distribution of property clauses in the instrument, as argued by Petitioner.  This, in practice, means that in every respect throughout the entire trust instrument, Petitioner must be treated as predeceased.  A deceased person cannot logically serve as fiduciary.

Probate Code section 6122 prohibits similar provisions in a will executed before a dissolution from nominating the former spouse from serving as trustee or executor of the will.  The case of Estate of Coleman (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 380, also confirms this outcome, where the argument being made is substantially similar to the argument Petitioner makes here:

Barlow argues that the only part of the will that contravenes section 6122 is the nomination of Jean Coleman as executor of the will. He argues the will gives decedent's estate to the trustee of the trust, not to Jean Coleman, and this bequest is not revoked by section 6122. He claims the nomination of Jean Coleman as the trustee by the trust document is not affected by section 6122 because it is not a “provision of the will” as required by section 6122. He claims the transfer of property to Jean Coleman under the trust was not invalidated by section 6122. We disagree.

(Estate of Coleman (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 380, 387 [“emphasis added”].)  Even more persuasive was the court’s rationale, which contemplated the effect of a marital settlement agreement on the trust contained within the will:

A revocation occurs where the settlor makes a conveyance of the trust property out of the trust. (Bogert, Trusts & Trustees (2d rev. ed.1983) § 1001, p. 336.) If the trust reserves the power in the settlor to withdraw trust property from the trust, as here, the withdrawal terminates the trust as to the property withdrawn. (IV Scott on Trusts (4th ed.1989) § 330.11, pp. 370–371.) Where the property of the trust ceases to exist, there is nothing to which the trustee may hold legal title, nothing in which the beneficiaries may hold a beneficial interest, and there is no longer a trust. (IA Scott on Trusts (4th ed.1987) § 74.2, p. 434.) It follows that the complete withdrawal of the trust property terminates the entire trust.

(Id. at p. 388 [emphasis added].) 

In this case, it appears from the May 15, 2023, Judgment on Reserved Issues that Petitioner and Decedent divided the marital estate pursuant to just such a marital settlement agreement as the one at issue above.  (Jdgmnt. on Res. Issues, at ¶2, case no. 18FL01568 [“agreement in court”].)  Thus, the trust ceased to exist due to both the operation of Probate Code section 5040, and the fact that the judgement in case no. 18FL01568 withdrew all the property in the trust.

Therefore, the Petition should be denied because Petitioner has no interest in the subject trust, and cannot serve as the trustee of that trust, thus has no standing in this case.  Even if Petitioner did have standing, Probate Code section 5040 requires this court to treat her as pre-deceased in every respect of the trust instrument, going so far as to treat the trust as ceasing to exist. (Estate of Coleman, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th, at p. 388.)

Petitioner should show cause why sanctions should not issue, because the Petition was unmeritorious, omitted relevant facts that controlled the outcome of the Petition, and did not disclose the existence of relevant court orders affecting the title to the subject property.

A trial court has authority to issue sanctions against a party when an action or tactic is frivolous (CCP, §128.5(a)), or when a petition is presented to the court that by the attorney’s signature affirms “claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law” (CCP, §128.7(b)(2)), but lacks any of those affirmations in fact.  An action is “frivolous” and in “bad faith” where “any reasonable attorney would agree [it] is totally devoid of merit” (i.e., lacking any basis in statutory or case law, or without any necessary evidence to support it. (Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(III)-B, “Sanctions Under CCP § 128.5.” [citing [Karwasky v. Zachay (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 679, 681].  See also Estate of Kempton (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 189, 206.)  The Court also has authority to sanction a party and their attorney for violation of the Rules of Court. (CRC, Rule 2.30(b) [“In addition to any other sanctions permitted by law, the court may order a person, after written notice and an opportunity to be heard, to pay reasonable monetary sanctions to the court or an aggrieved person, or both, for failure without good cause to comply with the applicable rules.”].)

In this case, sanctions are warranted under Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5, 128.7, and CRC, Rule 2.30 for the omission of the relevant facts relating to the Petitioner’s dissolution case, and failure to file a Notice of Related Case thereof.  As a result of the distribution of property and marital status change in that case, the Petition in this case objectively lacked merit, because that case contained relevant evidence controlling the disposition of the subject property, and that disposition could not conclude with the property coming under either ownership or control of the Petitioner as trustee.

Petitioner admits in the Supplement filed on November 6, 2025, at paragraph 2 that Petitioner “failed to inform her counsel of the details of the family law matter and the resulting judgement [sic],” but then contrarily denies in paragraph 1 of the supplement that there was no failure to disclose that information because the marital status on Decedent’s Death Certificate shows “Divorced” as the marital status.  This is not persuasive.

Claiming Petitioner admitted to the divorce by pointing to an obscure field in the Death Certificate seems disingenuous when Petitioner pursued the petition as if no divorce occurred, admitted it was not disclosed, and in supplement presses still for the court to grant the petition for reasons that it is not opposed and would be judicially inefficient to seek the proper procedure.  All this, despite clear language in the statue and caselaw forbidding that from happening, and despite this Court’s power (and arguable duty) to stop that from happening.  (Estate of Sobol (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 771, 785. Accord, Estate of Lind (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1424, 1436 [Probate Court has inherent power (and maybe a duty) to raise issues that affect distribution of property].)

Therefore, the Court should issue OSC re: Sanctions to Petitioner and attorney for same, and set the hearing on January 13, 2026.

Appearances:

The court is open to the public for court business. The court is also conducting hearings via Zoom videoconference.

Meeting ID: 161 956 1423

Passcode: 137305

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