Tentative Ruling: Matter of Rachel De La Cruz Trust
Case Number
25PR00463
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Thu, 03/05/2026 - 09:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion Anti-SLAPP Motion; Petition re Internal Affairs of Trust to Enforce No-Contest
Tentative Ruling
For the reasons set forth below, Respondent Rachel De La Cruz’s Anti-SLAPP motion to strike is granted. The petition is dismissed with prejudice.
Background:
This action commenced on September 2, 2025, by the filing of the petition to enforce no-contest clause of The Rachel De La Cruz Trust, dated July 17, 2000, as amended on March 9, 2018 (the “Trust”), by petitioner Yolanda Dismukes, formerly known as Yolanda De La Cruz (“petitioner” or “Yolanda”). [Note: Due to common surnames, some individuals will be referred to by their given names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.]
As alleged in the petition:
Rachel De La Cruz Sr. (“Rachel Sr.”) executed the Trust on July 17, 2000, and amended the Trust on March 9, 2018. (Pet., ¶ 1 & Exhs. A, B.) The March 9, 2018, amendment to the Trust names petitioner as successor trustee of the Trust and contains the following no-contest provision:
“Section 1.03 Contest Provision
“This Section of my Amendment applies to my trust and to this Amendment. If any provision of this Section conflicts with any provision of my trust, the provision of this Section will prevail.
“The right of a beneficiary to take any interest given to him or her under this trust or any trust created under this trust instrument will be determined as if the beneficiary predeceased me without leaving any surviving descendants if that beneficiary, alone or in conjunction with any other person, engages in any of these actions:
“contests by a claim of undue influence, fraud, menace, duress, or lack of testamentary capacity, or otherwise objects in any court to the validity of this trust, any trust created under the terms of this instrument, my Will, or any beneficiary designation of an annuity, retirement plan, IRA, Keogh, pension, profit-sharing plan, or insurance policy signed by me, (collectively referred to in this Section as Document or Documents) or any amendments or codicils to any Document;
“seeks to obtain adjudication in any court proceeding that a Document or any of its provisions is void, or otherwise seeks to void, nullify, or set aside a Document or any of its provisions;
“files suit on a creditor’s claim filed in a probate of my estate, against the trust estate, or any other Document, after rejection or lack of action by the respective fiduciary;
“files a petition or other pleading to change the character (community, separate, joint tenancy, partnership, domestic partnership, real or personal, tangible or intangible) of property already characterized by a Document;
“files a petition to impose a constructive trust or resulting trust on any assets of the trust estate; or
“participates in any of the above actions in a manner adverse to the trust estate, such as conspiring with or assisting any person who takes any of these actions.
“My Trustee may defend any violation of this Section at the expense of the trust estate. A contest includes any action described above in an arbitration proceeding, but does not include any action described above solely in a mediation not preceded by a filing of a contest with a court.
“But during any period in which the laws of the State of California govern the applicability or validity of this provision, California Probate Code Section 21311 will apply, and my Trustee may only enforce this provision against any of these types of contests:
“a direct contest brought by any beneficiary without probable cause;
“a pleading by any beneficiary to challenge a property transfer on the grounds that the transferor did not own the property at the transfer time; and
“any filing of a creditor’s claim or prosecution of any action based on the filing of a claim of this kind.
“The terms direct contest, and pleading have the same meanings as set forth in California Probate Code Section 21310. This trust and any trusts created in this instrument are protected instruments as provided in California Probate Code Section 2131 0(e).” (Pet., ¶ 1 & Exh. B.)
Rachel Sr. died in 2022, and the only property she held was a home located in Carpinteria (the “Property”). (Pet., ¶ 2.) For many years prior to her death, Rachel Sr.’s daughter, Rachel De La Cruz Jr. (“respondent” or “Rachel Jr.”) also lived in the home, rent free. (Ibid.)
Upon Rachel Sr. passing, respondent refused to leave the property. (Pet., ¶ 3.) Petitioner gave respondent notice and instituted an unlawful detainer action against respondent. (Ibid.) Respondent agreed to leave the property at a Mandatory Settlement Conference in the unlawful detainer action. (Pet., ¶ 3.)
Shortly thereafter, respondent and her son Eugene De La Cruz filed civil complaint No. 23CV03965, against petitioner as trustee of the Trust, seeking entitlement to monies for repairs, maintenance, and funds that were alleged to have been paid for Rachel Sr.’s expenses. (Pet., ¶ 4 & Exh. C.)
Petitioner alleges that by filing the civil complaint and asserting claims for reimbursements in the unlawful detainer action, respondent has violated the no-contest provision. (Pet., ¶ 5.)
On November 21, 2025, respondent filed the present anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (“Anti-SLAPP”) motion to strike the petition, arguing that the conduct giving rise to the petition was protected activity and that petitioner cannot meet her burden of presenting admissible evidence showing a probability that she will prevail on her claim.
Petitioner opposes the motion and, while admitting that the conduct that gives rise to the petition is protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute, she argues that the motion should be denied under the second prong of the Anti-SLAPP statute.
Analysis:
1. Standards for Special Motions to Strike
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides, in relevant part:
“(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.
“(b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
“(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.
“(3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent proceeding.
* * *
“(e) As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. We have described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation, fn.] The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ [Citation.]” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384–385.)
2. First Prong
“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citations.] Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.] ‘The only means specified in section 425.16 by which a moving defendant can satisfy the [“arising from”] requirement is to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e)....’ [Citation.] In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062–1063.)
Here, petitioner does not deny that the petition is based on respondent’s filing of the creditor claim in Case No. 23CV03965, as well as asserting claims for reimbursements in the unlawful detainer action, and that the first prong has been satisfied.
The burden now turns to petitioner to provide admissible evidence relative to the second prong.
3. Second Prong
“If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)
At this second stage, “a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.)
In support of the opposition, petitioner cites Dae v. Traver (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 447 in support of her argument that her burden is “only to show that his No Contest Petition has ‘ “minimal merit.” ’ ” (Opp., p. 3, ll. 10-21.) Petitioner then correctly acknowledges that, generally, to prevail on the second step, she is required to provide sufficient evidence showing that respondent contested the trust without probable cause. (Opp., p. 3, ll. 23-27.) She then argues that pursuant to Probate Code 21311, subdivision (a)(3), “when one brings a no-contest petition to enforce a no-contest clause against a creditor claim, a showing of a lack of probable cause for the contest is not required.” (Opp., p. 4, ll. 1-6.) The statement is not an accurate recitation of the law. The authorities do not say that if a party brings a creditor claim, a party seeking to enforce a no-contest clause is relieved of having to establish that the party bringing the claim lacks probable cause. They still must do so. What is does say is that even if a creditor claim is made without probable cause to do so, a no-contest clause does not apply unless expressly provided for.
Probate Code 21311, subdivision (a)(3) provides:
“A no contest clause shall only be enforced against the following types of contests: . . . The filing of a creditor’s claim or prosecution of an action based on it. A no contest clause shall only be enforced under this paragraph if the no contest clause expressly provides for that application.”
“Under current law, a no contest clause is enforceable against a “ ‘direct contest that is brought without probable cause.’ ” [Citation.]” (Key v. Tyler (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505, 517.) In Key v. Tayler, the court specifically discussed probable cause and held that the party seeking to enforce a no-contest clause has the burden of proof to show that the party that contested the testamentary document did so without probable cause. (Id. at pp. 528-531.)
“ ‘ “Direct Contest” ’ means a contest that alleges the invalidity of a protected instrument or on or more of its terms, based on one or more of the following grounds:
“(1) Forgery.
“(2) Lack of due execution.
“(3) Lack of capacity.
“(4) Menace, duress, fraud, or undue influence.
“(5) Revocation of a will pursuant to Section 6120, revocation of a trust pursuant to Section 15401, or revocation of an instrument other than a will or trust pursuant to the procedure for revocation that is provided by statute or by the instrument.
“(6) Disqualification of a beneficiary under Section 6112, 21350, or 21308.” (Prob. Code, § 21310, subd. (b).)
Petitioner has set forth no persuasive argument, nor provided any proof, that by filing the civil complaint, or seeking reimbursements in the unlawful detainer action, respondent has made a direct contest to the Trust without probable cause.
A review of the civil complaint, attached as Exhibit F to the opposition, does not reveal any direct contest made to the Trust or any of the provisions of the Trust.
The remainder, and bulk, of the opposition simply provides circular arguments and reasoning to the effect of: Respondent filed a creditor’s claim, and therefore she is subject to the no-contest clause. There are no declarations or any other admissible evidence that tends to show that respondent’s complaint in Civil Case No. 23CV03965 was brought without probable cause or that petitioner is likely to prevail on the probate petition. The motion will be granted on the grounds that petitioner has failed to meet her burden.
Further, and in the alternative, the motion will be granted because the court agrees with respondent that, as defined in the Trust documents, respondent’s civil action does not constitute the filing of a creditor’s claim which would trigger the no-contest clause. “ ‘The interpretation of a trust instrument, like any written document, is a question of law. [Citations.] Under applicable rules of interpretation of written instruments, where there is no conflicting evidence, the reviewing court must independently interpret the document.’ ” [Citations.]” (Estate of Cairns (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 937, 944.) Here, there is no conflicting evidence that would lead to a different conclusion.
4. Attorney Fees and Costs
With exceptions not present here, “a prevailing defendant [or respondent] on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) The court will address attorney fees separately by noticed motion, if any, to be filed by respondent.