Tentative Ruling: Santa Barbara Humane vs Nathan William Calhoun

Case Number

25CV08093

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 05/08/2026 - 13:30

Nature of Proceedings

Motion to Strike - Anti-SLAPP

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein, the special motion to strike of respondent Nathan Calhoun is granted. The court strikes the allegations of the first amended petition set forth in paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28 of the attached amended declaration of Kerri Burns, and set forth in paragraph 15 of the attached amended declaration of Dori Villalon. Petitioner Santa Barbara Humane’s request for an award of attorney fees is denied.

Background:

On December 29, 2025, petitioner Santa Barbara Humane (SBH or petitioner), as an employer, filed its original petition for workplace violence restraining orders against respondent Nathan Calhoun. The petition seeks a restraining order with respect to Kerri Burns and Dori Villalon as employees and protected persons.

A temporary restraining order was granted on December 30, 2025, to expire January 20, 2026. The hearing on the petition, and the temporary restraining order expiration were subsequently continued upon request, with the current hearing date and expiration date of June 5, 2026.

On January 7, 2026, Calhoun was served with the petition, the temporary restraining order, and other documents.

On February 18, 2026, SBH filed its first amended petition (FAP) which includes other listed protected persons.

On March 2, 2026, Calhoun filed this special motion to strike.

The motion is opposed by SBH.

Analysis:

Calhoun brings this special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) (Note: Following the practice of published decisions, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is sometimes referred to as the “anti-SLAPP statute” and a motion brought under section 425.16 as an “anti-SLAPP motion.”

Although the anti-SLAPP statute is ordinarily directed to causes of action in civil complaints, the anti-SLAPP statute is also applicable to petitions for workplace violence restraining orders. (City of Los Angeles v. Animal Defense League (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 606, 617 (City of Los Angeles), disapproved on other grounds in City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420, fn. 10.)

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) “At the first step, the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them. When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage. If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Id. at p. 396.)

(1)       First Prong

“The issue before us concerns the first step of this process, determining whether the plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity. At this first step, courts are to ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] The defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).)

 “As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

“Assertions that are ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ are not subject to section 425.16. [Citations.] Allegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.)

“In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2); accord, Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 353.)

            (A)       Elements of Cause of Action

The petition sets forth one cause of action for a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8.

“Any employer or collective bargaining representative of an employee who has suffered harassment, unlawful violence, or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (a).)

“ ‘Harassment’ is a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (b)(4).)

“ ‘Unlawful violence’ is any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, or any violation of Section 243.3 of the Penal Code, but shall not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (b)(8).)

“ ‘Credible threat of violence’ is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for their safety, or the safety of their immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (b)(1).)

“ ‘Course of conduct’ is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an employee to or from the place of work; entering the workplace; following an employee during hours of employment; making telephone calls to an employee; or sending correspondence to an employee by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of the public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or computer email.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (b)(1).)

“This section does not permit a court to issue a temporary restraining order or order after hearing prohibiting speech or other activities that are constitutionally protected, protected by the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq.), protected by Chapter 11.5 (commencing with Section 3555) of Division 4 of Title 1 of the Government Code, or otherwise protected by Section 527.3 or any other provision of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (c).)

“The employer ‘must establish by clear and convincing evidence not only that [the individual] engaged in unlawful violence or made credible threats of violence, but also that great or irreparable harm would result to an employee if a prohibitory injunction were not issued due to the reasonable probability unlawful violence will occur in the future.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he requirement of establishing the reasonable probability wrongful acts, or simply unlawful violence, will occur in the future guarantees that injunctive relief will be issued to prevent future harm instead of punishing past completed acts.’ [Citation.]” (CSV Hospitality Management LLC v. Lucas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 117, 122–123.)

            (B)       Claims Subject to Motion

The FAP incorporates by reference as allegations of the basis for the WVRO claim declarations of nine individuals. Some of those declarations are amended declarations from the same declarant attached to the original petition. Declarations attached to the FAP are cited herein as amended declarations. In his notice of motion, Calhoun identifies six paragraphs from these declarations (as incorporated allegations of the FAP) that are the subject of the special motion to strike:

1.         Paragraph 24 of the Amended Declaration of Kerri Burns: “Just an hour and a half later, at about 1:30 pm, I was informed via text from Dori Villalon, COO, that Mr. Calhoun was back at our property in Santa Maria at 1687 W. Stowell.”

2.         Paragraph 25 of the Amended Declaration of Kerri Burns: “I asked Vanessa Lopez, our clinic Director who was in Santa Maria, to send an email to all Santa Maria staff letting them know not to engage with Mr. Calhoun.”

3.         Paragraph 26 of the Amended Declaration of Kerri Burns: “The next day, December 20, 2025, Mr. Calhoun showed up at the Santa Barbara campus. While he was there, every dog started barking incessantly, which was unusual behavior for them, and they were unable to settle down, remaining in an agitated state for a long period of time.”

4.         Paragraph 27 of the Amended Declaration of Kerri Burns: “We shut down the Santa Barbara campus about an hour early and staff used the buddy system to get to their cars. When staff members were leaving, Mr. Calhoun walked closer to their cars.”

5.         Paragraph 28 of the Amended Declaration of Kerri Burns: “Two days later, Mr. Calhoun again went to the Santa Maria campus around 4:00 pm. He knows that we close to the public at 4:30 pm, so this timing felt like a threat to the safety of our staff.”

6.         Paragraph 15 of the Amended Declaration of Dori Villalon: “He has since been to my workplace at least three times.”

            (C)       Application of First Prong Standards

Calhoun argues that each of the paragraphs that are subject to this motion are matters which appear to support SBH’s claim for issuance of a WVRO. SBH argues that SBH’s WVRO claim is not based on any of these paragraphs, which provide background incidental to the claim.

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.] … [T]he focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.] ‘The only means specified in section 425.16 by which a moving defendant can satisfy the [“arising from”] requirement is to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e)....’ [Citation.] In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062–1063.)

Where a cause of action is based upon multiple factual bases, the court considers whether the allegations sought to be stricken supply the elements of a claim or merely provide context. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012.) “It does not matter that other unprotected acts may also have been alleged within what has been labeled a single cause of action; these are ‘disregarded at this stage.’ [Citation.] So long as a ‘court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached’ with respect to these claims. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1010.)
 

The items 1 and 2 (Burns amended decl., ¶¶ 24, 25) relate to Calhoun’s activities on December 19, 2025. In order to understand the extent of these allegations, the court considers both the context of the allegation and the declarations of the parties. (Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 408 [“the court is not limited to examining the allegations of the complaint alone but rather considers the pleadings and the factual material submitted in connection with the special motion to strike”].) In context these allegations are:

“On Friday, [December 19, 2025,] around noon, our attorney sent to Mr. Calhoun the medical records we had maintained for his animal, after he reached out that morning for them. (See Duffy Declaration.)” (Burns amended decl., ¶ 23.) (Note: The date stated in the declaration is erroneously stated as February 19, 2024; the date appears to be intended to be December 19, 2025, as demonstrated herein.)

“Just an hour and a half later, at about 1:30 pm, I was informed via text from Dori Villalon, COO, that Mr. Calhoun was back at our property in Santa Maria at 1687 W. Stowell.” (Burns amended decl., ¶ 24.)

“I asked Vanessa Lopez, our clinical Director who was in Santa Maria, to send an email to all Santa Maria staff letting them know not to engage with Mr. Calhoun.” (Burns amended decl., ¶ 25.)

In the declaration of the same declarant attached to the original petition, these allegations included more facts:

“On Friday, December 19, 2025 at about 1:30 pm, I was informed via text from Dori Villalon, COO, that Mr. Calhoun was back at our property in Santa Maria at 1687 W Stowell. I was told he was just on the other side of the fence yelling—angry and agitated—and holding a sign. I called Ms. Villalon and told her to have staff contact the Santa Maria Police Department. I was told the police would not come out because he was not directly on Santa Barbara Humane’s property.” (Burns decl., dated Dec. 22, 2025, ¶ 21.)

“At the time that I was notified of the situation, I was in Santa Barbara off-site. But I immediately drove to our Santa Maria Campus because I was concerned about staff safety. On my drive up, staff informed me Mr. Calhoun had left.” (Burns decl., dated Dec. 22, 2025, ¶ 22.)

“I asked Vanessa Lopez, our clinic Director who was in Santa Maria, to send an email to all Santa Maria staff letting them know not to engage with Mr. Calhoun.” (Burns decl., dated Dec. 22, 2025, ¶ 23.)

“Upon arriving at the Santa Maria campus, it was clear that staff was very alarmed that this was happening.” (Burns decl., dated Dec. 22, 2025, ¶ 24.)

Calhoun describes the events of December 19 as:

“On December 19, 2025, I engaged in the first of my three public protests outside of Santa Barbara Humane facilities. This one was on the side Stowell Road, outside the organization’s Santa Maria facility. I held a sign that read, on one side, ‘Culture of: Fear, Lies, Negligence, and Euthanasia’—a reference to the organization’s claim of having a ‘Culture of Caring’—and on the other, ‘Baseline Worker: $18/hour. COO: $250k+. CEO: $350k+.’ For about forty minutes, I picketed on the public easement along Stowell Road and spoke about the organization’s mismanagement, its treatment of workers, and the resulting impact on animal care. I had my small dog with me but was otherwise by myself. I used no amplified sound. While I spoke loudly, I did not scream. At no point did the volume of my voice disturb my own dog. I did not hear any disturbance of any animals (barking, etc.) from the facility.” (Calhoun decl., ¶ 12.) (Note: Calhoun has also lodged a flash drive which is supposed to contain a video of the December 19 incident. (Calhoun decl., ¶ 13 & exhibit B.) The flash drive lodged with the court is not readable, giving an error that the flash drive is inaccessible and must be formatted to be used. The court is thus unable to consider this evidence. However, in view of the disposition based upon the other evidence presented and the standards for disposition of an anti-SLAPP motion, consideration of the video is not necessary.)

Public protests regarding animal care at facilities constitute protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). (City of Los Angeles, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 620.) “[U]nder the statutory scheme, a court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue in the second step of the analysis, if necessary.” (Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1089.)

Taking the pleadings and evidence together and applying the standards relevant to the first prong, Calhoun has shown that the allegations of items 1 and 2 relate to Calhoun’s protected activity. While the allegations in the amended declaration omit details from the original declaration (and only the allegations in the amended declaration are subject to the special motion to strike), the allegations are shown to be not merely incidental to the remaining allegations in the FAP. Instead, Calhoun has also shown that these allegations are intended, together with other allegations, to meet the harassment element of the WVRO claim to show a course of conduct, and to show that there is a probability of conduct subject to section 527.8 in the future. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (b)(1), (4); CSV Hospitality Management LLC v. Lucas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 122–123.) Calhoun has met his first prong burden as to items 1 and 2.

Items 3 and 4 (Burns amended decl., ¶¶ 26, 27) relate to Calhoun’s activities on December 20, 2025. These allegations in the declaration attached to the original petition are:

“But this was not the last incident (or even the second to last). The next day, December 20, 2025, Mr. Calhoun showed up at the Santa Barbara campus and continued his angry and aggressive yelling and ranting. When he did this in Santa Barbara, every dog started barking incessantly, which was unusual behavior for them, and they were unable to settle down barking incessantly, which was unusual behavior for them, and they were unable to settle down because of Mr. Calhoun’s yelling. He heard this agitation that he caused the animals—who he says he loves—but he kept right on yelling, keeping them all in an agitated state.” (Burns decl., dated Dec. 22, 2025, ¶ 25.)

“While he was ranting and yelling, Mr. Calhoun would approach clients of the Santa Barbara campus when they came to the site, yelling at them and saying disparaging things about us.” (Burns decl., dated Dec. 22, 2025, ¶ 26.)

“We shut down the Santa Barbara campus about an hour early and staff used the buddy system to get to their cars. When staff members were leaving, Mr. Calhoun walked closer to their cars.” (Burns decl., dated Dec. 22, 2025, ¶ 27.)

According to Calhoun: “The next day, I traveled to Santa Barbara to visit two other animal care organizations—Santa Barbara County Animal Services’ Santa Barbara location and ASAP Cats—for potential volunteer or employment opportunities and to protest outside Santa Barbara Humane’s Goleta facility. Around 3:45 p.m., I again picketed on a public sidewalk and easement outside the facility and spoke out against the organization’s treatment of its workers and animals, and the connection between those practices and management decisions. Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s deputies arrived after about thirty minutes. The deputies asked me what I was doing, told me I was free to continue protesting, and told me they were not admonishing me. I did not hear any disturbance of any animals (barking, etc.) from the facility.” (Calhoun decl., ¶ 14.)

“Around 4:30 p.m., I left the area to watch the sunset at nearby Goleta Beach. After sunset, I returned and continued my protest for another half hour. Different Sheriff’s deputies arrived this time, watched me, and again confirmed that me that I was acting within my legal rights.” (Calhoun decl., ¶ 15.)

For the same reasons discussed with respect to items 1 and 2, Calhoun has met his burden of showing that the allegations of items 3 and 4 support claims that arise out of protected activity. Calhoun has met his first prong burden with respect to these items.

Item 5 (Burns amended decl., ¶ 28) relates to Calhoun’s activities on December 21, 2025. These allegations in the declaration attached to the original petition are:

“As we have been preparing this filing for a restraining order, Mr. Calhoun has again shown up at the Santa Maria campus, again yelling and holding a sign. He arrived around 4 pm today, Sunday, December 21. He knows that we close to the public at 4:30 pm, so this feels like a threat to the safety of our staff. Mr. Calhoun is currently walking around the perimeter of the property. Police have arrived and are documenting the incident.” (Burns decl., dated Dec. 22, 2025, ¶ 28.)

According to Calhoun: “The next day, December 21, I again protested outside the Santa Maria facility on Stowell Road for about 20 minutes and in the same manner as the prior two protests. Again, I did not hear any disturbance of any animals (barking, etc.) from the facility. In fact, they told me I was within my rights to continue demonstrating.” (Calhoun decl., ¶ 16.) Calhoun also include evidence of a journal entry from the Santa Maria Police Department summarizing the December 21 incident. (Calhoun decl., ¶ 17; Calhoun Request for Judicial Notice, exhibit A.) (Note: The court grants the request for judicial notice as to the document; judicial notice does not extend to the truth of factual matters set forth therein (StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9). The court considers the factual matters stated therein only as evidence under the applicable standard.)

For the same reasons discussed with respect to items 1 and 2, Calhoun has met his burden of showing that the allegations of item 5 support claims that arise out of protected activity. Calhoun has met his first prong burden with respect to this item.

Item 6 (Villalon amended decl., ¶ 15) merely states that Calhoun has been to the SBH workplace at least three times after November 26, 2025, without describing when or where. In the declaration attached to the original petition, these times are explained as the incidents of December 20 and 21. (Villalon decl., dated Dec. 21, 2025, ¶¶ 4, 5, 8, 11.)

For the same reasons discussed with respect to items 1 and 2, Calhoun has met his burden of showing that the allegations of item 6 support claims that arise out of protected activity. Calhoun has met his first prong burden with respect to this item.

(2)       Second Prong

For the reasons discussed above, the court concludes that the items subject to the motion are all allegations supporting a claim arising out of protected activity and that Calhoun has met his first prong burden. The burden now shifts to SBH to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. (See Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.)

SBH has not presented any evidence specifically in connection with the substantive opposition, providing only an attorney declaration relating to post-filing attorney activity. However, as discussed above, the FAP itself attaches multiple declarations. The court considers those declarations in addressing the second prong.

In opposition to the motion, SBH repeatedly argues that the court has already concluded that the evidence supporting the FAP demonstrates a credible threat of violence or stalking by having granted a temporary restraining order. The grant of a temporary restraining order on the evidence presented in the original petition does not preclude consideration of the anti-SLAPP motion anew based upon the anti-SLAPP statute’s different standards to be applied to the FAP. (See Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 652.) More particularly, the temporary restraining order would have been based upon the entirety of the record presented in the original petition and does not provide any guidance as to whether SBH is likely to succeed as to the specific items addressed by this motion.

As discussed in the context of the first prong, Calhoun has met his burden based upon first prong standards of showing that claims arising out of those items arise out of protected activity. The standards under the second prong are different. The court does not weigh evidence, and merely determines whether the evidence presented, if credited by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)

There is tension in Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 with respect to protesting activity. Under section 527.8, subdivision (a), a WVRO may be issued with respect to an employee who has suffered harassment, unlawful violence, or a credible threat of violence, as those terms are further defined. Under subdivision (c), the court is not permitted to issue a WVRO “prohibiting speech or other activities that are constitutionally protected.” Picketing and demonstrations with respect to matters in the public interest are within the core of protected First Amendment activity. (See, e.g., Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1255 [sidewalk protests]; City of Los Angeles, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 620.) As limitations on constitutionally protected activities, time, place, and manner restrictions on protests outside businesses may burden no more speech than necessary. (See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. (1994) 512 U.S. 753, 776 [114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593].) At the other end of the spectrum, true threats are not constitutionally protected. (See Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359 [123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535].)

Applying the second prong standards with respect to items 1 and 2 (Burns amended decl., ¶¶ 24, 25), the allegations of Calhoun’s activities do not support harassment, unlawful violence, or a credible threat of violence as defined under section 527.8. The conduct on December 19, 2025, does not constitute “harassment” because there is no showing that the activity “serves no legitimate purpose.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (b)(4).) The evidence from the declarations attached to original petition instead confirm that there was a public protest purpose in Calhoun’s conduct on December 19, which is a legitimate purpose. For the same reason, the allegations do not support either unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (b)(1), (8).) Thus, the evidence presented by SBH does not meet the second prong burden as to items 1 and 2 to show that the claim arising from the conduct set forth in items 1 and 2 is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The special motion to strike will be granted as to items 1 and 2.

Applying the second prong standards with respect to items 3, 4, 5, and 6, the allegations of Calhoun’s activities do not support harassment, unlawful violence, or a credible threat of violence as defined under section 527.8. Just as with items 1 and 2 and for the same reasons, the evidence presented is insufficient to show that the claims arising from the conduct set forth in these items are legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The special motion to strike will be granted as to items 3, 4, 5, and 6.

It is important to emphasize that the scope of the second prong analysis is limited by the specific allegations of claims that are sought to be stricken. As discussed in the first prong analysis, the allegations of items 1 through 6 are only relevant to the FAP as additional bases, individually or in combination, in support of a WVRO under section 527.8. The evidence presented does not substantiate claims arising from the constitutionally protected activities of items 1 through 6. Consequently, the court will strike the allegations identified in items 1 through 6. Striking these allegations has no effect upon the remaining allegations of the FAP.

Based upon this disposition, Calhoun’s motion is not frivolous or solely intended to cause delay. The court denies SBH’s request for an award of attorney fees.