Tentative Ruling: Joseph Robinson vs Caleb Overton et al
Case Number
25CV07973
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 05/04/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Demurrer; Motion: Strike
Tentative Ruling
Joseph Robinson v. Caleb Overton, et al.
Case No. 25CV07973
Hearing Date: May 4, 2026
HEARINGS: 1. Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint
2. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Joseph Robinson: Jason W. Wansor, Rogers Sheffield & Campbell LLP
For Defendants Caleb Overton, and SB Wealth Inc., dba Keller Williams Realty Santa Barbara: R. Chris Kroes, Linda Elias-Wheelock, McCarthy & Kroes
TENTATIVE RULINGS:
- Defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint is overruled in its entirety.
- Defendants’ motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s complaint is denied.
- Defendants shall file and serve their answers to plaintiff’s complaint no later than May 18, 2026.
Background:
This action commenced on December 19, 2025, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Joseph Robinson against defendants Caleb Overton (Overton) and SB Wealth Inc., dba Keller Williams Realty Santa Barbara (Keller Williams) (collectively “defendants”) for: (1) Fraudulent Misrepresentation, (2) Fraudulent Concealment, (3) Negligent Misrepresentation, (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (5) Unfair Business Practices, (6) Professional Negligence, and (7) Breach of Implied Contract.
As alleged in the complaint:
In April 2024, plaintiff engaged defendants as his real estate agent and brokerage to represent him in the purchase of real property located at 3621 San Pedro Lane, Santa Barbara. (Compl., ¶ 8.)
During escrow for the purchase of the property, defendants obtained from the seller or the seller’s agent “Previous Transaction” disclosure packets from prior sales of the property, but defendants failed to disclose to plaintiff critical information, including: (1) Engineering and drainage files documenting severe foundation cracks, saturated soil beneath the primary bedroom, missing anchor bolts, concrete deterioration, and over $80,000 in prior drainage and foundation repairs, (2) The Action Home Inspection report, from 2009, showing significant moisture conditions, seasonal ponding beneath the living room and half bath, and long-term drainage deficiencies, (3) The seller’s 26-page Timeline chronicling decades of flooding, mold remediation, fraudulent or incorrect construction records, and chronic water intrusion, and (4) Prior seller questionnaires disclosing water intrusion, mold clearance reports, crawlspace flooding, HVAC failures, plumbing failures, and structural deficiencies. (Compl., ¶ 10.) The documents totaled nearly 300 pages and were material to the property’s condition. (Ibid.) Defendants without the disclosure packets during escrow, allowing them to be mislabeled, misfiled, or deliberately obscured. (Id. at ¶ 12.)
Defendants pressured plaintiff to remove all contingencies in order to close the transaction while acknowledging via text that material 2007 sale disclosures existed and would be provided. (Compl., ¶ 11.) Defendants downplayed the importance of contingencies in a multiple-offer environment despite knowing plaintiff had incomplete disclosures. (Ibid.)
On April 26, 2024, defendants misrepresented to plaintiff that they were sending a 485-page full disclosure via a Google Drive ling, when in fact no such transmission occurred until well after closing. (Compl., ¶ 13.)
The transaction closed in May 2024, without plaintiff receiving the material disclosures. (Compl., ¶ 14.) Defendants only provided the seven Previous Transaction packets on August 26, 2024, more than three months after closing, buried in a Dropbox link labeled “broker file,” without explanation. (Ibid.)
On September 17, 2025, when confronted by plaintiff about the delayed disclosures, defendants responded that the documents should have been sent during escrow but provided no proof of transmission. (Compl., ¶ 15.) Subsequent inquiries were met with evasion, including refusal to respond due to perceived threats of legal action, followed by unsupported implications that the disclosures had been sent. (Ibid.)
Had the disclosures been provided during escrow, plaintiff would have canceled the transaction immediately due to the revealed defects, including chronic moisture intrusion, flooding, foundation failures, mold history, illegal construction, drainage defects, and long-term structural instability. (Compl., ¶ 16.)
On May 16, 2024, shortly after closing, plaintiff discovered severe defects matching those in the concealed documents, including a muddy and wet crawlspace beneath the primary bedroom. (Compl., ¶ 17.) Over the following months, plaintiff incurred substantial costs for: (1) Mold confirmation and remediation in multiple areas, (2) HVAC replacement, insulation, and partial demolition, (3) Demolition of the hall bathroom, (4) New roof installation, which failed to resolve humidity issues, (5) Window replacements due to sealing failures, (6) Stucco repair, drainage consultation, hydrology review, and crawlspace evaluation, (7) Addressing structural concerns, and (8) A major square-footage discrepancy. (Compl., ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff’s damages exceed hundreds of thousands of dollars, including significant repair and remediation costs to address undisclosed defects, including drainage, encapsulation, ventilation, and grading, among other necessary measures; loss of use and relocation costs; health-related impacts; emotional distress; diminution in property value; and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Compl., ¶ 18.)
Additional allegations contained in the complaint will be discussed below where appropriate.
Defendants now demur to the first, second, third, and fifth causes of action, all on the grounds that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute each of the causes of action.
Defendants also seek to have punitive damages allegations, prayer for punitive damages, and prayer for attorneys’ fees stricken from the complaint.
Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and the motion to strike.
Analysis:
Standard on Demurrer
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
“(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
“(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.
“(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.
“(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.
“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.
“(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.
“(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)
“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
“If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer. “ ‘[W]e are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer, but instead must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. The courts of this state have . . . long since departed from holding a plaintiff strictly to the ‘form of action’ he has pleaded and instead have adopted the more flexible approach of examining the facts alleged to determine if a demurrer should be sustained.’ ” [Citations.]” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.)
“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
A demurrer searches for defects in the allegations of the pleading. “A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.” (Ramsden v. Western Union (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 879.)
First Cause of Action for Fraudulent Misrepresentation
“One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” (Civ. Code, § 1709.)
“ ‘The necessary elements of fraud are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.’ ” [Citations.]” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1239.)
“[F]raud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. . . . This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)
“Less specificity should be required of fraud claims “ ‘when ‘it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy,’ ” [citation]; “ ‘[e]ven under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party. . . .’ ” [Citation.] (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.)
Defendants make no argument that the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud are not pled with the requisite specificity. Rather, defendants argue that the complaint “is devoid of the critical factual allegations that would support a fraud claim. Specifically lacking from the cause of action for fraud are elements (b) knowledge of falsity; and (c) intent to defraud i.e. to induce reliance.” (Demurrer, p. 5, ll. 8-10.)
In addition to the allegations discussed above, plaintiff pleads:
“Defendants knowingly and intentionally made false representations to Plaintiff, including but not limited to: (a) acknowledging via text that material ‘2007 sale’ disclosures existed and would be provided before contingency removal; (b) misrepresenting on April 26, 2024, that a ‘485-page full disclosure’ was being sent via Google Drive; and (c) implying post-closing that disclosures had been sent during escrow without proof.” (Compl., ¶ 21.)
“Defendants made these representations with the intent to induce Plaintiff to proceed with the transaction, remove contingencies, and close escrow.” (Compl., ¶ 23.)
“An “ ‘ “intent to deceive” ’ is not an essential element of the cause of action, . . .’ ” the required intent is an intent to induce action. [Citation.]” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1062.)
“Such things as knowledge, intent, and scienter may be pleaded generally . . ..” (Gervase v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1244.)
The allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation are sufficient to overcome demurrer. The demurrer to the first cause of action will be overruled.
Second Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment
“The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact was known; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact. [Citations.] A duty to disclose a material fact can arise if (1) it is imposed by statute; (2) the defendant is acting as plaintiff’s fiduciary or is in some other confidential relationship with plaintiff that imposes a disclosure duty under the circumstances; (3) the material facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows those facts are not known or reasonably discoverable by plaintiff (i.e., exclusive knowledge); (4) the defendant makes representations but fails to disclose other facts that materially qualify the facts disclosed or render the disclosure misleading (i.e., partial concealment); or (5) defendant actively conceals discovery of material fact from plaintiff (i.e., active concealment). [Citations.] Circumstances (3), (4), and (5) presuppose a preexisting relationship between the parties, such as “ ‘between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement. [Citation.] All of these relationships are created by transactions between parties from which a duty to disclose facts material to the transaction arises under certain circumstances.’ ” [Citation.]” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40–41.)
Defendants’ argument regarding the second cause of action is the same as it is for the first cause of action. It fails for the same reasons.
The demurrer to the second cause of action will be overruled.
Third Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation
“The normal elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation are “ ‘ “(1) a misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) made without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) made with the intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.” ’ ” [Citation.] Liability for negligent misrepresentation is ordinarily imposed only on those who supply information in the course of a business or profession. [Citation.]” (Sproul v. Vallee (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 285, 298.)
Defendants’ argument regarding the third cause of action is the same as it is for the first and second causes of action. It fails for the same reasons.
The demurrer to the third cause of action will be overruled.
Fifth Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices
“[U]nfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)
“ ‘The scope of the UCL is quite broad. [Citations.] Because the statute is framed in the disjunctive, a business practice need only meet one of the three criteria to be considered unfair competition.’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘ “Therefore, an act or practice is “ ‘unfair competition’ ” under the UCL if it is forbidden by law or, even if not specifically prohibited by law, is deemed an unfair act or practice.” ’ ” [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1359.)
Defendants make a convoluted and conclusory argument that plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts showing that there is a causal link between the alleged unlawful practice and the claimed loss.
Plaintiff in fact does plead a causal link between defendants’ alleged actions and the claimed loss. Those facts are contained in paragraphs Nos. 17 and 18, which are set forth above, in conjunction with the other paragraphs of the complaint.
The demurrer to the fifth cause of action will be overruled.
Motion to Strike
“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)
“In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)
“[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)
Defendants move to strike the following portions of the complaint:
- Page 6, lines 6-7: “plus punitive damages due to Defendants’ malice, oppression or fraud.”
- Page 6, lines 3-4: “plus punitive damages.” [Note: This appears to be a typographical error. The referenced page and lines do not say anything about punitive damages. The court believes that defendants intended to state “Page 6, line 23.)
- The prayer for punitive damages set forth on page 9, line 28: “For Punitive and exemplary damages.”
- The prayer for attorneys’ fees, at page 10, line 3: “For attorneys’ fees.”
The first three portions listed by defendants are related to plaintiff’s fraud cause of action.
“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)
If plaintiff can prove at least one of his fraud causes of action, by clear and convincing evidence, he may be entitled to punitive damages. As such, the first three portions will not be stricken.
Likewise, the prayer for attorneys’ fees is not improper. There are several bases upon which plaintiff may eventually recover attorney fees. A motion to strike would only lie if there was no possibility of plaintiff recovering attorney fees. As such, the fourth portion referenced by defendant will not be stricken.