Tentative Ruling: Vedanta Society of Southern California vs Janet Friesen

Case Number

25CV06993

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 10/09/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motions to Compel (4)

Tentative Ruling

1.  For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff to compel defendant to provide fully code compliant verified responses to requests for admission nos. 1 to 24, and for sanctions, is continued to November 13, 2026. On or before October 23, 2026, the parties shall file a joint status report or, if necessary, file and serve individual status reports addressing the matters described in this ruling.
2.  For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff to compel defendant to provide fully code compliant verified responses to form interrogatory nos. 4.1, 7.1–7.3, 14.1, 15.1, 16.1, 16.2 and 16.7, and for sanctions, is continued to November 13, 2026. On or before October 23, 2026, the parties shall file a joint status report or, if necessary, file and serve individual status reports addressing the matters described in this ruling.
3.  For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff to compel defendant to provide fully code compliant verified responses to special interrogatory nos. 1 through 40, and for sanctions, is continued to November 13, 2026. On or before October 23, 2026, the parties shall file a joint status report or, if necessary, file and serve individual status reports addressing the matters described in this ruling.
4.  For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff to compel defendant to provide fully code compliant verified responses to requests for production nos. 1 to 72, and for sanctions, is continued to November 13, 2026. On or before October 23, 2026, the parties shall file a joint status report or, if necessary, file and serve individual status reports addressing the matters described in this ruling.

Background:

As alleged in the verified complaint of plaintiff Vedanta Society of Southern California (Plaintiff):

Plaintiff owns real property described as 2719 Bella Vista Drive (the Vedanta Property) in Santa Barbara, California. (Complaint, ¶ 1.) Janet A. Peak f/k/a Janet Rienstra Friesen, who is the Trustee of the Janet Rienstra Friesen Trust Dated August 17, 2005, (Friesen) owns real property described as 2711 Bella Vista Drive (the Friesen Property) in Santa Barbara, California. (Ibid.) The Friesen Property is adjacent to and located west of the Vedanta Property. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has a 20 foot wide easement over the Friesen Property (the Easement) for ingress and egress to a residence owned by Plaintiff on the Vedanta Property (the Vedanta Residence). (Ibid.) A 20-foot driveway within the Easement (the Driveway) exists as the sole access to the Vedanta Residence. (Ibid.)

Over the years, Friesen has made improvements to the Friesen Property which include expanding and remodeling the primary residence, and adding a guest house, septic system, rain gutters, down spouts, and drainage. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) Those improvements modified then existing drainage systems and caused a slope failure or landslide resulting from Friesen directing surface water and underground runoff and sewage from the Friesen Property onto the Easement and Driveway. (Complaint, ¶¶ 9, 10.) Specifically, broken pipes, down-spouts and down-spout drainage system, and a leaking septic system on the Friesen Property; Friesen’s excessive surface watering and excessive irrigation; and Friesen’s artificial landscape fill caused excessive moisture to discharge into the slope resulting in a saturation of the soils and the landslide. (Complaint, ¶¶ 12-16.)

As a result of the landslide, the Easement, the Driveway, and portions of the land owned by Plaintiff towards what is now the toe of the landslide were destroyed. (Complaint, ¶¶ 9, 10.) The slide is still active and causing more and more of the Driveway to be destroyed with more destruction reasonably likely to continue into the future. (Complaint, ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff sent Friesen numerous written communications informing her of the damage Friesen’s acts and omissions have caused, were causing, and threatened to cause. (Complaint, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff’s structural engineer made attempts to contact Friesen and her geologist, but these communications were left without response. (Ibid.) Friesen never took sufficient steps to prevent the damage to the Driveway and Easement. (Ibid.) As a result, Plaintiff’s sole access to the Vedanta Residence has been destroyed, forcing Plaintiff to cut off all utilities to that residence. (Complaint, ¶ 20.) Before the landslide occurred, Plaintiff was able to generate income by renting the Vedanta Residence. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff can no longer rent the Vedanta Residence. (Complaint, ¶ 20.)  

On November 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Friesen, asserting five causes of action: (1) trespass; (2) private nuisance; (3) negligence; (4) interference with easement; and (5) declaratory relief.

On January 9, 2026, Friesen, who asserts they were erroneously named in the complaint, filed a verified answer responding to the allegations of the complaint and asserting fifteen affirmative defenses.

On June 4, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order (the RFA Motion) compelling Friesen to provide code compliant responses, without objections, to Plaintiff’s set one requests for admission (the RFA) nos. 1 through 24.

On June 5, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order (the FI Motion) compelling Friesen to provide code compliant responses, without objections, to Plaintiff’s set one form interrogatory (the FI) nos. 4.1, 7.1 through 7.3, 14.1, 15.1, 16.1, 16.2, and 16.7.

On June 8, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order (the SI Motion) compelling Friesen to provide code compliant responses, without objections, to Plaintiff’s set one special interrogatory (the SI) nos. 1 through 40; and separately filed a motion for an order (the RFP Motion) compelling Friesen to provide code compliant responses, without objections, to Plaintiff’s set one requests for production (the RFP) nos. 1 through 72.

The RFA Motion, FI Motion, SI Motion, and RFP Motion (collectively, the Motions) are each supported by separate declarations of Plaintiff’s counsel, Anthony Kornarens (attorney Kornarens). As those declarations present identical or effectively identical information and evidence, the court will refer and cite to those declarations collectively.

Attorney Kornarens effectively asserts that the RFA, the FI, the SI, and the RFP (collectively, the Discovery) were propounded on Friesen on January 9, 2026. (Kornarens Decs., ¶¶ 3 & exhibits A.) On February 6, Friesen’s counsel requested a mutual 30 day extension for Friesen to respond to the Discovery, which attorney Kornarens’ co-counsel, Kevin Nimmons (attorney Nimmons), granted to March 10. (Kornarens Decs., ¶¶ 4, 5 & exhibits B, C.) On March 4, Friesen’s counsel requested an additional two-week extension to respond to the Discovery, which attorney Nimmons granted to March 24. (Kornarens Decs., ¶¶ 6, 7 & exhibits D, E.)

On March 24, Friesen served responses to the Discovery which attorney Kornarens asserts were not properly verified or code compliant. (Kornarens Decs., ¶¶ 7(A)-(D), 8 & exhibits F [responses to RFA, FI, SI, & RFP].) The parties agreed to extend the deadline to file motions to compel to June 9. (Kornarens Decs., ¶¶ 10 & exhibits G.) On May 1, May 4, May, May 19, attorney Kornarens attempted to resolve informally the issues raised by each of the Motions with Friesen’s counsel. (Kornarens Decs., ¶¶ 11, 12, 16 & exhibits H, J.)

On June 1, Friesen’s counsel agreed to withdraw some of Friesen’s objections and stated they would maintain others. (Kornarens Decs., ¶¶ 19-20 & exhibits K.) On June 3, attorney Kornarens responded by explaining that the court will need to rule on the remaining objections unless Friesen withdrew them. (Kornarens Decs., ¶¶ 21 & exhibits L.)

On September 29, Friesen filed separate oppositions to each of the Motions.

Analysis:

(1)       The RFA Motion

“On receipt of a response to requests for admissions, the party requesting admissions may move for an order compelling a further response if that party deems that either or both of the following apply:

“(1) An answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete.

“(2) An objection to a particular request is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (a)(1), (2).) Notice of the motion must be “given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or any specific later date to which the requesting party and the responding party have agreed in writing ....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (c).)

The RFA Motion asserts that the responses of Friesen to the RFA were dated, signed, and served the day after the verification of those responses was signed by Friesen. For these reasons, the RFA Motion argues, the March 24 responses of Friesen to the RFA were unverified, and all objections to the RFA have been waived.

“The party to whom the requests for admission are directed shall sign the response under oath, unless the response contains only objections.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.240, subd. (a).) The separate statement submitted in support of the RFA Motion shows that the responses of Friesen to the RFA do not contain only objections. (See, e.g., Sep. Stmt. at p. 2 [denying RFA no. 1]; pp. 7, 12, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 104, 109 [same re RFA nos. 4-17, 21 & 22]; pp. 90, 94, 99 [admitting RFA nos. 18, 19, & 20].) The available information and evidence shows Friesen signed their responses to the RFA under oath on March 23. (Kornarens Dec. [RFA Motion], exhibit F at p. 21.)

“The attorney for the responding party shall sign any response that contains an objection.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.240, subd. (c).) The responses of Friesen to the RFA include objections. (See, e.g., Sep. Stmt. at pp. 2 [response to RFA no. 1]; 7 [response to RFA no. 2]; 11 [response to RFA no. 3].) The available information and evidence also shows that on March 24, Friesen’s counsel, Kaylin A. Bierly, signed the responses of Friesen to the RFA that contain objections. (Kornarens Dec. [RFA Motion], exhibit F at p. 20.)

Though “[u]nsworn responses are tantamount to no responses at all[]” (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636), the RFA Motion fails to explain, with reasoned argument, why Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.240 imposes a requirement that the party signing responses to requests for admission must sign those responses under oath on the same date that their counsel sign any responses which contain an objection.

Moreover, “[t]here is absolutely no reason to require a party to verify an objection. It is sufficient to have the attorney sign the objection(s). If the attorney is wrong, the court will so decide after conducting the appropriate proceedings to determine if, for instance, the claim of privilege lies. Requiring the objection to be verified by the party would add nothing to the trial court’s analysis.” (Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 657 (Food 4 Less).)

Furthermore, “there is no need to verify that portion of the response containing the objections. Thus, if the response is served within the statutory time period, that portion of the response must be considered timely notwithstanding the lack of verification. The omission of the verification in the portion of the response containing fact-specific responses merely renders that portion of the response untimely and therefore only creates a right to move for orders and sanctions ... as to those responses but does not result in a waiver of the objections made. The only situation in which lack of verification could both render the response untimely and result in a waiver of objections ... is when the initial unverified response contains no objections.” (Food 4 Less, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 657–658 & fn. 5, fn. 6 omitted, original italics.)

The RFA Motion effectively concedes that Friesen timely served the responses to the RFA by the extended deadline, and that those responses include objections and answers. (Memorandum at p. 4, ll. 27-28 [“Responses were served within the extended due date.”]; Sep. Stmt. at pp. 2, 7, 11, 20-21, 25, 30, 35, 40, 44-45, 49-50, 54-55, 59-60, 64-65, 69-70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 94, 99, 104, 108-109, 113-114, & 118-119; see also Food 4 Less, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 657 [discussing “hybrid response containing objections and fact-specific responses”].) As no verification is required to preserve the objections to the RFA asserted in the responses of Friesen, and for all reasons discussed above, the RFA Motion fails to show why the signing of the responses under oath by Friesen the day before Friesen’s counsel signed those portions of the responses which contain objections results in a waiver of those objections.

A motion for an order compelling a further response to requests for admissions must also “be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under [Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (b)(1).) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040, subd. (a).) The opposition of Friesen to the RFA Motion asserts that, though the parties’ correspondence shows that Friesen agreed to withdraw their general objections and supplement their responses to the RFA, Plaintiff “rushed” to file the RFA Motion on June 4 and did not wait for the deadline proposed by Plaintiff. For these reasons, the opposition argues, Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith before filing the RFA Motion.

The record of the parties’ correspondence shows that a good faith attempt was made to informally resolve the issues presented by the RFA Motion, and that “the parties were at an impasse ....” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.) For these reasons, the court does not find that Plaintiff failed to make a reasonable or good faith attempt to resolve the issues presented by the RFA Motion.

The court’s review of the parties’ correspondence also shows, as further discussed above, that the parties agreed to extend the deadline to file the RFA Motion to June 9. (Kornarens Dec. [RFA Motion], ¶ 10, exhibit G at pdf p. 66 [“We agree to extend the deadline for Plaintiff to file any motions to compel by an additional 30 days, making the new deadline June 9, 2026”], & exhibit H at pdf p. 71 [“Per agreed on extension, the current deadline to file motions to compel is June 9, 2026.”].) In a letter dated June 1, Friesen’s counsel agreed that Friesen would “withdraw the General Objections”, and “supplement many of her responses” as discussed in attachments to that correspondence. (Kornarens Dec. [RFA Motion], ¶¶ 19, 20 & exhibit K at p. 2.) Those attachments do not reference or discuss the RFA that are placed at issue in the RFA Motion. (Kornarens Dec. [RFA Motion], exhibit K.)

In support of the opposition to the RFA Motion, Friesen submits a declaration of their counsel, Cameron M. Kalunian (attorney Kalunian), who states that on September 1, after attorney Kalunian transmitted a meet-and-confer letter to Plaintiff’s counsel identifying deficiencies in Plaintiff’s responses to Friesen’s discovery requests, the parties agreed upon a resolution of the majority of the outstanding discovery issues. (Kalunian Dec., ¶¶ 12-13.) Pursuant to that resolution, Friesen has agreed to serve verified supplemental responses to the RFA before the hearing on the RFA Motion. (Kalunian Dec., ¶ 13.) Attorney Kalunian asserts that those supplemental responses will moot the RFA Motion. (Ibid.)

In addition, Friesen asserts in their response to Plaintiff’s separate statement that the RFA Motion is moot because Friesen will serve verified supplemental responses to the RFA before the hearing. (Resp. Sep. Stmt. at pp. 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34-35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, & 53.)

The reply of Plaintiff asserts that Friesen has not provided supplemental responses to the RFA, and that any supplemental responses proposed by Friesen will not remove multiple objections which Plaintiff contends are without merit and improper.

“[A] party opposing a motion to compel further responses may [not] unilaterally divest the court of authority to rule on the motion by serving a further response in the interim ....” (County of San Benito v. Superior Court (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 243, 256 [also noting that this “would permit a party faced with a motion to compel to delay its adjudication indefinitely by successive supplemental but inadequate responses”].) Instead, where a party provides supplemental responses before a hearing on a motion to compel further responses, “[i]f the propounding party proceeds with the motion ... the trial court has the discretion to rule on the motion. The trial court might compel responses without objection if it finds no legally valid responses have been provided ...; it might deny the motion to compel responses as essentially unnecessary, in whole or in part, and just impose sanctions; it might ... either determine that further answers are required, or order the propounding party to ‘meet and confer’ [citation] and file a separate statement [citation]; or it might take the motion off calendar, thereby requiring the propounding party to file a motion ....” (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 409.)

For all reasons discussed above, the present undisputed record reflects that Plaintiff filed the RFA Motion before the agreed upon deadline of June 9, and after Friesen effectively conceded that their responses to the RFA that are at issue in that motion could be improved, and stated that they would serve supplemental responses without the “General Objections”. (See Kornarens Dec. [RFA Motion], ¶¶ 19-21 [“Plaintiff is now proceeding ... before the June 9 extended deadline.”].) Notwithstanding the absence of any evidence showing that Friesen has served any supplemental responses to the RFA at issue, to the extent Friesen serves supplemental responses to those RFA before the hearing on the RFA Motion, the court would be inclined to deny the RFA Motion as moot, without prejudice to the issue of sanctions being raised in any future motion to compel that may be filed by Plaintiff with respect to any such supplemental responses.  

Under the circumstances present here, and for all reasons discussed above, the court will continue the hearing on the RFA Motion, and order the parties to file a joint status report or, if necessary, to file and serve individual status reports stating whether Friesen has or has not served supplemental responses to the RFA that are at issue in the RFA Motion. To the extent those reports reflect that Friesen has served supplemental responses to the RFA at issue prior to the continued hearing on the RFA Motion, the court encourages the parties to engage in a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve any issues in regard to those supplemental responses, including whether a withdrawal of the RFA Motion by Plaintiff, without prejudice to a later request for monetary sanctions, is appropriate; and to provide a description and the result of those efforts in their joint or individual status reports.

(2)       The FI Motion, SI Motion, and RFP Motion

The FI Motion, SI Motion, and RFP Motion, and the separately filed oppositions of Friesen to each of those motions, present and raise identical or effectively identical information and arguments in regard to whether Friesen has waived objections to the FI, SI, and RFP based on the date Friesen signed their verifications and Friesen’s counsel signed the responses; and whether Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith. Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply here as to those matters.

Friesen also asserts in their opposition to the FI Motion, the SI Motion, and the RFP Motion, including Friesen’s responses to the separate statements of Plaintiff, that those motions are moot for the same reasons discussed above, including that Friesen will serve verified supplemental responses to the FI, the SI, and the RFP prior to the hearing.

The same reasoning and analysis apply. For the same reasons further discussed above, to the extent Friesen serves verified supplemental responses to the FI, the SI, and the RFP that are at issue in the FI Motion, the SI Motion, and the RFP Motion, the court would be inclined to deny those motions as moot, without prejudice to the issue of sanctions being raised in any future motion to compel as to those supplemental responses. Therefore, and for these same reasons, the court will continue the hearing on the FI Motion, the SI Motion, and the RFP Motion and order the parties to file a joint status report or, if necessary, file and serve individual status reports stating whether Friesen has or has not served the supplemental responses to FI, SI, or RFP. The joint or individual status reports of the parties shall also include, if appropriate, the result of any attempts by the parties to resolve any remaining issues including whether a withdrawal of the FI Motion, the SI Motion, and the RFP Motion by Plaintiff, without prejudice to a later request for monetary sanctions, is appropriate under the circumstances.