Tentative Ruling: Cavalry SPV I LLC vs Rita Mendez

Case Number

25CV06876

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 03/30/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Compel re Arbitration and Stay of Case

Tentative Ruling

Cavalry SPV I, LLC v. Rita Mendez                                  

Case No. 25CV06876

           

Hearing Date:      March 30, 2026                                                      

HEARING:              Motion of Plaintiff Rita Mendez to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings

                                   

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Cavalry SPV I, LLC: Matthew W. Quall, Ranjeet K. Brar, Ingrid V. Caero, Tiffany A. Pack, Norin Dhaliwal, Mohamad A. Baydoun, Quall Cardot LLP

                                    For Defendant Rita Mendez: Matthew Campa, Campa Consulting Law Office

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings of plaintiff Rita Mendez is granted. This matter is ordered to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement. This action is stayed pending the completion of the arbitration proceedings.

Background:

On October 31, 2005, plaintiff Cavalry SPV I, LLC (Cavalry), initiated this action by filing a limited jurisdiction complaint against defendant Rita Mendez (Mendez) asserting one cause of action for breach of contract.

As alleged in the complaint:

Cavalry is a business authorized to collect debts in California. (Compl., ¶ 1.)

On March 26, 2008, Citibank, N.A. (Citibank), issued a credit card account to Mendez (Credit Account).

The last payment on the Credit Account was made on February 25, 2024. (Compl., ¶¶ 9, 20.)

As of September 13, 2024, the outstanding amount on the Credit Account was $19,174.38. (Compl., ¶ 8.)

On October 21, 2024, Cavalry purchased the debt associated with the Credit Account. (Compl., ¶¶ 6-8.)

Cavalry seeks to recover the balance of the principal amount on the Credit Account in the amount of $19,174.38, reasonable attorney fees, and other appropriate relief. (Compl., p. 4, ll. 15-18.)

Cavalry served Mendez with the complaint on November 14, 2025.

On December 15, 2025, Mendez filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.

On December 15, 2025, Mendez filed a proof of service indicating that her motion to compel arbitration and supporting documents were electronically served on counsel for Cavalry that same day. Service was made via the email address, mquall@quallcardot.com, which is the contact email address for Cavalry’s counsel listed on Cavalry’s electronically filed complaint. (See Compl., p. 1, ll. 5-6; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.251(b)(1)(B)-(2); Super. Ct. Santa Barbara, Local Rules, rule 1012(d), E-Service.)

Cavalry has not filed any opposition to Mendez’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.

Analysis:

“Private arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties ….” (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313.) “There is no public policy favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate…. Whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate is determined under general California contract law. [Citation.] Hence, when ruling on a petition to compel arbitration, the superior court may consider evidence on factual issues such as contract formation bearing on the threshold issue of arbitrability.” (City of Vista v. Sutro & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 401, 407.) “Under ‘both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.’ ” (Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 19.)

“The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence an agreement to arbitrate a dispute exists.” (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120.) “It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be: [¶] 1. Parties capable of contracting; [¶] 2. Their consent; [¶] 3. A lawful object; and, [¶] 4. A sufficient cause or consideration.” (Civ. Code, § 1550.)

“The consent of the parties to a contract must be: [¶] 1. Free; [¶] 2. Mutual; and, [¶] 3. Communicated by each to the other.” (Civ. Code, § 1565.) “Consent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense….” (Civ. Code, § 1580.) “The existence of mutual consent is determined by objective rather than subjective criteria, the test being what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to believe. [Citation.] Accordingly, the primary focus in determining the existence of mutual consent is upon the acts of the parties involved.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 789 (Monster).)

In support of her motion to compel arbitration, Mendez declares that she applied for and was issued a Citibank Costco Anywhere Visa Card, which she used for personal, household, and consumer purposes. (Declaration of Rita Mendez [Mendez Decl.], ¶ 2.) When the account was opened, Citibank provided her a cardmember agreement containing a binding arbitration provision (Arbitration Agreement). (Mendez Decl., ¶ 3.) Mendez attaches the Arbitration Agreement as Exhibit A to her motion. (Mendez Decl., ¶ 3; Motion, Ex. A.)

The Arbitration Agreement provides in part as follows:

“PLEASE READ THIS PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT CAREFULLY.

This section provides that disputes may be resolved by binding arbitration. Arbitration replaces the right to go to court, have a jury trial or initiate or participate in a class action. In arbitration, disputes are resolved by an arbitrator, not a judge or jury. Arbitration procedures are simpler and more limited than in court. This arbitration provision is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and shall be interpreted in the broadest way the law will allow.

“Covered claims

“• You or we may arbitrate any claim, dispute or controversy between you and us arising out of or related to your Account, a previous related Account or our relationship (called “Claims”).

“• If arbitration is chosen by any party, neither you nor we will have the right to litigate that Claim in court or have a jury trial on that Claim.

“Except as stated below, all Claims are subject to arbitration, no matter what legal theory they’re based on or what remedy (damages, or injunctive or declaratory relief) they seek, including Claims based on contract, tort (including intentional tort), fraud, agency, your or our negligence, statutory or regulatory provisions, or any other sources of law; Claims made as counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims, interpleaders or otherwise; Claims made regarding past, present or future conduct; and Claims made independently or with other claims. This also includes Claims made by or against anyone connected with us or you or claiming through us or you, or by someone making a claim through us or you, such as a co-applicant, Authorized User, employee, agent, representative or an affiliated/parent/subsidiary company.

“Arbitration limits

“• Individual Claims filed in a small claims court are not subject to arbitration, as long as the matter stays in small claims court.

“• We won’t initiate arbitration to collect a debt from you unless you choose to arbitrate or assert a Claim against us. If you assert a Claim against us, we can choose to arbitrate, including actions to collect a debt from you. You may arbitrate on an individual basis Claims brought against you, including Claims to collect a debt.

“• Claims brought as part of a class action, private attorney general or other representative action can be arbitrated only on an individual basis. The arbitrator has no authority to arbitrate any claim on a class or representative basis and may award relief only on an individual basis. If arbitration is chosen by any party, neither you nor we may pursue a Claim as part of a class action or other representative action. Claims of 2 or more persons may not be combined in the same arbitration. However, applicants, co-applicants, Authorized Users on a single Account and/or related Accounts or corporate affiliates are here considered as one person.” (Motion, Ex. A at p. 3.)

The Arbitration Agreement states that it survives if the account is sold to a third party, such as Cavalry:

“Survival and Severability of Terms

This arbitration provision shall survive changes in this Agreement and termination of the Account or the relationship between you and us, including the bankruptcy of any party and any sale of your Account, or amounts owed on your Account, to another person or entity. If any part of this arbitration provision is deemed invalid or unenforceable, the other terms shall remain in force, except that there can be no arbitration of a class or representative Claim. This arbitration provision may not be amended, severed or waived, except as provided in this Agreement or in a written agreement between you and us.” (Motion, Ex. A at p. 3.)

The claims and issues presented in Cavalry’s complaint arise out of the Credit Account. (See Compl., ¶¶ 1, 6-9; Motion, Ex. A at p. 3.) These claims are subject to the Arbitration Agreement. (Motion, Ex. A at p. 3 [“You may arbitrate on an individual basis Claims brought against you, including Claims to collect a debt.”] As to the enforceability against Cavalry, “[t]his arbitration provision shall survive changes in … the relationship between you and us, including … any sale of your Account, or amounts owed on your Account, to another person or entity.” (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, “a nonsignatory [in this case Cavalry] can be compelled to arbitrate when it is suing as a third-party beneficiary of the contract containing the arbitration clause.” (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1240; see also Compl., ¶¶ 6-8, 12, 14.)

Based on the forgoing, Mendez has carried her burden to demonstrate mutual assent to arbitrate the claims raised in this action pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement. (See Mendez Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; Motion, Ex. 3; Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565; Monster, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 789.) In addition, the court construes the absence of any opposition by Cavalry as a concession that the motion has merit. For all the reasons stated herein, the court will grant Mendez’s motion, order this matter to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, and stay this action pending the completion of the arbitration proceedings. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.2, 1281.4; see also 9 U.S.C. § 3.)