Edgar Osuna vs Crisis24 Inc et al

Case Number

25CV05800

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 03/09/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion: Compel Arbitration and Dismiss Class Claims or, in the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings

Tentative Ruling

Osuna v. Crisis24, Inc., et al.                                          

Case No. 25CV05800

           

Hearing Date: March 9, 2026                                                             

HEARING:              Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Edgar Osuna: Joseph Lavi, Vincent C. Granberry, Jeffrey D. Klein, Javad TahbazSalehi, Lavi & Ebrahimian, LLP

                                    For Defendant Crisis24, Inc., Gardaworld Security Services of California, Inc.: Malcolm A. Heinicke, Joseph D. Lee, Andrew J. Delaplane, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP                  

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of defendants Crisis24, Inc., and Gardaworld Security Services of California, Inc., to compel arbitration is granted. The individual, non-representative claims alleged by plaintiff Edgar Osuna in this action are ordered to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement as modified by this ruling (see Riordan Decl., Ex. H). Section 12.1 of the employee proprietary information, inventions, and non-competition agreement and paragraph 7 of the mutual non-disclosure agreement are severed (see Osuna Decl., Exs. 1-2). This action is stayed pending the resolution of the arbitration proceedings.  

Background:

On September 17, 2025, plaintiff Edgar Osuna initiated this action by filing a complaint against defendants Crisis24, Inc. and Gardaworld Security Services of California, Inc. (collectively, Defendants). The complaint sets forth eight causes of action for (1) failure to pay wages in violation of Labor Code sections 1194 and 1197, (2) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of Labor Code sections 510 and 1194, (3) failure to authorize or permit meal periods in violation of Labor Code sections 512 and 226.7, (4) failure to authorize or permit rest periods in violation of Labor Code section 226.7, (5) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures in violation of Labor Code section 2802, (6) failure to provide complete and accurate wage statements in violation of Labor Code section 226, (7) failure to timely pay wages in violation of Labor Code sections 201, 202 and 203, and (8) unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.

As alleged in the complaint: Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as an hourly, non-exempt employee from May 30, 2025, until July 3, 2025, including in Carpinteria. (Compl., ¶¶ 4-7.) During his employment, plaintiff was subjected to unlawful employment practices, including failure to pay wages for all hours worked (Compl., ¶ 14), on-duty, unpaid meal breaks (Compl., ¶¶ 16-18), failure to pay wages for all overtime worked (Compl., ¶¶ 19-24), failure to permit meal breaks (Compl., ¶¶ 25-29), failure to permit rest breaks (Compl., ¶¶ 30-34), failure to indemnify employment-related expenses such as cellphones and tools (Compl., ¶¶ 35-39), failure to provide accurate wage statements (Compl., ¶¶ 40-41), and failure to pay final wages at separation (Compl., ¶¶ 42-43). Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself, others similarly situated, and the general public, including a putative minimum wage class, overtime class, meal period class, rest period class, indemnification class, wage statement class, waiting time class, and a California class. (Compl., ¶ 44.)

On October 22, 2025, Defendants moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the class action claims or in the alternative stay proceedings pending arbitration. Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion on the grounds that the arbitration agreement at issue (Agreement) is unconscionable.

Analysis:

(1)       Contractual Consent to the Agreement

“Private arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties ….” (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313.) “Under ‘both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.’ ” (Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 19.) “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence an agreement to arbitrate a dispute exists.” (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120.)

“It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be: [¶] 1. Parties capable of contracting; [¶] 2. Their consent; [¶] 3. A lawful object; and, [¶] 4. A sufficient cause or consideration.” (Civ. Code, § 1550.) “The consent of the parties to a contract must be: [¶] 1. Free; [¶] 2. Mutual; and, [¶] 3. Communicated by each to the other.” (Civ. Code, § 1565.) “Consent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense….” (Civ. Code, § 1580.) “The existence of mutual consent is determined by objective rather than subjective criteria, the test being what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to believe. [Citation.] Accordingly, the primary focus in determining the existence of mutual consent is upon the acts of the parties involved.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 789.)

Defendants submit the Agreement between Crisis24 Protective Solutions, LP (Crisis24), and plaintiff, as well as plaintiff’s electronic signature indicating plaintiff consented to the Agreement. (Riordan Decl., Ex. H.) The Agreement provides in part: “Any and all claims that Crisis24 may have against you, or that you may have against Crisis24 (or any of Crisis24’s parents, affiliates, partners, members, employees, officers, directors, insurers and agents) arising out of or relating to your employment with Crisis24 or any of its affiliates, including but not limited to termination of employment, will be submitted for resolution to mandatory, binding arbitration.” (Id. at ¶ 1.)

According to the evidence submitted by Defendants, on June 12, 2025, prior to his start date, plaintiff was sent an email from human resources with onboarding instructions for a computer program called Dayforce. (Riordan Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, Ex. A.) The email provided plaintiff with instructions for onboarding in Dayforce, including a link to the Dayforce login page as well as plaintiff’s unique username and a temporary password. (Ibid.)

On June 12, 2025, plaintiff logged into Dayforce and began completing his onboarding paperwork. (Riordan Decl., ¶¶ 7-8, Exs. B-C.) To review the Agreement, plaintiff as a new employee was required to click on the link listed on the onboarding forms page to view relevant company policies, which includes a link to a PDF of the Agreement. (Riordan Decl., ¶¶ 9-11.) After reviewing the Agreement, plaintiff checked a box stating, “I accept and acknowledge the company policy above.” (Riordan Decl., ¶¶ 11-17, Exs. D-H.) Crisis24’s files reflect that plaintiff electronically signed the Agreement on June 12, 2025—the same day he received his onboarding email from Crisis24. (Riordan Decl., Exs. C, H.)

Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the Agreement. (Osuna Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.)  Plaintiff states that he does not recall signing an arbitration agreement, but recalls he was required to electronically sign onboarding documents using a worksite computer. (Ibid.) Defendants carried their burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff consented to the Agreement and that the Agreement applies to plaintiff’s complaint. These issues do not appear to be disputed. The court notes the lack of argument from plaintiff in his opposition brief on these issues.

(2)       The Agreement is Governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)

The Agreement provides that “[t]he Federal Arbitration Act will govern the interpretation and enforcement of this Policy.” (Riordan Decl., Ex. H, ¶ 2.) Defendants argue that the FAA governs. (Motion p. 14, ll. 1-10.) Plaintiff does not contest the FAA’s application in his opposition. “Thus, there is no ambiguity regarding the parties’ intent. They adopted the FAA … to govern their arbitration.” (Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1121-1122; see also Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 394.) The court will apply the FAA to the interpretation and enforcement of the Agreement as agreed by the parties.

(3)       Procedural Unconscionability

Under the FAA, an arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract….” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) “[U]nconscionability remains a valid defense to a petition to compel arbitration” under the FAA. (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1142.) However, “such rules must not facially discriminate against arbitration and must be enforced evenhandedly. … [and] must not disfavor arbitration as applied by imposing procedural requirements that ‘interfere[ ] with fundamental attributes of arbitration,’ especially its ‘lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1143.) “The party resisting enforcement of an arbitration agreement has the burden to establish unconscionability.” (Jenkins v. Dermatology Management, LLC (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 633, 640.)

“[U]nder California law, as under federal law, an arbitration agreement may only be invalidated for the same reasons as other contracts.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 98 (Armendariz).) “Because unconscionability is a reason for refusing to enforce contracts generally, it is also a valid reason for refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement …. The United States Supreme Court … recognized that ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements ....’ ” (Id. at p. 114.)

“Unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion. [Citation.] The term [contract of adhesion] signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it. [Citation.] If the contract is adhesive, the court must then determine whether other factors are present which, under established legal rules—legislative or judicial—operate to render it [unenforceable].” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113.)

“[U]unconscionability has both a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results. [Citation.] ‘The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.’ [Citation.] But they need not be present in the same degree. ‘Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.’ [Citations.] In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.)

Here, plaintiff signed the Agreement as part of the onboarding process. (Riordan Decl., ¶¶ 6-20.) He was required to execute the onboarding documents via a worksite computer. (Riordan Decl., ¶¶ 10-12; Osuna Decl, ¶¶ 2-7.) Plaintiff was not given the option to negotiate the terms of the Agreement. (Osuna Decl, ¶¶ 3-6.) The Agreement appears to be a standard form that Defendants’ employees were required to execute. (Riordan Decl., Ex. H.) While the agreement indicates that plaintiff could opt out by sending an email to human resources within 30 days, he was still required to execute it as written. (Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 8.) Procedural unconscionability is reduced because Plaintiff still had remaining time to opt out of the Agreement at the time of his separation from Defendants. (Osuna Decl., ¶ 2; Riordan Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. H.) Plaintiff submits evidence that he was not provided “any signed documents” for his records but attaches to his opposition several onboarding documents that he signed. (Osuna Decl., ¶ 3, Exs. 1-3.) There is at least a modicum of procedural unconscionability under these facts.

(4)       Armendariz Factors

As to substantive unconscionability, the California Supreme Court established five minimum requirements for lawful arbitration of statutory claims in the workplace. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 102.) “Such an arbitration agreement is lawful if it (1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.” (Ibid.)
 

As to the first factor of neutral arbitrators, the Agreement provides that arbitration shall be conducted before a neutral arbitrator and incorporates by reference the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules for employment arbitrations. (Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 4.) Rule 13 of the AAA rules provides for a fair process by which the parties may select a neutral arbitrator. (See Delaplane Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. C at pp. 12-13.) The first factor is satisfied.

As to the second factor of more than minimal discovery, the Agreement provides that the “AAA employment arbitration rules will apply to the arbitration process including … discovery of information.” (Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 4.) AAA rule 21 governs the exchange of information. (See Delaplane Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C at pp. 16-17.) “The arbitrator shall manage any necessary exchange of information among the parties, including depositions, interrogatories, document production, or other means, with a view to achieving an efficient and economical resolution of the dispute while, at the same time, promoting equality of treatment and safeguarding each party’s opportunity to fairly present its claims and defenses.” (Ibid.) The parties are required to “i) exchange documents in their possession or custody on which they intend to rely; [¶] (ii) update their exchanges of documents on which they intend to rely as such documents become known to them; [¶] [and] iii) identify the witnesses, if any, they plan to have testify at the hearing.” (Ibid.) “The arbitrator may, on application of a party or on the arbitrator’s own initiative [¶] … require the parties, in response to reasonable document requests, to make available to the other party documents in the responding party’s possession or custody ….” (Ibid.) The Agreement provides for more than minimal discovery.

As to the third factor of written award, the Agreement provides, “[a]fter the arbitration concludes, the arbitrator will issue a written opinion, normally within thirty days, including the factual and legal bases for the arbitrator’s decision.” (Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 4.) AAA rule 44 provides “[t]he award shall be issued promptly by the arbitrator and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or specified by law, no later than 30 calendar days from the date the hearing is closed.” (Delaplane Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C at pp. 24-25.) AAA rule 45 provides the award “shall be in writing and signed by a majority of the arbitrators.” (Id. at p. 25.) AAA rule 51 notes that the parties are “deemed to have consented that judgment upon the arbitration award may be entered in any federal or state court having jurisdiction thereof.” (Id. at p. 26.) The third factor of written award is satisfied.

As to the fourth factor for equal relief as permitted in court, the Agreement provides that “[t]he arbitrator will follow applicable law in deciding the claims.” (Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 4.) “[I]f a party prevails on a claim that entitles that party to attorneys’ fees and/or litigation costs under pertinent law, the arbitrator will rule upon a motion for fees and/or costs under the same standards a court would apply.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) There does not appear to be any limitations on substantive relief available to the plaintiff. The fourth factor has been met. As to the procedural mechanism of class-wide litigation, the court will address that issue separately below.

As to the fifth factor pertaining to arbitration costs, the Agreement provides that, “[t]o the extent required by applicable law, Crisis24 will pay the unique costs of the arbitration (for example, the AAA’s fee and the arbitrator’s fees) to the extent they exceed the relevant court filing fee in the state in which you work or last worked for Crisis24.” (Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 5.) The court will sever the modifying clause, “to the extent required by law,” and clarify that Defendants must pay the costs unique to arbitration. With this modification, the fifth factor has been met. The court notes that Defendants agree that they must pay the costs unique to arbitration. (Motion, p. 17, ll. 15-22.)

(5)       Class Waiver

Plaintiff argues that the following class action waiver in the Agreement is substantively unconscionable: “By agreeing to be subject to this Policy, you and Crisis24 are each giving up your right to a jury trial and the right to commence, participate in, or recover through a class or collective action for any dispute arising out of or relating to your employment with Crisis24. You and Crisis24 instead agree to arbitrate any such dispute on an individual basis only. This means that you may not join or combine your claims with any other persons in a proceeding, and you may not bring claims in court or in arbitration on behalf of (or seek remedies for) any other entity or person, such as other Crisis24 employees. The Parties’ waiver of the right to proceed on a class or collective basis is a material and essential part of this Policy; if this waiver is found unenforceable as to any class or collective claims, such claims will proceed only in court and not in arbitration. It is the intent of the Parties that a court (not an arbitrator) will resolve any dispute over the enforceability of this requirement that you and Crisis24 arbitrate covered disputes solely on an individual basis.” (Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 1.)

Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, class action waivers in arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA. (See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 348-352 (Concepcion).) “Concepcion invalidated a state-law rule against class waivers as applied to arbitration agreements.” (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 346.) “[A] party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 651 (Viking River).) Here, the Agreement evidences the parties’ contractual intent to proceed to arbitration on an individual basis. (See Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 1.) The parties agreed the FAA would govern. (Ibid.) The parties’ Agreement on this issue is enforceable under the FAA. (See Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 348-352; Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 651.)

(6)       Claims Under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA)

Plaintiff has not asserted a PAGA cause of action in this action, but nonetheless contends that the limitation on PAGA claims in the Agreement is substantively unconscionable. The Agreement provides: “To the full extent allowed by law, the claims subject to arbitration also include any individual claims you may have under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), meaning claims under PAGA premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by you, and such individual PAGA claims shall be submitted to arbitration on an individual basis seeking recovery for you and you alone: provided, however, that it is understood and agreed that (a) to the extent governing law does not allow for arbitration of individual (as opposed to representative) PAGA claims, then such claims will be resolved in court and not in arbitration; and (b) to the extent that, notwithstanding this Policy, you are permitted by applicable law to assert representative PAGA claims (i.e., claims on behalf of other allegedly aggrieved employees), such claims shall be resolved in court and not in arbitration.” (Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 1.)

The are no PAGA claims currently before the court. The court notes, however, as to proceedings governed by the FAA, it appears that PAGA claims may be split into individual claims subject to arbitration and representative claims subject to jurisdiction in court. (See Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1125-1128.) “Under the statute, a plaintiff who files a PAGA action with individual and non-individual claims does not lose standing to litigate the non-individual claims in court simply because the individual claims have been ordered to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 1128.) The court does not find that this provision in the Agreement is substantively unconscionable.

(7)       Mutuality

In addition to the five Armendariz factors discussed above, “an arbitration agreement imposed in an adhesive context lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting party, but not the other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences.”  (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 120.) An arbitration agreement, for example, “lacks mutuality” if “it requires the arbitration of employee—but not employer—claims arising out of a wrongful termination. An employee terminated for stealing trade secrets, for example, must arbitrate his or her wrongful termination claim under the agreement while the employer has no corresponding obligation to arbitrate its trade secrets claim against the employee.” (Ibid.)

The Agreement applies to “[a]ny and all claims that Crisis24 may have against you, or that you may have against Crisis24 (or any of Crisis24's parents, affiliates, partners, members, employees, officers, directors, insurers and agents) arising out of or relating to your employment with Crisis24 or any of its affiliates, including but not limited to termination of employment ….” (Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 1.) “The following claims are not covered by this Policy: claims for workers’ compensation or unemployment compensation benefits; claims that as a matter of law cannot be subject to arbitration; and claims under an employee benefit plan that specifies a different arbitration procedure.” (Id. at ¶ 2.) The Agreement contains sufficient mutuality on its face.

Plaintiff argues that mutuality is lacking because two additional agreements were executed as part of plaintiff’s onboarding that provide for jurisdiction in court: an employee proprietary information, inventions, and non-competition agreement (PINA) and a mutual nondisclosure agreement (NDA). (Osuna Decl., Ex. 1, § 12.1, Ex. 2, ¶ 7.) These documents were executed by plaintiff as part of his onboarding on the same day he executed the Agreement. (Osuna Decl., Exs. 1-2.) Under the PINA, the plaintiff confirmed: “I hereby expressly consent to the personal jurisdiction of the state and federal courts for Delaware in any lawsuit filed there against me by Company arising from or related to this Agreement.” (Id., Ex. 1, § 12.1.) Under the NDA: “a non-breaching Party shall be entitled to seek, and a court of competent jurisdiction may grant, specific performance and injunctive or other equitable relief as a remedy for any breach of this agreement.” (Id., Ex. 2, ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff cites Civil Code section 1642 and argues the Agreement, the NDA, and the PINA must be interpreted together. Under section 1642, “[s]everal contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be taken together.” (Civ. Code, § 1642.) It is unclear that the Agreement (between plaintiff and Crisis24), PINA (between plaintiff and Crisis24, Inc.), and NDA (between plaintiff and Crisis24), are all between the same parties as to the same matters. However, as discussed below, the court will sever section 12.1 of the NDA and paragraph 7 of the PINA to ensure mutuality.

(8)       Severance of Section 12.1 of the PINA and Paragraph 7 of the NDA

“Under [Civil Code] section 1670.5, once a trial court has determined that a contract or any of its clauses is unconscionable, it may do one of the following: (1) refuse to enforce the contract; (2) sever any unconscionable clause; or (3) limit the application of any clause to avoid unconscionable results. [Citation.] … Accordingly, the court has discretion not to sever, and to thus refuse to enforce the entire agreement, only when an agreement is ‘permeated’ by unconscionability.” (Wise v. Tesla Motors, Inc. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 325, 338 (Wise), internal quotation marks omitted.) “[C]ourts may liberally sever any unconscionable portion of a contract and enforce the rest when: [1] the illegality is collateral to the contract’s main purpose; [2] it is possible to cure the illegality by means of severance; and [3] enforcing the balance of the contract would be in the interests of justice.” (Id. at p. 339.)
 

Here, the plaintiff has asserted various wage and hour violations under the Labor Code. (Compl., ¶¶ 4-43.) The Agreement applies. (Riordan Decl., Ex. H at ¶ 1.) The NDA and PINA are not currently at issue. (Complaint; Riordan Decl., Ex. H; Osuna Decl., ¶ 2-7, Exs. 1-2.) “The main purpose of the Arbitration Agreement is to require the arbitration of nearly all disputes between the parties.” (Wise, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 339.) The dispute resolution provisions in the NDA and PINA apply to a narrow set of issues that are collateral to the main purpose of the Agreement. (Osuna Decl., Exs. 1-2.) Enforcement of the Agreement is in the interest of justice and consistent with the parties’ contractual intent.

Based on these circumstances, the court will sever section 12.1 of the PINA and paragraph 7 of the NDA, and enforce the Agreement. This will ensure mutuality and preclude any potential unfair application of the dispute resolution provisions of the NDA and PINA. (See Wise, 117 Cal.App.5th at pp. 339-341 [“Because all three conditions for severance … exist here, we conclude that the allegedly unconscionable … provisions [in the non-disclosure agreement] should have been severed and that the Arbitration Agreement (sans those provisions) should have been enforced.”].) “The ‘strong legislative and judicial preference is to sever the offending term and enforce the balance of the agreement.’ ” (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 513.)

(9)       Stay Pending Arbitration

“If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” (9 U.S.C. § 3.) The court will order this matter to arbitration as to plaintiff’s individual claims, enforce the waiver of class action claims, and stay this action pending the resolution of plaintiff’s individual claims in arbitration. (See ibid.; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.2, 1281.4.)

(10)     Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

In reply, Defendants request judicial notice of several court documents pertaining to litigation in which the plaintiff participated as a party. The court will deny Defendants’ request for judicial notice on the grounds that it was first submitted on reply and does not present documents pertinent to the court’s ruling. Courts may decline to take judicial notice of matters that are not material to the resolution of the issues before the court. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.) “[J]judicial notice, since it is a substitute for proof [citation], is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.” (Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063.)