Tentative Ruling: Elena Aranda vs Fei Fang Lee et al
Case Number
25CV05493
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 03/16/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
CMC; Demurrer
Tentative Ruling
Elena Aranda v. Fei Fang Lee, etc., et al.
Case No. 25CV05493
Hearing Date: March 16, 2026
HEARING: Demurrer of Defendants to Complaint
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Elena Aranda: Lacy L. Taylor, Scott A. Jaske, Thyne Taylor Fox Howard, LLP
For Defendants Fei Fang Lee aka Frank Lee, individually and as trustee of the Lee Family Trust dated December 20, 2003, Yi-Hu Lee aka Kate Lee, and CPH Lee Family Limited Partnership: Robert A. Hufnagel, Resnick & Louis, P.C.
TENTATIVE RULING:
The general and special demurrer of defendants to the complaint of plaintiff Elena Aranda is sustained in part, with leave to amend, and overruled in part. The special demurrer for uncertainty is sustained as to defendants Fei Fang Lee aka Frank Lee, in his capacity as trustee of the Lee Family Trust, only, Yi-Hu Lee aka Kate Lee, and CPH Lee Family Limited Partnership as to the seventh (malicious prosecution) and ninth (intentional infliction of emotional distress) causes of action. In all other respects, including as to defendant Fei Fang Lee aka Frank Lee in his individual capacity, the demurrer is overruled. Plaintiff shall file and serve her first amended complaint on or before April 1, 2026.
Background:
As alleged in plaintiff’s complaint:
Plaintiff Elena Aranda entered into a residential lease agreement with defendant Fei Fang Lee aka Frank Lee (Frank Lee) dba Ocean View Apartments for premises located at 505 Red Rose Lane, Unit #14, Santa Barbara (the Property). (Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 2, 9 & exhibit A.) The Property is owned by defendant CPH Lee Family Limited Partnership (CPH), whose sole partner is the Lee Family Trust. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Frank Lee is the trustee of the Lee Family Trust. (Ibid.) The Property is managed by both Frank Lee and defendant Yi-Hu Lee aka Kate Lee (Kate Lee). (Ibid.) Kate Lee held herself out as the manager of the Property and communicated directly with Aranda on behalf of Lee and CPH. (Ibid.)
Aranda paid Defendants a security deposit of $2,800.00 in connection with the
tenancy of the Property and her first month of rent in the amount of $2,300. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) The commencement date of the Lease was July 24, 2023, but Aranda was not provided possession of the Property until August 9, 2023. (Complaint, ¶ 13.)
Aranda moved to Santa Barbara to start new employment, a fact of which the defendants were aware. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14-15.)
Immediately upon moving in, Aranda discovered that the Property was unsafe and uninhabitable. (Complaint, ¶ 16.) The Property was infested with cockroaches, contained leaking plumbing, had an inoperable heater, and was missing smoke and carbon monoxide alarms, in addition to other serious violations of state and local housing codes. (Ibid.)
Aranda promptly complained to defendants who refused to make any repairs or cure
any dilapidations. (Complaint, ¶ 17.) As a result of defendants’ failure to take action, Aranda contacted the City of Santa Barbara, which inspected the Property on August 16, 2023, and issued Notices of Violation directing defendants to abate vermin, repair unsafe conditions, and bring the Property into compliance. (Complaint, ¶ 18. The Property was yellow-tagged on August 25, 2023. (Ibid.)
On August 28, 2023, defendants were aware and knew the Property was uninhabitable and subject to official code enforcement, nevertheless, in direct retaliation for Aranda having filed a complaint with the City of Santa Barbara, Frank Lee served Aranda with a Three-Day Notice to Quit, falsely alleging a failure to pay rent and unlawful subletting. (Complaint, ¶ 19 & exhibit C.)
On August 30, 2023, the City of Santa Barbara returned to the Property and red-tagged the Property. (Complaint, ¶ 20.) The City of Santa Barbara advised Frank Lee that he needed to relocate Aranda to another apartment or a hotel. (Ibid.) Defendants refused to provide any alternative housing for Aranda and refused to
compensate Aranda for her relocation expenses. (Complaint, ¶ 21.) As a result, Aranda was unable to safely reside at the Property, and incurred relocation expenses, including temporary lodging costs, and other out-of-pocket expenses. (Ibid.) Aranda moved into Motel 6 in Santa Maria on September 1, 2025 and thereafter struggled with the daily commute to her new job in Santa Barbara. (Complaint, ¶ 22.)
Unbeknownst to Aranda, on September 5, 2023, defendants filed an unlawful detainer action against Aranda to evict her from the Property in Santa Barbara County Superior Court case number 23CV03816 (the Unlawful Detainer Action). (Complaint, ¶ 23.)
On September 6, 2023, Aranda returned the keys to the Property to defendants. (Complaint, ¶ 24.) At that time of the return of the keys, Aranda did not know whether defendants intended to repair or not repair the Property, nor was she aware that defendants had already initiated the Unlawful Detainer Action against her. (Ibid.)
Aranda appeared and defended against the Unlawful Detainer Action. (Complaint, ¶ 25.)
As a result of being forced out of the Property, Aranda became homeless and was unable to continue her employment. (Complaint, ¶ 26.) On October 2, 2023, Aranda was forced to resign from her employment. (Complaint, ¶ 27 & exhibit D.)
Aranda requested the return of her $2,800 security deposit, but defendants wrongfully withheld the entire deposit, issuing a letter on October 24, 2023 (dated October 12, 2023), purporting to deduct for rent and repairs even though the Property had been condemned. (Complaint, ¶ 27 & exhibit E.) Defendants issued a false and bad-faith security deposit accounting. (Ibid.)
After successfully defending against the Unlawful Detainer Action, the Court entered a dismissal in favor of Aranda on December 19, 2023. (Complaint, ¶ 28 & exhibit F.)
On September 4, 2025, Aranda filed her complaint in this action asserting 10 causes of action: (1) breach of written lease agreement; (2) negligence; (3) breach of warranty of habitability; (4) private nuisance; (5) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment/ constructive eviction; (6) wrongful eviction/ abuse of process; (7) malicious prosecution; (8) violation of Security Deposit Law (Civ. Code, § 1950.5); (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (10) unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200).
On December 4, 2025, defendants filed their general and special demurrer to the causes of action of the complaint. The demurrer is opposed by Aranda.
Analysis:
“ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
(1) Causes of Action as against Frank Lee as Trustee
Defendants first demur on the grounds that the complaint does not allege any duty, role, or obligation as to the Lee Family Trust and so it is improper to assert claims against Frank Lee in his capacity as trustee of the Lee Family Trust. (Demurrer, at p. 6.) Aranda argues that Frank Lee, as trustee of the Lee Family Trust, is liable as the general partner owner of the Property.
As alleged in the complaint, the Property is owned by CPH, a limited partnership. An owner of real property may be liable in tort, as is alleged here, for breach of duties to persons on its property. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158–1159 [explaining overlap of negligence and premises liability].) This provides a basis, together with elements of the respective causes of action, for liability as to CPH.
“Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b) [for liability arising before a general partner became a general partner], all general partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the limited partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.” (Corp. Code, § 15904.04, subd. (a).) Aranda alleges that the Lee Family Trust is the general partner of CPH, and hence the Lee Family Trust would be jointly and severally liable for all obligations of CPH.
“As recognized in California: ‘ “Unlike a corporation, a trust is not a legal entity. Legal title to property owned by a trust is held by the trustee....” “ ‘A ... trust ... is simply a collection of assets and liabilities. As such, it has no capacity to sue or be sued, or to defend an action.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he proper procedure for one who wishes to ensure that trust property will be available to satisfy a judgment ... [is to] sue the trustee in his or her representative capacity.’ [Citation.]” (Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 522.)
Frank Lee is therefore properly sued in his capacity as trustee for liability alleged against CPH. The demurrer on this ground is overruled.
(2) Malicious Prosecution
Aranda’s seventh cause of action is for malicious prosecution.
“ ‘To establish a cause of action for the malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor [citations]; (2) was brought without probable cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with malice [citations].’ [Citation.]” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 676.)
Defendants argue that Aranda has failed to plead each of these elements. Defendants also argue that the complaint fails to allege liability as to each of the defendants (as opposed to all defendants) or is at least uncertain in that respect.
The only pleading relative to the Unlawful Detainer Action that is now before the court is the dismissal. (Complaint, ¶ 74 & exhibit F.) Exhibit F identifies the plaintiff in the Unlawful Detainer Action as Fei Fang Lee. There are therefore adequate allegations that defendant Frank Lee commenced the Unlawful Detainer Action. Aranda alleges that the underlying lease was entered into with Frank Lee dba Ocean View Apartments. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) Generic allegations that other defendants were acting as agents on behalf of other defendants are at least uncertain as to which defendants other than Frank Lee, in an individual capacity, would have commenced or directed the commencement of the Unlawful Detainer Action. The special demurrer for uncertainty to the seventh cause of action will be sustained as to all defendants except Frank Lee, in his individual capacity, on that ground.
“ ‘ “An action is deemed to have been pursued without probable cause if it was not legally tenable when viewed in an objective manner as of the time the action was initiated or while it was being prosecuted.” [Citation.] The test is whether, on the basis of facts then known, any reasonable attorney would have believed that instituting or maintaining the prior action was tenable.’ [Citation.]” (Landis’ Labyrinth, Inc. v. Whitaker (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 724, 735 (Landis’ Labyrinth).)
The complaint alleges that, at the time of the commencement of the Unlawful Detainer Action, Aranda was not in possession of the Property and that the Property was not legally habitable. (Complaint, ¶ 75.) These are sufficient allegations of lack of probable cause because these two elements each negate a basis for a claim in unlawful detainer. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1161 [defining unlawful detainer in various ways requiring that the tenant continue in possession of the premises]; Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 635 [breach for warranty of habitability is defense to unlawful detainer based on nonpayment of rent].)
“To establish the malice element of a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant initiated the prior action for an improper purpose. [Citation.] Malice is not limited to actual ill will towards the plaintiff. [Citation.] Instead, malice ‘ “may range anywhere from open hostility to indifference.” ’ [Citation.]” (Landis’ Labyrinth, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at pp. 735–736.)
The complaint alleges that defendants acted in retaliation for Aranda complaining to the City of Santa Barbara. (Complaint, ¶ 75.) This is a sufficient allegation of improper purpose to satisfy the element of malice for pleading purposes.
Defendants do not argue that the allegations of dismissal of the Unlawful Detainer Action are not sufficient to allege favorable termination.
The elements of malicious prosecution have been sufficiently alleged as to defendant Frank Lee in his individual capacity. The demurrer will be overruled to that extent.
(3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Aranda’s ninth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.’ [Citations.] A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.] And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ [Citation.]” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051, internal quotation marks omitted.)
Defendants argue that this cause of action is not sufficiently alleged because it is just a habitability case and that the cause of action fails to allege the role of each defendant.
Aranda alleges that the Property was knowingly in seriously substandard condition leading to it being red-tagged by the City of Santa Barbara. (Complaint, ¶¶ 55, 88.) These allegations are not of mere annoyances and are sufficient, for pleading purposes, to allege extreme and outrageous conduct by the renting defendant.
With respect to the role of defendants, “[e]ven as against a special demurrer a plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245.)
There is no ambiguity or uncertainty that this action is asserted against defendant Frank Lee in his individual capacity as the party alleged to have leased the Property to Aranda. The demurrer will be overruled in this respect. With respect to the remaining defendants, it is uncertain whether the basis for liability is an act or omission of the remaining defendant or only vicarious liability is asserted. The special demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained as to all other defendants.
(4) Unfair Business Practices
Aranda’s tenth cause of action is for violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).
“As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)
“By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices’ that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable. [Citation.]” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) More specifically, “[u]nless otherwise expressly provided, the remedies or penalties provided by this chapter are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17205.) Consequently, redundancy is not a basis for demurrer to this cause of action.
A plaintiff need not show the lack of an adequate remedy at law to state a cause of action under the UCL. For example, in Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, the California Supreme Court found that, although wrongfully withheld salary payment may constitute legal “damages,” orders for payment of wages unlawfully withheld from an employee are also a restitutionary remedy under the UCL. (Id. at pp. 174, 177.) A court may nonetheless use equitable considerations to guide the court’s discretion in fashioning the equitable remedies authorized by section 17203. (Id. at p. 179.)
Here, in any event, Aranda has alleged wrongful retention of the security deposit, the return of which would constitute restitution available under the UCL. (Complaint, ¶ 98.)
The demurrer to the tenth cause of action will be overruled.
(5) Leave to Amend
The court sustains the special demurrers discussed herein so that Aranda may alleged facts explaining the basis for liability of particular defendants asserted in specific causes of action. The court will grant leave to amend.