Laura Xh Stui v. Community Action Commission of Santa Barbara dba CommUnify

Case Number

25CV04781

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 02/04/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Laura Xh Stui: Alvin B. Lindsay, William Tran, D. Law, Inc.

                                   

For Defendant Community Action Commission of Santa Barbara dba CommUnify: Rafael Gonzalez, Christina M. Behrman, Mullen & Henzell L.L.P.

RULING

For all reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is granted. The parties are ordered to arbitration pursuant to the Dispute Resolution Policy as to Plaintiff’s individual claims including her individual PAGA claims. This action is stayed in all other respects pending the completion of the arbitration proceedings. This ruling constitutes the Court’s statement of decision. (See Metis Development LLC v. Bohacek (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 679, 689.)

Background

On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff Laura Xh Stui (Plaintiff) initiated this action by filing a class action complaint against Defendant Community Action Commission of Santa Barbara dba CommUnify (Defendant). The complaint asserts eleven causes of action for (1) failure to pay minimum wages, (2) failure to pay wages and overtime under Labor Code section 510, (3) meal period liability under Labor Code section 226.7, (4) rest break liability under Labor Code section 226.7, (5) violation of Labor Code section 226, (6) failure to maintain records under Labor Code sections 1174 and 1174.5, (7) violation of Labor Code section 204, (8) violation of Labor Code section 203, (9) violation of Labor Code section 221, (10) failure to reimburse necessary business expenses under Labor Code section 2802, and (11) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200.

On October 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) which added a twelfth cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) seeking penalties for violations of the Labor Code.

As alleged in the FAC:

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a teacher. (FAC, ¶ 2.) Defendant tasked her with duties that included developing weekly lesson plans for preschool children, developing and maintaining a safe and positive classroom climate, and creating an intentional learning environment, among other tasks and duties. (Ibid.)

Defendant employed other similarly situated employees as teachers, and in similar

and related positions to provide teaching and childcare services to Defendant’s clients in the cities of Goleta, Carpinteria, Lompoc, Buellton, Santa Maria, Orcutt, Guadalupe, New Cuyama, and throughout California. (FAC, ¶ 3.)

Defendant required Plaintiff and putative class members to work off-the-clock,

but Defendant failed to accurately record the hours they were on the clock, failed to pay them at the appropriate rates for all hours worked, failed to pay all wages due and owing at termination or resignation, and failed to provide them with accurate itemized wage statements. (FAC, ¶ 4.)

Defendant also failed to provide Plaintiff and putative class members with lawful meal and rest periods. (FAC, ¶ 4.) Employees were not provided with the opportunity to take full uninterrupted and duty-free rest periods and meal breaks, as required by the Labor Code and the applicable IWC Wage Orders. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff seeks to represent a putative class of “[a]ll individuals employed by Defendants at any time during the period of four (4) years prior to the filing of this lawsuit … as non-exempt, hourly employees by Defendants within the State of California.” (FAC, ¶ 39.)

Defendant brings this motion to compel arbitration on the basis that the parties agreed to the dispute resolution policy contained in an employee handbook. The dispute resolution policy contains an arbitration clause. Plaintiff executed a handbook acknowledgement form during her onboarding process. The parties dispute whether these circumstances constitute mutual consent to arbitrate.

Analysis

“Private arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties ….” (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313.) “Under ‘both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.’ ” (Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 19.) “Hence, when ruling on a petition to compel arbitration, the superior Court may consider evidence on factual issues such as contract formation bearing on the threshold issue of arbitrability.” (City of Vista v. Sutro & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 401, 407.)

“The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence an agreement to arbitrate a dispute exists.” (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120.) “It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be: [¶] 1. Parties capable of contracting; [¶] 2. Their consent; [¶] 3. A lawful object; and, [¶] 4. A sufficient cause or consideration.” (Civ. Code, § 1550.) “[A]n agreement to arbitrate may be express or implied so long as it is written.” (Harris v. TAP Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 373, 383 (Harris).)

“The consent of the parties to a contract must be: [¶] 1. Free; [¶] 2. Mutual; and, [¶] 3. Communicated by each to the other.” (Civ. Code, § 1565.) “The existence of mutual consent is determined by objective rather than subjective criteria, the test being what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to believe. [Citation.] Accordingly, the primary focus in determining the existence of mutual consent is upon the acts of the parties involved.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 789.)

Defendant presents evidence of a Human Resources Policy Handbook (Handbook) in support of its motion. (Moreno Decl., ¶ 4, Exs. A-B.) The Handbook includes a dispute resolution policy (Policy) that includes an arbitration clause. (Moreno Decl., Ex. B at p. 64.) Defendant provides evidence that Plaintiff signed a Human Resources Policy Handbook Acknowledgment (Acknowledgment) on September 18, 2024. (Moreno Decl., Ex. A) Defendant presents evidence that Defendant sent Plaintiff a copy of the Handbook to her work and personal email accounts on September 18, 2024. (Moreno Decl., ¶ 5.)

According to Plaintiff, she “did not know that there was an arbitration policy in the handbook and … was never told that [she] was bound by an arbitration policy if [she] accepted or continued employment with Defendant.” (Stui Decl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff does not present evidence to dispute that her signature is on the Acknowledgment or that she received by email a copy of the Handbook that same day. As Plaintiff recalls, “[d]uring the onboarding process, [she does] remember Human Resources handed [her] a ‘Human Resources Policy Handbook’ and instructed [her] to sign the acknowledgement form at the end of the handbook before [she] could start working.” (Stui Decl., ¶ 5.)  

The Acknowledgment Plaintiff signed states in part: “By signing below I acknowledge that I have received and read a copy of the CommUnify – Human Resources Policy Manual. I understand that I am responsible for reading the Manual and for knowing and complying with the policies set forth in the manual during my employment with the Agency, and I agree to be bound by those policies. [¶] I further understand that, with the exception of the Dispute Resolution Policy, the policies contained in the manual are guidelines only and are not intended to create any contractual rights or obligations, express or implied. [¶] I also understand that, with the exception of the Dispute Resolution Policy and policy of employment at will, the Agency has the right to amend, interpret, modify, or withdraw any of the provisions of the Manual at any time in its sole discretion, with or without notice….” (Moreno Decl., Ex. A)

The Policy provides in part, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the Company and I mutually agree … all disputes arising out of … my employment … shall be resolved only by an Arbitrator … and not by way of Court or jury trial.” (Moreno Decl., Ex. B, § 14, subd. 1.) “This Agreement shall survive the termination of my employment and the expiration of any benefit plan.” (Moreno Decl., Ex. B, § 14, subd. 9.) There is a class action waiver and certain limitations on PAGA claims. (Moreno Decl., Ex. B, § 14, subds. 7, 8.)

The Policy states in bold (in part) and capital letters (in part):

“I understand that I must arbitrate whatever individual claims I have against the Company, and that the Company is also obligated to arbitrate any claims it has against me. I further understand that I may consult with an attorney as to any aspect of this Agreement. This Agreement is the full and complete agreement relating to the formal resolution of disputes and to the extent it becomes applicable, supersedes any existing agreement between the parties with regard to arbitration. MY SIGNATURE ON THE ‘HANDBOOK ACKNOWLEDGMENT FORM’ INDICATES THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND ALL OF THE TERMS CONTAINED IN THIS DISPUTED RESOLUTION AGREEMENT. I UNDERSTAND THAT EMPLOYMENT OR CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT AT THE AGENCY CONSTITUTES ACCEPTANCE OF THIS DISPUTE RESOLUTION AGREEMENT AND ITS TERMS, AND THAT THE AGENCY AND I ARE MUTUALLY BOUND BY ITS TERMS.” (Moreno Decl., Ex. B at p. 65.)

The language in the preceding paragraph is on page 65 of the Handbook. (Moreno Decl., Ex. B at p. 65.) The Acknowledgment is on page 67. (Id. at p. 5 of 8 [table of contents].) The Acknowledgment specifically references the Policy, including that Plaintiff had read and understood the Handbook which includes the Policy. (Moreno Decl., Ex. A.) Plaintiff agreed to be bound by the policies in the Handbook. (Ibid.) Plaintiff admits to signing the Acknowledgment located on the last page of the Handbook during the onboarding process. (Stui Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s evidence that she received emailed copies of the Handbook on the same day she signed the Acknowledgement. (Moreno Decl., ¶ 5.)

Although Plaintiff indicates she did not read the Policy, whether Plaintiff “chose not to read or take the time to understand these provisions is legally irrelevant.” (Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 383.) “An arbitration clause within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never actually read the clause.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.) “Reasonable diligence requires the reading of a contract before signing it. A party cannot use his own lack of diligence to avoid an arbitration agreement.” (24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1215.) “Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.” (Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 381.) Based on the objective, outward manifestations of the words and actions of the parties, Defendant has carried its burden to demonstrate mutual consent to arbitrate this action pursuant to the Policy.

As to Plaintiff’s PAGA claims, Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims are also ordered to arbitration and the Court will address any remaining PAGA issues after the arbitration proceedings are completed. (See Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1125 [“When an action includes arbitrable and nonarbitrable components, the resulting bifurcated proceedings are not severed from one another; rather, the Court may ‘stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.’ ”].) “[A] Plaintiff who files a PAGA action with individual and non-individual claims does not lose standing to litigate the non-individual claims in Court simply because the individual claims have been ordered to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 1128.)
 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and order the parties to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the Policy. The Court will stay this action pending the resolution of the arbitration proceedings. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.2, 1281.4.)