Tentative Ruling: Holly Leigh Martyn vs John E Price et al

Case Number

25CV04780

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 05/01/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Preliminary Injunction

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons stated herein, the application of defendants and cross-complainants for a preliminary injunction is denied.

Background:

As alleged in the complaint of plaintiff Holly Leigh Martyn:

Plaintiff owns real property located at 1130 Barger Canyon Road in Santa Barbara, California (the Martyn Property), which was created by the recording of a parcel map on January 14, 1969. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 18 & exhibit 8.)

John E. Price (J Price) and Janna Price (collectively, the Prices), as co-trustees of The Price Living Trust Dated September 28, 2007, own the real property located at 1550 La Vista Road (the Parcel A Price Property). (Complaint, ¶ 6.)

David E. Chambers and Maureen E. Chambers (collectively, the Chambers) own vacant land assigned Assessor’s Parcel Number 153-370-010 (the Chambers Property). (Complaint, ¶ 7 & exhibit 3.)

Pacific Heights Acquisitions, LLC, (Pacific Heights) owns real property located at 1556 La Vista Road (the Parcel B Pacific Heights Property). (Complaint, ¶ 8.)

Michael Jay Paveloff and Sherri Anne Paveloff (collectively, the Paveloffs) own real property located at 1560 La Vista Road (the Parcel C Paveloff Property). (Complaint, ¶ 9.)

Ma’an Nasir (Nasir) owns real property located at 1455 La Vista Road (the Parcel D Nasir Property). (Complaint, ¶ 10.)

The Parcel A Price Property, the Chambers Property, the Parcel B Pacific Heights Property, the Parcel C Paveloff Property, and the Parcel D Nasir Property (collectively, the Defendant Properties) are located uphill from the Martyn Property. (Complaint, ¶ 2, 14-15 & 40.)

Three wells on the Martyn Property collect and supply water to a tank located on the Paveloff Property, where that water is stored and distributed to the Defendant Properties. (Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 21, 28, 31 & 40-41.) The Paveloffs are the only parties connected by a pipeline to those wells, and taking water from the only well still in operation. (Complaint, ¶ 40.) Defendants claim ownership to and easement and access rights in the three wells on the Martyn Property. (Complaint, ¶¶ 19, 21, 30-31.)

The Prices or the Chambers constructed one well (Upper Well 2) within the easement area, at the bottom edge of slope and above a dry creekbank on the Martyn Property without properly compacting the soil; supporting, armoring, and draining the land; or providing mitigation measures to account for the location of the well. (Complaint, ¶¶ 30-31.) Upper Well 2 was damaged by heavy rains in 2022 and 2023 that caused the land around Upper Well 2 and an adjacent creek bank to collapse, resulting in damage to that well, its related equipment, and the access route used to get to Upper Well 2, rendering that route unstable. (Complaint, ¶¶ 32-33.) The unstable land within the access easement to Upper Well 2 is inaccessible to heavy vehicles and unable to support construction equipment necessary to perform site work or repairs. (Complaint, ¶ 34.)

The only well still in operation and which Defendants claim to own (Road Well 1) is for domestic water use. (Complaint, ¶¶ 37 & 40.) Defendants have not produced evidence that Road Well 1 is permitted by the local agency with jurisdiction, and do not have a valid easement or other legal right to access the Martyn Property to get to or operate Road Well 1. (Complaint, ¶¶ 37-38.) Defendants also erected an unpermitted antenna at Road Well 1 which receives signals from the water tank on the Paveloff Property. (Complaint, ¶ 46.)

The third well (Abandoned Well 3) is located north of Road Well 1, has not been in operation for almost two decades, and is permanently inactive. (Complaint, ¶ 39.) On May 25, 2025, J Price applied for a permit to drill a replacement well near Abandoned Well 3, which was suspended by the County of Santa Barbara due to an easement dispute. (Complaint, ¶¶ 42-44.) J Price has threatened to enter the Martyn Property to drill a new well at the site of Abandoned Well 3. (Complaint, ¶ 44.)

Road Well 1, Upper Well 2, and Abandoned Well 3 (collectively, the Wells), their related facilities, and the alleged easements burdening the Martyn Property, have been abandoned or extinguished by the nonuse of those wells by Defendants; by the destruction of the land in the area of the Wells rendering them inoperable; by the recording of various quitclaim deeds by the Prices, the Chambers, and Nasir, among other individuals; or when the Parcel A Price Property, the Parcel B Pacific Heights Property, the Parcel C Paveloff Property, the Parcel D Nasir Property, and the Martyn Property came to be owned by the same party. (Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 23-24, 49, 56.)

On August 1, 2025, plaintiff filed their verified complaint against defendants the Prices, the Chambers, Pacific Heights, the Paveloffs, and Nasir (collectively, Defendants), asserting seven causes of action: (1) quite title; (2) declaratory relief; (3) declaratory relief – Water Code section 7005; (4) contribution – Water Code section 7002; (5) trespass – for removal of unpermitted antennae; (6) private nuisance (against the Prices, the Chambers, and the Paveloffs only); and (7) trespass to land (against the Paveloffs only).

On August 6, 2025, plaintiff filed an ex parte application (the Martyn Application) for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re preliminary injunction restraining or preventing defendants from: (1) entering the Martyn Property and drilling any replacement or other water wells, or reopening any wells, near or inside Abandoned Well 3; (2) entering the Martyn Property with any vehicles to attempt to access the area of Upper Well 2; (3) entering the Martyn Property to perform any unpermitted work in relation to any of the Wells; and (4) powering on electricity at Abandoned Well 3 or Upper Well 2 without first correcting electrical fire hazards with licensed, bonded contractors performing permitted work. Defendants filed opposition to the Martyn Application.

On August 8, 2025, after a hearing held on August 7, the court issued a temporary restraining order (the TRO), and order to show cause (the OSC) why preliminary injunctions requested in the Martyn Application should not issue.

On October 16, plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum in support of the Martyn Application and the OSC.

On October 21, defendants each filed verified answers to the complaint, and the Prices, Pacific Heights, and Nasir filed a verified cross-complaint against plaintiff, alleging seven causes of action: (1) quite title to express easements; (2) quiet title to implied easements; (3) quiet title to prescriptive easements; (4) quiet title to equitable easements; (5) declaratory judgment; (6) private nuisance; and (7) interference with easements.

On October 27, Defendants filed a combined opposition to the OSC.

On November 7, after a hearing, the court issued a minute order (the November MO) adopting its tentative ruling granting the Martyn Application, in part and as further discussed in that order and herein. Except as granted pursuant to the November MO, the Martyn Application was otherwise denied.

On November 18, the court signed an order (the November Order) entering a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants, “including any and all persons and entities acting for or on their behalf and/or in concert with them, such as, but not limited to any employees, agents, managers, or contractors, are hereby enjoined and restrained from entering [the Martyn Property] and drilling any water wells (whether termed “replacement” or otherwise), or reopening any wells on the Martyn Property, near or inside [Abandoned Well 3].” (November Order, ¶ 1.)

On December 3, plaintiff filed their verified answer to the cross-complaint of the Prices, Pacific Heights, and Nasir.

On March 23, 2026, Defendants and cross-complainants, to whom the court will refer collectively as Defendants for convenience of writing, filed the present ex parte application (application) for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue requiring plaintiff to remove recently installed obstructions purportedly interfering with Defendants’ access to Upper Well 2, and enjoining plaintiff and her agents from interfering with access to Upper Well 2 including any necessary deviation beyond easement boundaries. The application also requests that the court issue an order to show cause regarding contempt, based on what Defendants contend is a willful circumvention by plaintiff of the November Order. Further, the application requests an award of attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Defendants pursuant to a 2007 Amended Water Rights Agreement.

On March 24, plaintiff filed their opposition to the application.

At the hearing on the application held on March 24, plaintiff submitted courtesy copies of their opposition for the court’s review. After reviewing plaintiff’s opposition and a hearing, the court declined to rule on the application and set the matter to be heard on the court’s law and motion calendar. The court ordered plaintiff to file any opposition to the application no later than April 6, and Defendants to file any replies to plaintiff’s opposition no later than April 13.

In support of the application, J Price asserts that, pursuant to certain grant deeds and an agreement for sale recorded in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara, the Prices believed that they would always have the right to water from the well sites on the Martyn Property. (J Price Dec., ¶¶ 5-7.) J Price also asserts that a 2007 Amended Water Rights Agreement requires and confirms express rights to water on and under the Martyn Property, outside of the area where the residence on that property was built. (J Price Dec., ¶¶ 8-9.) According to J Price, plaintiff has, since February 9, 2007 and prior to the filing of this lawsuit, allowed J Price to access the Martyn Property to use the wells. (J Price Dec., ¶ 10.)

J Price explains that Upper Well 2 has existed for decades at the bottom edge of a hillside slope above a creek bank, and is one of the three wells historically used to collect and supply water from the Martyn Property pursuant to various recorded instruments described in the J Price declaration. (J Price Dec., ¶ 11.) Access to Upper Well 2, which has been out of operation for two years due to a landslide, is also provided for in a recorded easement burdening the Martyn Property. (Ibid.) After an inspection of Upper Well 2, J Price discovered that the well pump requires replacement. (Ibid.) Plaintiff has interfered with and objected to J Price bringing vehicles to the area to replace the well pump for Upper Well 2. (J Price Dec., ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff has also repeatedly complained about the disrepair of Upper Well 2, and claims that the conditions at that well create an imminent threat and ongoing wildfire and safety risk to life and property. (J Price Dec., ¶ 13.)

After the court did not order any restrictions as to Upper Well 2, J Price hired Alexander Pump Service (Alexander Pump), a licensed contractor, to inspect and replace Upper Well 2. (J Price Dec., ¶¶ 13-14.) On January 8, 2026, J Price gave notice to plaintiff that Alexander Pump would be coming onsite to replace the Upper Well 2 well pump. (J Price Dec., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff provided the security code to enter the Martyn Property. (Ibid.)

On or about January 13, 2026, a single truck from Alexander Pump attempted to enter the Martyn Property with the replacement well pump for Upper Well 2, solely for the purpose of removing the old pump and installing a new pump. (J Price Dec., ¶ 14.) Mr. Appel (Appel), who is plaintiff’s boyfriend, prevented Alexander Pump from accessing Upper Well 2 except within a ten-foot lane that Appel arbitrarily created on the Martyn Property. (Ibid.)

J Price asserts that plaintiff knows that erosion, slope instability, and deteriorated conditions exist in the area of Upper Well 2, that the portion of the dirt road within the easement used to access Upper Well 2 has washed out and narrowed, and that restricting access to a nominal ten foot corridor is unsafe and impracticable. (J Price Dec., ¶ 15.) Notwithstanding this knowledge, plaintiff obstructed and prevented Alexander Pump from accessing Upper Well 2 to replace the pump and repair the hazardous conditions alleged by plaintiff in these proceedings. (Ibid.)

J Price asserts that allowing Alexander Pump to access Upper Well 2 poses no risk, danger, or hazard, and that any hazardous condition has been created by plaintiff’s lack of cooperation and newly installed obstructions. (J Price Dec., ¶ 15.) As to an earlier statement by J Price that the Wells can be repaired by equipment capable of navigating the existing access road, J Price states that their prior statement was meant to convey that the well could be repaired by use of the existing access road, and that the access road referred to in that statement is the access road that plaintiff claims is outside the easement area and has unilaterally blocked off. (J Price Dec., ¶ 18.)

After Alexander Pump was denied access, J Price’s attorneys requested that plaintiff and Appel cease their obstruction of access to Upper Well 2 beyond the easement boundaries, to the extent necessary to allow repairs to the easement and Upper Well 2. (J Price Dec., ¶ 16.) The parties were unable to resolve their dispute. (J Price Dec., ¶ 17.)

Plaintiff has also denied Defendants from accessing Upper Well 2 by installing raised planter beds that prevent any vehicle from accessing that well to complete the repairs. (J Price Dec., ¶ 19.) J Price includes in their declaration, photos of the planters installed on the Martyn Property, which were taken by J Price on February 6, 2026. (Ibid.) Also attached to the J Price declaration is a copy of a survey in which J Price has marked the location of those planters. (J Price Dec., ¶ 20 & exhibit G.)

J Price asserts that the installation of the planters by plaintiff prevents J Price from accessing Upper Well 2 to replace the well pump and perform repairs in regard to the life safety issues alleged by plaintiff. (J Price Dec., ¶ 21.) J Price also states that it is necessary to restore the Upper Well 2 to working condition because Road Well 1 ceased functioning on March 13, 2026, resulting in critically low water levels and an urgent risk to the safety and habitability of the Defendant Properties. (J Price Dec., ¶¶ 22 & 24.) The J Price declaration includes a photograph of the Road Well 1 water gauge on March 16, 2026, that was taken by J Price. (J Price Dec., ¶ 23.)

J Price states that, though Road Well 1 has been repaired by Alexander Pump, it is functioning at a reduced rate. (J Price Dec., ¶ 25.) According to J Price, during the efforts to repair Road Well 1, plaintiff engaged in similar efforts to restrict or interfere with access to that well by changing the gate code to the Martyn Property, by berating Alexander Pump employees with comments that they do not have easement rights to perform the work, and by attempting to restrict Alexander Pump’s vehicles to access constraints that make the repair not possible. (Ibid.)

The application is also supported by a declaration of Gilbert Alcantar, who is employed with Alexander Pump as a water well technician. (Alcantar Dec., ¶ 2.) Alcantar states that, on January 13, 2026, Alexander Pump was assigned to replace the Upper Well 2 well pump. (Alcantar Dec., ¶ 3.) On that day, Alcantar and Victor Galarza drove one truck, and attempted to enter the Martyn Property with the replacement well pump for the purpose of removing the old pump at Upper Well 2 and installing the new pump. (Alcantar Dec., ¶ 4.) Based on Alcantar’s experience as a well and water systems technician, a truck is required to transport the large and heavy equipment and parts that are necessary to perform the repair. (Alcantar Dec., ¶ 5.)

As Alcantar drove onto the Martyn Property, they observed two individuals who identified themselves as plaintiff and Appel, blocking access to Upper Well 2 outside of a ten-foot corridor, a portion of which was eroded and unsafe for vehicular access. (Alcantar Dec., ¶ 6.) The access to Upper Well 2 was restricted by a vehicle parked on the access road, and by a stake with a cable that marked out a portion of the left side of the path. (Alcantar Dec., ¶ 7.) Alcantar was told by plaintiff and Appel that the left side of the path was outside the easement area and that Alcantar was not permitted access to that area. (Ibid.) The Alcantar declaration includes a photo taken by Alcantar which depicts the stake and cable marking out a portion of the left side of the pathway. (Ibid.) Those circumstances prevented Alcantar from accessing Upper Well 2 to perform the repairs. (Alcantar Dec., ¶ 6.)

According to Alcantar, the access path to Upper Well 2 narrows significantly as that path continues to the well. (Alcantar Dec., ¶ 8.) The restricted or marked off area that plaintiff and Appel assert is the easement, includes about 4 and a half feet of pathway which does not provide enough clearance for the Alexander Pump truck. (Ibid.) Though the truck necessary for the well repair cannot safely drive on a portion of the pathway, it could safely drive down that pathway if the area marked off by plaintiff and Appel could be used. (Alcantar Dec., ¶ 9.) Because plaintiff and Appel did not permit Alcantar to access the marked off area of the pathway, Alcantar was not able to perform the repair work on Upper Well 2. (Alcantar Dec., ¶ 10.)

In support of the application, Defendants’ counsel, Scott B. Mahler, describes the parties efforts to meet and confer regarding their access dispute, among other matters. (Mahler Dec., ¶¶ 3-7.)

On April 6, plaintiff filed their opposition to the application, which is supported by a declaration of plaintiff that contains similar if not identical evidence and information contained in plaintiff’s declaration submitted in support of the Martyn Application. Plaintiff adds that the measurements of the dirt road within the claimed easement referenced in their prior declaration were taken by plaintiff and Appel using a measuring tape. (Martyn Dec., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff further asserts that, though J Price previously stated that Upper Well 2 could be repaired using equipment capable of navigating the existing access road without leaving the easement boundary, Alexander Pump arrived at plaintiff’s property with trucks that were larger than those previously described by Defendants. (Martyn Dec., ¶¶ 8-9.)

Plaintiff states that the washing out of the dirt access road where Defendants claim an easement has been known to Defendants for years, and that on April 1, 2024, plaintiff’ offered to share in the costs of stabilizing the creek bed. (Martyn Dec., ¶ 10; Index of Exhibits, exhibit 1 [letter from plaintiff’s former counsel].) Though plaintiff did not receive a substantive response to that offer, Defendants offered to sell Upper Well 2 to plaintiff. (Martyn Dec., ¶ 10.) Because the Martyn Property is served by the Goleta Water District, plaintiff did not buy Upper Well 2. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff further states that the County of Santa Barbara Fire Department inspected the electrical equipment at Upper Well 2 on November 20, 2025, and cited code violations in a report provided to plaintiff and Defendants’ counsel. (Martyn Dec., ¶ 14.) Only then did Defendants send a tradesman to address the electrical equipment at Upper Well 2. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff paid approximately $20,000 for their “garden” the application seeks to remove, and includes with their declaration a picture of the current condition of that garden. (Martyn Dec., ¶ 15.) Plaintiff contends that the planters at issue are not within the easement claimed by Defendants. (Martyn Dec., ¶¶ 15-16.) Plaintiff also includes with their declaration, the same survey depicted in the J Price declaration and described above, which plaintiff asserts shows the “Residence Area” of the Martyn Property and the location of the easement containing the access route to Upper Well 2. (Martyn Dec., ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff’s opposition is also supported by a declaration of Frederick Richard “Rick” Jones (Jones), who is a registered civil engineer and land surveyor, and the principal of Land Review Consultants Co. – Land Reports Co. (Jones Dec., ¶ 2.) Attached to that declaration is a copy of Jones’ curriculum vitae. (Ibid. & exhibit 1.)

Jones was retained by plaintiff to survey the Martyn Property. (Jones Dec., ¶ 4. ) As part of that process, Jones reviewed the 2007 Amended Water Rights Agreement, a copy of which is attached to the Jones declaration. (Jones Dec., ¶ 5 & exhibit 2.) According to Jones, the 2007 Amended Water Rights Agreement includes a diagram or survey exhibit which maps and depicts the “Residence Area” of the Martyn Property, as that term is defined in that agreement. (Jones Dec., ¶ 6.)

On February 12, March 27, and April 3, 2026, Jones visited the Martyn Property, looked for control points and survey markers, took measurements, and determined easement and boundary areas for that property. (Jones Dec., ¶ 7.) During that visit, Jones observed that plaintiff had installed planters in the northeast section of the Martyn Property. (Jones Dec., ¶ 8.) Jones surveyed the planters, and states that they are located within the Residence Area and do not encroach into the “Access Easement” or the “New Water Easement” (as those terms are defined in the 2007 Amended Water Rights Agreement). (Ibid.)

In support of plaintiff’s opposition, Appel, who lives with plaintiff at the Martyn Property, states that on January 13, 2026, Alexander Pump visited that property to replace the pump at Upper Well 2. (Appel Dec., ¶¶ 2-3.) Appel placed a movable stake attached to a chain in the dirt road for the purpose of visually showing Alexander Pump where plaintiff and Appel believed the 10-foot-wide access easement boundary claimed by Defendants lies along the dirt road leading to Upper Well 2. (Appel Dec., ¶ 3.) Appel also showed Alexander Pump the areas where the dirt road had eroded and where the Upper Well 2 pump had slumped and become unstable. (Ibid.)

According to Appel, Alexander Pump had two large trucks and asked Appel if they could drive beyond where Appel believed the boundary line was for the claimed 10-foot-wide easement. (Appel Dec., ¶ 3.) Appel explained that Alexander Pump would have to make their own decision about where and how to drive, and that if they went around the boundary line then Appel and plaintiff would view that as a trespass. (Ibid.)

Appel further states that they reviewed the Alcantar declaration described above, and that it is not true that Appel and plaintiff blocked access outside of the marked off ten-foot corridor. (Appel Dec., ¶ 4.) Instead, Appel states, they told Alexander Pump that Appel would remove the stake, chain, and Appel’s car. (Appel Dec., ¶ 4.) Alexander Pump did not ask Appel to do that, and instead said they had to call their supervisor to determine what to do next. (Ibid.) After the conversation, Alexander Pump drove off and returned later that day with J Price. (Appel Dec., ¶¶ 4-5.) Appel watched as Alcantar walked the property with J Price, and saw or heard Alcantar pointing out to J Price the areas where the claimed access easement was unsafe to pass through with trucks. (Appel Dec., ¶ 6.) Soon after, they all left. (Ibid.)

Alexander Pump returned to the Martyn Property on March 13, 2026, and explained that they were there to “figure out” an issue with Road Well 1, which Appel understood to be unexpected. (Appel Dec., ¶¶ 7-8.) Though not given any notice of that visit for which Alexander Pump apologized, Plaintiff and Appel opened the driveway gate when Alexander Pump arrived. (Ibid.) Before Alexander Pump left, they explained to Appel that they were looking for a suspected leak in Road Well 1. (Ibid.)

Alexander Pump returned on March 16, 2026, and explained to Appel that there was a hole in the Road Well 1 well pipe. (Appel Dec., ¶ 9.) Though Alexander Pump spent the day pulling out the pipe in pieces, they did not finish their job and asked if they could leave their truck, materials, and equipment overnight. (Ibid.) Appel spoke with Bobby at Alexander Pump, and explained that plaintiff was fine with Alexander Pump leaving their stuff there overnight but that plaintiff was not accepting any responsibility for it. (Ibid.)

Alexander Pump returned the next day, March 17, 2026, and finished their work on Road Well 1. (Appel Dec., ¶ 10.) Alexander Pump told Appel that they had replaced everything in Road Well 1 and that the well was working when they finished. (Ibid.)

Appel states that they have read the J Price declaration filed in support of the application; that the accusation of plaintiff interfering is false; that Alexander Pump has never been unable to get through the driveway gate; that the one time when Alexander Pump showed up and couldn’t get the code to work, plaintiff and Appel opened the gate for them; and that plaintiff and Appel did not berate Alexander Pump employees. (Appel Dec., ¶ 11.)

Appel also asserts that J Price was not at the Martyn Property during Appel’s conversations with Alexander Pump in January and March 2026; that Appel was never asked to trim a tree branch that J Price asserts was crossing over the easement area; that Appel saw Alexander Pump drive their truck past a tree branch to access the site of Road Well 1; and that Appel did not stop Alexander Pump or say anything to suggest they could not do the work on Road Well 1. (Appel Dec., ¶ 11.) Included in the Appel declaration is a photo showing the Alexander Pump truck at the site of Road Well 1 the week prior to the date of the Appel declaration. (Ibid.)

Analysis:

“[A]s a general matter, the question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.... ‘The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554, original italics.) “[T]he burden [is] on [Defendants], as the parties seeking injunctive relief, to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction.” (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481 (O’Connell).)

In their application, Defendants assert that the recorded easement burdening the Martyn Property expressly provides for the access route to Upper Well 2, which is not operational, and that that Defendants require access to Upper Well 2 to restore it to working condition, as well as to maintain, repair, or remediate the hazardous conditions alleged by plaintiff in these proceedings. Defendants also assert that Road Well 1 has recently ceased functioning and is operating at a reduced rate resulting in critically low water levels and a risk to the habitability and safety of the Parcel A Price Property, the Parcel B Pacific Heights Property, and the Parcel D Nasir Property.

Because portions of the access route to Upper Well 2 within the claimed easement are unsafe or impractical due to erosion, slope instability, and washout, Defendants contend, any confinement of vehicular access to a narrow ten-foot corridor within that route is dangerous. Defendants further contend that allowing Defendants to access Upper Well 2 on a temporary, limited basis would impose a minimal burden on plaintiff, and would restore the long standing access that has existed for decades.

The application also argues that any obstruction or interference by plaintiff of Defendants’ ability to access to Upper Well 2, including by installing raised planter beds and preventing Alexander Pump from accessing that well, contradicts or violates the court’s earlier findings and rulings.

In support of their application, Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of (exhibit 1) plaintiff’s verified complaint filed on August 1, 2025; (exhibit 2) the verified cross-complaint filed in this case by the Prices, Pacific Heights, and Nasir on October 21, 2025; (exhibit 3) the Martyn Application; (exhibit 4) the November MO; and (exhibit 5) the notice of entry of the November Order filed on January 15, 2026, to which a copy of that order is attached. (Def. RJN, ¶¶ 1-5.) The court will grant the request of Defendants for judicial notice of plaintiff’s complaint, the cross-complaint filed in this case, the Martyn Application, the November MO, and the November Order. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) Judicial notice does not extend to the truth of any hearsay or factual assertions appearing in those court records. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564, 1569.)

Plaintiff asserts in their opposition to the application, that trucks such as those driven by Alexander Pump cannot access Upper Well 2 unless they are driven outside of the boundary of Defendants’ claimed access easement and through the Martyn Property which, according to plaintiff, suggests that Defendants may need to repair the access route. Though Defendants have known of the damage to the dirt access road to Upper Well 2, they have not produced any plans to repair that road or the site of the well pad. Plaintiff further asserts that the planter beds which Defendants seek to remove do not obstruct or block the claimed access easement leading to Upper Well 2. For these reasons, plaintiff argues, the present circumstances do not demonstrate any threat of irreparable harm to Defendants, and do not justify expanding the access route to Upper Well 2 outside of the claimed easement and onto the Martyn Property.

In reply, Defendants assert that they “do not seek any ... permanent or material alteration of the easement” and instead “seek only limited, practical access necessary to safely reach and repair” Upper Well 2, which Defendants contend is consistent with the easement’s express purpose and necessary under the current conditions. (Reply at p. 6, ll. 1-4.) Defendants contend that although plaintiff acknowledges that a portion of the ten-foot access easement leading to Upper Well 2 is unsafe due to the dangerous conditions discussed above, plaintiff has denied Defendants a minimal, temporary deviation to allow Alexander Pump to safely access Upper Well 2 to perform repairs. Defendants further contend that the installation by plaintiff of multiple raised bed planters eliminates any practical access to Upper Well 2.

“ ‘ “An easement is an interest in the land of another, which entitles the owner of the easement to a limited use or enjoyment of the other’s land. [Citations.] [¶] An easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in another’s possession and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.” ’ [Citation.] [E]asements may be created by an express grant, an implied grant, or by prescription.” (Batta v. Hunt (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 295, 304-305.)

The points advanced by the parties in their respective moving and opposing papers suggests to the court that, for present purposes, the parties do not dispute that the Martyn Property is burdened by an easements defined or provided for various recorded documents, which provides access to Upper Well 2 by means of a ten-foot wide pathway or dirt road that leads to that well. The court will, for convenience of writing, refer to that easement, including the access road to Upper Well 2, as the “Access Easement”.

“The general rule is clearly established that, despite the granting of an easement, the owner of the servient tenement may make any use of the land that does not interfere unreasonably with the easement.” (City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576, 579.) Though Defendants request that the court issue an injunction requiring plaintiff to remove their raised planter beds, plaintiff has produced evidence which shows that those planter beds were not installed within, and do not obstruct or interfere with, the Access Easement. Though Defendants contend that the installation of those planter beds by plaintiff “restrict[] access outside a narrow corridor” (reply at p. 13, ll. 2-3), Defendants present no reasoned legal or factual argument showing that the raised planter beds were installed by plaintiff within the Access Easement, or why the planter beds obstruct or interfere with the Access Easement.

Though Defendants do not appear to dispute that the raised planter beds at issue were not installed by plaintiff within the Access Easement, the available evidence and information also shows that the access road leading to Upper Well 2 within the Access Easement has washed out, eroded, and is unstable. The evidence and information also shows or suggests that, to access Upper Well 2, Defendants or their contractor must travers or access some portion of the Martyn Property outside of the Access Easement. For these reasons, it is the court’s understanding that the injunction sought in the application seeks to restrain plaintiff from obstructing or preventing Defendants or their contractor from using the Martyn Property, by deviating from the Access Easement onto the Martyn Property, to access Upper Well 2.

Because Defendants appear to contend that plaintiff’s conduct constitutes a violation of prior court rulings or orders because those rulings or orders preserved existing easement rights to access Upper Well 2, the court finds it useful to briefly discuss those rulings here.

As further discussed in the November MO, the Martyn Application included a request for a preliminary injunction restraining or preventing Defendants from entering the Martyn Property with any vehicles to attempt to access the area of Upper Well 2, which is referred to in the November MO, and herein, as “Injunction Order No. 2”. (Def. RJN, exhibit 4.) Pursuant to the November MO, the court adopted its tentative ruling on the Martyn Application as to Injunction Order No. 2, as follows:

“By its express terms, Injunction Order No. 2 seeks only to restrain defendants from entering the Martyn Property with any vehicles to access Upper Well 2. Injunction Order No. 2 does not seek to prevent defendants from otherwise performing any repairs to this well.

The parties here do not appear to dispute that Upper Well 2 has not been operational or repaired since the rainstorms described above caused the land adjacent to or under Upper Well 2 to collapse. As further detailed above, Martyn contends that the portion of the dirt road used to access Upper Well 2 that lies within defendants’ alleged easement has washed out and narrowed, and, according to Martyn, is impassable. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 7.)

Though the Rowe declaration addresses purported fire hazards observed by Rowe at the site of Upper Well 2, wholly absent from the Rowe declaration is any information or evidence in regard to whether the dirt road which is the subject of Injunction Order No. 2 is impassable as Martyn contends. Martyn also fails to explain why the Rowe declaration shows that the use of this dirt road presents a fire hazard or safety risk.

In addition, though Nguyen states that the land under Upper Well 2 has collapsed, Martyn fails to sufficiently explain why any information appearing in the Nguyen declaration shows that the dirt road is impassable or otherwise unsafe. (See, e.g., Nguyen Decl., ¶¶ 11 & 13.)

J Price confirms that Upper Well 2 has been out of operation for 2 years, and states that it can be repaired by “equipment capable of navigating the existing access roads located on the easements.” (J Price Decl., ¶¶ 9-11.) In the memorandum opposing the Application, defendants state that a dispute arose between the parties in regard to the cause of the landslide which damaged the area adjacent to Upper Well 2; that Upper Well 2 was providing water to defendants prior to this landslide; that at the time of the landslide, Upper Well 2 was being “serviced and overhauled”; that the landslide made the area inaccessible to vehicles; that less than 50 cubic yards of dirt must be moved from the landslide area to permit vehicular access; that Martyn objected to defendants bringing vehicles to the area to move this dirt; that Martyn prevented defendants from repairing Upper Well 2 by refusing to allow access the Martyn Property; and that defendants have tried to negotiate a good faith resolution of the parties’ dispute as to Upper Well 2. (Opp. Appl. at p. 5, ll. 2-9.)

In the opposition to the OSC, defendants also assert that they have not undertaken efforts to restore Upper Well 2 during the past two years because Martyn has blocked them from doing so. (Opp. OSC at p. 10.)

In the moving and reply papers, Martyn presents no evidence, information, or reasoned argument to refute the contentions described above.

Defendants also assert the same evidence, information, and arguments described above to show the harm defendants would suffer in regard to defendants’ inability to obtain sufficient water based on, among other things, the limited amount of water produced by the Road Well.

Though Martyn states her belief that the dirt road is unstable and impassable, and references measurements taken in August 2025 to show that the road has narrowed, Martyn provides no basis on which Martyn obtained any personal knowledge of these matters. Martyn also fails to identify the person who measured the road, when Martyn reviewed these measurements, or the manner in which the road was measured, among other things. For these reasons, the matters stated in the Martyn declaration in regard to the condition of the dirt road appear speculative and conclusory. The court disregards statements made in declarations which are “argumentative, speculative and impermissible opinions, and also lack foundation and personal knowledge.” (Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1238.)

Even if the court were to assume without deciding that the dirt road used to access Upper Well 2 was presently impassable, Martyn fails to explain why Martyn will suffer irreparable harm if the court were to deny Injunction Order No. 2. For example, Martyn does not describe what harm would be incurred if defendants attempted to access the dirt road to move what defendants describe, without dispute, as a “nominal” amount of dirt to make the road passable. Martyn also fails to show the nature of any harm that Martyn would suffer should defendants attempt to use the dirt road to access the area of Upper Well 2, or why any such harm could not be compensated by the payment of damages. For these reasons, Martyn has failed to show why Martyn will suffer irreparable harm should the court deny the Application as to Injunction Order No. 2.

It can also be inferred from the undisputed record that defendants do not actually intend to trespass upon the Martyn Property, and instead intend to move what defendants describe as a nominal amount of dirt in the area of Upper Well 2 which made that area inaccessible. As Martyn presents no evidence, apart from the speculative assertions described above, sufficient to show any realistic prospect that defendants will be required, or intend, to trespass upon the Martyn Property to access the area of Upper Well 2, Martyn has failed to show why Injunction Order No. 2 should be issued. [Epstein v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1410 (Epstein).]

In addition, vague and overbroad injunctions are generally improper. (Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1169 [Evans] [general discussion].) “[J]udicial abstention may be appropriate in cases where ‘granting injunctive relief would be unnecessarily burdensome for the trial court to monitor and enforce given the availability of more effective means of redress.’ [Citation.]” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 496 [Arce].)

Though Martyn seeks to enjoin defendants from entering the Martyn Property to access the area of Upper Well 2 based on Martyn’s speculative conclusion that the dirt road is impassable, Martyn also states that this road “wraps around” Martyn’s house. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 7.) It is unclear from the present record whether this dirt road is also used to access other wells, such as the Road Well which Martyn concedes is still in operation and supplies water to defendants’ respective properties. (See, e.g., Appl. at p. 9; Martyn Decl., ¶ 5; Nguyen Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; see also M Paveloff Decl., ¶ 10.) For these reasons, it appears to the court that the request stated in Injunction Order No. 2 is unnecessarily broad (In re Coleman (1974) 12 Cal.3d 568, 572 [Coleman] [discussion of circumstances under which order at issue provided “adequate notice of proscribed area and conduct”].) .

Noted above, Martyn also does not effectively dispute defendants’ assertions that Upper Well 2 was supplying water to defendants prior to the landslide, that the landslide damaged the area of Upper Well 2 which was at the time being serviced, that a dispute arose regarding the cause of the landslide which ostensibly rendered the dirt road impassable and damaged the area of Upper Well 2, that defendants intended and undertook efforts to repair this damage, that Martyn has prevented defendants from accessing the Martyn Property to repair this damage, or that the parties have been attempting to resolve their dispute. Gershman also states that, after the parties’ mediation broke down, defendants’ counsel stated that defendants would “imminently” be going onto the Martyn Property to perform work at the site of Upper Well 2. (Gershman Decl., ¶ 4.)

Considering the available information and evidence described above, the present record indicates that the last uncontested status preceding the present controversy, which ostensibly involves a dispute arising after the landslide and Martyn’s subsequent denial of access to the area of Upper Well 2, was that Upper Well 2 was operable, supplying water to defendants, and accessible to defendants. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the granting of Injunction Order No. 2 would maintain the status quo. (United Railroads of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1916) 172 Cal. 80, 87 [United Railroads] [general discussion of status quo].)

In addition, though the balance of the harms in regard to defendants’ ability to supply of water to the Defendant Properties does not weigh in favor of granting Injunction Order No. 1 for reasons more fully discussed above, that injunction differs in its scope and effect. Absent evidence of what, if any, irreparable harm Martyn will incur should the court deny Injunction Order No. 2, and under the totality of the circumstances present here considering that it is undisputed that Upper Well 2 was supplying water to defendants prior to the landslide, the balance of harms weighs in favor of denying the Application as to Injunction Order No. 2 for all reasons discussed above.

Martyn advances the same arguments discussed above to show why there is a likelihood of success on the merits of Martyn’s claims as to Upper Well 2. The same reasoning and analysis apply here. Furthermore, Martyn’s arguments regarding whether Upper Well 2 should be deemed an abandoned well under the Santa Barbara County Code does not change the court’s analysis. For example, it can be inferred from the available evidence and information presented by the parties that defendants have demonstrated an intention to continue using Upper Well 2. (Santa Barbara County Code, ch. 34A-2, § 34A-2, subd. (b)(1) [requiring that “property owner has not demonstrated an intention to use the well”].)

“[T]he burden [is] on [Martyn], as the part[y] seeking injunctive relief, to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction.” (O’Connell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481.) For all reasons discussed above, Martyn has failed to show that she is likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of Injunction Order No. 2 than defendants are likely to suffer if that injunction is granted. Instead, the record reflects that a greater injury will result to defendants from granting Injunction Order No. 2 than to Martyn from refusing that injunction. For these reasons, and as the evidence, information, and arguments presented by the parties can reasonably support either the granting or the denial of Injunction Order No. 2, the court will deny the Application as to Injunction Order No. 2.” (Def. RJN, exhibit 4.)

Though the court denied the Martyn Application as to Injunction Order No. 2, “[t]he granting or denying of a preliminary injunction does not constitute an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy.” (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286 (Cohen).) For these reasons, the contention that the November MO adjudicated the rights of Defendants in regard to the Access Easement or any secondary easement is without merit.

Moreover, as noted in the November MO, Defendants argued in their opposition to the Martyn Application that a nominal amount of dirt in the area of Upper Well 2 would need to be moved from the landslide area to permit vehicular access, and that Defendants did not intend, or would not need, to enter or trespass upon the Martyn Property to move that dirt. (Def. RJN, exhibit 4.) The court determined that plaintiff had not met their burden to show why Defendants, if not restrained, intended to or would actually be required, to trespass upon the Martyn Property to access Upper Well 2. (Ibid.) The present application seeks an injunction that would effectively allow Defendants to, on a temporary and limited basis, enter the Martyn Property to access Upper Well 2 for the purpose of replacing the well pump, which Defendants contend is necessary due to the condition of the road within the Access Easement, and consistent with secondary rights incident to that easement. (See Application at pp. 12, 19 & 21-24.)

An application for a preliminary injunction must show that there exists “some possibility that the [moving party] would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim.” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) “The trial court’s determination must be guided by a ‘mix’ of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff’s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction.” (Ibid.)

For all reasons discussed above, to the extent Defendants claim that they possess secondary rights incident to the Access Easement which permit Defendants to trespass on the Martyn Property to access Upper Well 2 for the purpose of repairing that well, and that plaintiff has unlawfully interfered with those rights, the application must show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of that claim. (See also Cohen, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 286-287 [court must rule on both factors].)

“When an easement is based on a grant ..., the grant gives the easement holder both ‘those interests expressed in the grant and those necessarily incident thereto.’ [Citation.] ‘Every easement includes what are termed “secondary easements;” that is, the right to do such things as are necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement itself.’ [Citation]” (Dolnikov v. Ekizian (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 419, 428.)

For example, “the holder of an easement may have a secondary easement for the purpose of making repairs, renewals and replacements on the property that is servient to the easement.” (Donnell v. Bisso Brothers (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 38, 43.) Civil Code section 845 requires that “[t]he owner of any easement in the nature of a private right-of-way, or of any land to which any such easement is attached, shall maintain it in repair.” (Civ. Code, § 845, subd. (a).) “And the owner of an easement has the right at all reasonable times to enter on the servient premises and make any necessary repairs.” (Emerson v. Bergin (1888) 76 Cal. 197, 201.) Further, the owner of the servient tenement may not place or maintain any obstructions to the maintenance of an easement. (See, generally, City of Los Angeles v. Jameson (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 351, 356–357.)

“[W]here one man has an easement over the land of another, the duty of keeping the easement in repair rests upon its owner, and when repairs are necessary he may enter on the servient tenement to make them.” (Durfee v. Garvey (1889) 78 Cal. 546, 551.) However, “[t]o repair means to preserve the property in its original condition, not to create something new, ‘ “to restore to a sound state something which has become partially dilapidated, not to create something which has no existence.” ’ [Citation.]” (Schneider v. Lane (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 39, 49.) In addition, “incidental easements may be exercised so long as the owner thereof uses reasonable care and does not increase the burden on or go beyond the boundaries of the servient tenement, or make any material changes therein.” (Ward v. City of Monrovia (1940) 16 Cal.2d 815, 822.)

The present record is sufficient to show that Defendants hold, or claim, the Access Easement; that the Access Easement burdens the Martyn Property by providing access through that property to Upper Well 2; that Upper Well 2 is not operational and requires replacement of the well pump; that the Alexander Pump trucks are necessary to deliver a new well pump to Upper Well 2; that those trucks cannot use the Access Easement in its current condition because that easement is eroded, washed out, and not accessible to those trucks; that, as a result, the Alexander Pump trucks must deviate from the Access Easement onto the Martyn Property in order to deliver a new pump to Upper Well 2; and that plaintiff has engaged in conduct which prevents or obstructs Alexander Pump from entering the Martyn Property for the purpose of accessing and repairing Upper Well 2.

For all reasons discussed above, the available evidence and information is sufficient to show, under the circumstances present here, some possibility of prevailing on Defendants’ claims to a secondary easement for the purpose of making repairs to Upper Well 2, that the secondary easement grants Defendants a right to enter the Martyn Property to make necessary repairs at reasonable times, and that, to the extent secondary easement rights grant Defendants the right to enter the Martyn Property to make repairs to Upper Well 2, plaintiff has interfered with those rights. (Costa Mesa City Employees’ Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 309-310.)

The application must also, for all reasons discussed above, show that the balance of harms weighs in favor of granting the injunction requested by Defendants.

Defendants contend that any obstruction by plaintiff of Defendants’ access to Upper Well 2 by preventing Defendants from deviating from the Access Easement undermines the present status quo. Even if the present record is sufficient to show that, preceding this controversy, Upper Well 2 was supplying water before a landslide damaged the area of that well and portions of the Access Easement, the application does not show that Defendants or their contractor were making repairs to or maintaining the Access Easement, or accessing Upper Well 2 to make necessary repairs, by entering onto the Martyn Property pursuant to secondary easement rights. For these reasons, the application fails to show why the issuance of the requested injunction would maintain the status quo. (See United Railroads, supra, 172 Cal. at p. 87 [general discussion].)

Defendants also contend that the obstructions at issue prevent Defendants from repairing the hazardous conditions alleged by plaintiff in this action. Apart from generally citing plaintiff’s allegations, wholly absent from the application is any information or evidence showing which, if any, hazardous conditions at Upper Well 2 presently exist, or threaten Defendants with any interim harm. The application also does not address whether the payment of any damages which may arise from any present inability of Defendants to repair, or any delay in repairing, those hazardous conditions would fully compensate Defendants. (Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471 [noting that preliminary injunctive relief should be denied if payment of damages would provide full compensation].)

In regard to the contention that Defendants require access to Upper Well 2 for the purpose of establishing an adequate water supply for fire suppression and personal needs, the general and conclusory information presented in the application regarding the lack of an adequate water supply from Road Well 1 is, on balance, insufficient to show what, if any, interim harm will result from the nonissuance of the injunction.

For example, to the extent the Road Well 1 water gauge was, as of March 16, 2026, nearly empty as J Price contends, the application includes no additional evidence or information showing the water level of that well on any other dates. Plaintiff also presents undisputed evidence which indicates or suggests that there existed a leak in the Road Well 1 well pipe that was repaired the next day, on March 17, 2026. For these reasons, the present record can reasonably support either the granting or the denial of the injunction requested in the application.

The application also does not address the court’s discussion in the November MO of information and evidence presented by Defendants in their opposition to the Martyn Application, which showed that Defendants were at that time, purchasing water from a neighboring ranch. (Def. RJN, exhibit 4.) To the extent Road Well 1 does not presently supply sufficient water to Defendants, the application fails to show why Defendants are unable to obtain water from a source other than Upper Well 2, or why any expense that may be incurred by Defendants in obtaining water from another source cannot not be compensated by the payment of damages. (Stevenson v. City of Sacramento (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 545, 551.)

Furthermore, “judicial abstention may be appropriate in cases where ‘granting injunctive relief would be unnecessarily burdensome for the trial court to monitor and enforce given the availability of more effective means of redress.’ [Citation.]” (Arce, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 496.) Though Defendants contend that the issuance of the requested injunction would impose a minimal burden on plaintiff, the perimeter or proscribed area of the Martyn Property which Defendants seek to enter is unclear. There is also no information showing when any entry onto the Martyn Property would occur, or whether that entry would occur on one day at one time, or over multiple days or times. For these reasons, the injunction requested in the application, if issued, would impose an unnecessary burden on the court to monitor and enforce. (See also Coleman, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 572; Evans, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169.)

In addition, the court assumes that the Martyn Property “is unique....” (Glynn v. Marquette (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 277, 280.) Considering that the issuance of the injunction requested in the application would effectively allow Defendants to trespass upon unique real property, it is also unclear whether the issuance of that injunction would cause any damage to the Martyn Property, whether plaintiff would be required to restore any damage to that property, or whether that damage would or would not be irreparable. (See also Keith v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 521, 524 [discussing whether any justification for a “prospective wilful trespass” was justified].) “Moreover, the right to an injunction in a case involving a trespass irreparable in character and of a continuing nature ‘does not depend upon the extent of the damage measured by a money standard.’ [Citation.]” (Aspen Grove Condominium Assn. v. CNL Income Northstar LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)

For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that the present status quo of the controversy at issue would be preserved by not issuing the injunction requested in the application. The application also fails to show why the payment of damages would be insufficient to fully compensate Defendants for any interim harm that Defendants are likely to suffer, or why Defendants are likely to suffer greater injury than plaintiff is likely to suffer, if the injunction were not issued. Though the evidence, information, and arguments presented by the parties can reasonably support either the granting or denial of the application in regard to whether there exists a likelihood of success on the merits of Defendants’ claim of a secondary easement, the balance of the harms and relative hardships the parties would suffer favors the denial of the application for all reasons discussed herein. Therefore, the court will deny the application.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice:

In addition to the court records (exhibits 1 through 5) described and discussed above, Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of (exhibit 6) a grant deed from Louis P. Behrens and Patricia A. Behrens to Don L. Holden, Grace R. Holden, George T. Wilson, and Rhoda A. Wilson, recorded in the official records of Santa Barbara County on July 26, 1979, as instrument no. 79-34720; (exhibit 7) an “Amendment to Easement” from Robert M. Behrens to Don L. Holden, recorded in the official records of Santa Barbara County on June 1, 1983, as instrument no. 83-27169; (exhibit 8) an “Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Water Rights and Easements” between Michael Edward Robles and Zapata Investments Corporation, recorded in the official records of Santa Barbara County on October 18, 1988, as instrument no. 88-067112; (exhibit 9) a grant deed from Edmond J. Atelian and Rose C. Atelian to Charles A. Bischof and Kathy J. Odell, recorded in the official records of Santa Barbara County on August 15, 1997, as instrument no. 97-047547; (exhibit 10) an “Agreement for Assignment of Well Rights and For Grant of Easement and Well Rights” recorded in the official records of Santa Barbara County on December 22, 1997, as instrument no. 97-078230; and (exhibit 11) an “Amended Water Rights Agreement” involving Barger Canyon Associates, LLC, John Price, Janna Price, David E. Chambers, and Maureen E. Chambers, recorded in the official records of Santa Barbara County on February 7, 2007, as instrument no. 2007-0009324. (Def. RJN, ¶¶ 6-11.)

The court will grant Defendants’ request for judicial notice of exhibits 6 through 11 described above. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c) & (h).) Judicial notice of those records does not extend to the truth of their contents, or to their proper interpretation. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

Objections to evidence:

Plaintiff has filed evidentiary objections to material appearing in the declaration of J Price submitted in support of the application.

 

Defendants have filed evidentiary objections to material contained in the declarations of plaintiff and Appel submitted in support of plaintiff’s opposition to the application.

The court considers only that evidence which is relevant and admissible to the issues presented in in the parties’ respective moving and opposing papers.