Daria Lucero-Ahedo, et al. v. Carpinteria Unified School District, et al.

Case Number

25CV04752

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 02/25/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File First Amended Petition

Tentative Ruling

For Petitioners and Plaintiffs Daria Lucero-Ahedo, C.A., A.A., and M.A.: Andrea Marcus

For Respondents and Defendants Carpinteria Unified School District, Diana F. Rigby, and Jamie Persoon: Molly Thurmond, Cyrus Khosh-Chashm

                      

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioners’ motion for leave to file first amended petition for writ of mandate is granted. Petitioners shall separately file and serve the amended petition for writ of mandate no later than February 27, 2026. Respondents shall file and serve any responsive pleading, to the amended petition, within 30 days of service of the amended petition.

Background

This action commenced on July 31 2025, by the filing of the verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for damages and declaratory relief (the “petition”) by Petitioners and Plaintiffs Daria Lucero-Ahedo, C.A., A.A., and M.A.: Andrea Marcus against Respondents and Defendants Carpinteria Unified School District (CUSD), Diana F. Rigby, and Jamie Persoon based on allegations of breach of contract, violation of federal and state civil rights, and related torts.

As alleged in the petition:

C.A. is a 13-year-old student with disabilities entitled to protections under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). (Pet., ¶ 4.) A.A. is an 8-year-old student with disabilities entitled to protections under IDEA. (Id. at ¶ 5.) M.A. is an 11-year-old student enrolled at CUSD. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Ahedo and her husband are the legal guardians and parents of the minors. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

C.A. is a Hispanic middle school student with disabilities. (Pet., ¶ 11.) C.A.’s family relocated back to Carpinteria in November 2022, following several destabilizing personal events. (Ibid.) At the time of C.A.’s enrollment in CUSD, Ahedo informed school staff, in writing, of her son’s struggles, disabilities, and past evaluations yet, despite Ahedo’s plea for help, CUSD failed to initiate any assessments to determine how to properly serve C.A. (Id. at ¶ 12.) CUSD suspended C.A. over 20 days between January 2023 and May 2024 for behaviors that were manifestations of C.A.’s disability, without provision of any behavioral supports, interventions, or special education services. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

In May 2024, CUSD scheduled an expulsion hearing, and C.A.’s parents consulted with legal counsel who directed them to formally request an evaluation for special education eligibility. (Pet., ¶ 14.) After the request, CUSD cancelled the hearing and initiated the evaluation process. (Ibid.)

On May 30, 2025, the parties entered into a written settlement agreement to resolve the pending due process claim, whereby CUSD agreed to reimburse Petitioners up to $125,000 for C.A.’s tuition at Fusion Academy for the 2024-2025 extended school year and the full 2025-2026 school year. (Pet., ¶ 15.) Despite Petitioners’ full compliance with the agreement, CUSD has refused to reimburse tuition expenses. (Ibid.)

On July 9, 2025, claiming the family had relocated to Oxnard, Respondents summarily revoked the enrollment of all three minor Petitioners on grounds of alleged non-residency. (Pet., ¶ 16.) Respondents provided no evidence supporting their residency allegations and ignored the protections guaranteed to homeless students under federal and state law. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Rigby and Persoon have further engaged in a campaign of harassment and intimidation against the family, including trespassing on their private property, questioning their landlord and employer, and demanding written confirmations under threat of immigration consequences. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

The complaint was served on August 18, 2025, via personal service.

Having received no responsive pleading to the complaint, Petitioners took Respondents’ default on October 3, 2025.

On October 9, 2025, Respondents filed a motion to set aside the default. As the attached proposed pleading to the motion to set aside default, Respondents attached their proposed demurrer.

On December 10, 2025, the Court set aside Respondents’ default. As part of the order, the Court required Respondents’ counsel to “meet and confer with Petitioners’ counsel regarding the proposed demurrer, and if no agreement is reached, moving parties shall separately file and serve their proposed demurrer to the complaint after obtaining a hearing date.”

Petitioners now move for leave to file a first amended petition.

Defendants do not oppose the motion, in theory, but point to several concerns that they believe will result in numerous and protracted motion practice before any of Petitioners’ substantive claims, if any, can be addressed.

Analysis

Petitioners move to file a first amended petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subdivision (a)(1) and 576.

Petitioners argue that they “seek leave to amend for the limited and proper purpose of proceeding at this stage solely on a stand-alone Petition for Writ of Mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, to obtain prompt judicial resolution of Respondents’ refusal to comply with a binding IDEA settlement agreement and mandatory statutory enrollment obligations.” (Motion, p. 2, ll. 3-5.)

The stated effect of the proposed amendment would be to proceed  on a stand-alone writ of mandate rather than to litigate the writ concurrently with the damages and non-writ causes of action contained in the original pleading. (Motion, p. 2, ll. 17-20.)

The proposed amended petition does not add any additional parties, expand factual allegations, or introduce new legal theories.

As noted above, Respondents do not oppose the motion in theory but, rather, express their confusion regarding the proposed amended petition, and argue that the filing of the amended petition will result in additional motion practice. Respondents’ positions are not legally sufficient grounds for denial of the motion.

“The Court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The Court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).)

“Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 576.)

The Court will grant leave to file the first amended petition for writ of mandate. However, to be clear, the Court makes no determination, currently, as to the merits of the respective parties’ positions regarding the consequences or legal effect of filing the amended petition.