Tentative Ruling: Daria Lucero-Ahedo, et al. v. Carpinteria Unified School District, et al.
Case Number
25CV04752
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 10/07/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
1. Motion to Dismiss Parties; 2. Demurrer to Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition/Complaint for Writ of Mandate and Related Relief
Tentative Ruling
For Petitioners and Plaintiffs Daria Lucero-Ahedo, C.A., A.A., and M.A.: Andrea Marcus
For Respondents and Defendants Carpinteria Unified School District, Diana F. Rigby, and Jamie Persoon: Molly Thurmond, Cyrus Khosh-Chashm
RULING
For the reasons set forth herein:
- Petitioners’ motion to dismiss parties is taken off-calendar as moot.
- Respondent’s demurrer to petitioner’s second amended petition/complaint for writ of mandate and related relief is sustained with leave to amend, as to each cause of action, and the prayer for relief, as set forth below.
- Petitioner Daria Lucero-Ahedo shall file and serve her third amended petition/complaint no later than October 28, 2026.
Background
This action commenced on July 31 2025, by the filing of the original verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for damages and declaratory relief by petitioners and plaintiffs Daria Lucero-Ahedo (Ahedo), C.A., A.A., and M.A. (collectively “petitioners”) against respondents and defendants Carpinteria Unified School District (CUSD), Diana F. Rigby, and Jamie Persoon based on allegations of breach of contract, violation of federal and state civil rights, and related torts.
On February 25, 2026, the court granted petitioners’ motion for leave to file a first amended petition (FAP). On the same day, petitioners filed their FAP against the same respondents.
On June 4, 2026, the parties stipulated to the filing of a second amended petition/complaint (SAP).
On June 16, 2026, petitioner Ahedo, individually and on behalf of C.A., filed her SAP against respondent CUSD. Removed from the action, by the filing of the SAP, were petitioners M.A. and A.A., as well as respondents Rigby and Persoon. The SAP contains causes of action for: (1) Traditional Writ of Mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085; (2) Alternative Administrative Mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5; (3) Alternative Declaratory Relief; and (4) Alternative Contract Enforcement/Breach of Settlement Agreement.
As alleged in the SAP:
On May 29, 2025, Ahedo and Michael Ahedo, on behalf of themselves and C.A., entered into a final settlement agreement and release of claims (the “agreement”) with CUSD. (SAP, ¶ 17.) The agreement resolved Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and FAPE claims though the period identified in the agreement, but expressly did not resolve other non-IDEA, FAPE claims, or certain “CDE” complaint matters. (SAP, ¶ 18.) (Note: the acronym “CDE” is undefined in the SAP.) CUSD’s Board approved or ratified the agreement and CUSD thereafter treated the agreement as operative. (SAP, ¶ 19.)
Pursuant to the agreement, CUSD agreed to reimburse C.A.’s parents up to $40,000.00 for educationally related services and private educationally related assessments for C.A., subject to proof and the conditions stated in the agreement. (SAP, ¶ 20.) The agreement provides that reimbursement for educationally related services would occur within 30 calendar days after CUSD received the required documentation and Board approval. (SAP, ¶ 21.) Under the agreement, CUSD also agreed to reimburse C.A.’s parents for C.A.’s tuition costs incurred at Fusion Academy in an amount up to $125,000.00, subject to proof as stated in the agreement. (SAP, ¶ 22.) CUSD also agreed to contract with a qualified “BCBA” selected for C.A. for consultation to Fusion Academy and observation of C.A. at Fusion Academy for 10 hours per month, according to the terms of the agreement. (SAP, ¶ 23.) (Note: the acronym “BCBA” is undefined in the SAP.) The agreement includes a relocation provision stating that if C.A.’s parents do not currently reside within CUSD boundaries, or if they relocate outside CUSD boundaries during the term of the agreement, CUSD’s obligations to fund Fusion Academy shall cease on the date of relocation. (SAP, ¶ 24.)
“Petitioners do not seek adjudication of FAPE in this action. Petitioners seek performance, payment, reimbursement, and implementation of definite settlement obligations and mandatory public procedures related to CUSD’s stated basis for refusing performance.” (SAP, ¶ 25.)
On June 6, 2025, Ahedo submitted proof of payment for C.A.’s Fusion Academy costs to CUSD and CUSD to inform her immediately if it required anything further from her or Fusion Academy to process timely reimbursement under the agreement. (SAP, ¶ 26.) On the same date, CUSD acknowledged receipt and stated that it would process payment after the Board approved the agreement. (SAP. ¶ 27.) On June 24, 2025, Ahedo submitted additional proof of payment for C.A.’s Fusion Academy costs. (SAP, ¶ 28.) CUSD later relied on its residency determination as the basis for refusing to fund C.A.’s attendance at Fusion Academy. (SAP, ¶ 30.)
On July 9, 2025, CUSD sent a letter to the Ahedo family stating that, based on recent evidence, CUSD had confirmed that the family’s current residence was in Oxnard, and that the children were not eligible to attend schools within CUSD and that their enrollment would be revoked effective July 25, 2025. (SAP, ¶¶ 31-32.) The letter invoked Board Regulation 5111.1 District Residency (the “Regulation”), which provides procedures governing investigations and revocation of enrollment when CUSD claims that enrollment is based on false or unreliable evidence of residency. (SAP, ¶ 34.) The Regulation requires, among other things, that before revocation of enrollment based on alleged false evidence of residency, the parent or guardian shall be sent written notification of the facts leading to the decision. (SAP, ¶ 35.) The Regulation further provides that the parent or guardian must be informed of the right to schedule a meeting with a hearing officer to inspect supporting documents, rebut district evidence, question district witnesses, and present oral and documentary evidence, including witnesses, on the student’s behalf. (SAP, ¶ 36.)
CUSD did not provide the required factual basis and supporting evidence before issuing the revocation notice. (SAP, ¶ 39.)
On July 9, 2025, Ahedo requested evidence supporting CUSD’s claim. (SAP, ¶ 40.) On July 10, 2025, Ahedo requested a meeting with the hearing officer, and on July 11, 2025, again followed up regarding the scheduling of a hearing. (SAP, ¶¶ 41-42.) On July 14, 2025, and July 15, 2025, petitioners’ counsel requested that CUSD provide the basis and evidence for its allegation that the family did not live in the District. (SAP, ¶ 43.) CUSD did not provide the requested information or documents and stated that the supporting documentation could be inspected at the hearing. (SAP, ¶ 44.)
On August 8, 2025, CUSD conducted a residency hearing and, on August 11, 2025, issued a decision stating, among other things, that the family provided no evidence to support residence in Carpinteria and that enrollment had been based on false evidence of residency. (SAP, ¶¶ 45-46.)
Petitioners appealed CUSD’s decision to the CUSD Board and, on September 10, 2025, CUSD notified petitioners that the Board had denied the residency appeal, and that denial was final. (SAP, ¶¶ 47-48.) CUSD thereafter relied on the residency determination as the basis for refusing to fund C.A.’s Fusion Academy attendance and related settlement implementation. (SAP, ¶ 49.)
Petitioners are not seeking re-enrollment in CUSD, ongoing CUSD residency relief, McKinney-Vento enrollment relief, or adjudication of whether CUSD offered or denied C.A. a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The remaining dispute concerns CUSD’s refusal to pay, reimburse, and implement settlement obligations for C.A.’s Fusion Academy placement and related settlement services, where CUSD’s stated basis for nonperformance was its residency determination concerning the family. (SAP, ¶ 6.)
CUSD could not lawfully rely on its residency determination as the basis for refusing settlement performance without first complying with mandatory public duties arising from Board Regulation 5111.1, Education Code section 48204.2, and CUSD’s official implementation of Board-approved settlement obligations. (SAP, ¶ 7.)
Additional allegations and prayers for relief, contained in the SAP, will be discussed below where appropriate. The court notes that the SAP omits nearly all of the factual allegations contained in earlier pleadings that provide background context to the claim and why the agreement was entered into in the first place.
On June 23, 2026, following the filing of the SAP, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Rigby and Persoon as respondents/defendants, and to dismiss M.A. and A.A. as petitioners/plaintiffs.
On July 17, 2026, CUSD filed its demurrer to the SAP, and to each cause of action therein.
On September 24, 2026, petitioners filed their opposition to the demurrer. (Note: The caption of the opposition still lists A.A. and M.A. as petitioners/plaintiffs, and Rigby and Persoon as respondents/defendants even though they are not identified parties to this action in the SAP.)
Analysis
Motion to Dismiss Parties
Petitioners move to dismiss Rigby and Persoon as respondents/defendants and M.A. and A.A. as petitioners/plaintiffs. The motion was unnecessary because the filing of the SAP resulted in them being dismissed from the action without any need to do anything further.
“Generally, “ ‘ “an amendatory pleading supersedes the original one, which ceases to perform any function as a pleading. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Such amended pleading supplants all prior complaints. . . . [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]’ ” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 884.)” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 862, 875, fn. 5.)
“[E]xcepting for the statutory authority permitting the filing of a supplemental complaint alleging facts occurring after the filing of the formal complaint [citations], it is elementary that there can only be One complaint in an action [Citations].” (Cohen v. Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 650, 656.)
The failure to add a previously named defendant to an amended pleading dismisses that party without prejudice. (Kuperman v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 943, 947.)
The motion will be taken off-calendar as moot.
Demurrer to the SAP
The party on whom a petition for writ of mandate has been served may respond by demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1089, subd. (a); Chapman v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 261, 271 [“[a] proceeding in mandamus is generally subject to the general rules of pleading applicable to civil actions” and the petition must “allege specific facts showing entitlement to relief”].) “The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (Quelimane); accord, Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 38.)
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
“(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
“(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.
“(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.
“(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.
“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.
“(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.
“(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)
“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
First Cause of Action
CUSD demurs to the first cause of action for Traditional Writ of Mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 on four grounds.
The first argument is that petitioners appear to seek payment of money but fail to allege compliance with the government tort claims act.
“Except as provided in Sections 946.4 and 946.6, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board, in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this division.” (Gov. Code, § 945.4.)
“Except as otherwise provided by statute:
(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.
(b) The liability of a public entity established by this part (commencing with Section 814) is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person.” (Gov. Code, § 815.)
“Government Code section 815 restores sovereign immunity in California except as provided in the Tort Claims Act or other statute. Thus the intent of the act is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied.” (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838.)
“[A]n action for ‘ “money or damages” ’ against a public entity may not proceed unless a written claim has first been presented to the governmental entity and the claim either has been granted or rejected. (Gov. Code, §§ 905, 945.4.) Unless a specific exception applies, ‘ “[a] suit for “ ‘money or damages’ ” includes all actions where the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, regardless whether the action is founded in “ ‘ “tort, contract or some other theory.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Lozada v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1152.)
The argument in opposition to CUSD’s first argument of failure to allege compliance with the government tort claims act, is that the first cause of action seeks enforcement of defined public procedures and does not seek tort damages. (Opp., p. 7, ll. 22-25.) Petitioners further argue that the government tort claims act does not bar the request for nonmonetary review of CUSD’s final residency determination merely because petitioners also request attorney fees recoverable as litigation costs. (Opp., p. 8, ll. 1-5.)
Relevant to the first cause of action, as alleged in the SAP, under the heading of the first cause of action:
“Petitioners request a writ of mandate compelling CUSD to comply with its mandatory duties and to process and pay amounts due under the settlement agreement, subject to proof submitted and the agreement’s express terms.” (SAP, ¶ 72, italics added.)
Clearly, petitioners’ representation, that the only money being sought relates to attorney fees, is untrue.
By way of the first cause of action to the SAP, petitioners seek monetary damages that are subject to the government claims act requirements. Petitioners have not pled compliance with the act. The demurrer will be sustained for failure to allege compliance with, or an exception to, the requirement.
CUSD’s second argument regarding the first cause of action of the SAP is that petitioners fail to set forth facts sufficient to allege any breach of duty or other wrongdoing for which a writ of mandate may issue. In making this argument, CUSD is essentially requesting that the court, at the pleading stage, make a determination regarding whether the complaints of actions, and inactions, were mandatory or discretionary. That is not proper on demurrer, and the argument fails.
Relevant to the first cause of action, as alleged in the SAP, under the heading of the first cause of action:
“Petitioners have a beneficial interest in CUSD’s performance of mandatory duties because CUSD’s nonperformance directly affects C.A.’s settlement-payment and related implementation rights.” (SAP, ¶ 62.)
“CUSD had mandatory duties arising from Board Regulation 5111.1 and Education Code section 48204.2 to follow required residency-investigation and revocation procedures before using an alleged nonresidency determination as the basis for official action.” (SAP, ¶ 63.)
“Those mandatory duties included, but were not limited to, the duty to provide written notice of the facts leading to any revocation decision and the duty to provide a meaningful opportunity to inspect supporting documents, rebut evidence, question witnesses, and present evidence.” (SAP, ¶ 64.)
“CUSD also had mandatory official duties arising from its implementation of the Board-approved settlement agreement, including the duty to process and pay Fusion Academy tuition reimbursement and related settlement benefits upon receipt of required proof and satisfaction of the agreement’s terms.” (SAP, ¶ 65.)
For pleading purposes, the SAP is sufficient to overcome CUSD’s second argument, and the demurrer will not be sustained based on CUSD’s second argument.
CUSD’s third argument regarding the first cause of action of the SAP is that petitioners misuse the writ procedure in an attempt to obtain writ relief for alleged breach of contract for which adequate relief is otherwise available. CUSD’s argument is conclusory in that it simply expresses an opinion that the SAP does not legitimately seek to enforce a ministerial duty but, rather, it seeks to enforce a contract (the agreement) or a procedural requirement not found in regulations or statutes. The argument fails. The first cause of action alleges that petitioners seek to compel CUSD to comply with mandatory duties (SAP, ¶ 72) and requests “a writ determining that CUSD may not rely on a residency determination reached without compliance with mandatory procedures as the basis for refusing settlement-payment and related implementation obligations.” (SAP, ¶ 73.) The demurrer to the first cause of action will not be sustained based on CUSD’s third argument.
CUSD’s forth and final argument regarding the first cause of action of the SAP is that plaintiffs fail to set forth facts to support their statement that they have no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law, and that “the only relief [petitioners] seek is payment of money.” (Demurrer, p. 10, ll. 4-5.) Based on the allegations of the SAC, and cited above, petitioners seek more than money damages, and the allegations that they have no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law is sufficient, at the pleading stage, to overcome this argument.
Second and Third Causes of Action
As noted above, the second cause of action is for alternative administrative mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, and the third cause of action is for alternative declaratory relief. CUSD’s argument regarding the two cases of action is identical to the arguments regarding the first cause of action and the analysis ends in with the same result: The demurrer to the second and third causes of action will be sustained for failure to allege compliance with, or an exception to, the Government Tort Claims Act.
Fourth Cause of Action
The fourth cause of action is for breach of contract.
As with the first through third cause of action, the SAP is deficient in that petitioners do not plead compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act. Petitioners acknowledge this deficiency in the fourth cause of action. The demurrer will be sustained for failure to allege compliance with, or an exception to, the Government Tort Claims Act. Further:
“A contract is an agreement to do or not do a certain thing.” (Civ. Code, § 1549.)
“It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be:
“1. Parties capable of contracting;
“2. Their consent;
“3. A lawful object; and,
“4. A sufficient cause or consideration.” (Civ. Code § 1550.)
The essential elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are “(1) the contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance; (3) the defendant’s breach; and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.” (Richman v Hartley (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 1182, 1186.)
Typically, in a breach of contract action, plaintiffs either set out the terms of a contract verbatim, or, more frequently, include a copy of the contract as an exhibit to the complaint. Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972 (Heritage), addresses this often-argued issue. Heritage does not require plaintiffs to plead all terms of the contract verbatim or to include a copy of the contact as an exhibit to the complaint. Heritage specifically holds that a contract may be pleaded by its legal effect. “In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must allege the substance of its relevant terms.” (Id., at p. 993, italics added.)
The agreement is not attached as an exhibit to the SAP and petitioners do not adequately set forth the substance of the relevant terms of the agreement. As noted herein, petitioners omitted all of the background information that is necessary to understand why the agreement was entered into and the terms of the agreement. Those terms that are described are only referred to in very broad terms that are insufficient for pleading purposes. The demurrer will also be sustained on these grounds. As with the other causes of action, petitioners will be given leave to amend.
CUSD’s final argument is that the prayer for relief is “so overbroad and ambiguous as to render it impossible to issue and enforceable order,” that petitioners fail to specify with particularity the relief they request, and that petitioners fail to identify the nature or scope of the orders they seek. Petitioners implicitly acknowledge the deficiency in the prayer for relief and request that they be given leave to amend. The demurrer to the prayer for relief will be sustained and petitioners will be given leave to amend.