Daria Lucero-Ahedo, et al. v. Carpinteria Unified School District, et al.

Case Number

25CV04752

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 12/10/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Respondents and Defendants Carpinteria Unified School District, Diana F. Rigby, and Jamie Persoon’s Motion for Order Setting Aside Default

Tentative Ruling

For Petitioners and Plaintiffs Daria Lucero-Ahedo, C.A., A.A., and M.A.: Andrea Marcus

For Respondents and Defendants Carpinteria Unified School District, Diana F. Rigby, and Jamie Persoon: Molly Thurmond, Cyrus Khosh-Chashm

                       

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein, respondents and Defendants Carpinteria Unified School District, Diana F. Rigby, and Jamie Persoon’s motion for order setting aside default is granted. The moving parties shall meet and confer with petitioners’ counsel regarding the proposed demurrer, and if no agreement is reached, moving parties shall separately file and serve their proposed demurrer to the complaint after obtaining a hearing date.

Background

This action commenced on July 31 2025, by the filing of the verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for damages and declaratory relief (the “petition”) by petitioners and Plaintiffs Daria Lucero-Ahedo, C.A., A.A., and M.A.: Andrea Marcus against respondents and Defendants Carpinteria Unified School District (CUSD), Diana F. Rigby, and Jamie Persoon based on allegations of breach of contract, violation of federal and state civil rights, and related torts.

As alleged in the petition:

C.A. is a 13-year-old student with disabilities entitled to protections under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). (Pet., ¶ 4.) A.A. is an 8-year-old student with disabilities entitled to protections under IDEA. (Id. at ¶ 5.) M.A. is an 11-year-old student enrolled at CUSD. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Ahedo and her husband are the legal guardians and parents of the minors. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

C.A. is a Hispanic middle school student with disabilities. (Pet., ¶ 11.) C.A.’s family relocated back to Carpinteria in November 2022, following several destabilizing personal events. (Ibid.) At the time of C.A.’s enrollment in CUSD, Ahedo informed school staff, in writing, of her son’s struggles, disabilities, and past evaluations yet, despite Ahedo’s plea for help, CUSD failed to initiate any assessments to determine how to properly serve C.A. (Id. at ¶ 12.) CUSD suspended C.A. over 20 days between January 2023 and May 2024 for behaviors that were manifestations of C.A.’s disability, without provision of any behavioral supports, interventions, or special education services. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

In May 2024, CUSD scheduled an expulsion hearing, and C.A.’s parents consulted with legal counsel who directed them to formally request an evaluation for special education eligibility. (Pet., ¶ 14.) After the request, CUSD cancelled the hearing and initiated the evaluation process. (Ibid.)

On May 30, 2025, the parties entered into a written settlement agreement to resolve the pending due process claim, whereby CUSD agreed to reimburse petitioners up to $125,000 for C.A.’s tuition at Fusion Academy for the 2024-2025 extended school year and the full 2025-2026 school year. (Pet., ¶ 15.) Despite petitioners’ full compliance with the agreement, CUSD has refused to reimburse tuition expenses. (Ibid.)

On July 9, 2025, claiming the family had relocated to Oxnard, respondents summarily revoked the enrollment of all three minor petitioners on grounds of alleged non-residency. (Pet., ¶ 16.) Respondents provided no evidence supporting their residency allegations and ignored the protections guaranteed to homeless students under federal and state law. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Rigby and Persoon have further engaged in a campaign of harassment and intimidation against the family, including trespassing on their private property, questioning their landlord and employer, and demanding written confirmations under threat of immigration consequences. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

The complaint was served on August 18, 2025, via personal service.

Having received no responsive pleading to the complaint, petitioners took respondents’ default on October 3, 2025.

On October 9, 2025, respondents filed the present motion to set aside the default pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

Petitioners oppose the motion.

Analysis

“The Court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the Court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the Court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b), italics added.)

The motion is timely filed.

The trial Court has broad discretion to vacate the judgment and/or the clerk’s entry of default that preceded it.  However, “this discretion may be exercised only after the party seeking relief has shown that there is a proper ground for relief, and that the party has raised that ground in a procedurally proper manner, within any applicable time limits.” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.)

Unless the motion to set aside default is accompanied by an attorney affidavit of fault relief is discretionary and the burden is on Defendant to demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (See Lorenz v. Commercial Accept. Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 989.) The party moving for relief on the basis of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” must show specific facts demonstrating that one of these conditions was met. (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410.)

“The law favors judgments based on the merits, not procedural missteps. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded us that in this area doubts must be resolved in favor of relief, with an order denying relief scrutinized more carefully than an order granting it. As Justice Mosk put it in Rappleyea, “ ‘Because the law favors disposing of cases on their merits, ‘ “any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default [citations]. Therefore, a trial Court order denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on the merits.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lasalle v. Vogel (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-135.)

 

By way of the attorney affidavit of fault, counsel declares:

“On Thursday, October 2, 2025 Ms. Marcus contacted CUSD and informed it that the complaint in this matter had been served on August 18, 2025, and yet no responsive pleadings had been filed. (Exhibit 1, attached to this Declaration.) That letter was forwarded to me. I reviewed our files, and discovered that indeed, this matter had been filed and served. It was discovered at that time that the complaint had been timely forwarded to my office, and inadvertently misfiled with the other

Ahedo matters, which we have been monitoring.” (Thurmond Decl., ¶ 5.)

“On Friday morning, October 3, 2025, I notified Ms. Marcus [petitioners’ counsel] that I had been retained to represent Respondents/Petitioners in this matter, apologized for the confusion and oversight, requested an extension of time in which to respond to this pleading, and promised that a response would be filed and served on or before October 10, 2025. (Exhibit 2, attached to this Declaration.) Ms. Marcus responded by demanding that I explain the confusion. I did, and again requested an

extension until October 10, 2025 to respond to the pleading. (Id.)” (Thurmond Decl., ¶ 6.) “Ms. Marcus failed to respond. Instead, at 5:28 p.m. on Friday October 3, 2025, I received an email from Ms. Marcus’s assistant, with the Request for Entry of Default, attached. (Exhibit 3, attached to this Declaration.) In that email, Ms. Marcus implied that it was necessary to file the Request for Entry of Default in order to avoid further delay in the Ahedo children’s receipt of education.” (Id. at ¶ 7.)

Although respondents’ counsel primarily argues that the error in failing to timely file a responsive pleading to the complaint was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the Court does not find the neglect excusable. However, because there is an affidavit of attorney fault, relief from the default is mandatory.

Petitioners’ opposition, and the authorities cited therein, is not persuasive and does not alter the fact that respondents’ counsel admitted that it was their actions that resulted in the failure to timely file an answer.

“When a complying affidavit is filed relief is mandatory, even if the attorney’s neglect was inexcusable. [Citation.]” (Bailey v. Citibank, N.A. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 335, 349.)

The motion to set aside default will be granted. As required, respondents have included a copy of their proposed responsive pleading. As it is a demurrer, they will be ordered to meet and confer with petitioners’ counsel and, should the parties fail to reach an agreement, respondents shall obtain a hearing date and separately file the demurrer.

Petitioners’ request that a “partial default judgment” be entered is improperly brought by way of the opposition and will be denied.