Tentative Ruling: Dominique Lacerte vs BMO LLC et al

Case Number

25CV04636

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 05/08/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motions to Compel

Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff’s motions to compel further responses are denied as moot. No monetary sanctions are awarded in favor of or against any party.

Background:

On July 25, 2025, plaintiff Dominique Lacerte (plaintiff), individually and as the Trustee of the Arthur Joseph Lacerte Survivor’s Trust Dated July 11, 2018, (the Trust), filed a complaint against defendants BMO, LLC (BMO), Robert Mecay (R Mecay), and Susan Ackerman (Ackerman) (collectively, “defendants”), asserting three causes of action: (1) trespass (against defendants); (2) nuisance (against defendants); and (3) breach of contract (against BMO only).

On October 10, without any response to the complaint having been filed, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (the FAC) asserting the same three causes of action against the same parties described above. As alleged in the operative FAC:

The Trust owns real property (the Property) located at 2311 Finney Street in Summerland, California. (FAC, ¶ 1.) The Property was purchased in 2018, and is burdened by an “Access Easement” for “‘ingress, egress, and underground private utilities’” over the easterly 18 feet of the Property, and for the benefit of 2305 Finney Street (2305 Finney). (FAC, ¶ 9.) The Access Easement was recorded on September 29, 1989, and provides essential access to large portions of the Property for fire and other emergency vehicles, such as paramedics and ambulances. (FAC, ¶¶ 9 & 11.)

BMO is the legal owner of 2305 Finney. (FAC, ¶ 10.) Robert Mecay (R Mecay) is the managing member of BMO. (Ibid.) Plaintiff believes that BMO is a “shell” utilized by R Mecay and Ackerman (collectively, the Mecay Defendants) for their ownership of 2305 Finney and to rent that property as a short term rental. (Ibid.)

Soon after the Property was acquired, the Mecay defendants abused their access to the Access Easement by using it as a parking lot for vehicles, including after plaintiff, plaintiff’s father Arthur Lacerte, and plaintiff’s sister Bridgette Lacerte (collectively, “the Lacertes”) requested that the Mecay defendants stop parking vehicles in the Access Easement and a deputy from the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department advised R Mecay of the safety risks of parking in the Access Easement. (FAC, ¶¶ 8 & 10-12.) The Mecay defendants and their guests also used the Lacertes’ private driveway, which is outside of the boundary of the Access Easement, as a turnaround when backing out of 2305 Finney. (FAC, ¶ 13.)

On May 26, 2020, the Lacertes filed, as Santa Barbara Superior Court case number 20CV01909 (the Lacerte Action), a complaint seeking a declaration that the Access Easement could not be used for parking, and damages for trespass onto the Lacertes’ driveway. (FAC, ¶14.) BMO filed in the Lacerte Action, a cross-complaint alleging that the Lacertes had constructed a fence on a beach access path that BMO had used since 2005 (the beach access issue). (FAC, ¶ 15.) The court severed and deferred its resolution of the beach access issue while separately proceeding with the Access Easement and driveway issues. (Ibid.)

A trial of the Access Easement and driveway issues proceeded on September 13, 2021. (FAC, ¶ 16.) On October 27, 2021, the court entered a declaratory judgment (the Judgment) in favor of the Lacertes and the Trust. (FAC, ¶ 17.) In addition, the parties reached a settlement of the beach access issues and the cross-complaint filed by BMO in the Lacerte Action, the terms of which are memorialized in a written settlement agreement (the Settlement) executed by the parties, which became effective on January 2, 2024. (FAC, ¶¶ 18-25 & Ex. 1.)

BMO has failed to perform under and violated the terms of the Settlement. (FAC, ¶¶ 26-36.) In addition, BMO and the Mecay defendants have continued using and parking in the Access Easement in violation of the Judgment and without the permission or authorization of the Lacertes. (FAC, ¶¶ 37-45.)

On November 12, 2025, defendants filed a general demurrer to the FAC. The demurrer was overruled, and defendants were ordered to answer the FAC

On January 30, 2026, defendants filed a motion for a protective order staying discovery until the court determines how this case will proceed. The motion was denied.

On February 10, 2026, plaintiff separately filed three motions, which the court will refer to, collectively, as the “Discovery Motions”: (1) a motion for an order compelling Ackerman (the Ackerman Motion) to supplement her responses to Plaintiff’s requests for production of documents, set one form interrogatories, and set one requests for admission and to produce documents requested; (2) a motion for an order compelling BMO (the BMO Motion) to supplement its responses to plaintiff’s requests for production of documents, set one form interrogatories, and set one requests for admission and to produce documents requested; and (3) a motion for an order compelling R Mecay (the Mecay Motion) to supplement his responses to plaintiff’s requests for production of documents, set one form interrogatories, and set one requests for admission and to produce documents requested. Each of the Discovery Motions includes a request for sanctions against Ackerman, BMO, and R Mecay.

Defendants separately opposed each of the Discovery Motions, which were calendared for hearing on March 20. As one result of the March 20 hearing, the parties were ordered to further meet and confer and file a joint report or, if necessary, file and serve individual status reports, addressing each of the matters described in the ruling including which, if any, issues remain in regard to each discovery request at issue in plaintiff’s motions to compel defendants to provide further responses.

Analysis:

On April 24, 2026, the parties filed their joint status report. Rather than using the joint status report to solely inform the court about their meet and confer efforts and status of the discovery responses, the parties used it as an opportunity to re-argue their respective motions. This is not what the court intended the joint status report to be used for. The helpful information that was gleaned from the status report is that the parties further met and conferred as ordered, and defendants agreed to provide supplemental discovery responses to all discovery requests at issue on or before May 1, 2026. The court commends the parties for working cooperatively in this regard.

On May 5, 2026, plaintiff filed a status report confirming that defendants did in fact serve supplemental responses to the discovery requests and produced documents. As such, plaintiff is no longer seeking to compel further responses in connection with her motions to compel. However, she still seeks monetary sanctions.

“The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. The court may also impose this sanction on one unsuccessfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on any attorney who advised that assertion, or on both. If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

As to the motion to compel further responses to the RFPs: “The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

As to the motion to compel further responses to the RFAs: “The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (d).)

As to the motion to compel further responses to the interrogatories: “The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)

“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).)

As discussed in ruling on the demurrer and the motion for protective order, defendants’ primary objection to all the discovery requests was that the requests were premature due to the pending demurrer and the motion for protective order. It is correct that under the holding of  Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, and other cases, the pendency of a demurrer does not typically render discovery premature. As the parties are aware, the court ruled in accordance with this general rule. The court did, however, note that under the appropriate circumstances, the court could have stayed the proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 526.

The court believes that defendants had a good faith belief in the merits of their demurrer and their motion for protective order. Their objections of prematurity at the time, although ultimately, in effect, overruled, were made with substantial justification. The court finds that the existing circumstances warrant the denial of monetary sanctions.