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Tentative Ruling: Dominique Lacerte vs BMO LLC et al

Case Number

25CV04636

Case Type

Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 10/23/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons discussed herein:

Cross-defendants’ special motion to strike is denied.

Background:

On July 25, 2025, plaintiff Dominique Lacerte (plaintiff), individually and as the Trustee of the Arthur Joseph Lacerte Survivor’s Trust Dated July 11, 2018, (the Trust), filed a complaint against defendants BMO, LLC (BMO), Robert Mecay (R Mecay), and Susan Ackerman (Ackerman) (collectively, “defendants” or “cross-complainants”), asserting three causes of action: (1) trespass (against defendants); (2) nuisance (against defendants); and (3) breach of contract (against BMO only).

On October 10, without any response to the complaint having been filed, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (the FAC) asserting the same three causes of action against the same parties described above. As alleged in the operative FAC:

The Trust owns real property (the Property) located at 2311 Finney Street in Summerland, California. (FAC, ¶ 1.) The Property was purchased in 2018, and is burdened by an “Access Easement” for “‘ingress, egress, and underground private utilities’” over the easterly 18 feet of the Property, and for the benefit of 2305 Finney Street (2305 Finney). (FAC, ¶ 9.) The Access Easement was recorded on September 29, 1989, and provides essential access to large portions of the Property for fire and other emergency vehicles, such as paramedics and ambulances. (FAC, ¶¶ 9 & 11.)

BMO is the legal owner of 2305 Finney. (FAC, ¶ 10.) Robert Mecay (R Mecay) is the managing member of BMO. (Ibid.) Plaintiff believes that BMO is a “shell” utilized by R Mecay and Ackerman (collectively, the Mecay Defendants) for their ownership of 2305 Finney and to rent that property as a short term rental. (Ibid.)

Soon after the Property was acquired, the Mecay defendants abused their access to the Access Easement by using it as a parking lot for vehicles, including after plaintiff, plaintiff’s father Arthur Lacerte, and plaintiff’s sister Bridgette Lacerte (collectively, “the Lacertes”) requested that the Mecay defendants stop parking vehicles in the Access Easement and a deputy from the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department advised R Mecay of the safety risks of parking in the Access Easement. (FAC, ¶¶ 8 & 10-12.) The Mecay defendants and their guests also used the Lacertes’ private driveway, which is outside of the boundary of the Access Easement, as a turnaround when backing out of 2305 Finney. (FAC, ¶ 13.)

On May 26, 2020, the Lacertes filed, as Santa Barbara Superior Court case number 20CV01909 (the Lacerte Action), a complaint seeking a declaration that the Access Easement could not be used for parking, and damages for trespass onto the Lacertes’ driveway. (FAC, ¶14.) BMO filed in the Lacerte Action, a cross-complaint alleging that the Lacertes had constructed a fence on a beach access path that BMO had used since 2005 (the beach access issue). (FAC, ¶ 15.) The court severed and deferred its resolution of the beach access issue while separately proceeding with the Access Easement and driveway issues. (Ibid.)

A trial of the Access Easement and driveway issues proceeded on September 13, 2021. (FAC, ¶ 16.) On October 27, 2021, the court entered a declaratory judgment (the Judgment) in favor of the Lacertes and the Trust. (FAC, ¶ 17.) In addition, the parties reached a settlement of the beach access issues and the cross-complaint filed by BMO in the Lacerte Action, the terms of which are memorialized in a written settlement agreement (the Settlement) executed by the parties, which became effective on January 2, 2024. (FAC, ¶¶ 18-25 & Ex. 1.)

BMO has failed to perform under and violated the terms of the Settlement. (FAC, ¶¶ 26-36.) In addition, BMO and the Mecay defendants have continued using and parking in the Access Easement in violation of the Judgment and without the permission or authorization of the Lacertes. (FAC, ¶¶ 37-45.)

On November 12, 2025, defendants filed a general demurrer to the FAC. The demurrer was overruled, and defendants were ordered to answer the FAC

On April 17, 2026, cross-complainants, BMO, Mecay, and Ackerman, filed their operative first amended cross-complaint (FACC) against cross-defendants Dominique Lacerte, an individual and as Trustee of the Arthur Joseph Lacerte survivor’s trust dated July 11, 2018; and Bridgette Lacerte, an individual and as Co-Trustee of said Trust (collectively “cross-defendants”) for: (1) trespass; (2) breach of contract - settlement agreement; (3) private nuisance; (4) invasion of privacy - unauthorized audio surveillance; and (5) declaratory relief. All causes of action are alleged as to all cross-defendants.

As alleged in the FACC:

BMO owns real property located at 2305 Finney Street, Summerland (BMO property). (FACC, ¶ 1.) Mecay is the managing member of BMO and Ackerman resides with Mecay. (FACC, ¶ 2.)

Cross-defendants own real property located at 2311 Finney Street, Summerland (Lacerte property) through the Lacerte Trust. (FACC, ¶ 3.) The Lacerte property is adjacent to the BMO property. (Ibid.)

BMO alleges that it has express rights to an 18-foot-wide access easement for ingress, egress, and underground private utilities over the easterly 18 feet of the Lacerte property, pursuant to an easement grant deed recorded on September 29, 1989. (FACC, ¶ 6.) The access easement provides the sole means of vehicular ingress and egress to the BMO property. (Ibid.) BMO has used the access easement since it purchased the BMO property in April 1998, and the access easement has continuously provided the only vehicular access to the BMO property for over 27 years. (FACC, ¶ 7.)

On May 26, 2020, cross-defendants filed a complaint against BMO in Case No. 20CV01909 (the “first action”) for trespass and declaratory relief related to parking within the access easement. (FACC, ¶ 10.) BMO filed a cross-complaint for prescriptive easement, quiet title, obstruction and interference with the express easement, and declaratory relief. (Ibid.) The cross-complaint was subsequently amended to add claims relating to a beach access path on the Lacerte property, which the court severed for separate resolution. (Ibid.)

Following trial of the first action, the court entered judgment declaring that all parties are prohibited from parking in the access area except for: (1) brief, transitory, and temporary idling of vehicles for pickup and delivery services, and (2) brief, transitory, and temporary idling of vehicles by cross-defendants for the purpose of removing and re-hooking the chain fence across the Lacerte driveway. (FACC, ¶ 11.)

Lacerte and BMO executed a settlement agreement and mutual release, effective January 2, 2024, which required Lacerte to support BMO’s pursuit of entitlements for the new 2305 path, including by signing modifications to the declaration of restrictions to allow development within the exclusion area. (FACC, ¶ 12.)

Cross-complainants caused a plat map survey to be completed on February 11 - 12, 2026, which reveals that a portion of the Lacerte residential structure protrudes into the access easement. (FACC, ¶ 13.) The judgment in the first action did not address, and no party raised, the question of whether the Lacerte residential structure encroached into the access easement, and no survey establishing the precise boundaries existed at the time of trial of the first action. (FACC, ¶ 14.)

The plat map also shows that a fence constructed by cross-defendants, in March 2019, is situated on the BMP property and in some locations extends over the property line. (FACC, ¶ 15.) The fence was constructed without cross-complainants’ permission or authorization. (Ibid.) Cross-defendants have also installed an iron railing along the 2311 beach access path on the Lacerte property. (FACC, ¶ 16.)

Following the execution of the settlement agreement, cross-defendants have parked vehicles belonging to cross-defendants, cross-defendants’ family members, and cross-defendants’ agents and invitees in and blocking the access area, and have permitted large trucks to park, stop, or idle such that they protrude beyond the driveway into the access easement, obstructing cross-complainants’ right of ingress and egress. (FACC, ¶ 18.)

Further allegations that are pertinent to the present motion will be discussed below where appropriate.

On May 21, 2026, cross-defendants filed their special motion to strike (Anti-SLAPP) as to the fourth cause of action for invasion of privacy - unauthorized audio surveillance, arguing that the claim arises from protected activity and that cross-defendants cannot demonstrate that the claim is legally sufficient and supported by sufficient evidence to sustain a favorable judgment.

The motion is opposed.

Analysis:

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides, in relevant part:

“(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.

“(b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

“(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.

“(3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent proceeding.

* * *

“(e) As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. We have described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation, fn.] The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ [Citation.]” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385.)

First Prong - Protected Activity

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citations.] Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.] ‘The only means specified in section 425.16 by which a moving defendant can satisfy the [“arising from”] requirement is to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e)....’ [Citation.] In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062-1063.)

“Assertions that are “ ‘merely incidental’ ” or “ ‘collateral’ ” are not subject to section 425.16. [Citations.] Allegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.)

Here, the elements of the challenged claim, which form the basis for cross-complainants’ claim of liability, are an invasion of privacy by unauthorized audio surveillance.  

“A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the person attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity, through the use of any device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the device was used.” (Civ. Code, § 1708.8, subd. (b).)

“The Legislature hereby declares that advances in science and technology have led to the development of new devices and techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications and that the invasion of privacy resulting from the continual and increasing use of such devices and techniques has created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized society.

The Legislature by this chapter intends to protect the right of privacy of the people of this state.

The Legislature recognizes that law enforcement agencies have a legitimate need to employ modern listening devices and techniques in the investigation of criminal conduct and the apprehension of lawbreakers. Therefore, it is not the intent of the Legislature to place greater restraints on the use of listening devices and techniques by law enforcement agencies than existed prior to the effective date of this chapter.” (Pen. Code, § 630.)

“A person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication, uses an electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop upon or record the confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) per violation, or imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If the person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section or Section 631, 632.5, 632.6, 632.7, or 636, the person shall be punished by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per violation, by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment.” (Pen. Code, § 632, subd. (a).)

“(a) Any person who has been injured by a violation of this chapter may bring an action against the person who committed the violation for the greater of the following amounts:

(1) Five thousand dollars ($5,000) per violation.

(2) Three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff.

(b) Any person may, in accordance with Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 525) of Title 7 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, bring an action to enjoin and restrain any violation of this chapter, and may in the same action seek damages as provided by subdivision (a).

(c) It is not a necessary prerequisite to an action pursuant to this section that the plaintiff has suffered, or be threatened with, actual damages.

(d) This section shall not be construed to affect Title 4 (commencing with Section 3425.1) of Part 1 of Division 4 of the Civil Code.” (Pen. Code, § 637.2.)

By way of the FACC, with respect to the fourth cause of action, cross-complainants allege:

“Cross-Complainants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversations at and about the BMO Property at 2305 Finney Street, Summerland, California. The BMO Property is a private residence. Conversations occurring on or about the BMO Property among Cross-Complainants, their family members, guests, invitees, and tenants constitute confidential communications within the meaning of Penal Code section 632.” (FACC, ¶ 44.)

“Cross-Defendants have installed and maintain surveillance cameras on the Lacerte Property that are intentionally directed at the Access Easement and at the BMO Property. Upon information and belief, Cross-Defendants’ surveillance cameras intentionally capture audio recordings of conversations occurring on the BMO Property and in the Access Easement without the knowledge or consent of Cross-Complainants or their guests, invitees, or tenants. California is a two-party consent state, and California Penal Code section 632, subdivision (a), prohibits the intentional recording of a confidential communication without the consent of all parties.” (FACC, ¶ 45.)

“Cross-Defendants’ intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Cross-Defendants have demonstrated knowledge of private conversations and activities occurring at the BMO Property that Cross-Defendants could not have known absent audio surveillance. Upon information and belief, Cross-Defendants have used the audio recordings to monitor Cross-Complainants’ activities and to support their litigation against Cross-Complainants, as part of a broader pattern of harassment and intimidation directed at Cross-Complainants.” (FACC, ¶ 46.)

“Penal Code section 637.2 provides a civil cause of action for any person whose confidential communication has been recorded in violation of Penal Code section 632. The injured party may recover the greater of $5,000 or three times the amount of actual damages sustained.” (FACC, ¶ 47.)

“Cross-Defendants’ unauthorized audio surveillance also violates Cross-Complainants’ right to privacy guaranteed by Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution. Cross-Complainants possess a legally protected privacy interest in their conversations at their own property. Cross-Complainants had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances. Cross-Defendants’ conduct constitutes a serious invasion of that privacy interest, sufficiently serious and unwarranted as to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms.” (FACC, ¶ 48.)

“As a direct and proximate result of Cross-Defendants’ invasion of privacy, Cross-Complainants have suffered damages, including loss of privacy, emotional distress, and interference with the quiet enjoyment of the BMO Property, in an amount to be proven at trial, but in no event less than $5,000 per violation pursuant to Penal Code section 637.2. Cross-Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing Cross-Complainants’ harm.” (FACC, ¶ 49.)

Cross-defendants’ entire argument centers around a single sentence in the FACC, contained in paragraph No. 46: “Upon information and belief, Cross-Defendants have used the audio recordings to monitor Cross-Complainants’ activities and to support their litigation against Cross-Complainants, as part of a broader pattern of harassment and intimidation directed at Cross-Complainants.”

By making their argument, cross-defendants are conflating the basis of the cause of action (the invasion of privacy) with what is allegedly done with the audio recordings. The basis of the claim is not what might have been done with audio recordings. The basis of the claim is the intrusion on privacy, and resulting harm (“loss of privacy, emotional distress, and interference with the quiet enjoyment of the BMO Property”), by the surveillance itself. The surveillance is not a protected activity. Thus, the anti-SLAPP motion does not get past the first prong of the analysis, and will be denied.

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