Tentative Ruling: Dominique Lacerte vs BMO LLC et al

Case Number

25CV04636

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 03/20/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrer; Motion Protective Order; 3 Motions to Compel

Tentative Ruling

(1) For the reasons stated herein, the demurrer of defendants to plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overruled. Defendants shall, on or before April 3, 2026, file and serve an answer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint.

(2) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendants for a protective order is denied.

(3) For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s separately filed motions to compel each defendant to provide further responses to plaintiff’s requests for the production of documents, requests for admission, and form interrogatories, and for monetary sanctions, are each continued to May 8, 2026. The parties shall further meet and confer in accordance with this ruling and, on or before April 24, 2026, file a joint report or, if necessary, file and serve individual status reports, addressing each of the matters described herein including which, if any, issues remain in regard to each discovery request at issue in plaintiff’s motions to compel defendants to provide further responses.

(4) For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff shall, on or before April 24, 2026, file and serve a notice of payment of fees identifying each of the discovery motions described herein for which filing fees have been paid and for which adjudication is sought by plaintiff.

(5) The parties shall appear at the hearing and be prepared to address the related case matters described herein.

Background:

On July 25, 2025, plaintiff Dominique Lacerte (Plaintiff), individually and as the Trustee of the Arthur Joseph Lacerte Survivor’s Trust Dated July 11, 2018, (the Trust), filed a complaint against defendants BMO, LLC (BMO), Robert Mecay (R Mecay), and Susan Ackerman (Ackerman) (collectively, Defendants), asserting three causes of action: (1) trespass (against Defendants); (2) nuisance (against Defendants); and (3) breach of contract (against BMO only).

On October 10, without any response to the complaint having been filed, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (the FAC) asserting the same three causes of action against the same parties described above. As alleged in the operative FAC:

The Trust owns real property (the Property) located at 2311 Finney Street in Summerland, California. (FAC, ¶ 1.) The Property was purchased in 2018, and is burdened by an “Access Easement” for “‘ingress, egress, and underground private utilities’” over the easterly 18 feet of the Property, and for the benefit of 2305 Finney Street (2305 Finney). (FAC, ¶ 9.) The Access Easement was recorded on September 29, 1989, and provides essential access to large portions of the Property for fire and other emergency vehicles, such as paramedics and ambulances. (FAC, ¶¶ 9 & 11.)

BMO is the legal owner of 2305 Finney. (FAC, ¶ 10.) Robert Mecay (R Mecay) is the managing member of BMO. (Ibid.) Plaintiff believes that BMO is a “shell” utilized by R Mecay and Ackerman (collectively, the Mecay Defendants) for their ownership of 2305 Finney and to rent that property as a short term rental. (Ibid.)

Soon after the Property was acquired, the Mecay Defendants abused their access to the Access Easement by using it as a parking lot for vehicles, including after Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s father Arthur Lacerte, and Plaintiff’s sister Bridgette Lacerte (collectively, the Lacertes) requested that the Mecay Defendants stop parking vehicles in the Access Easement and a deputy from the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department advised R Mecay of the safety risks of parking in the Access Easement. (FAC, ¶¶ 8 & 10-12.) The Mecay Defendants and their guests also used the Lacertes’ private driveway, which is outside of the boundary of the Access Easement, as a turnaround when backing out of 2305 Finney. (FAC, ¶ 13.)

On May 26, 2020, the Lacertes filed, as Santa Barbara Superior Court case number 20CV01909 (the Lacerte Action), a complaint seeking a declaration that the Access Easement could not be used for parking, and damages for trespass onto the Lacertes’ driveway. (FAC, ¶14.) BMO filed in the Lacerte Action, a cross-complaint alleging that the Lacertes had constructed a fence on a beach access path that BMO had used since 2005 (the beach access issue). (FAC, ¶ 15.) The court severed and deferred its resolution of the beach access issue while separately proceeding with the Access Easement and driveway issues. (Ibid.)

A trial of the Access Easement and driveway issues proceeded on September 13, 2021. (FAC, ¶ 16.) On October 27, 2021, the court entered a declaratory judgment (the Judgment) in favor of the Lacertes and the Trust. (FAC, ¶ 17.) In addition, the parties reached a settlement of the beach access issues and the cross-complaint filed by BMO in the Lacerte Action, the terms of which are memorialized in a written settlement agreement (the Settlement) executed by the parties, which became effective on January 2, 2024. (FAC, ¶¶ 18-25 & Ex. 1.)

BMO has failed to perform under and violated the terms of the Settlement. (FAC, ¶¶ 26-36.) In addition, BMO and the Mecay Defendants have continued using and parking in the Access Easement in violation of the Judgment and without the permission or authorization of the Lacertes. (FAC, ¶¶ 37-45.)

On November 12, 2025, Defendants filed a general demurrer to the FAC on the grounds that the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to allege a cause of action, that there is another action pending between the same parties and the same causes of action in which the court has retained jurisdiction to resolve disputes, and that claim preclusion bars the causes of action alleged in the FAC. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer, which is calendared for hearing on March 20, 2026.

On January 30, 2026, Defendants filed a motion for a protective order (the PO Motion) staying discovery until the court determines how this case will proceed. Plaintiff opposes the PO Motion, which is also calendared for hearing on March 20.

On February 10, 2026, Plaintiff separately filed three motions, which the court will refer to, collectively, as the “Discovery Motions”: (1) a motion for an order compelling Ackerman (the Ackerman Motion) to supplement her responses to Plaintiff’s requests for production of documents, set one form interrogatories, and set one requests for admission and to produce documents requested; (2) a motion for an order compelling BMO (the BMO Motion) to supplement its responses to Plaintiff’s requests for production of documents, set one form interrogatories, and set one requests for admission and to produce documents requested; and (3) a motion for an order compelling R Mecay (the Mecay Motion) to supplement his responses to Plaintiff’s requests for production of documents, set one form interrogatories, and set one requests for admission and to produce documents requested. Each of the Discovery Motions include a request for sanctions against Ackerman, BMO, and R Mecay.

Defendants separately oppose each of the Discovery Motions, which are also calendared for hearing on March 20.

Analysis:

(1)       Defendants’ Demurrer

“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

As grounds for demurrer to the first cause of action for trespass and the second cause of action for nuisance, Defendants assert that those causes are subject to abatement because the Judgment entered in the Lacerte Action includes damages for trespass and a declaration of rights concerning parking in the Access Easement, and is generally subject to modification. Defendants further assert that the doctrine of claim preclusion bars the first and second causes of action alleged in the FAC.

As grounds for demurrer to the third cause of action for breach of contract, Defendants contend that cause of action is also subject to abatement because the court in the Lacerte Action retained jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Defendants argue, the demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend or, alternatively, these proceedings should be abated and stayed pending a final resolution of the Lacerte Action.

In support of the demurrer, Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of, among other records, the complaint filed in the Lacerte Action (the Lacerte Complaint); a second amended cross-complaint filed by BMO in the Lacerte Action (the BMO Cross-Complaint); the Judgment; the Settlement; a stipulation filed in the Lacerte Action on January 25, 2024 (the Stipulation) which sets forth the basic terms of the Settlement; and a court order entered in the Lacerte Action on January 29, 2024, retaining jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement (the Order). (Def. RJN, ¶¶ 1, 3, 5 & 10-12.) Though the request states that copies of the Lacerte Complaint, the BMO Cross-Complaint, the Judgment, the Settlement, the Stipulation, and the Order are attached as exhibits, the court’s copy of that request does not include those exhibits.

Though Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that the records or materials described above were filed with the court in the Lacerte Action, or that a copy of the Settlement is attached to the FAC, Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ request for judicial notice. In that opposition, Plaintiff generally contends that the request attempts to inject facts outside of the pleadings which should be disregarded, that Defendants attempt to use the records at issue for the truth of the matters asserted, and that the court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of any factual assertions appearing in those records.

Though a copy of the Judgment is not attached to the FAC, Plaintiff expressly alleges the entry of, and the “declarations” contained in, the Judgment that BMO and the Mecay Defendants purportedly violated, and recites the terms of the Settlement purportedly breached by BMO. (See FAC, ¶¶ 16-17 & 20-45.) The FAC further alleges that the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Judgment. (FAC, ¶ 17(m).) The Settlement attached to the FAC also states: “The Court has expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of [the] Judgment entered on the Lacerte Complaint.” (FAC, Ex. 1 at p. 2, Recital ¶ H.)

Because the FAC excerpts from the Judgment and attaches a copy of the Settlement purportedly violated or breached by BMO, and considering that those documents, which are also referenced in the demurrer, are records of this court whose terms of form a basis for the allegations in the FAC, “it is essential that we evaluate the [FAC] by reference to these documents.” (Ingram v. Flippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285, fn. 3, disapproved on another ground in Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 1106 [taking judicial notice of documents summarized in complaint granted].) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will grant Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Judgment and the Settlement, as well as the Lacerte Complaint, the BMO Cross-Complaint, the Stipulation, and the Order, which are also proper subjects of judicial notice under the circumstances present here. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)

Judicial notice of the court records described above does not extend to “the truth of any of the factual assertions appearing in the court documents....” (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569 (Sosinsky).) Further, though the court “cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations in a court record, it can take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments.” (Starr v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999, 1014 [also noting that the court may not take judicial notice of any facts in a stipulation except for terms approved in a court order]. Also relevant here, “[w]hether a factual finding is true is a different question than whether the truth of that factual finding may or may not be subsequently relitigated a second time.” (Sosinsky, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1569.)

Moreover, “a complaint may be read as if it included matters judicially noticed. [Citations.] Such matters may show the complaint fails to state a cause of action though its bare allegations do not disclose the defect.” (Lazzarone v. Bank of America (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 581, 590.)

“A plea in abatement pursuant to section 430.10, subdivision (c), may be made by demurrer or answer when there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action. [Citation.] In determining whether the causes of action are the same for purposes of pleas in abatement, the rule is that such a plea may be maintained only where a judgment in the first action would be a complete bar to the second action. [Citation.] Where a demurrer is sustained on the ground of another action pending, the proper order is not a dismissal, but abatement of further proceedings pending termination of the first action. [Citations.]” (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 787–788, original italics.)

The court’s review of the Lacerte Complaint and the BMO Cross-Complaint shows that the Mecay Defendants were not parties to the Lacerte Action. The Lacerte Complaint also does not assert a cause of action for nuisance or for breach of any contract against Defendants. In addition, though the Judgment reflects that R Mecay, who is the managing member of BMO, was present at the trial in the Lacerte Action, the Judgment was issued in favor of Plaintiff and against BMO, and not the Mecay Defendants.

Furthermore, as the FAC and judicially noticeable materials show that the Judgment was entered as to the complaint filed in the Lacerte Action, the demurrer also fails to explain why the Lacerte Action remains “pending” as to that complaint. (See, e.g., Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1127 (Ofek), original italics [the entry of judgment is “the end of that underlying proceeding.”].)

For the reasons discussed above, the demurrer fails to show why these proceedings and the Lacerte Action are pending between the same parties or the same causes of action such that the Judgment operates as a complete bar this action, or why abatement of these proceedings on the grounds stated is appropriate or warranted.

The term “[r]es judicata … is an umbrella term encompassing issue preclusion and claim preclusion, both of which describe the preclusive effect of a final judgment.” (Guerrero v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1098.) Claim preclusion, the primary aspect of res judicata, prevents a party from relitigating the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties while issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of issues actually litigated and resolved in the prior proceeding. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896; Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 797.)

Further, “[t]he identity of two causes of action is determined by a comparison of the facts alleged which show the nature of the invasion of plaintiff’s primary right.

“ ‘California follows the “primary right theory” of Pomeroy: “Every judicial action must therefore involve the following elements: a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, and a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant; a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consisted in a breach of such primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defendant springing from this delict, and finally the remedy or relief itself.... Of these elements, the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong combined constitute the cause of action ....” ’ [Citation.]” (Bush v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1384 (Bush), original italics.)

“If all of the facts necessary to show that an action is barred by res judicata are within the complaint or subject to judicial notice, a trial court may properly sustain a general demurrer.” (Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1299.)

The same reasoning and analysis apply. For all reasons discussed above, the demurrer fails to show why the doctrines of res judicata or claim preclusion bar each of the causes of action asserted in these proceedings. (Bush, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384.)

The court also notes that the purported trespass by Defendants at issue in these proceedings is alleged in the FAC to include “the unauthorized and unlawful parking of vehicles by Defendants and their guests, invitees, employees, servants and agents in the Access Easement[]” and “the unauthorized and unlawful use of the Access Easement to place, store, and use construction materials and equipment by Defendants’ agents, employees, and/or contractors.” (FAC, ¶ 48.)

A reasonable interpretation of the FAC, including facts which may be inferred from those expressly alleged, also shows that the conduct that Plaintiff alleges constitutes a trespass occurred after the Judgment was entered. (FAC, ¶¶ 37-45.) For example, the FAC expressly alleges that “Plaintiff does not complain of any trespass that predates the ... Judgment.” (FAC, ¶ 51.) For these reasons, the FAC, on its face, is sufficient to show that the Lacerte Action does not involve identical causes of action or issues, and that the Judgment does not operate as a bar to the present proceedings.

As to Defendants’ contention that the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Judgment, proceedings to enforce a judgment are not “a continuation of the underlying proceeding giving rise to the judgment.” (Ofek, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1126; see also Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 675, 682–683 [discussing rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction].) In addition, and as noted above, “the underlying case giving rise to a judgment is no longer a ‘pending’ ‘proceeding’ at the time of post-judgment proceedings because the entry of judgment is the end of that underlying proceeding.” (Ofek, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127, original italics.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will overrule the demurrer to the first cause of action on the grounds stated.

The second cause of action for nuisance arises from the same or substantially similar alleged conduct by Defendants, and also asserts that “Plaintiff does not complain of any conduct that predates the .... [Judgment].” (FAC, ¶ 63.). Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For all reasons further discussed above, the court will also overrule the demurrer to the second cause of action on the grounds stated.

As to the third cause of action, which alleges a purported breach of the Settlement by BMO, the demurrer fails to show grounds for abatement, or why claim preclusion bars these proceedings, for the same reasons further discussed above. For example, the face of the FAC and matters which are the proper subject of judicial notice show that the Settlement was executed by the parties and became effective after the Judgment was entered. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94 [“[t]hese are evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to a complaint or superseded complaint which can be considered on demurrer.”].)

Furthermore, to the extent the court retained jurisdiction pursuant to the Order to enforce the Settlement, “that only means the [court] could exercise jurisdiction without requiring a separate action on the settlement agreement. It does not mean it is the only court with jurisdiction to adjudicate the settlement agreement. There is nothing remarkable about the fact that there are multiple suitable venues for a claim.” (MSY Trading Inc. v. Saleen Automotive, Inc. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 395, 405, original italics.)

Though the Settlement attached to the FAC concerns the BMO Cross-Complaint, and requires the parties to report to the court the progress of seeking certain entitlements at “periodically set Case Management Conferences[]” (Order, ¶ 1), the demurrer fails to show why the court has exercised its jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce the terms of the Settlement. The demurrer also fails to explain the court in the Lacerte Action is the only court with jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce the Settlement.

The demurrer further asserts that the FAC fails to allege any specific standards or timing for performance of the Settlement, which Defendants contend expressly provides that it may take several years to secure certain entitlements, and advances factual statements ostensibly to show BMO’s performance. For these reasons, the demurrer argues, the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for breach of contract.

“A breach of contract is ‘[t]he wrongful, i.e., the unjustified or unexcused, failure to perform’ the terms of a contract. [Citation.]” (Chen v. PayPal, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 559, 570.) “A cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiff’s performance or excuse for failure to perform, defendant’s breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom. [Citation.] A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect. [Citation.]” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.)

In addition to attaching a copy of the Settlement, the FAC sets out, verbatim, the terms of the Settlement purportedly breached by BMO, as well as the manner in which the Settlement was breached. (FAC, ¶¶ 69-70.) These allegations are sufficient to plead the contract, and Defendant’s breach.

Furthermore, while a demurrer may raise an issue of law (see Code Civ. Proc., § 589, subd. (a)), a demurrer tests only the pleadings and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters outside of that pleading. (Executive Landscape Corp. v. San Vicente Country Villas IV Assn. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 496, 499-500 [also noting that the court is precluded from weighing disputed facts on demurrer].) The disputed factual matters presented in the demurrer to show why the FAC fails to state a cause of action for breach of the Settlement, which appear to include facts contained in case management statements or status reports filed in the Lacerte Action, constitute extrinsic matters outside the FAC and may not, for present purposes, be considered or weighed by the court. (Ibid.; see also Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider matters raised in memorandum and not otherwise pleaded].) The court also does not consider Plaintiff’s ability to prove the allegations of the FAC. (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034.)

For all reasons discussed above, the court will overrule the demurrer to the third cause of action alleged in the FAC on the grounds stated.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice:

The court will, as further discussed above, grant Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Lacerte Complaint, the BMO Cross-Complaint, the Judgment, the Settlement, the Stipulation, and the Order.

The remaining matters or materials of which Defendants request judicial notice, which include various records filed by the parties in the Lacerte Action, constitute facts or other matters not disclosed on the face of the FAC or which are not relevant to the issues of whether the FAC states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

To the extent Defendants request judicial notice of the contents of any documents filed in the Lacerte Action, ‘[t]aking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.’ [Citation.] While courts may take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein. [Citation.] ‘When judicial notice is taken of a document, ... the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.’ [Citation.]” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) In addition, the assertion in a demurrer of allegations not contained in the subject pleading (i.e., a “speaking” demurrer) is improper and will not be considered. (See Harboring Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 426, 429 [objections to matters not disclosed in the pleading may be taken by answer to the complaint].)

Furthermore, “only relevant material may be noticed.” (Evid. Code, § 350; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, original italics, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, apart from granting Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Lacerte Complaint, the BMO Cross-Complaint, the Judgment, the Settlement, the Stipulation, and the Order, the court will deny the request for judicial notice of the remaining matters or records described in paragraphs 2, 4, 6 through 9, and 13 through 21 of Defendants’ request.

(2)       The PO Motion

The PO Motion requests that the court stay all pending and future discovery until Defendants’ demurrer is decided and the court determines what, if anything, remains to be litigated in light of the Settlement. The grounds for the PO Motion asserted by Defendants are the same, or effectively, the same as those presented in the demurrer in regard to the Settlement, and the court’s jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement which Defendants assert was intended as a conditional resolution of the matters alleged in the BMO Cross-Complaint, and whether Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Settlement.

As the court will overrule the demurrer for the reasons stated herein, the court will also deny the PO Motion on the grounds stated.

Though the court will deny the PO Motion for the reasons further discussed above, Defendants contend in that motion that it was their expectation that any disputes over the beach access issues would be addressed within the settlement-enforcement process and not in separate litigation; that Plaintiff’s discovery demands effectively force Defendants to relitigate settled matters in a separate proceeding which could prejudice the settlement proceedings or enforcement of the Settlement; that engaging in discovery outside of settlement proceedings would impose burdens and expense on Defendants and undermine the efficient resolution of the Settlement; and that staying discovery will preserve the integrity of the Settlement, avoid prejudice and oppression to Defendants, and promote judicial economy. (PO Motion at pp. 8-9.)

The court acknowledges that, under appropriate circumstances, a court may stay proceedings “based on the authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 526 which permits a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo on such grounds as irreparable injury, multiplicity of legal actions, or unconscionable relative hardship.” (Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141, 146–147 & fn. 1.) Though the PO Motion requests only a stay of discovery, and is not styled or appropriately presented as a request for a preliminary injunction enjoining the prosecution of these proceedings (see White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554), the court’s denial of the PO Motion is without prejudice to any future motion for a preliminary injunction that may be filed by Defendants, if appropriate. Nothing herein shall be interpreted or construed to reflect the manner in which the court might rule on any motion for a preliminary injunction that may be filed by Defendants in the future.

(3)       The Discovery Motions

The court has reviewed the Discovery Motions, and Defendants’ separately filed oppositions to those motions, including the supporting and opposing separate statements submitted by the parties. Based on that review, it appears to the court that Defendants have asserted only objections to each of the discovery requests at issue in the Discovery Motions, on the grounds that the demurrer and PO Motion are each pending, and that the requests seek to relitigate matters governed by the Judgment and the Settlement over which the court has retained exclusive jurisdiction.

Considering the court’s rulings on the demurrer and the PO Motion as further discussed above, the court will continue the Discovery Motions, and will order the parties to further meet and confer, fully and in good faith, regarding each of the discovery requests at issue in those motions, and Defendants’ responses to those requests, in consideration of the court’s rulings herein. The court expects the parties to fully meet and confer, in good faith, as to each specific discovery request at issue in the Discovery Motions, and each objection of Defendants to those requests. The court expects the parties to make a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve any remaining disputes. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.)

The court will also order the parties to submit a joint status report prior to the continued hearing, setting forth the parties’ efforts to meet and confer as to each discovery request at issue in the Discovery Motions (with specific references to each request), and which, if any, issues remain as to each of those requests. Although the court prefers that the parties submit a joint status report, the parties may, if necessary, file and serve separate individual status reports setting forth that party’s efforts to meet and confer, and any issues that remain to be determined as to each discovery request and remaining dispute at issue.

The court will determine the request for an award of sanctions asserted in the Discovery Motions at the continued hearing.

The court also notes that the Ackerman Motion, the BMO Motion, and the Mecay Motion each seek orders compelling Defendants to supplement their responses to three types of discovery requests separately directed to each defendant: (1) requests for production of documents; (2) set one form interrogatories; and (3) requests for admission. Each of those motions are authorized under subdivisions (a) of Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, 2031.310, and 2033.290. In each case, the orders requested by Plaintiff are keyed to the responses of each of the Defendants to a particular set of discovery. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.210, subds. (a) & (b) [governing responses to interrogatories]; § 2031.210, subds. (a) & (b) [same re inspection demands]; § 2033.220, subds. (a)-(c) [same re requests for admission].)

Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.010 et seq. (the Civil Discovery Act) authorizes motions to compel further responses to specific methods or types of discovery. For this reason, the Ackerman Motion, the BMO Motion, and the Mecay Motion each effectively combine three motions brought under the Civil Discovery Act with respect to three separate sets of discovery directed separately to each of the Defendants as further described above. For this reason, the Discovery Motions effectively constitute nine separately authorized motions as to the three sets of discovery separately directed to Ackerman, BMO, and R Mecay. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1003 [“[e]very direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment, is denominated an order. An application for an order is a motion”].)

Though, subject to exceptions not relevant here, a party is generally not prohibited from combining papers supporting a motion such as Plaintiff has done here, there exists a procedural problem regarding the payment of filing fees for each motion. For example, the fee to file a motion applies to “[d]iscovery motions under Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Gov. Code, § 70617, subd. (a)(4).) “Regardless of whether each motion or matter is heard at a single hearing or at separate hearings, the filing fees required by subdivisions (a), (c), (d), and (e) apply separately to each motion or other paper filed.” (Gov. Code, § 70617, subd. (f).)

For all reasons discussed above, because each motion for an order compelling each of the Defendants to provide supplemental responses to separate and specific sets of discovery is separately authorized under the Civil Discovery Act, a separate filing fee is required for each motion whether or not each of the motions are presented in a single notice with combined supporting papers, or separately noticed with separate supporting papers.

Court records reflect that the Plaintiff paid one filing fee for the Ackerman Motion, one filing fee for the BMO Motion, and one filing fee for the Mecay Motion, for a total of three filing fees for all nine separately authorized motions. “Officers of the state, or of a county or judicial district, shall not perform any official services unless upon the payment of the fees prescribed by law for the performance of the services, except as provided in this chapter.” (Gov. Code, § 6100.) “An unbroken line of decisions by our Supreme Court holds that it is mandatory for court clerks to demand and receive the fee required by statute before documents or pleadings are filed.” (Duran v. St. Luke’s Hospital (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 457, 459.)

For all reasons discussed above, Plaintiff must pay additional filing fees if Plaintiff wants the court to adjudicate each of the Discovery Motions. Therefore, the court will order Plaintiff to file and serve, on or before the deadline to submit their joint or individual status report, a notice of payment of fees identifying each of the Discovery Motions for which filing fees have been paid and for which adjudication is sought by Plaintiff.

(4)       Additional Matters

“A pending civil case is related to another pending civil case, or to a civil case that was dismissed with or without prejudice, or to a civil case that was disposed of by judgment, if the cases:

“(1) Involve the same parties and are based on the same or similar claims;

“(2) Arise from the same or substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact;

“(3) Involve claims against, title to, possession of, or damages to the same property; or

“(4) Are likely for other reasons to require substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a).) “Whenever a party in a civil action knows or learns that the action or proceeding is related to another action or proceeding pending, dismissed, or disposed of by judgment in any state or federal court in California, the party must serve and file a Notice of Related Case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.300(b).)

Though the Lacerte Complaint filed in the Lacerte Action was disposed of by the Judgment, as to the Settlement, the Lacerte Action and these proceedings involve the same parties; may arise, to some extent, from substantially similar events requiring the determination of substantially identical questions of law; involve the same property; and may require duplication of judicial resources to the extent the Order requires the parties to report to the court the progress of seeking entitlements described in the Stipulation. Notwithstanding the above, the court’s records reflect that no party has filed a Notice of Related Case. For these reasons, the court will require appearances at the present hearing. The parties shall be prepared to discuss whether they intend to file and serve a Notice of Related Case, or why that party contends that these proceedings and the Lacerte Action are not related.