Tentative Ruling: Andrea Vicars v. Marborg Industries, et al.
Case Number
25CV04624
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 04/08/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motions to Compel (3); Motion for Protective Order
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff Andrea Vicars: R. Chris Kroes, McCarthy & Kroes
For Defendants Marborg Industries and Homero Vences: Maryam Danishwar, Jonathan Semerjian, Clark Hill LLP
RULING
(1) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of Plaintiff for a protective order re special interrogatories and request for production of documents propounded by Defendant Marborg Industries is continued to May 13, 2026. The parties shall meet and confer in accordance with this ruling and, on or before April 29, 2026, submit a joint report, or file and serve individual status reports if necessary, setting forth, on a point-by-point basis as to each discovery request at issue, the matters described herein including which, if any, disputes have been resolved and which, if any, disputes remain.
(2) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of Plaintiff to compel Defendant Marborg Industries to provide further responses to set one form interrogatories is granted. Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s set one form interrogatory nos. 1.1, 2.11, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 4.1, 4.2, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.6, 12.7, 13.1, 14.1, 15.1, 16.1, 16.2, 16.7, 16.8, 17.1, 20.1, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5, 20.8, 20.9, 20.10, and 20.11, are overruled except as to those based on privilege. On or before April 22, 2026, Defendant shall serve verified, code compliant further responses to Plaintiff’s set one form interrogatory nos. 1.1, 2.11, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 4.1, 4.2, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.6, 12.7, 13.1, 14.1, 15.1, 16.1, 16.2, 16.7, 16.8, 17.1, 20.1, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5, 20.8, 20.9, 20.10, and 20.11, without the objections overruled herein. The Court awards sanctions in favor of Plaintiff Andrea Vicars, and against Defendant Marborg Industries and its counsel, Maryam Danishwar and Jonathan Semerjian, in the amount of $5,747.50, payable to Plaintiff’s counsel. Payment of sanctions is due by May 8, 2026.
(3) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of Plaintiff to compel Defendant Marborg Industries to provide further responses to set one request for admissions is granted. Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s set one request for admissions nos. 1 through 12 are overruled, except as to those based on privilege. On or before April 22, 2026, Defendant shall serve verified, code compliant further responses to Plaintiff’s set one request for admissions nos. 1 through 12, without the objections overruled herein. The Court awards sanctions in favor of Plaintiff Andrea Vicars, and against Defendant Marborg Industries and its counsel, Maryam Danishwar and Jonathan Semerjian, in the amount of $4,872.50, payable to Plaintiff’s counsel. Payment of sanctions is due by May 8, 2026.
(4) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of Plaintiff to compel Defendant Marborg Industries to provide further responses to set one requests for production of documents is granted. Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s set one request for production of documents and other things nos. 1 through 13 are overruled, except as to those based on privilege. On or before April 22, 2026, Defendant shall serve verified, code compliant further responses to Plaintiff’s set one request for production of documents and other things nos. 1 through 13, without the objections overruled herein. The Court awards sanctions in favor of Plaintiff Andrea Vicars, and against Defendant Marborg Industries and its counsel, Maryam Danishwar, in the amount of $5,310, payable to Plaintiff’s counsel. Payment of sanctions is due by May 8, 2026.
Background
As alleged in the complaint of Plaintiff Andrea Vicars:
On April 17, 2025, Marborg Industries (Marborg) came to 850 Clark Road in Santa Barbara, California, to pick up a full 40-yard dumpster. (Compl., ¶¶ MV-1, MV-2(f) & GN-1.) During the pickup, the 10,000 pound steel dumpster came off the hook, rolled down the driveway, and crashed into Plaintiff’s Mercedes Sprinter van, which then was pushed back and into Plaintiff’s Lexus, causing significant damage to both vehicles. (Compl., ¶ MV-2(f) & GN-1.)
On July 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed their complaint against Defendants Marborg and Homero Vences, alleging two causes of action: (1) motor vehicle; and (2) general negligence.
On November 26, 2025, Marborg filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting thirty-five affirmative defenses.
On December 23, Plaintiff filed a motion for a protective order (the protective order motion) in regard to Marborg’s special interrogatories and requests for production of documents. That motion also seeks an order limiting Defendant’s special interrogatories to the statutorily permitted number, and requiring Marborg to withdraw the declarations attached to the special interrogatories. The protective order motion also includes a request for an award of monetary sanctions against Marborg and its counsel of record.
Marborg opposes the protective order motion, which was calendared for hearing on March 18, 2026.
On February 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion (the FI Motion) for an order compelling Marborg to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s set one form interrogatories (the FI), and imposing monetary sanctions against Marborg and its counsel.
On February 18, Plaintiff filed a motion (the RFA Motion) for an order compelling Marborg to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s set one request for admissions (the RFA), and imposing monetary sanctions against Marborg and its counsel.
On February 19, Plaintiff filed a motion (the RFP Motion) for an order compelling Marborg to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s set one requests for production of documents (the RFP), and imposing monetary sanctions against Marborg and its counsel.
The RFA Motion was calendared for hearing on March 18, 2026. The FI Motion and the RFP Motion were each calendared for hearing on April 8, 2026.
On March 11, Defendant Vences filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting thirty-five affirmative defenses.
Also on March 11, Plaintiff filed a reply in support of its RFA Motion, stating that Marborg failed to file any opposition to that motion by the deadline prescribed in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(b).
On March 18, the Court issued an order continuing the protective order motion and the RFA Motion to April 8, to be heard with the FI Motion and the RFP Motion.
On April 1, Plaintiff separately filed a reply in support of the RFP Motion and the FI Motion, stating that Marborg failed to file any oppositions to those motions.
As of this writing, Court records reflect that Marborg has not filed any opposition to the RFA Motion, the FI Motion, or the RFP Motion.
Analysis
(1) The Protective Order Motion
The protective order motion is supported by a declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel, R. Chris Kroes (attorney Kroes), who states that on November 26, 2025, Marborg served form interrogatories; twenty-five requests for admissions; fifty-two requests for production of documents seeking financial records, loss of earnings, medical reports, and Plaintiff’s cell phone, social media, and personal injury data; and sixty-six special interrogatories seeking those same categories of information. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 4, exhibits B1 [special interrogatories] & B2 [requests for production of documents].) A declaration attached to the special interrogatories of Marborg states that the number of interrogatories is warranted because Plaintiff claims multiple physical and emotional injuries in these proceedings. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 5 & exhibit B1 at p. 13 [declaration for additional discovery].)
On December 1, attorney Kroes asserted in written correspondence with Marborg’s counsel, that discovery concerning personal injuries was inappropriate for a property damage case, and that opposing counsel’s affirmation justifying the additional interrogatories was false. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 6 & exhibit C [attorney Kroes’ December 1 correspondence].) In that correspondence, attorney Kroes requested that Marborg amend the special interrogatories and request for admissions. (Ibid.)
On December 3, attorney Kroes contacted Marborg’s counsel by telephone and pointed counsel to Plaintiff’s Judicial Council form complaint containing the claims made by Plaintiff. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 7.) Marborg’s counsel agreed that their declaration for additional discovery was in error, and stated that Marborg would amend the discovery to cover matters related to property damage and loss of use only, and remove the requests regarding personal injuries, hospital expenses, medical bills, financial data, and emotional distress. (Ibid.)
On December 3, Marborg’s counsel served amended discovery requests consisting of form interrogatories; twenty five admission requests; forty-one amended requests for production which also sought financial data, loss of earnings, and medical reports; and fifty-four amended special interrogatories seeking that same information. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 8 & exhibits D1-D2.) The amended special interrogatories included a declaration stating that the number of interrogatories was warranted because this lawsuit involves “’multiple allegations and multiple categories of damages....’” (Kroes Dec., ¶ 9 & exhibit D1 at p. 11.)
On December 4, attorney Kroes sent a meet and confer letter asserting that Marborg had repeated the same conduct, and listing the factual and legal reasons why each interrogatory and each request for production of documents were improper. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 10 & exhibit E.) In its response letter on the same date, Marborg’s counsel acknowledged that Plaintiff was not making a personal injury claim, and stated: “If you wish to object to our discovery request, you may do so through the formal response process.” (Kroes Dec., ¶ 11 & exhibit F.) Attorney Kroes has not received any further communications from Marborg’s counsel or any redactions or modifications to the discovery propounded by Marborg. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 11.)
The Kroes declaration includes examples of the text of Marborg’s special interrogatory nos. 1, 4, 7, 9 through 14, 16, 17, 19 through 22, and 24 through 29, and the text of Marborg’s request for production nos. 3, 4, 6, 11 through 13, 15 through 17, 19, 29, 31, 32, 36, 37, 42, and 43, which attorney Kroes asserts is improper. (Kroes Dec., ¶¶ 12-13.)
The opposition of Marborg to the protective order motion is supported by a declaration of its counsel, Jonathan Semerjian (attorney Semerjian), who states that, following the incident at issue in these proceedings where Plaintiff’s parked vehicles were struck, Marborg attempted to resolve the property claim directly with Plaintiff. (Semerjian Dec., ¶ 4.) According to attorney Semerjian, Plaintiff’s Sprinter van was transported to a repair facility where it was believed that its estimated damages included unrelated or pre-existing damage. (Ibid.) Though Marborg, through its insurance, offered to cover repairs arising from the incident, Plaintiff declined that offer and insisted that all damage to the vehicle be repaired. (Ibid.)
Attorney Semerjian further states that on June 17, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel issued a pre-litigation demand seeking estimated damages to the Sprinter van which included unrelated and pre-existing damage; seeking property damage to Plaintiff’s Lexus; and alleging the loss of use of the Sprinter van and Lexus since April 17, 2023. (Semerjian Dec., ¶ 5.) Marborg disputes the extent of the property damage and Plaintiff’s loss of use claim. (Ibid.)
On November 26, Marborg’s counsel propounded discovery addressing the incident. (Semerjian Dec., ¶ 7.) On December 1, Plaintiff clarified their claims and Marborg’s counsel promptly amended that discovery to eliminate all requests exclusively related to any personal injury claims. (Ibid.) On December 4, Marborg’s counsel attempted to further meet and confer to address Plaintiff’s concerns regarding the amended discovery, but Plaintiff’s counsel refused to continue discussions telephonically or in writing without hostility. (Ibid.)
The arguments advanced in the memorandum submitted in support of the protective order motion can be distilled to the following points: this case is limited in its scope to claims for property damage to and the loss of use of Plaintiff’s vehicles; Marborg’s discovery requests seek private and confidential information relating to Plaintiff’s medical records, emotional distress damages, lost wages, and other information regarding Plaintiff’s employment, finances, and cell phone and social media which is not relevant to the claims or subject matter of this litigation; the discovery sought by Marborg intrudes on Plaintiff’s privacy rights; Marborg’s declarations for additional discovery describe claims which are not alleged or raised in Plaintiff’s complaint, are false, constitute a misuse of the discovery process, and show that Marborg’s special interrogatories improperly exceed statutory limits; and the volume and nature of the discovery sought by Marborg shows or suggests an attempt to harass and unduly burden Plaintiff with unnecessary complexity and expense.
The opposition of Marborg raises or effectively raises the following points to support Marborg’s contention that the protective order motion should be denied in all respects: Marborg may inquire about the extent of Plaintiff’s claims beyond those alleged in the complaint; Plaintiff has reportedly admitted that both vehicles at issue in this litigation were inoperable for at least four months before the subject incident occurred; when Marborg’s insurance carrier attempted to resolve Plaintiff’s property damage claim, Plaintiff insisted that all damage to the Sprinter van, including unrelated and pre-existing damage, be repaired; discovery related to Plaintiff’s employment and income is relevant because Plaintiff’s claim for loss of use of the Sprinter van is tied to Plaintiff’s work related activities; Marborg disputes the amount of Plaintiff’s property damage claim including the calculations and extent of the claims included in Plaintiff’s June 17, 2025, pre-litigation demand; Marborg served the discovery requests to understand both the existing and potential theories and damages claimed by Plaintiff such that Marborg’s declarations for additional discovery were made in good faith; and Marborg’s amended special interrogatories and requests for production of documents moot the present motion because those amended requests are reasonable, narrowly tailored, and appropriate.
The undisputed available information and evidence shows that on November 26, 2025, Marborg served Plaintiff with special interrogatories which are numbered set one and begin with special interrogatory no. 1, and with requests for production of documents and other things which are numbered set one and begin with request for production no. 1. (Kroes Dec., exhibits B1-B2.) The undisputed present record also shows that on December 3, 2025, Marborg served Plaintiff with amended special interrogatories (the Marborg SI) which are also numbered set one and begin with special interrogatory no. 1, and an amended request for production of documents and other things (the Marborg RFP) which is numbered set one and begins with request for production no. 1. (Kroes Dec., exhibits D1-D2.)
As a threshold matter, and absent a dispute by Marborg, the Court deems the service by Marborg of the Marborg SI and the Marborg RFP, as a withdrawal of the special interrogatories and requests for production of documents and other things served by Marborg on November 26, 2025. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.060, subds. (a), (c) [requiring that each set of interrogatories be numbered consecutively and each interrogatory be identified by number]; Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.030, subds. (a)(1), (c) [same re inspection demands].) As the Marborg SI and the Marborg RFP are, for all reasons discussed above, the ostensibly operative discovery to which the protective order motion is directed, to the extent that motion addresses, is directed to, or seeks any orders in regard to the special interrogatories or requests for production of documents and other things served by Marborg on November 26, 2025, that motion is, for all reasons discussed above, moot and will be denied on that basis.
“A party may propound to another party either or both of the following:
“(1) Thirty-five specially prepared interrogatories that are relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.
“(2) Any additional number of official form interrogatories, as described in Chapter 17 (commencing with Section 2033.710), that are relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.
“(b) Except as provided in Section 2030.070, no party shall, as a matter of right, propound to any other party more than 35 specially prepared interrogatories. If the initial set of interrogatories does not exhaust this limit, the balance may be propounded in subsequent sets.
“(c) Unless a declaration as described in Section 2030.050 has been made, a party need only respond to the first 35 specially prepared interrogatories served, if that party states an objection to the balance, under Section 2030.240, on the ground that the limit has been exceeded.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.030, subd. (a), (b), (c).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.040 provides that “[s]ubject to the right of the responding party to seek a protective order under Section 2030.090, any party who attaches a supporting declaration as described in Section 2030.050 may propound a greater number of specially prepared interrogatories to another party if this greater number is warranted because of any of the following:
“(1) The complexity or the quantity of the existing and potential issues in the particular case.
“(2) The financial burden on a party entailed in conducting the discovery by oral deposition.
“(3) The expedience of using this method of discovery to provide to the responding party the opportunity to conduct an inquiry, investigation, or search of files or records to supply the information sought.
“(b) If the responding party seeks a protective order on the ground that the number of specially prepared interrogatories is unwarranted, the propounding party shall have the burden of justifying the number of these interrogatories.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.040, subds. (a), (b).)
The Marborg SI consist of special interrogatories identified as numbers 1 through 54, and include a declaration for additional discovery by attorney Semerjian, which states: “This number of questions is warranted under Section 2030.040 of the Code of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff’s lawsuit involves multiple allegations and multiple categories of damages as a result of the subject incident.” (Kroes Dec., exhibit D1 at p. 11, ¶ 7.) Apart from challenging the truth of that statement, the protective order motion does not advance any reasoned argument showing why the declaration for additional discovery attached to the Marborg SI otherwise fails to comply with the procedural requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.050. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.040, subd. (a) [requiring propounding party to attach “a supporting declaration as described in [s]ection 2030.050”].)
For all reasons discussed above, Marborg bears the burden of justifying the number of Marborg SI. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.040, subd. (b).)
Marborg does not dispute that this action seeks the recovery of damages sustained to Plaintiff’s vehicles, including the loss of use of those vehicles, and not compensation for any physical or mental injuries sustained by Plaintiff as a result of the incident alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. (See, e.g., Opp. at p. 3, ll. 12-16.) The justification for the number of Marborg SI proffered in Marborg’s opposition to the motion includes a general assertion that Marborg seeks to inquire about and understand the extent of Plaintiff’s existing and potential damage claims and theories of liability, in particular where Plaintiff claims damages for the loss of use of those vehicles. Apart from that general and conclusory assertion, wholly absent from that opposition is any reasoned factual or legal argument, with specific references to any of the Marborg SI including those which exceed the statutory limit set forth above, showing why the complexity or quantity of existing or potential issues in this particular case is different from those present in similar cases, or justifies more than 35 specially prepared interrogatories under the circumstances present here.
The opposition also fails to explain why Marborg could not obtain the information sought within the statutory limit, or the expedience of using the Marborg SI to provide Marborg with an opportunity to conduct an inquiry, search, or investigation of any files or records to supply that information.
For all reasons discussed above, the general and conclusory arguments advanced by Marborg fail to justify the number of Marborg SI. As Marborg has failed to meet its burden to justify that number, the Court intends to grant the protective order motion as to the request for an order limiting the Marborg SI to 35 special interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (b)(2).) The Court also intends to order that Marborg SI nos. 36 through 54 need not be answered by Plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (b)(1).)
As to the remaining issues and disputes raised in the protective order motion, that motion is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.090 and 2031.060, which authorize a party to whom, respectively, interrogatories have been propounded or an inspection demand has been directed, to move for a protective order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (a), & § 2031.060, subd. (a).) Each statute provides: “The Court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (b), & § 2031.060, subd. (b).)
“[T]he burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for whatever order is sought.” (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) To meet that burden, Plaintiff must establish, with “factual specificity”, good cause for the orders sought in the protective order motion. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318.) That factual specificity requires Plaintiff to affirmatively show why a specific discovery request should not be answered, with reference to each particular request. (Coriell v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 487, 492–493 [general discussion in context of interrogatories].)
The grounds for the protective order motion include that the Marborg SI and Marborg RFP impose undue burden and expense on Plaintiff. “The Court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The Court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a).) “The objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required....” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417 (West Pico).) Plaintiff “has an obligation to supply the basis for this determination.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549 (Williams).)
Wholly absent from the protective order motion is any evidence showing the amount of work required to answer the Marborg SI or Marborg RFP or what, if any, expense Plaintiff will incur if Plaintiff were required to answer the Marborg SI and Marborg RFP. Moreover, “some burden is inherent in all demands for discovery.” (West Pico, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 418.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the protective order motion fails to show why the Marborg SI or Marborg RFP impose undue burden or expense on Plaintiff.
The protective order motion also argues that the information or documents sought in the Marborg SI and Marborg RFP are not relevant to the subject matter of this action. Unless limited by Court order, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)
Available information and evidence shows that Marborg SI nos. 2 through 10, 11 [misnumbered as “no. 1”], 12, 13 [misnumbered as “no. 33”], 14, and 15 request that Plaintiff state each contention upon which the causes of action or claims alleged in the complaint are based; set forth each fact upon which Plaintiff bases each of those contentions; identify all persons with knowledge of those facts; identify all evidence that supports each contention identified by Plaintiff; and itemize all damages Plaintiff alleges were proximately caused by the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint. (Kroes Dec., exhibit D1 at pp. 2-4.) Inasmuch as the requests stated in Marborg SI nos. 2 through 15 seek to discover information or facts relating to the contentions, claims, or causes of action alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, whether expressly or by inference, those requests are expressly authorized under Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010, including as to the identity and locations of persons with knowledge of those contentions or facts and the existence of any document.
Wholly absent from the protective order motion is any reasoned factual or legal argument explaining why the discovery sought in Marborg SI nos. 2 through 15 is wholly irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation.
Furthermore, “[f]or discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.’ [Citation.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611–1612, original italics.) Considering the type or categories of information sought in Marborg SI nos. 2 through 15, the protective order motion also fails to explain why that information will not reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or assist Marborg to evaluate the claims or causes of action alleged by Plaintiff in this litigation. To the extent Plaintiff contends that some part of Marborg SI nos. 2 through 15 is objectionable, “the remainder of the interrogatory [must] be answered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.240, subd. (a).)
For all reasons discussed above, the protective order motion fails to establish good cause for a protective order as to the requests stated in Marborg SI nos. 2 through 15. Therefore, the Court intends to deny the motion as to those requests.
The same reasoning and analysis apply, or effectively apply, to Plaintiff’s request for a protective order as to Marborg RFP nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 [misnumbered “no. 54”], 25, and 26. (Kroes Dec., exhibit D2 at pp. 3-4 & 6.) For the same reasons further discussed above, the Court intends to deny the protective order motion as to those requests.
The protective order motion does not dispute, and appears to concede, that Plaintiff seeks to recover in this action, losses sustained as a result of Plaintiff’s inability to use the vehicles allegedly damaged as a result of the incident alleged in the complaint. (Motion at p. 6, ll. 4-6.) “For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by [the Civil] Code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not.” (Civ. Code, § 3333.) “It is established, under [Civil Code section 3333], that where a vehicle is injured by the wrongful act of another, the owner is entitled to recover for the damage done to the vehicle and also for the loss sustained by being deprived of its use during the time reasonably required for the making of repairs. [Citations.]” (Reynolds v. Bank of America National T. & S. Ass’n (1959) 53 Cal.2d 49, 50–51.)
“There is no fixed rule for the measure of tort damages under Civil Code section 3333. The measure that most appropriately compensates the injured party for the loss sustained should be adopted.” (Santa Barbara Pistachio Ranch v. Chowchilla Water Dist. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 439, 446–447.)
Noted above, Marborg contends that Plaintiff’s loss of use of the vehicles is tied to Plaintiff’s employment. Marborg SI nos. 30 through 35 request or effectively request, that Plaintiff state each date Plaintiff used the Sprinter van for Plaintiff’s employment; identify documents evidencing Plaintiff’s use of the Sprinter van for Plaintiff’s employment; identify each location Plaintiff traveled to for Plaintiff’s employment using the Sprinter van; state facts which support any contention that the Sprinter van was in operable condition at the time of the incident; state the dates the Sprinter van was inoperable from January 1, 2025, until the date of the incident; and identify repair facilities that inspected, serviced, maintained, or repaired the Sprinter van from January 1, 2024, through the present. (Kroes Dec., exhibit D1 at pp. 6-7.)
Plaintiff does not directly address whether, or expressly deny that, their loss of use claim includes losses sustained as a result of Plaintiff being unable to use their vehicle for work related activities or purposes. The protective order motion also fails to present any reasoned argument showing why any such losses may not be recovered by Plaintiff under the circumstances present here. Instead, Plaintiff contends that Marborg’s contention is without evidentiary support, including as to whether any pleadings or discovery responses disclose any such claim by Plaintiff.
The Court is unable to conclusively determine from the present record, whether Plaintiff seeks to recover losses arising from Plaintiff’s inability to use their vehicle for employment purposes. For these reasons, and as the protective order motion does not sufficiently address whether those losses are claimed or recoverable by Plaintiff in this action, Plaintiff has failed to meet their burden to demonstrate good cause for a protective order as to Marborg SI nos. 30 through 35.
Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff does not seek to recover in this action, losses arising from Plaintiff’s inability to use of their vehicle for employment purposes, the protective order motion fails to explain why Plaintiff is not required to include that information in any verified response to the Marborg SI. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.210, subd. (a) [setting forth required contents of response].) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Court intends to deny the protective order motion as to Marborg SI nos. 30 through 35. The same analysis and reasoning apply as to Marborg RFP nos. 23 [misnumbered as “no. 27”], 24, 31, 32, 33, 42 and 43. (Kroes Dec., exhibit D2 at pp. 6-7 & 9.)
Plaintiff represents, and Marborg does not appear to dispute, that Plaintiff does not seek to recover in this action, damages arising from a physical, mental, or emotional injuries resulting from the incident. For these reasons, the protective order motion is sufficient to show that discovery in regard to any personal injury sustained by Plaintiff is not relevant to the subject matter involved in this action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)
Marborg SI nos. 16, 17, and 18 request that Plaintiff identify any “collateral source” that has reimbursed, or is obligated to reimburse, Plaintiff or their health care provider; the amount each collateral source has paid or is obligated to pay; and any economic losses Plaintiff incurred that were not reimbursed by that collateral source. (Kroes Dec., exhibit D1 at p. 4.) The term “collateral source” is defined to mean “any person obligated to pay — pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, to any state or federal income-disability act, or to the Workers’ Compensation Act — any health, sickness or income-disability insurance, accident insurance providing health benefits or income-disability coverage, and any contract or agreement of any person, group, organization, partnership or corporation to provide, pay for or reimburse the cost of medical, hospital, dental or other health-care services.” (Ibid.)
Marborg SI nos. 19 through 22 request that Plaintiff describe all physical or mental injuries or complaints that Plaintiff alleges were proximately caused by the incident alleged in the complaint; state whether Plaintiff is unable to perform their normal functions, duties, or activities as a result of those injuries; and identify evidence supporting any claim for lost income. (Kroes Dec., exhibit D1 at p. 5.) Absent any reasoned explanation by Marborg, the requests stated in Marborg SI nos. 19 through 22 appear to seek discovery regarding personal injuries claimed by Plaintiff in this action, and the income losses Plaintiff sustained as a result of those injuries.
For all reasons discussed above, and considering that the undisputed subject matter of this action does not include physical or mental injuries sustained by Plaintiff as a result of the incident, Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient good cause for a protective order as to Marborg SI nos. 16 through 22. For these reasons, the Court intends to grant the protective order motion as to those interrogatories.
The same reasoning and analysis applies as to Marborg RFP nos. 3, 4, 11, 12 [misnumbered “no. 3”], 13 [misnumbered “no. 4”], 15, 16. For the same reasons discussed above, the Court intends to grant the motion as to those requests.
The protective order motion further contends that the discovery of information regarding Plaintiff’s wages, earning capacity, employment situation, financial information, cell phone data, and social media activity or data has no relevance to Plaintiff’s limited claims for property damage and loss of use, and constitute a serious intrusion on Plaintiff’s privacy rights.
“Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless.” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223.) “Courts have broad discretion in controlling the course of discovery.” (Fuller v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.)
Relevant here, “[t]he state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. [Citation.] Protection of informational privacy is the provision’s central concern. [Citation.] In [Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35], we established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A Court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.)
There exists a legally protected privacy interest in Plaintiff’s confidential financial information. (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657.) Moreover, “social security numbers are sensitive private information.” (Alch v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1436.)
Marborg SI no. 1 requests that Plaintiff furnish every social security number they have ever used. (Kroes Dec., exhibit D1 at p. 2.) For the reasons further discussed above, Plaintiff has an expectation of privacy in their social security number. As the discovery of Plaintiff’s social security number would reveal sensitive private information, Marborg SI no. 1 substantially interferes with and constitutes an intrusion upon a legally protected privacy interest of Plaintiff.
The opposition of Marborg to the protective order motion fails to identify any countervailing interest in obtaining Plaintiff’s social security number. Marborg also fails to explain why the information sought in Marborg SI no. 1 is probative of the claims alleged in this action, or relevant to Plaintiff’s claims for property damage and loss of use of Plaintiff’s vehicle. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the present record shows or suggests that the discovery of Plaintiff’s social security number is not likely to impact this proceeding, or lead to admissible or probative evidence regarding its subject matter.
For all reasons discussed above, as Marborg has failed to identify any countervailing interest which outweighs Plaintiff’s legally protected privacy interest in preventing the disclosure of their social security number, the Court intends to grant the protective order motion as to Marborg SI no. 1.
As to Marborg SI nos. 23 [misnumbered as “no. 24”], and 24 through 29, those requests seek to discover any name, web address, or username used by Plaintiff for any blogs, online forums, and other social media websites from three years prior to the incident; the user name and other account details of any job board or job search website of which Plaintiff was a member; whether Plaintiff had a mobile phone in their possession at the time of the incident, and the number, brand, and model of any such mobile phone as well as identifying information of Plaintiff’s mobile phone carrier. (Kroes Dec., exhibit D1 at pp. 5-6.)
Though there exists some question as to whether, or to what extent, the discovery sought in Marborg SI nos. 23 through 29 is relevant to the subject matter of this action, and whether those requests are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the protective order motion fails to explain why any activity in connection with a blog, online forum, or other social media website, including through the use of a mobile phone, implicates any privacy interest to the extent that activity is available to the public. Furthermore, to the extent Marborg seeks to discover content appearing in any blog, online forum, or other social media website that describes or relates to the subject matter of this action, it would appear that content would fall within the scope of permissible discovery.
In addition, to the extent Marborg contends that Plaintiff’s claims include damages sustained to Plaintiff’s vehicles prior to the incident at issue in this litigation, or any repairs made by Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s insurance carrier in regard to that damage, it would appear that information may be relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and that any requests seeking that information may be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The Court’s ruling herein is intended to provide guidance to the parties regarding the manner in which the Court intends to determine the protective order motion. Under the totality of the circumstances present here, the Court will continue the protective order motion to permit the parties an opportunity to further meet and confer as to the remaining Marborg SI and Marborg RFP at issue, in an effort to resolve the parties’ disputes. The Court expects the parties to meet and confer fully and in good faith.
Furthermore, the Court will order the parties to file a joint status report setting forth, on a point-by-point basis with specific reference to each discovery request at issue, the parties’ efforts to meet and confer as to each request and what, if any disputes remain to be determined. If necessary, the parties may file and serve individual status reports which must set forth the same information in accordance with this ruling.
The Court will determine Plaintiff’s request for an award of sanctions at the continued hearing on the protective order motion.
Plaintiff’s objections to the Semerjian declaration:
With their reply, Plaintiff submits objections to material appearing in the Semerjian declaration filed in support of Marborg’s opposition to the protective order motion. The Court considers only that evidence which is admissible and relevant to the issues presented in the protective order motion.
(2) The RFP Motion
In support of the RFP Motion, attorney Kroes states that on December 3, 2025, Plaintiff served Marborg with their RFP. (Kroes Dec. [RFP Motion], ¶ 5 & exhibit A.) Marborg served its unverified responses to those RFP, which consist of objections, on January 6, 2026. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 6 & exhibit B.) Attorney Kroes transmitted a written meet and confer letter regarding Marborg’s responses to the RFP on January 7, to which Marborg did not respond. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 8 & exhibit C.)
The parties subsequently engaged in further efforts to meet and confer, during which counsel for Marborg stated that it would serve substantive responses by February 11, 2026. (Kroes Dec., ¶¶ 9-11 & exhibits D-G.) After Marborg did not provide those responses or otherwise communicate with Plaintiff regarding its responses to the RFP, on February 13, attorney Kroes emailed Marborg’s counsel stating that Plaintiff would file a motion to compel Marborg’s responses. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 12 & exhibit H.) Attorney Kroes has not received any response to that communication, nor has Marborg provided a supplemental responses to the RFP. (Kroes Dec., ¶ 13.)
The proof of service of the RFP Motion indicates that proper and valid service of the RFP Motion was made on Marborg. Though the RFP Motion appears to have been effectively served on Marborg, as noted above, Marborg has not, as of this writing, filed any opposition to that motion.
A motion to compel further responses to an inspection demand must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) “[U]nless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, [the] burden [of showing good cause] is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
The Court has reviewed the separate statement submitted by Plaintiff in support of the RFP Motion, which shows that Plaintiff’s RFP nos. 1 through 13 seek writings, as defined in Evidence Code section 250, regarding the incident that occurred on April 17, 2025, and alleged in the complaint (the Incident); photos and videos of the Incident including the vehicles damaged in the Incident; policies of insurance that may cover the Incident; Marborg’s investigation of the Incident; correspondence between Marborg and Plaintiff, and Marborg and any other person regarding the Incident, this lawsuit, and Marborg’s defenses to Plaintiff’s claims; and Defendant Vences’ personnel file. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 2 & 5-13.) The fact-specific information included in the separate statement and the supporting declaration of attorney Kroes, is sufficient to show good cause justifying the discovery sought in Plaintiff’s RFP nos. 1 through 13.
The separate statement also shows that Marborg’s response to Plaintiff’s RFP no. 1 includes only objections on the grounds that RFP no. 1 is overly broad, vague, ambiguous, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, argumentative, compound, nonsensical, and calculated to annoy and harass Marborg; seeks information protected by the attorney client and work product privileges; seeks premature disclosure of expert opinion; seeks material protected from disclosure by third party privacy rights; fails to identify with particularity the information sought; seeks discovery equally available to Plaintiff; assumes facts not in evidence; calls for speculation; seeks a legal conclusion; and seeks trade secrets, confidential, and other proprietary information. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 3-4.)
The separate statement indicates that Marborg’s responses to Plaintiff’s RFP nos. 2 through 13 state: “Exact same objection, word for word for, as to Request #1.” (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 5-13.)
Upon a showing of good cause to compel production of documents, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify its objections. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221 (Coy); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)
As Marborg has not filed a timely opposition to the RFP Motion, Marborg has failed to justify any of its objections to Plaintiff’s RFP. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Court will grant the RFP Motion, overrule Marborg’s objections to the RFP except as to those based on privilege, and order Marborg to serve verified further responses to Plaintiff’s RFP nos. 1 through 13, without the objections overruled herein. Marborg’s responses to the RFP must comply with code requirements.
The RFP Motion includes a request for an order imposing sanctions against Marborg and its counsel, Maryam Danishwar, in the amount of $5,310. Subject to exception not relevant here, “the Court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with [Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)
Absent any showing by Marborg as to why it acted with substantial justification, or why there exist circumstances which would make the imposition of sanctions unjust, the Court finds, under the totality of the circumstances present here, that an award of sanctions is justified and warranted. For these reasons, the Court will grant the request of Plaintiff for an award of sanctions against Marborg and its counsel, Maryam Danishwar, in the amount of $5,310, which represents the reasonable expenses incurred by Plaintiff as a result of Marborg’s conduct and the filing of the RFP Motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a); Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 791; see also Kroes Dec. [RFP Motion], ¶¶ 25-28.)
(3) The RFA Motion and the FI Motion
In support of the RFA Motion and the FI Motion, Plaintiff submits separate declarations of attorney Kroes which also show that Plaintiff served Marborg with their RFA and FI on December 3, 2025; that Marborg served its responses to the RFA and FI on January 6, 2026; and that Plaintiff engaged in efforts to meet and confer with Marborg regarding those responses prior to filing the RFA Motion and the FI Motion. (Kroes Decs., ¶¶ 5-14 & exhibits A-H.)
The proofs of service of the RFA Motion and FI Motion also indicate valid and effective service of those motions on Marborg’s counsel of record. Noted above, Marborg has not, as of this writing, filed timely oppositions to either of those motions.
The separate statement submitted in support of the RFA Motion shows that, in its responses to Plaintiff’s RFA nos. 1 through 12, Marborg asserts objections made on the same or effectively the same grounds as those asserted in Marborg’s responses to Plaintiff’s RFP and described above. Marborg’s responses to Plaintiff’s RFA also include the following statement: “After a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Responding Party is not in possession of any such documents as no such documents exist.” (Sep. Stmt. [RFA Motion] at pp. 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 19, 21, 23, 26 & 28.) The separate statement in support of the FI Motion also shows that Marborg’s responses to the FI at issue include the same objections and statement described above. (Sep. Stmt. [FI Motion] at pp. 3-22.)
Plaintiff is not required to show good cause for the serving and filing of the RFA or FI. (Coy, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220–221 [general discussion].) Instead, Marborg bears the burden to show cause justifying its objections to those discovery requests. (Ibid.; see also Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 549.)
The same reasoning and analysis apply to the RFA Motion and the FI Motion. For the same reasons discussed above, Marborg has failed to justify its objections to Plaintiff’s RFA and FI.
In addition, the responses of Marborg to the RFA, which are set forth in Plaintiff’s supporting separate statement and above, fail to comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.210, subdivisions (a) or (b), section 2033.220, subdivisions (a), (b), or (c), or section 2033.230. Furthermore, the responses of Marborg to the FI set forth above and in Plaintiff’s supporting separate statement, fail to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.210, subdivision (a), section 2030.220, subdivisions (a), (b), or (c), section 2030.230, or section 2030.240.
For all reasons discussed above, the Court will grant the RFA Motion; overrule Marborg’s objections to the RFA except as to those based on privilege; and order Marborg to serve verified, further responses to Plaintiff’s RFA nos. 1 through 12, without the objections overruled herein. Marborg’s verified further responses to the RFA must comply with code requirements.
Further, and for all reasons discussed above, the Court will grant the FI Motion; overrule Marborg’s objections to the FI except as to those based on privilege; and order Marborg to serve verified, further responses to Plaintiff’s FI nos. 1.1, 2.11, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 4.1, 4.2, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.6, 12.7, 13.1, 14.1, 15.1, 16.1, 16.2, 16.7, 16.8, 17.1, 20.1, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5, 20.8, 20.9, 20.10, and 20.11, without the objections overruled herein. The verified further responses of Marborg to those FI must comply with code requirements.
“The Court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (d); see also § 2030.300, subd. (d) [same re interrogatories].)
As to Plaintiff’s request for an award of sanctions in connection with the RFA Motion, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For all reasons further discussed above, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s request for an award of sanctions against Marborg and its counsel, Maryam Danishwar and Jonathan Semerjian, in the amount of $4,872.50, which represents the reasonable expenses incurred by Plaintiff to file the RFA Motion. (Kroes Dec. [RFA Motion], ¶¶ 16 & 28-30; see also Notice of RFA Motion at p. 2.)
The same reasoning and analysis apply to the request for an award of sanctions in connection with the FI Motion. For the same reasons discussed above, the Court will grant that request, and award sanctions to Plaintiff and against Marborg and its counsel, Maryam Danishwar and Jonathan Semerjian, in the amount of $5,747.50, which represents the amount of reasonable expenses incurred by Plaintiff to file the FI Motion. (Kroes Dec. [FI Motion], ¶¶ 16 & 28-30; see also Notice of FI Motion at p. 2.)