Matthew Payman Ebneshahidi vs Regents of the University of California

Case Number

25CV04513

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 02/02/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

Matthew Payman Ebneshahidi v. Regents of The University of California                                                                                    

Case No. 25CV04513

Hearing Date: February 2, 2026                                

HEARINGS:           Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

                                   

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Matthew Payman Ebneshahidi: F. Javier Trujillo, Andrew Echavarria

For Defendant The Regents of The University of California: Jonathan D. Miller, Jennifer M. Miller, Nye Stirling Hale Miller & Sweet LLP

                       

TENTATIVE RULINGS:  

The Demurrer of Defendant to plaintiff’s first amended complaint is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file and serve his second amended complaint no later than February 23, 2026.

Background:

This action commenced on July 21, 2025, by the filing of the original complaint by plaintiff Matthew Payman Ebneshahidi (“plaintiff”) against defendant The Regents of The University of California (the “Regents”) for “Personal Injuries.”

Regents filed a demur to the original complaint on August 25, 2025. Prior to the hearing on the demurrer, on September 12, 2025, plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Regents for “Personal Injuries Pursuant to Government Code sections 811.2; 815.2.”

As alleged in the FAC:

On and before June 24, 2024, plaintiff was a student at the University of California Santa Barbara (“UCSB”). (FAC, ¶ 4.)

On June 24, 2024, plaintiff was riding his bicycle to get to class and was in the roundabout located near the Student Resource Center Building. (FAC, ¶ 5.) Regents actively encouraged its students, including plaintiff, to ride their bicycles to class and that the safest place to ride their bicycles was on Regents’ bicycle paths. (Ibid.)

Regents knew or through the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the bicycle paths needed repair and were a danger to its students in general, and plaintiff in particular. (FAC, ¶ 6.) Despite this knowledge Regents negligently established or failed to establish a reasonable bicycle path inspection protocol for the premises in general, and for the bicycle paths in particular. (Ibid.) The bicycle paths were in an unsafe condition for use as a bicycle path because potholes were caused by the deteriorated asphalt. (Ibid.)

Regents now demurs to the FAC on the grounds that the only cause of action fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Specifically, Regents argues that it is immune from liability for plaintiff’s injuries pursuant to Government Code section 831.4, subdivision (b).

Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.

Analysis:

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

“(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

“(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

“(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

“(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.

“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.

“(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.

“(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)

“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

Regents are a public entity. “ ‘ “Public entity” ’ includes the state, the Regents of the University of California, the Trustees of the California State University and the California State University, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State.” (Gov. Code, § 811.2.)

With respect to a public entity, and their employees, there are specific pleading requirements. A public entity has no liability for any injury to any person except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815; Tuthill v. City of San Buenaventura (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1089.) Claims based upon statutory liability cannot be generally alleged, but must be particularly pled to allege facts demonstrating the right to recover under the statute. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.)

“[I]n California all government tort liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute or “ ‘enactment’ ” [citations], and to state a cause of action every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty. [Citation.] Duty cannot be alleged simply by stating “ ‘defendant had a duty under the law’ ”; that is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact. The facts showing the existence of the claimed duty must be alleged. [Citations.] Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or “ ‘enactment,’ ” the statute or “ ‘enactment’ ” claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.)

As noted above, the statutory authorization, under which plaintiff brings the FAC, is Government Code section 815.2. That code section reads:

“(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.

“(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.”

Regents argues that it is immune from liability for plaintiff’s injuries pursuant to Government Code section 831.4, subdivision (b). Government Code section 831.4 provides, in its entirety:

“A public entity, public employee, or a grantor of a public easement to a public entity for any of the following purposes, is not liable for an injury caused by a condition of:

“(a) Any unpaved road which provides access to fishing, hunting, camping, hiking, riding, including animal and all types of vehicular riding, water sports, recreational or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city street or highway or (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) public street or highway of a joint highway district, boulevard district, bridge and highway district or similar district formed for the improvement or building of public streets or highways.

“(b) Any trail used for the above purposes.

“(c) Any paved trail, walkway, path, or sidewalk on an easement of way which has been granted to a public entity, which easement provides access to any unimproved property, so long as such public entity shall reasonably attempt to provide adequate warnings of the existence of any condition of the paved trail, walkway, path, or sidewalk which constitutes a hazard to health or safety. Warnings required by this subdivision shall only be required where pathways are paved, and such requirement shall not be construed to be a standard of care for any unpaved pathways or roads.”

Plaintiff’s argument that “whether the PATH constitutes a “ ‘trail’ ” with the meaning of §831.4 presents a question of fact inappropriate for resolution on demurrer,” (opp., p. 3, ll. 11-13) is without merit. “The words “ ‘trail’ ” and “ ‘path’ ” are synonymous. (Rodale, The Synonym Finder (1978) Rodale Press, Inc., p. 1249.) Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.1995) at page 1251 defines a trail as “ ‘a marked or established path or route. . ..’ ” (Italics added.) We hold that the Path qualifies as a “ ‘trail’ ” under subdivision (b).” (Carroll v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 606, 609, (Carroll).)

“Subdivision (a) [of Government Code section 831.4] speaks of unpaved roads, while subdivision (c) refers to paved trails. It is therefore logical to interpret subdivision (b)’s reference to “ ‘any trail’ ” to mean just that, i.e., any trail, whether paved or unpaved.” (Carroll, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 609.)

“The words of a statute are to be accorded their usual, ordinary import. Moreover, they are to be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and purpose of the statute in which they appear, and the various parts of a statute are to be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citation.] Unlike subdivision (a) of section 831.4, which refers specifically to “ ‘unpaved’ ” roads, and subdivision (c), which refers specifically to “ ‘paved’ ” trails, paths, etc., subdivision (b) refers to “ ‘[a]ny’ ” trail. The logical inference of the all-encompassing “ ‘any’ ” in subdivision (b), particularly in relationship to the limiting adjectives in its sister subdivisions, is that the nature of the trail’s surface is irrelevant to questions of immunity.” (Armenio v. County of San Mateo (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 413, 418.)

“ ‘ “ ‘The plainly stated purpose of immunity for recreational activities on public land is to encourage public entities to open their property for public recreational use, because ‘ “the burden and expense of putting such property in a safe condition and the expense of defending claims for injuries would probably cause many public entities to close such areas to public use.” ’ ” ’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘Trail immunity applies to all manner of defects in the trail’s condition.’ ” [Citation.]” (Helm v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226.)

Plaintiff’s opposition contains numerous allegations that are not included in the FAC. As the purpose of a demurrer is to search for defects that appear on the face of the complaint, plaintiff’s allegations that are contained in the opposition, but not in the FAC, are irrelevant.

Regents has provided clear and unambiguous authorities that the bike path is a “trail” for purposes of applying Government Code section 831.4 immunity, and that the immunity shields it from liability for plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff has provided no authority or argument that tends to negate the statutory immunity. As such, the demurrer will be sustained. As this is the first demurrer that will be sustained, plaintiff will be given leave to amend. The court notes that plaintiff has attached a, presumably proposed, second amended complaint (“SAC”) to the amended declaration of counsel. The court renders no opinion regarding the SAC, because it is irrelevant as it pertains to the analysis of the demurrer to the FAC that is presently before the court.