Reem Yassin vs Santa Barbara County et al

Case Number

25CV04411

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 02/09/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrers (2)

Tentative Ruling

Reem Yassin v. Santa Barbara County, et al.                      

Case No. 25CV04411

           

Hearing Date: February 9, 2026                                            

HEARING:              (1) Defendant County of Santa Barbara’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Verified Complaint

                                    (2) Defendant Mindi Boulet’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Verified Complaint

                                                           

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Reem Yassin: Douglas Han, Shunt Tatavos-Gharajeh, Talia Lux, Justice Law Corporation

                             For Defendants Santa Barbara County, Tracy Macuga, Diane Engler, Kelly Lazarus, Deepak Budwani, Matthew Speredelozzi, Callie Steele, La Mer Kyle-Griffiths, Rachel Puleo, and Mindi Boulet: Rachel Van Mullen, April E. Navarro, Office of the County Counsel

TENTATIVE RULING:

(1) The demurrer of defendants the County of Santa Barbara, Tracy Macuga, Diane Engler, Kelly Lazarus, Deepak Budwani, Matthew Speredelozzi, Callie Steele, La Mer Kyle-Griffiths and Rachel Puleo, to plaintiff’s first amended complaint is sustained as to the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth causes of action alleged against Tracy Macuga, Diane Engler, Kelly Lazarus, Deepak Budwani, Matthew Speredelozzi, Callie Steele, La Mer Kyle-Griffiths and Rachel Puleo only; and as to the seventh, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action, with leave to amend.

(2) The demurrer of defendant Mindi Boulet to plaintiff’s first amended complaint is sustained as to the seventh cause of action, with leave to amend.

(3) Plaintiff shall, on or before February 23, 2026, file and serve any second amended complaint.

Background:

The first amended complaint (the FAC) filed in this action by plaintiff Reem Yassin on September 2, 2025, is the operative pleading. The substantive factual allegations of the FAC appear in nearly 127 paragraphs, and are set forth in a narrative fashion which includes numerous and highly detailed factual allegations and, at times, lacks chronological consistency.

Briefly, the FAC alleges that plaintiff has a hearing disability which requires plaintiff to wear hearing aids and to utilize assistive equipment. (FAC, ¶¶ 12 & 14.) On October 30, 2023, plaintiff became employed as a public defender with the Santa Barbara County Public Defender’s office (the SBPD). (FAC, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff disclosed her hearing disability to the SBPD, and informed the SBPD that plaintiff wore hearing aids and would require assistive equipment to perform her job duties. (FAC, ¶¶ 12-16.) Ultimately, no accommodations were made. (FAC, ¶ 16.)

The FAC further alleges that, during her employment with the SBPD, plaintiff endured hostility, bullying, harassment, and discrimination as a result of her disability and the failure of the SBPD to make basic accommodations to ensure plaintiff could satisfactorily obtain training and perform her job duties. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶ 18-22.) Among other things, plaintiff’s requests for accommodations were not implemented, nor did the SBPD perform an interactive process, provide any alternative accommodations, or do anything to prevent the working environment from growing hostile or harassing to plaintiff due to her disability. (FAC, ¶¶ 29-35, 36-37, 128-131.) In addition, despite representations made to plaintiff that she would be assigned to the misdemeanor trial department, plaintiff was not transferred to that department until approximately five months into her employment. (FAC, ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff was moved to the misdemeanor department on March 25, 2024, two weeks before her employment ended. (FAC, ¶ 61.) Being unable to consistently perform her job duties without reasonable accommodation, plaintiff was left with no choice but to resign almost six months into her employment with SBPD, when it became clear no reasonable accommodations would be forthcoming. (FAC, ¶ 132.)

The FAC names defendants Santa Barbara County (the County), Tracy Macuga (Macuga), Dee Engler (Engler), Kelly Lazarus (Lazarus), Deepak  Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Callie Steele (Steele), La Mer Kyle-Griffiths (Kyle-Griffiths), Rachel Puleo (Puleo), and Mindi Boulet (Boulet), and alleges thirteen causes of action: (1) unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a)) (against the County, Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Deepak Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths only); (2) unlawful harassment based on disability (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)); (3) unlawful retaliation (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h) (against the County, Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Deepak Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths only); (4) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k)) (against the County, Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Deepak Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths only); (5) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n)) (against the County, Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Deepak Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths only); (6) failure to provide reasonable accommodations (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m)) (against the County, Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Deepak Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths only); (7) hostile work environment (Gov. Code, § 12923); (8) violation of Civil Code section 56.20 (against the County, Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Deepak Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths only); (9) wrongful termination (constructive discharge) in violation of public policy (against Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Deepak Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths only); (10) negligent misrepresentation of employment contract (against Macuga only); (11) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Deepak Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths only); (12) negligent infliction of emotional distress (against Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Deepak Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths only); (13) declaratory judgment (against the County, Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Deepak Badwani, Matthew Sperdelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths only).

On October 13, plaintiff separately filed three amendments to the FAC to correct Engler’s first name to “Diane”, to correct the last name of defendant Matthew Sperdelozzi’s name to “Speredelozzi”, and to correct defendant Deepak Badwani’s last name to “Budwani”.

On October 31, the County, Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Budwani, Speredelozzi, Steele, Kyle-Griffiths, and Puleo (collectively, the County Defendants) filed a demurrer to the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action alleged in the FAC. (Demurrer at pp. 6-7.)

On December 4, Boulet filed a demurrer joining in that of the County Defendants as to the seventh cause of action only.

On January 27, 2026, plaintiff filed an “omnibus” opposition to the demurrers of the County Defendants and Boulet.

Analysis:

In ruling on a demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) “In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

(1)       The demurrer of the County Defendants

As to the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth causes of action alleged in the FAC, the County Defendants contend that the individual defendants named in the FAC, who are public employees, do not constitute employers or agents of an employer within the meaning of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act or “FEHA”, codified as Government Code section 12900 et seq., and are immune from personal liability for alleged acts occurring within the course and scope of their employment. For these reasons, the County Defendants argue, as to those causes of action, the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under FEHA and is barred as to Macuga, Engler, Lazarus, Budwani, Speredelozzi, Steele, and Kyle-Griffiths (from this point, the Individual Defendants).

The omnibus opposition to the demurrer states: “Plaintiff recognizes individual employees are immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2 for the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth causes of action. ... As such, [p]laintiff need not address these [Individual Defendants’] contention that [p]laintiff failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them. Moreover, [the County] is not immune and thus, these causes of action can proceed against the County. Further, the County has not demurred to these first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. As such, [p]laintiff asks the court for leave to amend to remove the [Individual Defendants] for the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth causes of action and to only allege these causes of action against the County.” (Opp. at pp. 4-5.) In a footnote, the opposition further states: “Plaintiff recognizes her FAC alleges the ninth cause of action against the [Individual Defendants] only. Plaintiff intended on alleging this cause of action against the County as well and inadvertently excluded the County in error.” (Opp. at pp. 4-5, fn. 4.)

Under the circumstances present here and as plaintiff appears to concede the merits of the demurrer as to the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth causes of action alleged against the Individual Defendants, the court will sustain the demurrer as to those causes of action and defendants on the grounds stated, with leave to amend. To the extent the demurrer asserts additional grounds as to any of these causes of action, and as plaintiff requests leave to amend these causes of action to remove the Individual Defendants, the court will not, at this stage of the proceedings and in the interests of judicial efficiency, reach those grounds.

As to the seventh cause of action for hostile work environment alleged against the County Defendants, the demurrer asserts that cause of action restates the claims alleged in the second and ninth causes of action, and fails to, or cannot, assert a separate or common law cause or right of action because all public entity liability is statutory. As to the seventh cause of action, the omnibus opposition to the demurrer states that plaintiff “does not dispute that a standalone cause of action for hostile work environment is improper...”, and that plaintiff should be given leave to amend “to remove her seventh cause of action” and to amend the second cause of action to include language surrounding the purported hostile work environment. (Opp. at p. 5, ll. 17-18 & p. 6, ll. 20-22.)

As plaintiff also appears to concede the merits of the demurrer as to the seventh cause of action alleged in the FAC, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will sustain the demurrer of the County Defendants as to the seventh cause of action alleged in the FAC, with leave to amend.

As to the eleventh and twelfth causes of action for, respectively, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, the demurrer argues that the theories of liability asserted by these causes of action arise from workplace conduct and are therefore barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions of the Labor Code. The demurrer further contends that the FAC fails to allege any outrageous conduct by the Individual Defendants. For these reasons, the County Defendants argue, the FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute causes of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Though the opposition does not directly respond to the contentions of the County Defendants in regard to the eleventh and twelfth causes of action and described above, plaintiff asserts that the conduct alleged in the FAC falls outside the scope of employment, and that the FAC shows that the acts of the Individual Defendants were motivated by personal malice. (See Opp. at p. 9.)

The eleventh and twelfth causes of action are alleged against, respectively Macuga and the Individual Defendants only, and arise from the conduct described in the FAC and above. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 206, 208 [referring to the “conduct complaint of above” and “as alleged herein”] & 210 [alleging a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as to that conduct “[i]n the alternative”].) Those allegations show that the purported conduct by Macuga giving rise to the eleventh and twelfth causes of action includes: telling plaintiff that she would spend only a couple of weeks in the arraignment department; telling plaintiff that she would be assigned to the misdemeanor trial department after a couple of weeks; failing to implement plaintiff’s requests to accommodate a hearing disability; withholding the contents of a letter from a judge following an incident which purportedly occurred during a judicial diversion motion argued by plaintiff; criticizing actions taken by plaintiff during a plaintiff’s interview of a hostile client which plaintiff reported to department officials and a court bailiff; discouraging the implementation of workplace safety measures; exhibiting a lack of sensitivity for plaintiff’s disability when plaintiff was explaining her position regarding a client; getting angry and yelling at plaintiff for refusing to sign a performance review report; and failing to order equipment to accommodate plaintiff’s disability. (FAC, ¶¶ 10, 18, 23-29, 33-37, 39-51, 52-59, 61, 76, 79-83, 124.)

The allegations of the FAC also show that, as to the Individual Defendants, the conduct giving rise to the claims alleged in the eleventh and twelfth causes of action also include failing to implement plaintiff’s requests to accommodate a hearing disability, to appropriately implement such accommodations, or to obtain appropriate or recommended assistive devices. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 15-16, 23-29, 30-37, 116-118 & 120-121.) As to Steele, the FAC further alleges that Steele included incorrect information in plaintiff’s performance report. (FAC, ¶ 78.)

A reasonable interpretation of the FAC shows, expressly and by inference, that the purportedly wrongful conduct of the Individual Defendants alleged by plaintiff and described above occurred at plaintiff’s workplace and “in the normal course of the employer-employee relationship....” (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 902.) Wholly absent from the FAC are any allegations showing why any conduct occurred outside of plaintiff’s worksite or the scope of plaintiff’s employment. For these reasons, as to plaintiff’s claims for intentional and negligent emotional distress, “workers’ compensation is plaintiff[‘]s exclusive remedy for any injury that may have resulted.” (Ibid.)

For all reasons discussed above, the court will sustain the demurrer of the County Defendants to the eleventh and twelfth causes of action alleged in the FAC on the grounds stated, with leave to amend. As the court will otherwise grant plaintiff leave to amend, and as the FAC is, effectively, an original pleading, the court will grant plaintiff leave to amend the eleventh and twelfth causes of action alleged in the FAC. (Eghtesad v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411–412 [general discussion].) For the same reasons discussed above, the court need not reach the additional grounds for demurrer to these causes of action asserted by the County Defendants.

As to the tenth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation of employment contract alleged against Macuga only, the County Defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to allege timely compliance with claim presentation requirements set forth in the Government Claims Act before filing this action, that the FAC fails to allege the existence of any employment contract to which Macuga was a party, and that Macuga is statutorily immune from personal liability arising from any negligent misrepresentations, among other things. Plaintiff does not, in her opposition to the demurrer, directly address the grounds for demurrer as to the tenth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation of employment contract.

The tenth cause of action alleges that Macuga concealed facts from plaintiff or made representations of fact to plaintiff, regarding plaintiff’s job title and duties which Macuga had no reasonable grounds to believe were true; that Macuga concealed facts or made those representations with the intent that plaintiff rely upon them; and that plaintiff did rely upon those representations to her detriment. (FAC, ¶¶ 200-204.) Giving the FAC a reasonable interpretation, it would appear that the representations or concealment at issue arise from Macuga purportedly stating to plaintiff that plaintiff would be transferred or assigned to the misdemeanor trial department after a couple of weeks, and that the County’s disability department would accommodate plaintiff’s hearing disability. (See FAC, ¶¶ 10-11, 18, 28, 60, 124,

“Except as provided in Sections 946.4 and 946.6, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board, in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this division.” (Gov. Code, § 945.4.) “Thus, under these statutes, failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” (State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (Bodde).) In addition, claims relating to a cause of action for injury to person or property “shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).)

“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a claim need not be presented as a prerequisite to the maintenance of an action against a public employee or former public employee for injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee.” (Gov. Code, § 950.) However, “[e]xcept as provided in Section 950.4, a cause of action against a public employee or former public employee for injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee is barred if an action against the employing public entity for such injury is barred under Part 3 (commencing with Section 900) of this division or under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 945) of Part 4 of this division.” (Gov. Code, § 950.2.)

Though it is not entirely clear from the conclusory allegations appearing in the tenth cause of action what specific conduct of Macuga gives rise to that cause of action, it can reasonably be inferred from the whole of the FAC’s allegations that the conduct of Macuga at issue occurred within the course and scope of plaintiff’s employment with the SBPD for the same reasons further discussed above. (See, e.g., Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 209-210.)

For all reasons discussed above, plaintiff “must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. Otherwise, [the FAC] is subject to a general demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Bodde, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1243.) Apart from generally asserting that actions under FEHA are exempt from the claims presentation requirements, plaintiff fails to explain why the FAC pleads any exemption as to the theory of liability alleged in the tenth cause of action. For these and all reasons further discussed above, the court will sustain the demurrer to the tenth cause of action on the grounds stated.

As the court will otherwise grant plaintiff leave to amend for the same reasons stated above, the court will also grant plaintiff leave to amend the tenth cause of action to either allege compliance, or an excuse from compliance, with the claim presentation requirements discussed herein.

Though, for all reasons discussed above, the court need not reach the additional grounds for demurrer to the tenth cause of action asserted by the County Defendants, the court notes that plaintiff does not address or appear to dispute whether the allegations of the FAC show that Macuga is statutorily immune for any injury caused by any misrepresentation made by Macuga which gives rise to the tenth cause of action. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 822.2 [“[a] public employee acting in the scope of his employment is not liable for an injury caused by his misrepresentation, whether or not such misrepresentation be negligent or intentional, unless he is guilty of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice.”].)
 

The demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action asserts that cause of action is redundant of plaintiff’s causes of action for violations of FEHA, and that declaratory relief is not necessary or proper under the circumstances present here.

The thirteenth cause of action for declaratory relief seeks a judicial determination of plaintiff’s rights and duties “and a declaration that her physical disability, medical condition and/or some combination of these protected characteristics were substantial motivating factors in the decisions to subject her to the aforementioned adverse employment actions.” (FAC, ¶ 216.) The FAC further asserts that a “judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time such that Defendants may also be aware of their obligations under the law to not engage in discriminatory practices and to not violate the law in the future.” (FAC, ¶ 218.)

Where a pleading alleges “an existing actual controversy” which entitles the pleader to declaratory relief, the court “should not sustain a demurrer to the complaint and dismiss the action. ‘It is not essential to entitle a plaintiff to seek declaratory relief, that he should establish his right to a favorable declaration.’ [Citation.] Even ‘where the plaintiff is not entitled to a favorable declaration, the court should render a judgment embodying such determination and should not merely dismiss the action.’ [Citation.]” (C. Dudley De Velbiss Co. v. Kraintz (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 612, 615-616.)

Though the court will sustain the demurrer to the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and ninth causes of action as to the Individual Defendants, the County Defendants offer no reasoned argument showing why the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against the County for purported violations of FEHA, or causes of action for unlawful harassment or violation of Civil Code section 56.20, as alleged in, respectively, the second and eighth causes of action.

For all reasons discussed above, the demurrer fails to explain why there presently exists no actual controversy in regard to the claims alleged in the first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action against the County, or the second and eighth causes of action. In addition, “ ‘[a] general demurrer is usually not an appropriate method for testing the merits of a declaratory relief action, because the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights even if it is adverse to the plaintiff’s interest.’ [Citation.]” (Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 751.) Moreover, “a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.” (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will overrule the demurrer of the County Defendants to the thirteenth cause of action for declaratory relief.

(2)       The Demurrer of Boulet

Boulet’s demurrer is directed to the seventh cause of action only, and advances the same arguments further discussed above. Plaintiff’s omnibus opposition also advances the same points which, for reasons discussed above, show that plaintiff also appears to concede the merits of Boulet’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action alleged in the FAC.

The same reasoning and analysis apply. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will sustain the demurrer of Boulet to the seventh cause of action alleged in the FAC, with leave to amend.