Tentative Ruling: Andrea Marcus vs Carpinteria Unified School District
Case Number
25CV04113
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 04/13/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion: Leave; Motion: Quash
Tentative Ruling
Andréa Marcus v. Carpinteria Unified School District
Case No. 25CV04113
Hearing Date: April 13, 2026
HEARING: (1) Motion of Petitioner Andréa Marcus for Leave to File a Second Amended Petition
(2) Motion of Petitioner Andréa Marcus to Quash Notice of Deposition or in the Alternative Limit Scope of Deposition and Requests for Production
ATTORNEYS: For Petitioner Andréa Marcus: Self-Represented
For Respondent Carpinteria Unified School District: Melissa Hatch, Hatch & Cesario
TENTATIVE RULING:
(1) For all reasons stated herein, the motion of petitioner Andréa Marcus for leave to file a second amended petition is granted. Petitioner shall file a second amended petition on or before April 27, 2026.
(2) For all reasons stated herein, the motion of petitioner Andréa Marcus to quash the notice of deposition of petitioner is granted. Petitioner need not take any further action as to this deposition notice.
Background:
On July 2, 2025, petitioner Daria Lucero-Ahedo, filed a petition for writ of mandate to enforce the California Public Records Act (CPRA) under Government Code section 7920.000, et seq., pertaining to certain records of respondent Carpinteria Unified School District (CUSD). As alleged in the petition, Lucero-Ahedo is the mother of a 13-year-old Hispanic child with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and learning disability enrolled at Carpinteria Middle School within CUSD. (Pet., ¶ 2.) The records at issue are documents regarding transporting or placement of CUSD students at Casa Pacifica, an apparent third party that provides services to special needs students, during the 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 school years (collectively, the Records). (See Pet., ¶¶ 6-12; Marcus Decl. ISO Mtn. to Quash, ¶¶ 4-8.)
On August 5, 2025, the operative first amended petition (FAP) was filed. The FAP asserts the same basic facts as the original petition, but the named petitioner was changed from Lucero-Ahedo to Andréa Marcus (Marcus). Marcus was the attorney for Lucero-Ahedo as to the original petition. (See Pet.) Marcus indicates this change was made in response to CUSD’s argument that Lucero-Ahedo had not personally requested the Records at issue in the petition. (Marcus Decl. ISO Mtn. to Quash, ¶ 16.)
On November 19, 2025, the court granted Marcus’ unopposed motion to amend the FAP to reflect Marcus as the petitioner in this action. The FAP asserts two causes of action for (1) writ of mandate and (2) declaratory relief.
As alleged in the FAP:
On May 16, 2025, Marcus requested the Records from CUSD pursuant to the CPRA by sending an email to CUSD superintendent, Diana Rigby, assistant superintendent, Jason Kaff, and the members of the CUSD school board. (FAP, ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A.)
Marcus did not receive a response until June 2, 2025, when CUSD’s counsel informed Marcus that the Records would not be produced because the Records are: (1) exempt from disclosure; (2) consisted of medical, health, and other student records protected by state and federal privacy laws; (3) protected by the official information privilege; (4) protected by state or federal statutory privileges; (5) could not be disclosed because disclosure will be against public interest; (6) pertain to pending litigation or claims made pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act; or (7) relate solely to special needs minors. (FAP, ¶¶ 8-9, Ex. B.)
The letter from CUSD’s counsel stated “[i]t would be possible” for CUSD to provide data regarding: (1) the number of students placed at Casa Pacifica during the 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 school years; (2) the number of students transported by CUSD to or from Casa Pacifica during the 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 school years; (3) and the amount paid to Casa Pacifica for placing or transporting students to or from Casa Pacifica during the 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 school years. (FAP, ¶ 10, Ex. B.)
On June 3, 2025, Marcus asked CUSD’s counsel to provide the data that CUSD could provide and asked for confirmation whether CUSD has any other records responsive to the CPRA request. (FAP, ¶ 11.)
On June 13, 2025, Marcus received data described above but cannot confirm if these records are complete. (FAP, ¶ 12.) CUSD has not confirmed whether it has other records responsive to the CPRA request. (Ibid.)
The FAP requests that the court (1) issue a writ of mandate directing CUSD to comply with the CPRA without further delay and provide Marcus with all non-exempt records responsive to Marcus’ records request, (2) declare that CUSD violated Marcus’ rights under Article 1, Section 3 of the California Constitution and
Government Code section 7920.000 et seq., by failing to provide the requested Records, (3) declare that CUSD violated the CPRA, and (4) award reasonable attorney fees and costs. (FAP, p. 9, ll. 16-26.)
On December 19, 2025, Marcus filed a motion for leave to file a second amended petition. CUSD does not oppose the concept of amendment, but does not believe that the proposed amendment is sufficient to address the defects in the FAP.
On February 9, 2026, Marcus filed a motion to quash an amended notice of deposition served by CUSD seeking to take Marcus’ deposition and attaching document requests (Deposition Notice). In the alternative, Marcus asks the court to limit the scope of this Deposition Notice. Marcus argues that her deposition testimony is irrelevant to the issues raised in the FAP and the documents sought by the Deposition Notice are unrelated to the resolution of the FAP. CUSD opposes the motion to quash or in the alternative limit the Deposition Notice.
Analysis:
(1) Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Petition
“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) Leave to file an amended pleading at an early stage of litigation is routinely granted absent unusual circumstances so that cases may be heard on their merits. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) “Indeed, it is a rare case in which a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleading so that he may properly present his case. [Citation.] [A]bsent a showing of prejudice to the adverse party, the rule of great liberality in allowing amendment of pleadings will prevail.” (S.C. v. Doe 1 (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 365, 376, internal quotation marks omitted.) Given these legal authorities and that CUSD does not oppose the proposed amendment in principle, the court will grant Marcus’ motion for leave to file a second amended petition. (See CUSD Opp. to Mtn. for Leave, p. 2, ll. 19-20 [“Respondent does not oppose further amendment. Indeed, Respondent agrees that further amendment is necessary.”].)
(2) Motion to Quash or in the Alternative Limit Notice of Deposition and Document Requests
The enforcement procedures under the CPRA are set forth in Government Code sections 7923.000 through 7923.500. “Any person may institute a proceeding for injunctive or declarative relief, or for a writ of mandate, in any court of competent jurisdiction, to enforce that person’s right under this division to inspect or receive a copy of any public record or class of public records.” (Gov. Code, § 7923.000.) “Whenever it is made to appear, by verified petition to the superior court … that certain public records are being improperly withheld from a member of the public, the court shall order the officer or other person charged with withholding the records to disclose those records or show cause why that person should not do so.” (Gov. Code, § 7923.100.) “An agency shall justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the record in question is exempt under express provisions of this division, or that on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.” (Gov. Code, § 7922.000.) Statutory exemptions or limitations are found in Government Code sections 7930.000 through 7930.215, among other limitations. “The court shall decide the case after the court does all of the following: [¶] (a) Examine the record in camera, if permitted by subdivision (b) of Section 915 of the Evidence Code. [¶] (b) Examine any papers filed by the parties. [¶] (c) Consider any oral argument and additional evidence as the court may allow.” (Gov. Code, § 7923.105.)
An action under the CPRA is a special proceeding subject to the Civil Discovery Act. (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 285.) “Any party may obtain discovery … by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.) A deposition notice may be served and include the “specification with reasonable particularity of any materials or category of materials, including any electronically stored information, to be produced by the deponent.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.220, subd. (a)(4).)
While depositions are an available method of discovery in CPRA actions, “the CPRA is intended to ‘permit the expeditious determination’ of a narrow issue: whether a public agency has an obligation to disclose the records that the petitioner has requested.” (City of Los Angeles, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 289.) Discovery methods including depositions must seek information that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and that relates to a claim or defense in the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)
“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (a).) Upon a showing of good cause, the court may order that the proposed deposition not be taken, be taken only on specified terms and conditions, or be taken by written, instead of oral, examination, among other potential limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) The court has discretion under the CPRA as to what, if any, evidence apart from the administrative record and the arguments by the parties need be considered to decide a CPRA action. (Gov. Code, § 7923.105.)
Here, the discovery by the parties must be reasonably tethered to the narrow issue of whether CUSD is required to produce the Records in response to Marcus’ CPRA request. (See City of Los Angeles, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 289; Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) “To establish an agency has a duty to disclose under [the CPRA], the petitioner must show that: (1) the record ‘qualif[ies] as [a] public record[ ]’ [under the statute] and (2) the record is ‘in the possession of the agency.’ ” (Anderson-Barker v. Superior Court (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 528, 538 (Anderson-Barker), internal quotation marks omitted.) “The duty to disclose applies only when the petitioner has satisfied both elements.” (Id. at p. 539.) An agency has the burden to justify a statutory exemption. (See Gov. Code, § 7922.000.)
The court is not persuaded by CUSD’s argument that, “[Marcus] cannot have it both ways: Either she submits to deposition, or she withdraws her discovery requests.” (CUSD Opp. to Mtn. to Quash, p. 2, ll. 5-6.) A deposition notice should not be served for any improper purposes such as “unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).)
CUSD also questions Marcus’ motives by arguing Marcus only “demanded that the personal information be provided to further her ongoing efforts to exploit vulnerable, disabled minors [CUSD] is charged to protect.” (CUSD Opp. to Mtn. to Quash, p. 3, ll. 4-5.) However, the CPRA “does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.” (Gov. Code, § 7921.300.) Under the CPRA, “[t]he motive of the particular requester in seeking public records is irrelevant.” (Caldecott v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 212, 219.) Marcus’ motives do not appear relevant to the issues raised by the FAP and CUSD’s opposition does not explain why Marcus’ motives have any relation to any claim or defense in this action. (See Anderson-Barker, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 538-539; Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Gov. Code, § 7921.300.)
Considering all these circumstances, the court will grant Marcus’ motion to quash the Deposition Notice. Petitioner has carried her burden to demonstrate that the Deposition Notice was either served for an improper purpose or seeks information unrelated to the claims and defenses at issue in this action. CUSD has not explained in its opposition what testimony it seeks from Marcus that is relevant to the claims and defenses in this action.
The court notes there is an insufficient record to determine if the requests for production (Requests) referenced in Marcus’ motion were served as part of the Deposition Notice (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.220, subd. (a)(4)) or served separately as stand-alone requests for production (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.040). (See Marcus Decl. ISO Mtn. to Quash, ¶¶ 20-21.) To the extent the Requests were served as part of the Deposition Notice, they are quashed as part of the Deposition Notice. To the extent the Requests were served as stand-alone requests for production pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.040, this ruling does not address them but is without prejudice to any objections Marcus may assert under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.210 through 2031.240.