Neal Verma et al vs Cary Meadow et al

Case Number

25CV04088

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 03/13/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein, the demurrer of cross-defendants Neal Verma and Amitha Verma to the cross-complaint of Cary Meadow and Linda Meadow is overruled. Cross-defendants shall file and serve their answer to the cross-complaint on or before March 30, 2026.

Background:

As alleged in cross-complainants’ cross-complaint (CC):

Cross-complainants Cary Meadow and Linda Meadows, individually and as trustees of the Cary and Linda Meadow Family Trust dated January 22, 2001 (collectively, in all capacities, the Meadows) are owners of real property located at 3116 Eucalyptus Hill Road, Santa Barbara (the Meadows Property). (CC, ¶ 1.)

Cross-defendants Neal Verma and Amitha Verma (collectively, the Vermas) are owners of real property located at 726 El Rancho Road, Santa Barbara (the Verma Property). (CC, ¶ 2.) The Verma Property is adjacent to the Meadow Property. (CC, ¶ 5.)

Certain large trees located on the Verma Property present a fire hazard and a risk of falling, which could cause substantial damage to the Meadow Property, neighboring properties, and threaten the safety of the Meadows and others. (CC, ¶ 5.) Several mature eucalyptus, cypress, and pine trees located on the Verma Property are overgrown and diseased. (Ibid.) Several of the trees contain dead or dying large branches which are already broken and continue to break. (Ibid.) The canopies of several of the trees are on top of power lines. (Ibid.) These unsafe and unsightly trees present a significant fire hazard during wildfire season and a risk of falling limbs or total collapse, which could cause substantial damage to structures, landscaping, persons, and vehicles on the Meadow Property, neighboring parcels, and endanger the safety of the Meadows and others. (Ibid.)

The Vermas have stated that they are unwilling to pay any money to cut off these dangerous branches or remove the dangerous trees. (CC, ¶ 5.) The Vermas are rarely at the Verma Property and have no interest in properly maintaining their property. (Ibid.) The decrepit and unsightly condition of Verma Property significantly degrades property values in the immediate neighborhood. (Ibid.)

Despite repeated requests by the Meadows, the Vermas have refused, failed, or neglected to properly maintain these hazardous trees. (CC, ¶ 6.)

The Meadows have attempted to coordinate tree trimming and maintenance in accordance with an oral agreement that the parties would share costs for maintenance of shared or boundary trees. (CC, ¶ 7.) Specifically, in November 2023, the parties verbally agreed that each would pay 50 percent of the cost of trimming a boundary large cypress tree. (Ibid.) The Meadows paid the sum of $4,000 to trim that cypress tree, and the Vermas were sent a copy of the paid invoice as requested, but the Vermas have refused, and continue to refuse to pay their 50 percent share of $2,000 for this work. (Ibid.)

Also, a large oak tree located on the boundary between the two properties was diseased and dying, and in imminent danger of falling on the Meadow Property. (CC, ¶ 7.) To prevent property or personal damage, the Meadows paid the sum of $6,000 to remove that tree in October, 2024, but the Vermas have refused and continue to refuse to pay their 50 percent share of $3,000. (Ibid.)

On July 1, 2025, the Vermas filed their original complaint in this matter asserting five causes of action against the Meadows: (1) trespass; (2) private nuisance; (3) declaratory relief; (4) quiet title; and (5) trespass to timber.

On September 17, 2025, the Meadows filed their answer to the complaint admitting and denying allegations thereof and asserting 18 affirmative defenses. Also on September 17, the Meadows filed their CC asserting three causes of action against the Vermas: (1) private nuisance; (2) breach of oral agreement for recovery of costs for tree trimming/ property maintenance; and (3) declaratory relief.

On November 13, 2025, the Vermas filed their demurrer to the first cause of action of the CC. The demurrer is opposed by the Meadows.

Analysis:

“ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

The Meadows’ first cause of action is for private nuisance.

“Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.)

The Vermas argue that the Meadows have not stated a cause of action for nuisance because the Meadows allege that the condition of the trees create the potential for damage to their person or property not that there has been any actual injury, citing, among other cases, Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036 (Koll-Irvine).

In Koll-Irvine, commercial property owners brought a nuisance action against an aircraft fuel supplier arising out the location and operation of jet fuel storage tanks at John Wayne Airport. (Koll-Irvine, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1039.) The plaintiffs alleged that the proximity of storage tanks and the extreme risk it poses caused the plaintiffs to live in fear of destruction of their lives and property as a result of a potential aircraft accident or rupture of the tanks. (Ibid.) The threat of harm caused plaintiffs’ employees to change their use of their property by avoiding using a parking lot across the street from the tanks, keeping doors and windows overlooking the tanks closed or covered, and, in one instance, moving a work space from one side of a building to the other. (Ibid.)

In affirming the sustaining of demurrers to the plaintiffs’ action, the Koll-Irvine court stated:

“A nuisance may be both public and private, but to proceed on a private nuisance theory the plaintiff must prove an injury specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of his or her land. … Koll–Irvine contends its fear of a catastrophic accident constitutes an interference with the use and enjoyment of its land and has resulted in the diminution of the value and usefulness of its property and in mental anguish.

“Examples of interferences with the use and enjoyment of land actionable under a private nuisance theory are legion. ‘So long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable, and such as would be offensive or inconvenient to the normal person, virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount to a nuisance.’ [Citation.] An interference need not directly damage the land or prevent its use to constitute a nuisance; private plaintiffs have successfully maintained nuisance actions against airports for interferences caused by noise, smoke and vibrations from flights over their homes [citations] and against a sewage treatment plant for interference caused by noxious odors [citation].

“In this state, however, a private nuisance action cannot be maintained for an interference in the use and enjoyment of land caused solely by the fear of a future injury. In Helix Land Co. v. City of San Diego (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 932, the city’s demurrer to a private nuisance cause of action was sustained where the complaint alleged the threat of future flooding. [Citation.] And in Akins v. Sacramento Mun. Utility Dist. (1992) 18 Cal.App.4th 208, the plaintiffs sought compensation for their fear of exposure to radioactive materials arising from the operation of a nuclear power plant. In upholding a summary judgment on the nuisance cause of action, the court stated: ‘Plaintiffs have not presented evidence to show an actual physical invasion or damage to themselves or their properties.... [S]uch things as fear, anxiety, and emotional distress which are not caused by an interference with a specific private property right and which are common to the general population will not support a private action for nuisance.’ [Citation.]” (Koll-Irvine, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1041–1042, fns. and parallel citations omitted.)

As stated in Koll-Irvine, the interference sufficient to state a claim in nuisance is need not involve direct damage to land, but the interference need only be substantial and unreasonable.

“ ‘The first additional requirement for recovery ... on a nuisance theory is proof that the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land was substantial, i.e., that it caused the plaintiff to suffer “substantial actual damage.” ... The Restatement recognizes the same requirement as the need for proof of “significant harm” [citation], which it variously defines as “harm of importance” and a “real and appreciable invasion of the plaintiff’s interests” [citation] and an invasion that is “definitely offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable” [citation]. The degree of harm is to be judged by an objective standard, i.e., what effect would the invasion have on persons of normal health and sensibilities living in the same community? ... “If normal persons in that locality would not be substantially annoyed or disturbed by the situation, then the invasion is not a significant one, even though the idiosyncrasies of the particular plaintiff may make it unendurable to him.” [Citation.] This is, of course, a question of fact that turns on the circumstances of each case.

“ ‘The second additional requirement for nuisance is superficially similar but analytically distinct: “The interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable” ..., i.e., it must be “of such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” ... The primary test for determining whether the invasion is unreasonable is whether the gravity of the harm outweighs the social utility of the defendant’s conduct.... Again the standard is objective: the question is not whether the particular plaintiff found the invasion unreasonable, but “whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable.” ’ [Citation.]” (Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 263, 302–303.)

Here, the Meadows have alleged, among other things, that dead or dying large branches have broken and continue to break, and that the canopies of several trees are on top of power lines, constituting a present fire hazard and risk of falling. (CC, ¶ 5.) The Meadows have also alleged that because of the imminent danger posed by a diseased and dying oak tree, the Meadows paid to have the tree removed. (CC, ¶ 7.) Unlike the circumstances in Koll-Irvine, the Meadows did not merely suffer fear common to the general population from the legal operation of an inherently hazardous activity. Instead, these allegations provide reasonable and specific allegations of interference with the Meadow Property by virtue of the serious danger of large trees and branches falling onto the Meadow Property or onto power lines causing a fire risk. Under these circumstances a reasonable person may well determine that it would be too dangerous to use of the Meadow Property at or near these trees. Thus, these allegations plead not merely the possibility of harm, but a substantial and reasonable interference in the use of their property because of the danger posed by the conditions of the trees. As a matter of pleading, these allegations are sufficient to plead a private nuisance.

The demurrer to the first cause of action will be overruled.