Los Meganos Homeowners' Association vs City of Carpinteria

Case Number

25CV04015

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 12/19/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Petition: Relief

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons stated herein, the petition of Los Meganos Homeowner’s Association for an order that respondent City of Carpinteria accept late claim for damages to real property is denied.

Background:

On June 27, 2025, petitioner Los Meganos Homeowner’s Association (the Association) filed a petition against respondent City of Carpinteria (the City), for an order that the City and accept and review a claim by the Association for damages to real property. As alleged in the petition:

The Association is a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation that operates, manages, and governs a condominium complex (the Complex) comprised of twelve units known as the Los Meganos condominiums, and which are located at the beachfront intersection of Ash Avenue and Sandyland Road in Carpinteria, California. (Pet., ¶¶ 5 & 7.) In 1995, after a series of flooding incidents severely damaged Carpinteria homes, including one in the Complex, the City began the construction of a temporary 9.5 foot tall sand berm on the beach (the Berm) which protects beach area properties from winter storms and high surf. (Pet., ¶¶ 8 & 10.) The Berm is put up in early December and removed before Memorial Day. (Pet., ¶ 9.)

Construction of the Berm is supervised by the City’s Parks and Recreation director, and is permitted every five years by the California Coastal Commission. (Pet., ¶¶ 10-11.) The owners of homes in the Complex pay an assessment to the City for the construction of the Berm. (Pet., ¶ 10.)

In July 2023, the City’s Parks and Recreation director retired, and Tiffany Smith (Smith), a Parks and Facilities supervisor with no previous experience related to the Berm, was given the job of supervising its construction. (Pet., ¶ 11.) Under Smith’s supervision, the Berm ended 70 to 100 feet short of its usual termination point leaving Ash Avenue open to tidewaters. (Pet., ¶ 12.) On the last day of construction of the Berm, Smith was questioned by a Carpinteria resident as to why the Berm was not built to its usual length, and stated that it “ ‘wasn’t necessary.’ ” (Ibid.; Decl. of Dana Rosenberg, ¶4.)

On December 28, 2023, ocean waves flowed around the missing section of the Berm and flooded the common areas of the Complex, causing damage to that property. (Pet., ¶¶ 13-16, Exh. 1 [aerial view of Berm marked to show missing portion, the Complex, and the flood] & Exh. 3 [photos of damage].) On the day of the flooding, City crews went into common areas of the Complex to place sand bags and help owner Bill Ehrgott dig out the parking area for his and a neighboring unit which was buried in six inches of sand and mud. (Pet., ¶ 30.) Smith later sent workers to continue the cleanup of the sand, mud, and debris in other areas of the Complex. (Ibid.)

After the incident, Smith had multiple conversations and meetings with Ehrgott regarding cleanup of the flood debris, and exchanged multiple text messages in which Smith apologized for the “ ‘big blunder’ ” and the catastrophe. (Pet., ¶ 17; Decl. of Ehrgott, ¶¶ 3-4 & Exh. 4 [text messages between Smith and Ehrgott].)

In the Spring of 2024, Rod Resnik, who is a member of the Association’s grounds committee, went to the City to obtain a claim form and was given a form entitled “Claim Against The City of Carpinteria” which states that “ ‘[a] claim for damage against the City ... must be filed with the City Clerk within 180 days after which the incident or event occurred.’ ” (Pet., ¶ 17; Resnik Decl., ¶ 4 & Exh. 5.) That instruction is incorrect because, under Government Code section 911.2, a one-year limitations period applies to a claim relating to damage to real property. (Pet., ¶ 18.) To this day, the City provides claimants with this form. (Ibid.; Resnik Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.)

Though the Association worked to gather estimates and invoices to submit to the City, the Association realized in July 2024 that the six-month deadline had passed. (Pet., ¶ 19.) The Association assumed it had passed up the opportunity to be reimbursed for the damages and did not know it had another six months to submit a claim. (Pet., ¶ 19.) The Association did not learn that the City had provided the wrong claims period until it was too late to compose and file a claim within one year of the date of the flood. (Pet., ¶ 20.)

Petitioner presented a claim (the Claim) to the City on January 24, 2025, or twenty-seven days past the one-year deadline prescribed in Government Code section 911.2. (Pet., ¶ 20.) The City rejected the Claim in a “Late Claim Notice” which stated that the Association “’did not file a timely Application for Leave to Present a Late Claim.’” (Pet., ¶ 21 & Exh. 6 [Late Claim Notice].)

The petition requests that the court issue an order requiring the City to either accept the Claim as “excusably late” or as a timely claim for violation of the conditions of a Coastal Development Permit. (Pet., ¶ 34.)

On August 4, the City filed an opposition to the petition, which is supported by a declaration of its counsel, Kristine A. Tijam (Tijam). Tijam states that the City received the Claim on January 27, 2025, that the Claim states that the damage stemmed from the flooding incident on December 28, 2023, and that the Claim was “submitted on a standard claim form made available by the City for claimants desiring to submit government tort claims.” (Tijam Decl., ¶¶ 2-3 & Exh. A.)

Tijam further states that on January 30, 2025, Carl Warren & Company, who is the City’s claim administrator, issued the Late Claim Notice informing the Association that the Claim was being “returned as late because it was not presented within one year after accrual of the cause of action, and [the Association] did not file a timely Application for Leave to Present a Late Claim.” (Tijam Decl., ¶ 4 & Exh. B [Late Claim Notice].)

Tijam also asserts that the City was personally served with the petition on July 3, that the proof of service of the petition identifies a “complaint” which was not served on the City, and that no hearing date was set for the petition. (Tijam Decl., ¶¶ 6-9.)

On August 19, the Association filed notice (the Notice) that a hearing on the petition is scheduled for December 19 in this Department.

Analysis:

Subject to exception, “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board, in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this division.” (Gov. Code, § 945.4.) The claim presentation requirement set forth in Government Code section 945.4 applies to “tort claims arising out of negligence, nuisance, breach of statutory duties, and intentional wrongs...” and “all actions where the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, regardless whether the action is founded in ‘ “tort, contract or some other theory.” ’ [Citation.]” (Baines Pickwick Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 298, 307; Hart v. Alameda County (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 766, 778.)

“A claim relating to a cause of action ... for injury to person or to personal property ... shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) The Association expressly asserts in the petition that the claim at issue is for damages to real property only. (See, e.g., Pet. at p. 1, ll. 18-20 & ¶ 2.) The Claim also expressly states that it is “for damage to real property.” (Pet., Exh. 3 at p. 2.) In addition, the City does not appear to contend, in its opposition to the petition, that the Claim relates to a cause of action for injury to person or property. For these reasons, the court understands the Claim to relate solely to a cause of action for damage to real property notwithstanding whether the Claim describes any injury to personal property.

Relevant under the circumstances present here as further detailed above, “[a] claim relating to any other cause of action shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) A “failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” (State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) Moreover, “[a] public entity’s knowledge of an incident and injuries does not excuse the claim requirement.” (Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 211, 218.)

The parties here also do not reasonably dispute, that the Claim was presented more than one year after the cause of action for damage to the Association’s real property accrued.

“The board shall act on a claim in the manner provided in Section 912.6, 912.7, or 912.8 within 45 days after the claim has been presented.” (Gov. Code, § 912.4.) The available information and evidence shows that the City acted on the Claim within 45 days after its presentation by providing the Late Claim Notice, which is dated January 30, 2025. Noted above, the Late Claim Notice states that the City is returning the Claim to the Association because the City determined it was not timely and the Association did not timely file an application for leave to present a late claim. (Pet., Exh. 6; Tijam Decl., Exh. B.)

The undisputed record shows that the City did not reject, allow, compromise, or pay the Claim pursuant to Government Code section 912.6. Furthermore, as the Claim is not made against a judicial branch entity, a judge of one of those entities, or the state, the provisions of sections 912.8 and 912.8 do not apply here. Considering that the City did not reject or allow the Claim, the City fails to explain why the Claim is not deemed to have been rejected by operation of law “on the last day of the period within which the board was required to act upon the claim.” (Gov. Code, § 912.4, subd. (c).)

As to the petition’s request for an order requiring the City accept the Claim as excusably late, Government Code section 946.6 authorizes the making of “a petition ... to the court for an order relieving the petitioner from” the claim presentation requirement set forth in Government Code section 945.4.” (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (a).) A petition made under section 946.6 must show:

“(1) That application was made to the board under Section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied.

“(2) The reason for failure to present the claim within the time limit specified in Section 911.2.

“(3) The information required by Section 910.” (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (b)(1)-(3).)

Even if the court were to assume without deciding that the petition sufficiently shows the reasons why the Association failed to present the Claim within the time prescribed in section 911.2, and includes the information required by section 910 (and the court presently makes no findings in this regard), wholly absent from the petition is any information or evidence showing that “a written application” was “made to the [City] for leave to present that claim...” pursuant to section 911.4. (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (a)-(c).) Instead, the petition asserts that “for claims that are subject to a one-year limitations period, there is no procedure for filing an Application for Late Claim, that is an option only available for claims subject to the six-month claims deadline.” (Pet., ¶ 21; see also ¶ 27.) To support this contention, the petition cites subdivision (a) of Government Code section 911.4. (Ibid.)

Government Code section 911.4 provides that “[w]hen a claim that is required by Section 911.2 to be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action is not presented within that time, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present that claim.” (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (a).)

A written application made pursuant to section 911.4 “must be presented to the public entity as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action and shall state the reason for the delay in presenting the claim.” (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (b).) “If the application to file a late claim is denied, a petition for an order relieving the petitioner from the claims presentation requirement may be filed.” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1272.) The requirement that a late-claim application be filed not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action is to “protect[] a governmental entity from having to respond to a claim many years after the accrual of the action.” (Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1020, 1030.)

Though Government Code section 911.4 permits the filing of an application for leave to present a claim that relates to, among other things, injury to person or personal property, the Association fails to explain why this permissive language prohibits the filing of a late-claim application for claims relating to any other cause of action. Furthermore, “[a]s outlined above, the sequence of events by which one gets into court with a petition under section 946.6, requires first a failure to file a timely claim; then an application for leave to present a late claim followed by the denial of that application; then a petition in superior court for relief from the requirement of filing a claim.” (Toscano v. County of Los Angeles (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775, 782.)

In addition, the present petition is not a “a complaint for damages” in which the Association raises the issue of the City’s determination that the Claim was untimely. (Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 827.) Instead, as noted above, the petition seeks orders that the City accept the Claim or consider the Claim to timely assert a violation of a Coastal Development Permit.

“Under Government Code section 945.4, presentation of a timely claim is a condition precedent to the commencement of suit against the public entity. However, if the injured party fails to file a timely claim, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present such claim. [Citation.] If the public entity denies the application, Government Code section 946.6 authorizes the injured party to petition the court for relief from the claim requirements.” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1777, fn. 3 (Munoz).)

Though “Government Code section 946.6 is a remedial statute intended to provide relief from technical rules which otherwise provide a trap for the unwary...” (Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1778), a trial court may relieve a petitioner from the claim presentation requirements of Government Code section 945.4 only if “two requirements are met[]” (N.G. v. County of San Diego (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 63, 72). As further discussed above, the court must first find that an application under Government Code section 911.4 was made within a reasonable time which may not exceed the time prescribed in subdivision (b) of section 911.4. (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (c).) As the petition does not show that the Association submitted a written application to the City pursuant to section 911.4, the petition fails to comply with Government Code section 946.6.

The petition further asserts that the City should be estopped from requiring the Association to comply with the claims presentation requirements discussed herein based on the City’s knowledge of the flooding incident and resulting damage to the Complex, and because the claim form provided by the City misadvised the Association as to the deadline for filing the Claim.

“It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim. Such knowledge—standing alone—constitutes neither substantial compliance nor basis for estoppel.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455, superseded by statute on other grounds.) For these reasons, the ostensible failure by the Association to submit a written application to the City for leave to present the Claim pursuant to Government Code section 911.4 “precludes reliance on an estoppel.” (Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 716.)

As to the request for an order requiring the City to accept the Claim as a timely claim for violation of the conditions of a Coastal Development Permit, the petition includes no information or evidence to show why the Claim relates to a cause of action for violation of a Coastal Development Permit. Even if the available information and evidence shows that the Claim reasonably relates to a cause of action for violation of a Coastal Development Permit, the same reasoning and analysis apply.

In addition, though the petition does not allege a cause of action for violation of a Coastal Development Permit, to the extent that cause of action does not constitute a “suit for money or damages ... on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with” Government Code section 900 et seq. (Gov. Code, § 945.4), the Association fails to explain why it cannot file a complaint alleging such cause of action.

For all reasons further discussed above, as the petition fails to comply with Government Code section 946.6 and is procedurally inappropriate, the court will deny the petition.

In its opposition to the petition, the City objects to the petition on procedural grounds, and contends that it is unclear whether the Association intended to file a complaint or reserved or noticed a hearing date on the petition. “A copy of the petition and a written notice of the time and place of hearing shall be served before the hearing as prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure on (1) the clerk or secretary or board of the local public entity, if the respondent is a local public entity....” (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (d).) In addition, service of the petition must be “effected in the same manner as service of summons in order to give the court jurisdiction to enter an order against the public entity.” (Thierfeldt v. Marin Hosp. Dist. (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 186, 200.)

Noted above, the City does not dispute that it was personally served with the petition. The Notice was served before the hearing on the petition, and the declaration of service attached to the Notice also shows or indicates that the Notice was served on counsel for the City by electronic mail. (Notice at pdf p. 2.)

Furthermore, by substantively contesting the merits of the petition, the City has made a general appearance in this action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1014; California Dental Assn. v. American Dental Assn. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 346, 351-352 [general discussion].) “A general appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subd. (a).) A general appearance also “ ‘operates as a consent to jurisdiction of the person, ... curing defects in service.’ [Citation.]” (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145.) For these reasons, any defects in the service of the petition or Notice raised in the City’s opposition have been cured, or waived or forfeited by the City. (Id. at p. 1147.)