Isla Vista Rental Property Owners' Association vs County of Santa Barbara

Case Number

25CV03985

Case Type

Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 12/19/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Preliminary Injunction

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of plaintiff Isla Vista Rental Property Owners’ Association for issuance of a preliminary injunction is denied.

Background:

On May 13, 2025, defendant County of Santa Barbara (County) passed Santa Barbara County Ordinance No. 5250, adding article XVIII to chapter 10 of the Santa Barbara County Code. (Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice [DRJN], exhibit 1.) Ordinance No. 5250 (sometimes, Ordinance) established a rental housing inspection pilot program (Inspection Program) in Isla Vista, a community within the County.

Ordinance No. 5250 includes the following provisions in Santa Barbara County Code section 10-18.6:

“Section 10-18.6. Inspections

“A. The Director, or designee, is authorized to periodically or upon received complaints inspect all Residential Rental Housing Units within the unincorporated community of Isla Vista to determine compliance with all applicable Health and Safety Standards as defined in this Section.

[¶] … [¶]

“C. Notification of Inspection and Inspection Procedures.

“1. The Director, or designee, shall send a notice via certified mail or personal service of a scheduled inspection to the Owner of each Residential Rental Housing Unit to the address provided on the registration form.

“2. The Owner, or any authorized agent or legal representative thereof, shall permit an inspection of each Residential Rental Housing Unit by the Inspector upon fifteen (15) business days’ notice of the time and date of the scheduled inspection. An extension to a scheduled inspection may be granted by the Director, or designee.

“3. It shall be the responsibility of the Owner to provide actual notice to the individual tenants of the Residential Rental Housing Unit and to facilitate access to the units to be inspected.

“4. If an inspection is rescheduled by the Inspector, the Owner shall be given notice at least three (3) business days prior to the scheduled inspection date.

“5. An inspection may be rescheduled one time by the Owner without penalty upon written request three (3) business days prior to the date of inspection. Within ten (10) business days of the initial inspection date the Owner shall schedule a new inspection.

“6. The Owner or an authorized agent or legal representative of the Owner shall be present during the inspection. In the event that the Owner or an authorized agent is not present at the time of the scheduled inspection, the inspection may proceed upon authorization of the tenant granting lawful entry.

“7. The Owner shall not be in violation of this section if the tenant or occupant refuses to allow the inspection by the County. The Owner shall provide proof, under penalty of perjury, that a request to inspect the Residential Rental Housing Unit was served by the Owner and inspection was not permitted by the tenant.

“D. Failure or Refusal to Allow Inspections.

“1. If an inspection is scheduled and entry is thereafter refused or cannot be obtained, the County inspector shall have recourse to every remedy provided by law to secure lawful entry and inspect the premises, including, but not limited to, securing an inspection warrant pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1822.50 through 1822.57. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the inspector has reasonable cause to believe that the Residential Rental Housing Unit is so hazardous, unsafe or dangerous as to require immediate inspection to safeguard the

public health or safety, the inspector shall have the right to immediately enter and inspect the premises and may use any reasonable means required to effect the entry and make an inspection.

“2. If the property owner fails to grant access or refuses to schedule an inspection, the Director, or designee, is authorized to contact the tenant to secure lawful entry. In addition, the Director shall notify the tenant via personal service of the notice or posting on the Residential Rental Housing Unit a Notice of Inspection no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled inspection.

“E. Authority to Enter and Inspect.

“1. The Director, or designee, subject to the consent given by an occupant who reasonably appears to be at least 18 years of age, has authority to enter and inspect any dwelling or premises whenever necessary to secure compliance with, or prevent a violation of, any provision of this Section and any regulation adopted pursuant to Section 10-18.6 of this Section. In the event consent of the occupant is not available, the Director may obtain an inspection warrant pursuant to the provisions set forth in Code of Civil Procedure (commencing at Section 1822.50).

“2. The owner, authorized agent of any owner, or any of the parties in interest of any dwelling, or portion thereof, may enter the dwelling, subject to the consent of the occupant, whenever necessary to carry out any instructions, or perform any work required to be done pursuant to this Section and any regulation adopted pursuant to Section 10-18.8 of this Section.” (Santa Barbara County Code, § 10-18.6, subds. (A), (C)-(E).)

Members of plaintiff Isla Vista Rental Property Owners’ Association (plaintiff or Association) are rental property owners who are all subject to Ordinance No. 5250. (Taylor decl., dated July 29, 2025, ¶ 3.) Many plaintiff members have been directed by County to notice and to be present during inspections of rental properties. (Ibid.)

On June 26, 2025, the Association filed its unverified complaint in this action seeking declaratory relief. The Association seeks a declaration, and accompanying injunctive relief, that Ordinance No. 5250 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the Association and is invalid and unenforceable against the Association. The Association asserts as grounds for invalidity: (1) the Ordinance requires an owner to violate state law, specifically, Civil Code section 1954; (2) the Ordinance is a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) the Ordinance violates the owner’s equal protection; and (4) the Ordinance violates the substantive due process rights of the owner.

On July 29, 2025, the Association filed its ex parte application for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The application was opposed by County. On July 30, the court denied the application for the TRO.

On July 31, 2025, County filed its answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations of the complaint and asserting eight affirmative defenses.

On September 30, 2025, the Association filed this motion for issuance of a preliminary injunction.

The motion is opposed by County.

Analysis:

“The trial courts consider two interrelated questions in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) are the plaintiffs likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant; and 2) is there a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. [Citations.] ‘[By] balancing the respective equities of the parties, [the court] concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him.’ [Citations.]” (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.)

The burden is on plaintiff, as the party seeking injunctive relief, to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction. (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.) A preliminary injunction is available “[w]hen it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(2).)

(1) Evidentiary Issues

Plaintiff presents little evidence in support of this motion. The complaint is not verified. The motion itself does not attach, nor is accompanied by, any declarations or documentary evidence. Based upon the relief sought, the court considers the declaration of plaintiff’s counsel, attorney Lacy L. Taylor, that was filed in support of the ex parte application for a TRO as also being offered in support of this motion. The only substantive facts included in that declaration are: “Plaintiff members are rental property owners who are all subject to the Ordinance. Many Plaintiff members have already been directed by the County of Santa Barbara to notice and be present during inspections of rental properties.” (Taylor decl., dated July 29, 2025, ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff also presents the declaration of attorney Taylor attached to plaintiff’s reply. This declaration addresses information County provided to Taylor on October 15 relating to County reports of housing issues in Isla Vista.

Notwithstanding the paucity of evidence presented by plaintiff, plaintiff makes a number of statements in the motion papers; County objects to these statements on the basis of a lack of supporting evidence. Because these statements are not offered as evidence, the court does not rule on the evidentiary objections to them. However, the court does not consider “facts” that are argued but not supported by evidence.

In opposition to the motion, County requests that the court take judicial notice of: (DRJN, exhibit 1) Ordinance No. 5250; (exhibit 2) the resolution, adopted, May 13, 2025, adopting the Inspection Program (Resolution); and (exhibit 3) the County Board of Supervisors Agenda Letter for the May 6, 2025, hearing on the Inspection Program (Agenda Letter). The court grants these requests for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (b), (c), (h).) Judicial notice does not extend to the truth of factual matters set forth in such documents. (See Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

(2) Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The complaint’s one cause of action for declaratory relief asserts four separate bases that the Ordinance is invalid: (1) the Ordinance requires an owner to violate state law; (2) the Ordinance is a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) the Ordinance violates the owner’s right to equal protection of the law; and (4) the Ordinance violates the substantive due process rights of the owner. (Complaint, ¶ 28-36.)

(A) Relevant Case Law

In opposition to the motion, County points to two decisions of the Courts of Appeal addressing the validity of ordinances similar to Ordinance No. 5250: Rental Housing Owners Assn. of Southern Alameda County, Inc. v. City of Hayward (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 81 (Rental Housing); and Griffith v. City of Santa Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 982 (Griffith). Plaintiff addresses Griffith in the moving papers, but does not address Rental Housing in either the moving papers or reply.

(i) Rental Housing

In Rental Housing, the City of Hayward (Hayward) adopted a mandatory rental housing inspection program (Hayward ordinance) that authorized inspections in specified areas. (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 85.) The stated purpose of the program is to “ ‘safeguard the stock of decent, safe, and sanitary rental housing units within the City and to protect persons entering or residing in them by providing for inspection of rental housing units and the common areas when certain indicators show that violations of the Hayward Housing and Building Codes may exist in a unit or pursuant to a systematic area-wide inspection program.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The Hayward ordinance provided:

“ ‘Owners and managers shall allow for the inspection of these units. If an Owner or manager refuses to permit an inspection, the Enforcement Official is authorized to procure an inspection warrant.’ [Citation.]” (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 85, italics omitted.)

“ ‘Upon presentation of proper credentials, the Enforcement Official, after having obtained the consent of the Owner or occupant, may enter any rental housing unit ... at reasonable times during daylight hours to perform any inspection required by this code. [¶] ... [T]he Enforcement official shall not enter any rental housing unit ... without the consent of the Owner or occupant thereof unless an inspection warrant therefor has been issued....’ [Citation.]” (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 85-86, italics omitted.)

The Rental Housing petitioner, an association of rental housing owners, filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to enjoin Hayward from enforcing the Hayward ordinance. (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.) The petitioner argued that the portion of the Hayward ordinance that provided that “ ‘Owners and managers shall allow for the inspection of these units,” was preempted by Civil Code section 1954 (section 1954).’ ” (Id. at p. 86, italics omitted.) The petitioner also argued that the “shall allow” language violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because it required landlords to permit entry into residential units absent tenants’ consent or a warrant. (Ibid.)

The trial court in Rental Housing held, among other things, that the ordinance was facially invalid on those two grounds. (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 87.) In response to the trial court’s ruling, Hayward amended its ordinance to provide that (i) “the City shall mail notice of an inspection to owners and rental units at least 14 days prior to the date of inspection” and (ii) “ ‘It shall be the responsibility of the Owner ... to make a good faith effort to obtain the consent of the tenants to inspect the subject rental housing units or otherwise obtain legal access to the units.’ ” (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 88, italics omitted.)

The petitioner in Rental Housing argued, among other things, that Hayward had not complied with the writ of mandate because it failed to delete language that landlords “shall allow” for inspection and that the “good faith” requirement of landlord created the likelihood of an unlawful landlord inspection in violation of section 1954. (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 88-89.) The trial court sustained these objections and Hayward appealed. (Ibid.)

The Rental Housing court stated the applicable standards:

“ ‘A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute or ordinance considers only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘A claimant who advances a facial challenge faces an “uphill battle [ ]” [citation]’ [citation], and ‘ “ ‘petitioners cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular application of the statute.... Rather, petitioners must demonstrate that the act’s provisions inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation, fn.] ‘Under a facial challenge, the fact that the statute “ ‘might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid....’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘All presumptions favor the validity of a statute. The court may not declare it invalid unless it is clearly so. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 89-90.)

After noting that the Rental Housing petitioners do not have standing to assert a tenant’s Fourth Amendment claims, the Rental Housing court nonetheless found the ordinance did not violate the Fourth Amendment:

“The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ of their homes and persons. [Citation.] A governing principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that ‘a search of private property without proper consent is “unreasonable” unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.’ [Citation.] A corollary principle is that ‘because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness,” the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. [Citations].’ [Citation.] Here, nothing in the language of the amended ordinance offends either the warrant requirement or the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness. The amended ordinance requires tenant consent before a City inspection can proceed. Absent tenant consent, the City must obtain an inspection warrant. We fail to see how the amended ordinance’s good faith requirement violates the Fourth Amendment’s prescription of reasonableness.” (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 92.)

The Rental Housing court also rejected the argument that the Hayward ordinance was preempted by Civil Code section 1954:

“Patently, Civil Code section 1954 addresses the circumstances under which landlords are authorized ‘to enter an occupied residential dwelling.’ [Citation.] In contrast to section 1954, the amended ordinance authorizes City officials to enter a tenant’s residence to conduct inspections. Thus, we see no conflict between the amended ordinance, which governs inspections conducted by City officials, and section 1954, which limits the circumstances under which landlords can enter tenant residences.” (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 92-93.) “In sum, we conclude the trial court erred when it concluded that the good faith requirement of the amended ordinance was facially invalid under the law of agency. In addition, RHOA cannot demonstrate that the good faith requirement is facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment or section 1954.” (Id. at p. 93.)

The Rental Housing petitioner also argued that the Hayward ordinance “conflicts with section 1954 because it requires landlord presence at inspections. This requirement does not render the amended ordinance facially invalid under Civil Code section 1954. While it is conceivable a tenant might consent to an inspection by City officials yet deny the landlord permission to enter at the inspection, the amended ordinance does not address such a scenario. On a facial challenge, we must presume the validity of the ordinance. [Citation.] Thus, if such a scenario arose, we presume City officials would not, on the basis of the tenant’s consent to inspection by City officials, insist that they be accompanied by the landlord if the tenant objects to the landlord’s presence.” (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 93, fn. 9.)

The Rental Housing court accordingly vacated the trial court’s order sustaining objections to Hayward’s return on the writ. (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 95.)

(ii) Griffith

In Griffith, the City of Santa Cruz (Santa Cruz) passed an ordinance implementing residential rental dwelling unit inspection program (Santa Cruz ordinance). (Griffith, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 987.) Under the Santa Cruz ordinance, residential rental dwelling units that are not occupied by the owner of the property are subject to an annual inspection by city staff. (Id. at p. 988.) Owners must provide access within 21 days of a request for an inspection; when there is a tenant living on the premises the owner must ask the tenant to allow the inspection. (Ibid.)

The owner will not be in violation if the tenant refuses. (Ibid.) Where a tenant or landlord has refused to consent to an inspection, “ ‘the inspector shall have recourse to every remedy provided by law to secure lawful entry .... ‘ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

The petitioner in Griffith was the owner of residential rental properties within the Santa Cruz city limits. (Griffith, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 988.) The petition asserted claims for writ of mandate and declaratory relief alleging, among other things, that the Santa Cruz ordinance was preempted by the State Housing Law, and violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. (Id. at pp. 988-989.)

The trial court in Griffith denied the petition. (Griffith, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 989.) The trial court concluded that the Santa Cruz ordinance was rationally related to city’s legitimate purpose of ensuring a stock of “safe, decent and sanitary rental housing” so that there was no equal protection violation. (Ibid.) The trial court also found that the Santa Cruz ordinance was not preempted by state law because it did not set up any new or different standards and did not duplicate procedures. (Ibid.)

The Griffith court rejected the claim of conflict with state law because the Santa Cruz ordinance does not require a landlord to enter rented premises absent the tenant’s consent and, therefore, does not alter or conflict with Civil Code section 1954. (Griffith, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.)

With respect to the equal protection claim, the Griffith court stated:

“ ‘Equal protection of the law means that persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law must be treated alike under the law. [Citations.] But depending upon the circumstances, differential treatment can be constitutionally valid. “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. [Citations.] Where there are ‘plausible reasons’ for [the government] action, ‘our inquiry is at an end.’ [Citation.] This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. ‘The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.’ ” [Citations.] “In other words, the plaintiff must show that the difference in treatment was ‘ “so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the [government’s] actions were irrational.” ’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Griffith, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 993-994.)

The Griffith court concluded that there was a rational basis for regular inspections of all rentals: “Annual inspections of all property would advance that purpose. The rational basis for regular inspections of only rental properties is set forth in the Ordinance itself: City staff had observed that the most egregious violations occurred in the rentals.” (Griffith, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 994, italics omitted.)

In distinguishing [College Area Renters & Landlord Assn. v. City of San Diego (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 677 (College Area Renters), a case that found an equal protection violation for occupancy limits set only for rental dwellings and not owner-occupied homes], the Griffith court stated:

“In the present case, unlike College Area Renters, one class of property owner cannot lawfully maintain a condition that is unlawful for the other class. Owner-occupied residences are subject to the same health, safety, and building standards to which nonowner-occupied dwellings are subject. Owner-occupied dwellings are also subject to inspection when a violation comes to the attention of City officials. [Citation.] The only difference is that rental units are subject to regular inspections. The differential treatment—requiring registration and routine inspections of rental units only—meets the rational basis test because City could plausibly have concluded that regularly inspecting every residence would be overly burdensome on both City staff and most homeowners and that the more efficient way to promptly detect dangerous and unsanitary conditions would be to routinely inspect only the type of residence where the most egregious violations have previously been detected. There is no equal protection problem.” (Griffith, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 995.)

(B) Conflict with State Law

Plaintiff argues the Ordinance No. 5250 conflicts with state law because of the limitations of Civil Code section 1954.

“A landlord may enter the dwelling unit only in the following cases:

“(1) In case of emergency.

“(2) To make necessary or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations or improvements, supply necessary or agreed services, or exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workers, or contractors or to make an inspection pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1950.5 [relating to an inspection for damage prior to the termination of a tenancy].

“(3) When the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the premises.

“(4) Pursuant to court order.

“(5) For the purposes set forth in Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1954.201) [relating to separate water metering for rental units].

“(6) To comply with the provisions of Article 2.2 (commencing with Section 17973) of Chapter 5 of Part 1.5 of Division 13 of the Health and Safety Code [relating to the inspection of exterior elevated elements of buildings containing three or more multifamily dwelling units].” (Civ. Code, § 1954, subd. (a).)

Entry by a landlord outside of the authority granted by section 1954 may give rise to a claim of trespass by the tenant. (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1042–1043.)

Plaintiff argues that Ordinance No. 5250 compels owners to enter tenant-occupied dwellings and facilitate inspections without tenant consent in violation of section 1954.

Under section 10-18.6, subdivision (C) of the Ordinance, the process of inspection commences with the service on the Owner of a scheduled inspection with at least 15 business days’ notice. (Santa Barbara County Code, § 10-18.6, subd. (C)(1), (2).) “It shall be the responsibility of the Owner to provide actual notice to the individual tenants of the Residential Rental Housing Unit and to facilitate access to the units to be inspected.” (Id., § 10-18.6, subd. (C)(4).)

As an obvious point, section 10-18.6, subdivision (C)(4)’s requirement that the Owner provide notice to the tenant is not shown to violate any provision of Civil Code section 1954. Section 1954 addresses entry onto the tenant’s premises and has no prohibition of communication. The parties disagree as to the import of the remainder of subdivision (C)(4) “to facilitate access.”

As noted above, there is no evidence presented as to any actual acts or practices of County with respect to an owner’s “facilitating access.” The court therefore addresses this as a facial challenge to the Ordinance. “ ‘Words used in a statute ... should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature....’ [Citation.]” (S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti (2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 379.) The ordinary meaning of “facilitate” is “to make easier or less difficult” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1986) p. 812; see also American Heritage Dict. (5th ed. 2016) p. 632 [“to make easy or easier”].)

There is nothing in Ordinance No. 5250 that making the County’s access easier or less difficult requires illegal entry by the Owner under Civil Code section 1954. Thus, as explained in Rental Housing, under a facial challenge and in the absence of other evidence, there is no necessary conflict between the “to facilitate access” requirement and section 1954.

Under Ordinance section 10-18.6, subdivision (C)(6) the Owner or agent “shall be present during the inspection.” This provision is ambiguous as to whether the Owner is required to enter the tenant’s premises notwithstanding a lack of consent by the tenant. This aspect of the Ordinance is addressed directly by Rental Housing, supra, which, on a facial challenge presumes that the Ordinance would not be interpreted to require illegal entry by the Owner. (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 93, fn. 9.)

Plaintiff nonetheless argues that these sections require more of Owners because to avoid liability, the Owner must provide proof: “The Owner shall not be in violation of this section if the tenant or occupant refuses to allow the inspection by the County. The Owner shall provide proof, under penalty of perjury, that a request to inspect the Residential Rental Housing Unit was served by the Owner and inspection was not permitted by the tenant.” (Santa Barbara County Code, § 10-18.6, subd. (C)(7).) The first sentence of subdivision (C)(7) disclaims liability of the Owner if the tenant refuses to allow the inspection. By its plain terms, the Owner is not subject to liability for the tenant’s does not permit an inspection.

Plaintiff raises the scenario where a tenant simply does not consent—either by silence or by other failure to affirmatively grant permission—rather than affirmatively refusing. This scenario is not properly before the court. First, the Ordinance would not be subject to this objection if the tenant affirmatively refused, so the Ordinance is not facially invalid on that ground. Second, because entry is not permitted except by consent, by an exception in section 1954, or by other legal exception, the failure of the tenant to give consent may be interpreted as refusal. Thus, the Ordinance can be reasonably interpreted so that evidence of the tenant’s failure to give consent (when given a reasonable opportunity to do so) would be sufficient proof under this subdivision of the Ordinance. Again, that is sufficient to satisfy a facial challenge for invalidity. (See The Kennedy Com. v. Superior Court (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 385, 413 [“ ‘Where a statute is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, the interpretation which will harmonize rather than conflict with other provisions should be adopted.’ ”].)

Based on the arguments of the parties and the evidence presented, the court does not find that plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of showing that the Ordinance is invalid because it conflicts with state law.

As discussed in Rental Housing, supra, there are two central difficulties with plaintiff’s facial claim. First, an Owner out-of-possession has no privacy interest in units occupied by tenants and so does not have standing to assert Fourth Amendment claims relating to the tenant’s possession of the premises. (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 91-92.) Second, like the ordinance under discussion in Rental Housing, Ordinance No. 5250 does not permit entry without the permission of the tenant or possessor absent a legal right:

“If an inspection is scheduled and entry is thereafter refused or cannot be obtained, the County inspector shall have recourse to every remedy provided by law to secure lawful entry and inspect the premises, including, but not limited to, securing an inspection warrant pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1822.50 through 1822.57.” (Santa Barbara County Code, § 10-18.6, subd. (D)(1).)

“The Director, or designee, subject to the consent given by an occupant who reasonably appears to be at least 18 years of age, has authority to enter and inspect any dwelling or premises whenever necessary to secure compliance with, or prevent a violation of, any provision of this Section ….” (Santa Barbara County Code, § 10-18.6, subd. (E)(1).)

Read together these provisions authorize entry for inspection only with consent by the tenant or other person in possession or as otherwise permitted by law. Requiring the Owner to facilitate access is not shown to require the Owner to take steps any more intrusive than the “good faith” requirements at issue in Rental Housing, which the Rental Housing court found did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Rental Housing, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 92.)

(D) Equal Protection

Plaintiff argues that Ordinance No. 5250 has no rational basis for targeting the Isla Vista community for regulatory inspections while excluding other similarly situated areas within the County.

As discussed in Griffith, the standard for reviewing this argument is rational basis. “ ‘ “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. [Citations.] Where there are ‘plausible reasons’ for [the government] action, ‘our inquiry is at an end.’ [Citation.]” … [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Griffith, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 993-994.)

The Ordinance itself provides the following findings:

“The purpose of this Section is to establish the Isla Vista Rental Housing Inspection Pilot Program in the unincorporated area of the County of Santa Barbara known as the community of Isla Vista. This Section implements a proactive rental housing inspection program to protect the public health, safety, and welfare through the identification, prevention, and correction of substandard housing conditions that adversely affect the quality of life for residents living in the community and around the rental properties.

“The County of Santa Barbara finds that there exists, within the unincorporated area of the Community of Isla Vista, substandard, overcrowded, and/or unsanitary residential rental buildings and units where the physical and habitable conditions violate state and local housing and building codes and standards which results in making them unfit or unsafe for human occupancy or habitation. These residential rental buildings and units are detrimental to and/or jeopardize the health, safety, and welfare of their occupants and the public and severely impact the quality of the community.

“The results of this pilot program will be reported to the Board of Supervisors after its first year of implementation. The Board will determine to extend, modify, or repeal this Section.” (Santa Barbara County Code, § 10-18.1, subd. (A).)

The enacting Resolution contains the following recitals:

“A. WHEREAS, California Health and Safety Code Sections 17910-17998.3 establish minimum standards for the maintenance of housing units, authorizes local enforcement of state housing laws and adopted building codes, and specifically authorizes the adoption of proactive programs for housing inspections;

“B. WHEREAS, the unincorporated community of Isla Vista is densely populated community where 87% of the residents are renters and 96% of residents are college-aged and according to the latest US Census data there is a 72% poverty rate;

“C. WHEREAS, based on extensive community outreach, it has been reported by tenants and residents that substandard and unsafe housing conditions exist in rental units in the community including rodents, lack of heat, unsafe balconies, decks, and similar conditions, a lack of smoke detectors, and illegal conversions of non-habitable space (illegal lofts) which disproportionately affect vulnerable renters;

“D. WHEREAS, deficient and substandard housing has many detrimental effects on the stability of the neighborhoods within the community of Isla Vista, is environmentally undesirable, creates unsafe living conditions for tenants and neighbors, contributes to blight, negatively affects property values, and is otherwise detrimental to the health, safety and welfare of the community and its residents;

“E. WHEREAS, based on code enforcement activities and community outreach, the Board of Supervisors finds that tenants within the unincorporated community of Isla Vista are reluctant to report Building Code violations or other dangerous conditions to the County in fear of retaliation by their landlord despite state laws that make it unlawful for any retaliation to occur.

F. WHEREAS, on July 9, 2024, the Board of Supervisors considered and approved projects for Mutually Beneficial Capital Projects and Limited Term Programs, per the 2024 Settlement Agreement between County of Santa Barbara and the Regents of the University of California and designated $600,000 of the total agreement funds to create an Isla Vista Rental Housing inspection Pilot Program.” (Resolution, p. 1.)

These recitals are consistent with the staff report on the Ordinance. (Agenda Letter, pp. 2-3.)

The moving papers contain no evidence as to these findings. In reply, plaintiff provides information provided from the County with respect to habitability complaints during 2024, which information shows that few complaints were made or substantiated.

Unlike the ordinance analyzed in Griffith, Ordinance No. 5250 does not require that all rental properties be inspected, but instead limits rental properties to be inspected under the Ordinance to the Isla Vista community. The holding of Griffith therefore is not dispositive of this issue, but Griffith nonetheless remains instructive.

The purpose of the Ordinance, as quoted above, is to discover and combat substandard housing. There is no showing that the purpose is not a legitimate public purpose. Plaintiff’s argument is that the evidence relied upon by the County in determining to limit its inspections to Isla Vista is thin and does not justify such a limitation.

“ ‘A legislative “choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its ‘ “wisdom, fairness, or logic.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Rational basis review ‘ “ ‘requir[es] merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “[W]e will not overturn such [government action] unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the [government’s] actions were irrational.” ’ [Citation.]” (Getzels v. State Bar of California (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)

As Griffith indicates, there is a rational basis connecting inspections with identifying substandard and unsafe residential units and to ensure their rehabilitation or elimination. (Griffith, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.) The stated concerns of a high population of rental units in Isla Vista together with a belief that tenants underreport housing issues present a rational connection to promote housing inspections within that community. Moreover, as the final recital points out, inspection programs cost money. Money is available to fund this as a pilot project in a limited area. This evidences a rational basis to limit the inspection program to a specified area. The specified area is not arbitrary or irrational,

(3) Relative Harms

The second part of the analysis of an application for preliminary injunction is to balance the relative harms of the parties. The only evidence presented relevant to this issue is the general fact that plaintiff members are subject to Ordinance No. 5250 and some members have been directed to notice and to be present during inspections of rental properties. The relative harms, therefore, are to be inferred from the operation or non-operation of the Ordinance rather than from specific demonstrated or threatened conduct.

If a preliminary injunction were erroneously granted, the effect would be to prohibit unnecessarily the operation of the Inspection Program until disposition of this matter on the merits. By its terms, the Ordinance is in effect for only 12 months, at which time it is of no further force or effect unless extended or amended. (Santa Barbara County Code, § 10-18.12.) Prohibiting the operation of the Inspection Program during the pendency of this action would therefore preclude operation of the Inspection Program for the remainder of its term because it is unlikely that the merits of this action will be determined prior to the sunset of the Ordinance. Although the County could extend the term, the continuous operation of a pilot program itself serves a purpose to determine whether the program, in the legislative balance, should be continued or discontinued.

If a preliminary injunction were erroneously denied, the effect would be to require Owners to comply unnecessarily with the Ordinance and the burdens associated with such compliance. This would, by definition, mean that Owners were required to take action contrary to their rights under law.

Balancing these interests, the court finds that County would suffer the greater harms by the erroneous grant of a preliminary injunction than the plaintiff members would suffer by the erroneous denial of a preliminary injunction, but not sharply so. The plaintiff members’ legal rights are substantial and significant, even if outweighed in the context of the evidence presented here by the County’s goals of taking steps to identify and remediate substandard housing.

(4) Balance of Equities

Based upon the above discussion, the court finds that the balance of equities favors denial of the motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiff has presented little evidence to support this motion as to specific threats or harms and the court does not find a likelihood of success on the merits of a facial challenge to the Ordinance. In the absence of such evidence, the court does not, and cannot, evaluate plaintiff’s claims that may (or may not) exist as applied to plaintiff’s members. The court also finds that plaintiff has not shown that the balance of relative harms from the erroneous grant or denial of the injunction favors the grant of the injunction. More particularly, plaintiff has not shown potential harm to such an extent as to balance against the court’s finding that plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on a sliding scale.

Judicial Branch of California

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