Regina Ruiz et al vs St Vincent's Institution et al

Case Number

25CV03741

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 11/12/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

1) Demurrer to Complaint; 2) Motion: Strike Portion of the Complaint

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Regina Ruiz and Florence Berger: Lanny M. Tron, Terry L. Tron, Tron & Tron

                                   

For Defendants St. Vincent’s Institution and Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul Province of the West: Jennifer S. Branch, Ani Mazmanyan, Natalie C. Holtz, Lagasse Branch Bell + Kinkead LLP          

RULING

(1) For the reasons set forth herein, the demurrer of Defendants St. Vincent’s Institution and Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul Province of the West is sustained to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action, with leave to amend.

(2) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of Defendants to strike portions of the complaint is granted to strike the words “and punitive damages” from paragraph 4 of the complaint and is in all other respects denied.

(3) Plaintiffs shall file and serve their first amended complaint on or before November 26, 2025.

Background

As alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint:

Plaintiffs Regina Ruiz and Florence Berger were employed by joint employers Defendants St. Vincent’s Institution (SVI) and Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul Province of the West (DC). (Complaint, ¶ 1.)

Ruiz was Defendant SVI’s first ever Chief Development Officer. (Complaint, ¶ 2.) Berger was Legal Liaison and Lead Case Manager, and later Director. (Complaint, ¶ 3.) In September 2023, Ruiz reported false billings of an SVI contractor and reported theft of donated gift cards by an SVI employee. (Complaint, ¶ 2.) Berger also reported the theft of donated gift cards. (Complaint, ¶ 3.) The persons reported were related to SVI’s President and Chief Executive Officer. (Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 3.) Following these reports, Ruiz suffered retaliation and disability discrimination. (Complaint, ¶ 2.) Berger suffered retaliation, disability discrimination, and sexual harassment. (Complaint, ¶ 3.) Ruiz and Berger are no longer employed by Defendants. (Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 3.)

SVI’s Amendment of Articles of Incorporation, filed October 4, 1994, states:

“This corporation is a non-profit public benefit corporation and is not organized for the private gain of any person. This corporation is organized under the Non-profit Public Benefit Corporation law exclusively for charitable purposes.” (Defendants Request for Judicial Notice [DRJN], exhibit 6, art. II.)

“The corporation shall at all times operate and conduct its affairs, and the affairs of any of its affiliated corporation, in the context of the teachings and doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church and in compliance with Canon Law and the objectives and philosophies of the Daughters of Charity of Saint Vincent de Paul, Province of the West.” (DRJN, exhibit 6, art. II.)

SVI’s Amendment of Articles of Incorporation, filed December 27, 2023, states:

“This corporation is a non-profit public benefit corporation and is not organized for the private gain of any person. This corporation is organized under the Non-profit Public Benefit Corporation law exclusively for charitable and/or religious purposes.” (DRJN, exhibit 7, art. II.)

“The corporation shall at all times operate and conduct its affairs, and the affairs of any of its affiliated corporation, in the context of the teachings and doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church and in compliance with Canon Law and the objectives and philosophies of the Daughters of Charity of Saint Vincent de Paul, Province of the West.” (DRJN, exhibit 7, art. II.)

DC’s Restated Articles of Incorporation, filed June 25, 1987, states:

“This corporation is a religious corporation and is not organized for the private gain of any person. It is organized under the Nonprofit Religious Corporation Law exclusively for religious purposes” (DRJN, exhibit 8, art. II(A).)

“The specific purpose of this corporation is to support and foster the mission and purpose of the religious congregation of the Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul.” (DRJN, exhibit 8, art. II(B).)

On June 16, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this action asserting nine causes of action: (1) unlawful disability discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.); (2) failure to engage in good faith interactive process in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to determine reasonable accommodations in violation of FEHA; (4) unlawful retaliation in violation of FEHA; (5) unlawful sexual harassment in violation of FEHA; (6) failure to prevent retaliation, discrimination, and harassment in violation of FEHA; (7) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (8) tortious termination in violation of public policy; and (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On September 5, 2025, Defendants filed their demurrer to the first through sixth causes of action. Defendants argue that they are statutorily not subject to FEHA. Defendants concurrently filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint.

The demurrer and motion to strike are opposed by Plaintiffs

Analysis

(1) Extension of Time to Respond

Proof of service of the complaint was filed on July 18, 2025, showing service on each Defendant by mailing of acknowledgement of receipt of service on June 17.

On August 5, 2025, counsel for Defendants filed a declaration of demurring or moving party in support of an automatic extension.

In opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike, Plaintiffs assert that the August 5 declaration is false and therefore the extension of time to respond obtained by the filing of the declaration was not legally obtained. Plaintiffs therefore argue that the demurrer and motion to strike are untimely and should be disregarded.

The Court is not going to engage in determining the dispute between the parties as to the extension. Whether or not the demurrer and motion to strike were filed outside the time for responding, no prejudice is shown by the delay, and judicial economy supports resolving the merits of the demurrer and motion to strike now. Additionally, based on the nature of the dispute, it does not appear that further meeting and conferring would meaningfully advance the resolution of this dispute. The Court will therefore consider the demurrer and motion to strike as presented.

(2) Demurrer

“We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]” (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6, internal quotation marks omitted.)

            (A) Requests for Judicial Notice

In support of the demurrer, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of: (DRJN, exhibit 5) Defendants’ declaration of demurring or moving party, filed on August 5, 2025; (exhibit 6) SVI’s Amendment of Articles of Incorporation, filed with the California Secretary of State on October 4, 1994; (exhibit 7) SVI’s Amendment of Articles of Incorporation, filed with the California Secretary of State on

December 27, 2023; (exhibit 8) DC’s Restated Articles of Incorporation, filed with the California Secretary of State on June 25, 1987; (exhibit 9) SVI’s current

registration status with the State of California, Department of Justice as a charitable or nonprofit corporation; (exhibit 10) DC’s current registration status with the State of California, Department of Justice as a charitable or nonprofit religious corporation; (exhibit 11) a September 4, 2025, California Franchise Tax Board Entity Status Letter pertaining to SVI; and (exhibit 12) a September 4, 2025, California Franchise Tax Board Entity Status Letter pertaining to DC.

The Court will grant the request as to exhibit 5 as a Court record. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) The Court will grant the requests for exhibits 6 through 12 as recorded documents and official acts. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (h).) Judicial notice does not extend to the truth of factual matters set forth in such documents. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569.)

In reply, Defendants make further requests for judicial notice. The Court denies these requests because the Court does not consider additional evidentiary matter (or here, substitutes for evidentiary matter) in reply and the request is therefore not relevant to the disposition of these motions. (See Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-1538 [reply evidence not considered without giving opposing party opportunity to respond]; (Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [irrelevant matter not subject to judicial notice].)

            (B) Application of FEHA

Defendants argue that FEHA does not apply to them because they are religious institutions.

An aggrieved person may bring an action alleging unlawful employment practices under FEHA. (Gov. Code, § 12965.) Unlawful employment practices are defined by FEHA in Government Code section 12940. The unlawful employment practices apply to acts or omissions of an “employer.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (a) [discrimination], (h) [retaliation], (j)(1) [harassment].) An “employer” to whom FEHA applies is specifically defined:

“As used in this part in connection with unlawful practices, unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context: [¶] … [¶] (d) ‘Employer’ includes any person regularly employing five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, the state or any political or civil subdivision of the state, and cities, except as follows: [¶] ‘Employer’ does not include a religious association or corporation not organized for private profit.” (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (d).)

The definition in the applicable regulations is consistent with this statutory definition:

“ ‘Employer.’ Any person or individual engaged in any business or enterprise regularly employing five or more individuals, including individuals performing any service under any appointment, contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11008, subd. (e).)

“A religious association or religious corporation not organized for private profit is not an employer under the meaning of this Act; any non-profit religious organization exempt from federal and state income tax as a non-profit religious organization is presumed not to be an employer under this Act. Notwithstanding such status, any portion of such tax exempt religious association or religious corporation subject to state or federal income taxes as an unrelated business and regularly employing five or more individuals is an employer.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11008, subd. (e)(5).)

“ ‘Employer’ includes any non-profit corporation or non-profit association other than that defined in subsection (5).” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11008, subd. (e)(6).)

By the judicially noticed material and without additional allegations in the complaint on this issue, Defendants have shown that they fall within the exception to the definition of “employer” under FEHA.

In opposition, Plaintiffs state that they do not fall within this exception because they primarily operate educational institutions.

“(1)      Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a nonprofit public benefit corporation formed by, or affiliated with, a particular religion and that operates an educational institution as its sole or primary activity, may restrict employment, including promotion, in any or all employment categories to individuals of a particular religion.

“(2)      Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any other provision of law, employers that are nonprofit public benefit corporations specified in paragraph (1) shall be subject to the provisions of this part in all other respects, including, but not limited to, the prohibitions against discrimination made unlawful employment practices by this part.” (Gov. Code, § 12926.2, subd. (f).)

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants have waived the exemption or should be estopped from asserting the exemption.

All of Plaintiffs’ arguments depend upon facts asserted by Plaintiffs that are outside the pleadings and judicially noticed materials. “Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial notice.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.) Plaintiffs’ support for these arguments are not now properly before the Court. The Court will sustain the demurrers with leave to amend.

(3) Motion to Strike

“The Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the Court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

Defendants move to strike various text from the complaint on the grounds that FEHA does not apply to Defendants because they are not employers for the same reasons discussed in connection with the demurrer.

Item 1 for which Defendants seek text to be stricken from the complaint is: “Plaintiffs’ references to the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 17, 72, 73, 76, 79, 80, 84, 85, 87, 88, 91, 92, 96, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 117, 118, 121, 123, 126, 127, 141, and 156 ….” (Notice of Motion, at p. 2.) These “references” are not quoted or otherwise specified as text less than the entirety of the numbered paragraphs. The same is true of items 3, 4, 7, 8, and 11.

“A notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(a).)

The notice of motion as to items 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 11 does not comply with rule 3.1322(a). The motion will therefore be denied as to these items.

Item 2 is to strike the entirety of paragraphs 140, 149, 156, 160, and 162. Paragraph 140 alleges that Plaintiffs were fully qualified to perform essential functions of their employment with or without reasonable accommodations. Although this allegation is significant to a FEHA claim, it is not shown to be irrelevant at least as background to other causes of action. The motion will be denied as to paragraph 140. The same is true as to paragraphs 149 and 150. Paragraphs 156, 160, 161, and 162 relate solely to claims for which the Court is sustaining the demurrer. (See Complaint, at p. 28.) The motion to strike is therefore moot as to these paragraphs.

Item 9 is to “[p]laintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages on page 30 of the Complaint ….” Item 10 is for the reference to punitive damages in paragraph 4 of the complaint. In opposition, Plaintiffs agree to strike their demand for punitive damages. (Opposition, at p. 11.) There are no words in the prayer that specifically relate to punitive damages, so there is nothing identified in the notice for the Court to strike. Because Plaintiffs agree to strike their demand for punitive damages, it is appropriate to strike the words “and punitive damages” from paragraph 4 of the complaint without prejudice to the later filing of a noticed motion to amend as to punitive damages.