Tentative Ruling: Ruth Narez v. Santa Barbara County Employee Retirement System, et al.
Case Number
25CV03681
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Fri, 10/02/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
1) Demurrer of Defendants to First Amended Complaint; 2) Motion of Defendants to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint
Tentative Ruling
- As set forth herein, the demurrer of defendants Santa Barbara County Employee Retirement System, Greg Levin, Rebekah Bardakos, and Scott Dunlap to the first amended complaint of plaintiff Ruth Narez is sustained, with leave to amend, as to each cause of action of the complaint and as to the first amended complaint as a whole. Plaintiff shall file and serve a second amended complaint on or before October 12, 2026.
- Because the demurrer is sustained, the motion of defendants to strike portions of the first amended complaint is moot and is ordered off calendar.
Background:
As alleged in plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC):
Plaintiff Ruth Narez is, and has been, an employee of defendant Santa Barbara County Employee Retirement System (SBCERS) as a Public Sector Fiduciary and Member Service Retirement System Representative. (FAC, ¶ 8.) Defendants Greg Levin, Rebekah Bardakos, and Scott Dunlap are also employees of SBCERS. (FAC, ¶ 4.) (SBCERS, Levin, Bardakos, and Dunlap are referred to in the FAC and herein collectively as the “defendants.”)
Narez “repeatedly brought her concerns regarding the mismanagement of members retirement accounts, delayed service purchase completions, negligence of reciprocal inquiries by reciprocal members, along with customer complaints, Members service purchase SBCERS issues included SBCERS members pending a refund status due to overpayment of retirement contributions, which lead customer service frustration, lack of customer call backs or reasonable communication from newly discovered and appointed supervisor Scott Dunlap and being permitted by Rebekha Bardakos and accepted by Greg Levin.” (FAC, ¶ 18.)
Narez began reporting problems with management at SBCERS and mismanagement of County employee retirement benefits to defendants around June 2023. (FAC, ¶ 23.) Rather than resolve issues with management of employee retirement benefits or communicate with Narez, defendants targeted, micromanaged, harassed, retaliated, discriminated, and took multiple adverse employment actions against Narez. (Ibid.)
On June 4, 2024, Narez was given an unwarranted and unsubstantiated employee performance review by defendants, and specifically by Bardakos, and was denied her merit pay increase. (FAC, ¶ 21.)
As part of her employment with defendants, Narez was required to enter into a collective bargaining agreement regarding the terms of her employment with defendants. (FAC, ¶ 26.)
On June 13, 2025, Narez filed her original complaint in this action asserting five causes of action: (1) whistleblower retaliation; (2) breach of written contract; (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) declaratory relief.
On November 19, 2025, defendants filed their demurrer and motion to strike as to the original complaint.
On March 5, 2026, without the demurrer having been resolved and pursuant to stipulation of the parties, Narez filed her FAC asserting eight causes of action: (1) whistleblower retaliation (Lab. Code, § 1102.5); (2) breach of written contract; (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) unlawful discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.); (5) unlawful harassment in violation of FEHA; (6) unlawful retaliation in violation of FEHA; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (8) declaratory relief. (Note: The causes of action are numbered differently in the caption of the FAC than in the text of the FAC. The court will use the numbering as appears in the text of the FAC.)
On May 7, 2026, defendants filed their demurrer to the FAC and concurrently filed their motion to strike portions of the FAC. The demurrer and motion to strike are opposed by Narez.
Analysis:
(1) Requests for Judicial Notice
In support of the demurrer, defendants request that the court take judicial notice of: (Request for Judicial Notice, exhibit 1) case summary of Narez’s claim against SBCERS in Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) case No. LA-CE-1748-M as shown in PERB’s website; (exhibit 2) a PERB letter dated June 3, 2025; (exhibit 3) complaint issued by PERB based on Narez’s claim; and (exhibit 4) Narez’s notice of claim submitted on November 5, 2024. The requests are opposed by Narez.
The requests are relevant to the issues raised in the demurrer. Narez argues in opposition, and defendants agree in reply, that the scope of judicial notice is limited: “A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute. [Citation.] Although the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable. [Citation.][StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9] stated: ‘In ruling on a demurrer, a court may consider facts of which it has taken judicial notice. [Citation.] This includes the existence of a document. When judicial notice is taken of a document, however, the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.)
With respect to requests 1, 2, and 3, the docket of the PERB case and actions taken by PERB, including the issuance of a letter and a complaint, are matters subject to judicial notice. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (h).) However, factual statements by PERB or legal conclusions reached by PERB are not subject to judicial notice as true. (See Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569 [doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are used to determine whether issues may be relitigated in another forum].) The court does not, therefore, take judicial notice that a claim is untimely based upon a PERB letter so stating, but may take judicial notice of the fact that PERB did not act on a claim for the reasons stated.
With respect to request 4, the court may take judicial notice of the contents of a government claim to determine compliance with the claims presentation requirement. (Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 376.)
With this understanding and these limitations, the requests for judicial notice are granted. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c), (h).)
(2) Demurrer
“We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]” (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6, internal quotation marks omitted.)
(A) Whistleblower Claim
Narez’s first cause of action is for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. This claim is asserted against all defendants.
Defendants demur on the grounds that Narez does not identify the statute, rule, or regulation that any defendant violated, that Narez does not adequately allege causation, and that section 1102.5 does not impose liability on the individual defendants.
Defendants cite Bales v. County of El Dorado (E.D.Cal. Sept. 20, 2018, No. 2:18-CV-01714-JAM-DB) 2018 WL 4558235 for the proposition that liability under Labor Code section 1102.5 extends only to employers and not to individuals. Narez did not respond to this argument in opposition. Very recently, this issue was addressed in Chaudhry v. State of California (Sept. 28, 2026, A173501) __ Cal.App.5th ___ [2026 WL 2903565], which held that “a plaintiff cannot sue an individual manager or supervisor for retaliation under section 1102.5.” (Id. at p. 13.) The demurrer will therefore be sustained as to the individual defendants on that ground. (Note: The court recognizes that neither party has had the opportunity to address the Chaudhry decision. Because the court sustains the demurrer to this cause of action, with leave to amend, on other grounds as well, the parties may further address this issue, as may be appropriate, in an amended complaint or in challenges to such amended complaint.)
“An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy preventing an employee from disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee, or to another employee who has authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or from providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (a).)
“An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or for providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).)
“[S]tatutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity ….” (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.) “[T]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, [a plaintiff is] required to show that he engaged in protected activity …, that he was subjected to adverse employment action by his employer, and that there was a causal link between the disclosure and the adverse action.” (Manavian v. Department of Justice (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1141.)
While it is not necessary to plead that the disclosure of information relates to an actual violation of statute, rule, or regulation, it is necessary to allege that the employee had reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation or noncompliance with such statute, rule, or regulation. In order to plead with particularity, it is necessary to identify at least one statute, rule, or regulation which was thought to be violated. (See Nejadian v. County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 703, 719.) Because Narez does not do so, the demurrer will be sustained to this cause of action.
(B) Contract Claims
Narez’s second cause of action is for breach of contract; the third cause of action is for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants demur to these causes of action on the grounds that the subject matter of these causes of action are subject to the PERB proceeding, that Narez has not included these claims within the government claim, and generally that the allegations are insufficient. In opposition, Narez states: “Since the breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims primarily revolve around Ruth's collective bargaining agreement and/or memorandum of understanding, Ruth will defer to the to-be-issued PERB ruling on these causes of action.” (Opposition, at p. 8.)
“A cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiff’s performance or excuse for failure to perform, defendant’s breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.) “A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect. [Citation.] In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is nothing more than a cause of action for breach of contract.” (Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1344.) “ ‘The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to assuring compliance with the express terms of the contract, and cannot be extended to create obligations not contemplated by the contract.’ [Citation.]” (Pasadena Live v. City of Pasadena (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1094, italics omitted.)
In view of Narez’s opposition, the court will simply note that the express terms of the contract at issue are not alleged. The demurrer to these causes of action will be sustained on that ground.
(C) FEHA Claims
Narez’s fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action are for unlawful discrimination, unlawful harassment, and unlawful retaliation in violation of FEHA.
The fourth cause of action asserts discrimination on account of her race, national origin, ethnicity, and whistleblower status. (FAC, ¶ 70.) With respect to whistleblower status, that issue is addressed and found insufficiently pleaded in the context of Labor Code section 1102.5. With respect to discrimination on the basis of FEHA protected categories, there are no specific allegations that connect race, national origin, or ethnicity discrimination to actions against Narez. All negative activity is instead alleged as relating to her whistleblowing actions. (E.g., FAC, ¶¶ 20, 23.) The same issue exists with respect to the claims of harassment and retaliation under FEHA. (E.g., FAC, ¶¶ 75, 80-81.) Because of the lack of sufficient allegations of FEHA violations, the demurrer will be sustained as to these causes of action.
Additionally, nonemployer individuals are not liable for claims of discrimination or retaliation under FEHA. (Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1173; Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 643.) Although Narez argues for liability outside of FEHA, the claims are asserted in the FAC solely within claims expressly under FEHA. As FEHA claims, the demurrer will be sustained as to the individual defendants on that ground as well. To the extent Narez seeks to assert claims outside of FEHA, given the conclusory and limited nature of the allegations now in the FAC, such claims are insufficient, but the court does not now address whether such claims could be asserted if pleaded with greater specificity.
The demurrer to the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action will be sustained.
(D) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Narez’s seventh cause of action is for intentional infliction distress. Defendants demur to this cause of action on the grounds that personnel decisions do not constitute outrageous conduct within the meaning of this tort, and that the claim is barred by the exclusive remedy of workers’ compensation.
In opposition, Narez argues that reasonable minds may differ over whether the conduct is sufficiently outrageous, and hence not subject to demurrer, and that intentional infliction of emotional distress is outside the scope of employment, and hence not subject to workers’ compensation exclusivity.
“Plaintiffs allege defendants engaged in ‘outrageous conduct’ that was intended to, and did, cause plaintiffs ‘severe emotional distress,’ giving rise to common law causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The alleged wrongful conduct, however, occurred at the worksite, in the normal course of the employer-employee relationship, and therefore workers’ compensation is plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy for any injury that may have resulted.” (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 902 (Miklosy).)
As set forth in Miklosy: “As to the exception for conduct that ‘exceeds the risks inherent in the employment relationship,’ it might seem at first blush to apply here—based on the argument that whistleblower retaliation is not a risk inherent in the employment relationship—but we rejected this same argument in [Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 25 (Shoemaker)]. Like plaintiffs here, the plaintiff in Shoemaker alleged whistleblower retaliation and also a Tameny cause of action, and although he incorporated these allegations as part of his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we held workers’ compensation to be his exclusive remedy and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of that cause of action.” (Miklosy, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 902–903.)
As noted above, the court will sustain demurrers to the whistleblower claim and to the FEHA claims based upon insufficient pleading. As now alleged as an independent tort, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim falls within the workers’ compensation bar for the reasons explained in Miklosy and Shoemaker. The demurrer to the seventh cause of action will be sustained.
(E) Declaratory Relief
Narez’s eighth cause of action is for declaratory relief. Defendants demur to this cause of action on the grounds that declaratory relief is not a standalone cause of action. Narez does not address this cause of action in opposition.
Declaratory relief may be brought as a standalone cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1060, 1062.) However, where, as here, the declaratory relief claim is based upon past acts that are fully raised in other claims in the same complaint, the court may determine that declaratory relief is not properly granted. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.) As now pleaded and given the disposition of the demurrer as discussed above, declaratory relief would not be properly granted. The demurrer to the eighth cause of action will be sustained.
(F) Leave to Amend
As discussed above, the demurrer is being sustained to each cause of action of the FAC. This is the first complaint to which the court rules on a demurrer. The court will grant leave to amend.
(2) Motion to Strike
Because the court will sustain the demurrer to each cause of action of the FAC, the motion to strike portions of the complaint is moot. Nonetheless, the court expects that, in filing an amended complaint, Narez will address, to whatever extent is appropriate, the issues raised in the motion to strike.