Tentative Ruling: Misty Dawn Hoover vs County of Santa Barbara et al
Case Number
25CV03491
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 03/16/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion: Summary Judgment
Tentative Ruling
Misty Dawn Hoover v. County of Santa Barbara, et al.
Case No. 25CV03491
Hearing Date: March 16, 2026
HEARING: 1. Defendant City of Santa Barbara’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. Defendant City of Santa Barbara’s Motion for Defense Costs Against Plaintiff Misty Hoover Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1038.
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Misty Dawn Hoover: Self-Represented
For Defendant County of Santa Barbara: Sara Bruckner
For Defendant City of Santa Barbara: Tom R. Shapiro, Delaney Satz
For Defendant State of California: Davis Ryan
TENTATIVE RULING:
- Defendant City of Santa Barbara’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted.
- Defendant City of Santa Barbara’s Motion for Defense Costs Against Plaintiff Misty Hoover is granted in the amount of $7,500.00, to be paid by plaintiff to counsel for the City of Santa Barbara.
Background:
This action commenced on June 5, 2025, by the filing of the Judicial Council Form Complaint by plaintiff Misty Dawn Hoover (plaintiff) against the County of Santa Barbara (the “County”), the City of Santa Barbara (the “City”), and the State of California (the “State”), for (1) negligence, (2) premises liability, and (3) dangerous condition of public property.
As alleged in the complaint:
On January 11, 2025, plaintiff was on US-101 Southbound, near Mission Street, Santa Barbara, “when suddenly and without warning there was an unsafe road design and or condition, resulting in bodily injuries to Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶ L-1.)
The complaint gives almost no details as to what the “unsafe road design or condition” consists of. It merely states that plaintiff encountered the condition, was unable to avoid collision, and was injured. The government claims forms that are attached to the complaint as exhibits provide no additional information regarding the incident.
On October 28, 2025, the City answered the complaint with a general denial and four affirmative defenses. Importantly to the motions before the court, the affirmative defenses are: (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, (2) the City had no ownership, control, or maintenance responsibility for the alleged dangerous condition of public property, (3) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1038, plaintiff brought this frivolous action against the City without reasonable cause and in bad faith, and (4) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, because the City has no ownership or control of the alleged dangerous condition of public property, this action is frivolous, and therefore plaintiff brought the action against the City primarily for an improper purpose.
On October 30, 2025, the State answered the complaint with a general denial and 27 affirmative defenses.
On October 31, 2025, the County answered the complaint with a general denial and 16 affirmative defenses.
On December 2, 2025, the City filed the present motion for summary judgment, arguing that the City does not own, control, or maintain the location of the accident.
Also on December 2, 2025, the City filed the present motion for defense costs against plaintiff, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1038, arguing that plaintiff brought and continued to prosecute this action against the City without reasonable cause and without a good faith belief that there is a justifiable controversy. By way of the motion, the City seeks defense costs in the amount of $9,500.00.
Plaintiff has not filed opposition or any other response to the motion for summary judgment or the motion for defense costs.
Analysis:
Standard on Summary Judgment
A defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The procedure enables the court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. The court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) There is no obligation on the opposing party to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element necessary to sustain an adjudication in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) “[W]e liberally construe plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant’s own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64.)
“A defendant . . . has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
In resolving the motion, the court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Rather, the role of the trial court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
Separate Statement
“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1), requires each motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by a separate statement “ ‘setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.’ ” California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2)4 states: “ ‘The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion.’ ” Under the Rules of Court, “ ‘ “Material facts’ “ are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.’ ” (Rule 3.1350(a)(2).)” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 874-875.)
“The point of the separate statement is not to craft a narrative, but to be a concise list of the material facts and the evidence that supports them. “ ‘The separate statement serves two important functions in a summary judgment proceeding: It notifies the parties which material facts are at issue, and it provides a convenient and expeditious vehicle permitting the trial court to hone in on the truly disputed facts.’ ” [Citation.]” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875.)
“In opposing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must submit a separate statement setting forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. [Citations,] Without a separate statement of undisputed facts with references to supporting evidence in the form of affidavits or declarations, it is impossible for the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of disputed facts.” (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116; disapproved on other grounds by Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 41-42.)
The City has submitted a separate statement of undisputed material facts (SSUMF) setting forth six facts it contends are undisputed (UMFs).
As noted above, plaintiff has not filed any documents in response to the motion for summary judgment.
The UMF’s are:
“Plaintiff was traveling at the subject location when suddenly and without warning there was an unsafe road design and or condition, resulting in bodily injuries to Plaintiff.” (UMF No. 1.)
“The complaint contains three causes of action: Premises Liability, General Negligence, Dangerous Condition of Public Property, all of which name the City of Santa Barbara as a defendant.” (UMF No. 2.)
“On May 5, 2025, the City received a claim from First Law Group on behalf of Plaintiff Misty Dawn Hoover. The claim that was sent to the City indicated that Misty Dawn Hoover sustained injuries on January 11, 2025, due to ‘road design defect . . . on US-101 S/B.” (UMF No. 3.)
“On May 14, 2025, City Risk Analyst Marisa Kahn mailed a claim rejection letter to Attorney Dean Hakak at First Law Group in Covina, California. In rejecting the Plaintiff's claim, the letter notified Mr. Hakak that, “ ‘The City of Santa Barbara neither owns, maintains or otherwise exercises authority over US-101.’ ” Mr. Hakak was also advised that there is no basis to include the City in any litigation arising from this incident, and that the City would avail itself of C. C.P. §1038 and seek costs and attorney fees if it was wrongfully included in this litigation.” (UMF No. 4.)
“The City of Santa Barbara does not own, maintain, control or otherwise exercise authority over US-101. Nor does the City have any input, control or authority on the design, or construction of the US-101.” (UMF No. 5.)
“The plaintiff’s January 11, 2025 accident occurred on a roadway not owned, operated or maintained by the City of Santa Barbara.” (UMF No. 6.)
Evidence in support of the UMFs is provided by way of plaintiff’s complaint, the declaration of the City’s Risk Analyst Marisa Kahn, and the declaration of City Engineer Ashleigh Sizoo. The evidence all supports the facts as stated in the SSUMF.
General Negligence
As noted above, the first cause of action is for negligence.
“Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).)
“In other words, direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles. [Citations.] As Zelig observed, quoting from an earlier case, “ ‘ “ ‘the intent of the [Tort Claims Act] is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances....’ ” ’ ” [Citation.]” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.)
Plaintiff has set forth no statutory authority to permit an action against the City under a general negligence cause of action.
Premises Liability and Dangerous Condition of Public Property
“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:
“(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or
“(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (Gov. Code, § 835.)
It is axiomatic that a preliminary condition of liability under Government Code section 835 is that the public entity own or control the property for any liability to be imposed.
“ ‘Property of a public entity’ ” and “ ‘public property’ ” mean real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity. (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (c), supra..) For liability to be imposed on a public entity for a dangerous condition of property, the entity must be in a position to protect against or warn of the hazard. (Gov. Code, § 835, subd. (b), supra..) Therefore, the crucial element is not ownership, but rather control.” (Mamola v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 781, 788.)
The City has met its burden of proof that there are no triable issues of material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The City did not own or control any of the property that plaintiff contends constitutes a dangerous condition. Plaintiff has provided nothing to refute the proof.
The motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Motion for Defense Costs
The City seeks defense costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1038. That section provides:
“(a) In any civil proceeding under the Government Claims Act (Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810) of Title 1 of the Government Code) or for express or implied indemnity or for contribution in any civil action, the court, upon motion of the defendant or cross-defendant, shall, at the time of the granting of any summary judgment, motion for directed verdict, motion for judgment under Section 631.8, or any nonsuit dismissing the moving party other than the plaintiff, petitioner, cross-complainant, or intervenor, or at a later time set forth by rule of the Judicial Council adopted under Section 1034, determine whether or not the plaintiff, petitioner, cross-complainant, or intervenor brought the proceeding with reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law which warranted the filing of the complaint, petition, cross-complaint, or complaint or answer in intervention. If the court should determine that the proceeding was not brought in good faith and with reasonable cause, an additional issue shall be decided as to the defense costs reasonably and necessarily incurred by the party or parties opposing the proceeding, and the court shall render judgment in favor of that party in the amount of all reasonable and necessary defense costs, in addition to those costs normally awarded to the prevailing party. An award of defense costs under this section shall not be made except on notice contained in a party’s papers and an opportunity to be heard.
“(b) “ ‘Defense costs,’ ” as used in this section, shall include reasonable attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, the expense of services of experts, advisers, and consultants in defense of the proceeding, and where reasonably and necessarily incurred in defending the proceeding.
“(c) This section shall be applicable only on motion made before the discharge of the jury or entry of judgment, and any party requesting the relief pursuant to this section waives any right to seek damages for malicious prosecution. Failure to make the motion shall not be deemed a waiver of the right to pursue a malicious prosecution action.
“(d) This section shall only apply if the defendant or cross-defendant has made a motion for summary judgment, judgment under Section 631.8, directed verdict, or nonsuit and the motion is granted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1038.)
“[T]he recognized purpose of section 1038 is to discourage frivolous lawsuits by allowing blameless public entities to recover their defense costs. [Citation.] That the plaintiff may have her own legitimate tactical reasons for keeping the public entity in the lawsuit does not make the underlying claim against a public entity any less frivolous. Nor does it justify requiring the public entity to finance plaintiff’s choice of litigation tactics.” (Hall v. Regents of University of California (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1587 (Hall).)
Evidence in support of the motion illustrates:
On May 5, 2025, the City received a claim from plaintiff’s attorney that indicated plaintiff sustained injuries on January 11, 2025, due to a road design defect on US-101 Southbound. (Kahn Decl., ¶ 4.)
On May 14, 2025, the City mailed a claim rejection letter to plaintiff’s attorney that notified plaintiff’s attorney that: “The City of Santa Barbara neither owns, maintains or otherwise exercises authority over US-101.” The letter further advised plaintiff’s counsel that there was no basis to include the City in any litigation arising from the incident and that the City would seek attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1038 if it were wrongfully included in the litigation. (Kahn Decl., ¶ 5 & Exh. F.)
Despite being advised that the location of plaintiff’s accident occurred on a State of California Highway, and not in an area owned, controlled, or maintained by the City, plaintiff filed suit against the City on June 5, 2025. (Shapiro Decl., ¶ 5.)
On September 4, 2025, the day after the City was served with the lawsuit, counsel for the City placed a telephone call to plaintiff’s counsel to discuss the fact that the City had no ownership or control of the accident location, but was advised that plaintiff’s counsel was unavailable. (Shapiro Decl., ¶ 6.) Counsel for the City left a message as to why he was calling and followed up with an email that advised plaintiff’s attorney of the lack of involvement or potential liability, and requested a dismissal of the City without prejudice. (Ibid. & Exh. A.)
Not receiving a response to the call or email of September 4, 2025, on September 9, 2025, counsel for the City sent another email to plaintiff’s attorney asking for confirmation that plaintiff’s counsel received the September 4th email. (Shapiro Decl., ¶ 7 & Exh. B.)
On September 19, 2025, counsel for the City followed up with a third request. (Shapiro Decl., ¶ 8 & Exh. C.)
By way of this evidence, the City has established that plaintiff knew that the City could not be held liable for plaintiff’s claimed injuries, that the action was not filed with a good faith belief that the City could be held liable, and that despite this knowledge plaintiff persisted in pursuing the action against the City. The court finds that the City has met its burden of proof.
“To avoid paying defense costs under section 1038, plaintiff must show he or she filed and pursued the action with “ ‘reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law which warranted the filing of the complaint, ...’ ” [Citation.]” (Hall, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1585.)
Plaintiff has not filed any opposition or other response to the motion, and has not shown that she acted with reasonable cause and with a good faith belief that there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law.
The City seeks $9,500.00 in defense costs. This amount is calculated as $500.00 per hour, with 15 hours spent on the case at the time of filing the motion, and an estimated additional 4 hours to prepare replies and argue the motions. (Shapiro Decl., ¶ 15.) Shapiro describes the tasks that resulted in the expenditure of the 15 hours to date. (Id., at ¶ 16.)
The court finds that the hourly rate is reasonable, and the time spent to date was reasonable and necessary in defending this action. The court is not inclined to award the estimated additional 4 hours because plaintiff has filed no opposition to the present motions. As such, the court will grant the City’s motion for costs of defense in the amount of $7,500.00.