Citibank N.A. v. Svetlana L. Dayal

Case Number

25CV02873

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 01/28/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Suttell & Hammer, APC’s Special Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Citibank N.A. and Cross-Defendants Citigroup, Inc. and Jane Fraser: Adam Taryle, Mathew A. Morr, Ballard Spahr LLP

                            

For Cross Defendant Suttell & Hammer, APC: Luke K. Chamberlain, Messer Strickler Burnette, Ltd.

                            

For Defendant and Cross-Complainant Svetlana L. Dayal: Self-represented

RULING

For all reasons stated herein, Suttell & Hammer, APC’s special motion to strike allegations against Suttell & Hammer, APC, and Citibank N.A.’s joinder thereto, is granted. The first cause of action in the first amended cross-complaint against Suttell & Hammer, APC, and Citibank N.A., for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is stricken. The motion is otherwise denied.

Background

On May 7, 2025, Plaintiff Citibank N.A. (Citibank) initiated this action by filing a complaint against Defendant Svetlana Dayal (Dayal) alleging one cause of action (COA) for breach of contract.

As alleged in the complaint: On June 14, 2017, Citibank entered into a written agreement with Dayal. (Compl., ¶ BC-1 & Ex. A.) The attached agreement is a “Card Agreement” for payment on a credit card account. (Compl., Ex. A.) On January 7, 2025, Dayal breached the agreement by failing to make payments when due. (Compl., ¶ BC-2.) Citibank suffered damages in the unpaid amount due for a total of $16,761.33. (Compl., ¶¶ BC-2, BC-4.)

On August 27, 2025, Dayal filed an answer generally denying the allegations in the complaint and asserting nine affirmative defenses.

On August 27, 2025, Dayal filed a verified cross-complaint against cross-Defendants Citibank, Jane Fraser (Fraser), the chief executive officer of Citibank’s corporate parent Citigroup, Inc. (Citigroup), and Suttell & Hammer, APC (SHA), counsel of record identified on Citibank’s complaint in this action.

On September 4, 2025, Dayal filed her operative verified first amended cross-complaint (FACC) against Citibank, Citigroup, Fraser, and SHA, alleging five causes of action for (1) violation of the Fair Dept Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) against Citibank and SHA (15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f & 1692g), (2) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) against Citibank and Fraser (15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)), (3) defamation per se against Citibank and Fraser, (4) restitution against Citibank and Fraser, and (5) unfair competition against Citibank and Fraser. Although Citigroup was a named cross-Defendant in the caption of the FACC, no COA was asserted against Citigroup in the body of the FACC.

As alleged in the FACC: Citibank and SHA violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect on a disputed debt in this action without first validating the debt in violation of federal law. (FACC, ¶¶ 11-17.) Citibank and Fraser violated the FCRA by falsely publishing an account as an obligation owed by Dayal when such obligation had been assigned to the account of the United States under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) (50 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq.). (FACC, ¶¶ 18-23.) Citibank and Fraser are liable for defamation for publishing such false information to the credit bureaus. (FACC, ¶¶ 24-28.) Citibank and Fraser have been unjustly enriched at the expense of Dayal because the account over which Citibank sued Dayal in this action has been assigned under the TWEA. (FACC, ¶¶ 29-33.) Citibank and Fraser’s actions in violation of the FDCPA and FCRA also constituted unfair competition. (FACC, ¶¶ 34-37.)

On October 2, 2025, Dayal filed a proof of service indicating SHA was served with the FACC by substituted service effectuated on September 19, 2025.

On October 20, 2025, SHA filed an answer generally denying Dayal’s allegations and asserting five affirmative defenses.

On November 18, 2025, SHA filed a special motion to strike the FACC as it pertains to SHA including the first COA in the FACC for violation of the FDCPA. SHA argues that the complaint it filed as counsel in this action and the alleged prelitigation communications in advance of the complaint are protected activity under step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Further, SHA argues that Dayal’s allegations have no merit under step two.

On December 23, 2025, Citibank and Citigroup joined SHA’s special motion to strike. As discussed below, Citigroup’s joinder to this motion was ineffective because it was filed when Citigroup was in default, but this has no impact on this ruling.

On January 9, 2026, Dayal filed an opposition to this motion, arguing that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to debt collection activity under step one of the analysis and her verified FACC satisfies the minimum merit necessary under the step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Analysis

“The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate Defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the Defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the Defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. We have described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation.] The Court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the Plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the Plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the Defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the Plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385.)

Protected activity under the first step includes: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

“At this first step, Courts are to ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the Defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] The Defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) “The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the Plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the Defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92.)

The FACC alleges only one COA against moving party SHA, the first COA for violation of the FDCPA. (FACC, ¶¶ 11-17.) Citibank, who filed a joinder to this motion, is also named as a cross-Defendant in the first COA on the basis that SHA is acting as Citibank’s agent by pursuing this action. (FACC, ¶ 17.) SHA argues that the allegations against it in the FACC including the alleged prelitigation communications are protective activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Motion, p. 5, l. 25 – p. 7, l. 3.)

The first COA in the FACC alleges in part: “13. On or about March 5, 2025, Cross-Complainant disputed the alleged obligation and demanded validation under § 1692g. [¶] 14. Cross-Defendants failed to provide validation, [and] instead continued collection activity by filing a lawsuit. [¶] 15. By attempting to collect without validating, by misrepresenting the character, amount, or legal status of the debt, and by using unfair means to collect, Cross-Defendants violated §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g…. [¶] … [¶] 17. … Citibank ratified such conduct by permitting the continuation of this action despite actual notice of the assignment and dispute. Accordingly, Citibank shares liability for the FDCPA violations alleged herein.” (FACC, ¶¶ 13-17.) The FACC also alleges that SHA “failed to provide a validation as is required by law, and instead, initiated a lawsuit against Cross-Complainant, in violation of FDCPA and other State and Federal laws.” (FACC, ¶ 8.)

The first COA is based on SHA’s action as counsel and Citibank’s status as Plaintiff in this action. (See FACC, ¶¶ 11-17.) The FACC alleges that SHA and Citibank (as SHA’s principal) misrepresented the status of the alleged debt and unfairly sought to collect it in this action and thereby violated federal law. (FACC, ¶¶ 13-17.) The complaint filed by Citibank in this action through its counsel, SHA, is a “writing made before a … judicial proceeding.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1).). It is also a “writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a … judicial body ….” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).). “[S]tatements, writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute ….” (Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 965.)

Contrary to Dayal’s argument, debt collection lawsuits are not necessarily excepted from the anti-SLAPP statute based on the scope of the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47. “Although the litigation privilege sometimes bears on the analysis of the first (protected activity) or second (minimal merit) steps of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the anti-SLAPP statute and the litigation privilege are not coextensive.” (Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 361, 375-376.) Where, as here, a complaint filed by the debt collector in Court is the collection activity at issue, Courts have applied the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Aguilar v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 607, 618-631 [finding no minimal merit under step two]; see also Rodriguez v. LVNV Funding, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 717, 722-729 [finding minimal merit established under step two].)

The Court also considered the acts alleged in the first COA to determine if any of them form a basis of liability from non-protected activity. (See FACC, ¶¶ 11-17.) “If a cause of action contains multiple claims and a moving party fails to identify how the speech or conduct underlying some of those claims is protected activity, it will not carry its first-step burden as to those claims.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) Here, the FACC’s first COA only contains two theories of liability, that SHA is liable for the collection activity of pursuing this action and that Citibank is likewise liable because of its status as Plaintiff in this action. (FACC, ¶¶ 14-17.) Both theories are premised on the filing of this action. There are no non-protected claims in the first COA under step one. (FACC, ¶¶ 11-17.) The complaint in this action is a protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 421.16, subdivision (e).

As to step two, “[t]here are four elements to an FDCPA cause of action: (1) the Plaintiff is a ‘consumer’ under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3); (2) the debt arises out of a transaction entered into for personal purposes; (3) the Defendant is a ‘debt collector’ under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); and (4) the Defendant violated one of the provisions contained in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a–1692o.” (Wheeler v. Premiere Credit of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2015) 80 F.Supp.3d 1108, 1112.) Dayal argues in opposition that SHA “[a]ttempted to collect a disputed debt without providing validation,” “[m]isrepresented the legal status of the debt,” “[c]ontinued collection activity after notice of dispute,” and “[p]articipated in the publication of false credit information.” (Opp., pp. 5-6.) SHA argues that Dayal cannot support the fourth element. (See Motion, p. 7, l. 4 – p. 10, l. 4.)

Dayal relies solely on the verified FACC and does not submit any additional evidence in opposition to this motion. (Opp., pp. 4-6.) Dayal’s sole reliance on her verified FACC is improper as to step two. “As to the second step inquiry, a Plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its [pleading], even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.) Because no competent evidence was submitted by Dayal in opposition, she has not carried her burden under step two.

Even if the Court considered the verified FACC as evidence as argued by Dayal, her FACC fails to carry her burden to show minimal merit under step two. The FACC’s first COA is premised on Dayal’s position that her credit card accounts with Citibank have been assigned “to the account of the United States pursuant to 50 U.S. Code § 4305(b)(2).” (FACC, ¶¶ 2, 5, 7 & Exs. A-B.) “During the time of war … [¶] … [¶] Any payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery of property or interest therein, made to or for the account of the United States, or as otherwise directed, pursuant to this subdivision or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder shall to the extent thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the obligation of the person making the same; and no person shall be held liable in any Court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration of, or in pursuance of and in reliance on, this subdivision, or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder.” (50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(2), italics added.)
 

The FACC attaches a document purporting to be an assignment of Dayal’s Home Depot credit card accounts and alleges that these accounts have been assigned to the account of the United States. (FACC, ¶¶ 2, 5, 7 & Exs. A-B.) However, there is no evidence presented in the FACC that Dayal’s Home Depot credit card accounts were “made to or for the account of the United States, or as otherwise directed, pursuant to this subdivision or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder ….” (See 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(2).) The assignment attached to the FACC is signed only by Dayal and not by anyone affiliated with the United States government. (FACC, Ex. A.)

There is no evidence that these credit card accounts involved the specified wartime transactions pertaining to national security or defense issues as directed by the President of the United States under the TWEA. (See 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1).) There is no evidence that the President or United States government, as part of any wartime effort or national emergency, directed, instructed, or otherwise agreed pursuant to the TWEA that Dayal could assign her Home Depot credit card accounts to the United States government. (FACC, Ex. A.) There is no reasonable basis presented in the FACC on which Dayal could conclude that she could assign these credit card accounts to the United States government under the TWEA. (Ibid.)

SHA has presented evidence that it verified the debt related to Dayal’s credit card accounts before filing this action on behalf of Citibank. On February 2, 2025, SHA sent a debt verification letter to Dayal. (Affidavit of Robert C. Jindra (Jindra Decl.), ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. 1.) The February 21, 2025, letter from SHA identifies SHA as a debt collector, provides SHA’s debt collector license number and provides a reference number. (Jindra Decl., Ex. 1.) The letter describes the debt as a Citibank Home Depot consumer credit card account ending in 7603. (Ibid.) The letter states the last payment date, and the amount owed. (Ibid.) The letter provides information about how to dispute the debt, how to request information pertaining to the creditor, and how to obtain information pertaining to a debtor’s rights under the law. (Ibid.)

After Dayal responded on March 5, 2025, and requested validation of the debt, SHA performed an investigation. (Jindra Decl., ¶¶ 8-15, Ex. 2.) On March 27, 2025, SHA transmitted a debt validation letter to Dayal. (Jindra Decl., Ex. 2.) The March 27 letter (responding to Dayal’s March 5 letter requesting debt validation) identifies Citibank as the current and previous creditor, identifies the date Dayal became a Citibank customer, states the date of Dayal’s last payment and the amount owed, and provides copies of periodic billing statements and terms and conditions. (Ibid.) The March 27 letter states by “providing you with the information, we consider this matter addressed and will continue to consider this debt as valid.” (Ibid.) The letter identifies SHA as a debt collector. (Ibid.)

For all these reasons, Dayal has not stated a legally sufficient claim or made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment against SHA or Citibank as to the first COA for violation of the FDCPA. Dayal has not carried her burden under step two. The Court will grant SHA’s special motion to strike.

As to Citigroup’s joinder, “[a] Defendant against whom a default has been entered is out of Court and is not entitled to take any further steps in the cause affecting Plaintiff’s right of action ….” (Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386.) Citigroup’s joinder to this motion was ineffective because it was filed when Citigroup was in default. (Ibid.) However, the portion of the FACC at issue in this motion including the first COA does not make allegations against Citigroup. Citigroup’s ineffective joinder has no bearing on this ruling.