Michael Yen vs General Motors LLC

Case Number

25CV02585

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 01/12/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

Michael Yen v. General Motors LLC 

Case No. 25CV02585

           

Hearing Date: January 12, 2026                                                        

HEARING:              Motion of Defendant for Summary Judgment or for Summary Adjudication

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Michael Yen: Claude Manookian, Katrina B. Manookian, Artin Boughouzian, Manookian Law, APLC  

                                    For Defendant General Motors LLC: Mary Arens McBride, Ryan Kay, Sandra Habib, Erskine Law Group, APC

                                   

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of defendant General Motors LLC for summary judgment is granted.

Background:

This action involves claims by plaintiff Michael Yen regarding a 2022 Chevrolet Corvette (the Corvette). (Complaint, ¶ 5; Defendant’s Separate Statement [DSS], fact 1 & evidence cited.)

Yen was not the Corvette’s original owner and did not buy the Corvette new. (DSS, facts 2, 4 & evidence cited.) Earnhardt Chevrolet delivered the Corvette to its original owner on December 21, 2021, with 1 mile on its odometer. (DSS, fact 5 & evidence cited.) In connection with the delivery to the Corvette’s original owner in December 2021, GM issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty (the Warranty) with bumper-to-bumper coverage for the earlier of 36 months or 36,000 miles and powertrain coverage for the earlier of 60 months or 60,000 miles. (DSS, fact 6 & evidence cited.)

Yen bought the Corvette used from Porsche North Scottsdale, in Phoenix, Arizona, with 9,377 miles on the vehicle. (DSS, fact 2 & evidence cited.) Defendant General Motors LLC (GM) was not a party to the sale of the Corvette between Yen and Porsche North Scottsdale. (DSS, fact 3 & evidence cited.) Porsche North Scottsdale is not a GM-authorized dealership. (Ibid.)

GM did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to Yen or the vehicle when Yen bought the Corvette in January 2024. (DSS, fact 7 & evidence cited.) Yen received only the balance of coverages under the Warranty that GM issued in December 2021. (Ibid.)

On April 25, 2025, Yen filed his complaint in this action asserting six causes of action against GM: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.)—breach of express warranty; (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act—breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.)—breach of express warranty; (4) violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act—breach of implied warranty; (5) violation of Uniform Commercial Code (U. Com. Code, § 2313)—breach of express warranty; and (6) violation of Uniform Commercial Code (U. Com. Code, §§ 2314, 2315)—breach of implied warranty.

On July 7, 2025, GM filed its answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 25 affirmative defenses.

On September 18, 2025, GM filed this motion for summary judgment or alternatively for summary adjudication.

No opposition or other response to this motion has been filed by Yen. On January 2, 2026, GM filed a notice that no opposition had been received.

Analysis:

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

“For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication: [¶] … [¶] (2) A defendant … has met that party’s burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff … shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) There is no obligation on the opposing party to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)

Yen’s first two causes of action are for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act). GM argues that these causes of action fail because Yen did not purchase the vehicle new or from GM, and because Yen did not purchase the vehicle in California.

“The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act provides buyers of new motor vehicles with specific remedies when a vehicle turns out to be defective. [Citation.] [Civil Code section] 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) gives new car buyers what is known as a refund-or-replace remedy: It requires manufacturers to ‘promptly replace’ a defective new motor vehicle or ‘promptly make restitution’ to the buyer when the manufacturer is ‘unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle, as that term is defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22, to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts.’ These enhanced remedies under the Act for breach of express warranty are ‘distinct from’ and ‘in addition to’ remedies otherwise available in contract under the California Uniform Commercial Code. [Citation.]” (Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189, 195 (Rodriguez).)

“[Civil Code section] 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) defines ‘new motor vehicle’ to include a new vehicle ‘bought or used primarily for personal’ purposes as well as ‘a dealer-owned vehicle and a “demonstrator” or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 195.) “[A] motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty does not qualify as a ‘motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’ under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2)’s definition of ‘new motor vehicle’ unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale.” (Id. at p. 196)

GM has presented evidence that Yen did not purchase the Corvette as a new motor vehicle and that GM did not issue a new car warranty with the sale. GM has therefore met its initial burden on summary judgment that it is entitled to judgment on plaintiff’s first and second causes of action.

GM has also presented evidence that the sale of the Corvette did not occur within the State of California. The Song-Beverly Act “does not apply unless the vehicle was purchased in California.” (Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 483.) This provides a separate and additional basis upon which GM has met its initial burden on summary judgment on plaintiff’s first two causes of action.

Because GM has met its initial burden on summary judgment and summary adjudication on Yen’s first two causes of action, the burden shifts to Yen to show the existence of a triable issue of fact. Yen has not filed opposition to the motion and therefore has failed to meet that burden. GM is entitled to judgment as to the first and second causes of action.

Yen’s fifth and sixth causes of action are for violation of Uniform Commercial Code sections 2313 (fifth cause of action), and 2314 and 2315 (sixth cause of action).

“The Commercial Code’s express warranty provisions[, including section 2313,] are limited to warranties given by the seller directly to the buyer. [Citations.] Moreover, ‘the warranty sections ... are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract.’ [Citation.] In other words, while express warranties apply under the Commercial Code only to a seller in privity with the buyer, the buyer may sue a third-party manufacturer for breach of an express warranty in the absence of privity.” (Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1196, 1216–1217.) “Similarly, implied warranties arise under the Commercial Code[, including section 2314 and 2315,] only for a merchant or seller in privity with the buyer.” (Id. at p. 1217.)

Yen’s fifth and sixth causes of action assert breach of warranty claims only under Commercial Code sections 2313, 2314, and 2315 (Complaint, ¶¶ 56, 68), all of which require privity of contract. GM presents evidence that Yen purchased the Corvette from a third party and that GM is not in contractual privity with Yen. GM has therefore met its initial burden on summary judgment as to the fifth and sixth causes of action.

Because GM has met its initial burden on summary judgment and summary adjudication on Yen’s fifth and sixth causes of action, the burden shifts to Yen to show the existence of a triable issue of fact. Yen has not filed opposition to the motion and therefore has failed to meet that burden. GM is entitled to judgment as to the fifth and sixth causes of action.

Yen’s third and fourth causes of action are for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

“The Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss) [citation] authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty. Magnuson-Moss ‘calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law,’ except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule. [Citation.] … [F]ailure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constituted a failure to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss.” (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 832–833.)

As discussed above, Yen has asserted express and implied warranty claims against GM as provided in the Song-Beverly Act or in the Commercial Code. Yen has not provided any argument or evidence in opposition and therefore has not provided any basis for finding either that GM’s legal arguments are inapplicable or that triable issues of fact exist. On that basis, the court concludes that the failure to state any warranty claim in the complaint demonstrates a failure to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss. GM has therefore met its initial burden on summary judgment as to the third and fourth causes of action.

Because GM has met its initial burden on summary judgment and summary adjudication on Yen’s third and fourth causes of action, the burden shifts to Yen to show the existence of a triable issue of fact. Yen has not filed opposition to the motion and therefore has failed to meet that burden. GM is entitled to judgment as to the third and fourth causes of action.

Having concluded that GM is entitled to judgment on each of the causes of action of Yen’s complaint, GM’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.