Darryl Genis vs Blue Horizon Management Company et al

Case Number

25CV02491

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 11/12/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff: Robert Stoll Jr.

For Defendant Blue Horizon: Thomas Gelini

For Defendant DeRoos: Kristine Gamboa, Michael J. Nourafshan, Tabitha Flood

HEARING

Demurrer of Defendants to First Amended Complaint

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein, the demurrer of Defendant Debra De Roos to the first and second causes of action of Plaintiff Darryl Genis’s first amended complaint is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file and serve his second amended complaint on or before November 26, 2025.

Background

As alleged in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC):

Plaintiff Darryl Genis was at the premises located at 721 Eucalyptus Avenue, Santa Barbara (the Premises) and, on October 30, 2024, tripped and fell over an unprotected tree stump in the backyard of the Premises. (FAC, ¶¶ Prem.L-1, GN-1.) The condition was negligently allowed to remain for a period of time for Plaintiffs to have actual and constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. (FAC, ¶ GN-1.) There was no warning posted of the dangerous condition and no reasonable steps were taken to remediate the condition. (Ibid.)

Defendants Blue Horizon Management Company (Blue Horizon) and Debra De Roos negligently owned, maintained, managed, and operated the Premises. (FAC, ¶ Prem.L-2.)

On April 23, 2025, Genis filed his original complaint in this action asserting causes of action for premises liability and general negligence against both Defendants.

On June 10, 2025, without any response having been filed, Genis filed his FAC. The FAC reasserts the same two causes of action of the original complaint and adds a third cause of action for retaliatory eviction against Defendant De Roos.

On September 11, 2025, De Roos filed her demurrer to the first and second causes of action of the FAC. This demurrer is before the Court for this hearing.

On September 18, 2025, Blue Horizon filed its answer to the FAC, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 18 affirmative defenses. Blue Horizon concurrently filed a cross-complaint for indemnity and declaratory relief against De Roos.

On October 24, 2025, De Roos filed her answer to the Blue Horizon cross-complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 18 affirmative defenses.

The demurrer of De Roos is opposed by Genis.

Analysis

     “ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

    “The elements of a negligence claim, and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. [Citations.] Premises liability ‘ “is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises” ’; accordingly, ‘ “mere possession with its attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the imposition of an affirmative duty to act.” ’ [Citation.] But the duty arising from possession and control of property is adherence to the same standard of care that applies in negligence cases.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)

   “No strict requirements exist for the form of such allegations. The legal conclusion that a ‘duty’ exists is not necessary. … [T]he duty to exercise reasonable care can be inferred from the assertion of the fact that Defendant owned and managed the property. [Citation.] The negligence element may be generally pleaded; the breach of duty of care may be alleged by stating the act was negligently done. [Citations.] Here, the complaint alleged Defendant’s negligent management and maintenance of his property. Proximate cause, as here, may also be simply set forth.” (Pultz v. Holgerson (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1117, fns. omitted.)

   De Roos argues that Genis has not sufficiently alleged that De Roos knew of the alleged dangerous condition of the property so as to be able to address that condition. In opposition, Genis argues that it is sufficient to allege either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. In reply, De Roos argues that the general rule of premises liability does not apply to landlords, citing Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504 (Uccello).

   In Uccello, the issue was the duty of care owed by a landlord to a tenant’s invitees from an attack by a vicious dog kept by the tenants on the leased premises. (Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 507.) The Uccello Court held that “a duty of care arises when the landlord has actual knowledge of the presence of the dangerous animal and when he has the right to remove the animal by retaking possession of the premises.” (Ibid.) In reaching this conclusion, the Uccello Court stated:

    “Historically, the public policy of this state generally has precluded a landlord’s liability for injuries to his tenant or his tenant’s invitees from a dangerous condition on the premises which comes into existence after the tenant has taken possession. This is true even though by the exercise of reasonable diligence the landlord might have discovered the condition.” (Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 510.)

    “‘In the absence of agreement to the contrary, the lessor surrenders both possession and control of the land to the lessee, retaining only a reversionary interest; and he has no right even to enter without the permission of the lessee. Consequently, it is the general rule that he is under no obligation to anyone to look after the premises or keep them in repair, and is not responsible, either to persons injured on the land or to those outside of it, for conditions which develop or are created by the tenant after possession has been transferred. Neither is he responsible, in general, for the activities which the tenant carries on upon the land after such transfer, even when they create a nuisance.’ [Citation.]” (Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 511.)

   “To this general rule of nonliability, the law has developed a number of exceptions, such as where the landlord covenants or volunteers to repair a defective condition on the premises [citations], where the landlord has actual knowledge of defects which are unknown and not apparent to the tenant and he fails to disclose them to the tenant [citation], where there is a nuisance existing on the property at the time the lease is made or renewed [citation], when a safety law has been violated [citation], or where the injury occurs on a part of the premises over which the landlord retains control, such as common hallways, stairs, elevators or roof [citation].” (Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 511.)

   “A common element in these exceptions is that either at or after the time possession is given to the tenant the landlord retains or acquires a recognizable degree of control over the dangerous condition with a concomitant right and power to obviate the condition and prevent the injury. In these situations, the law imposes on the landlord a duty to use ordinary care to eliminate the condition with resulting liability for injuries caused by his failure so to act.” (Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 511.)

   De Roos argues that Genis has not sufficiently alleged that De Roos had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition or that De Roos retained control over the Premises where the dangerous condition is located.

   The Defendant’s knowledge is an ultimate fact (Crouch v. Wilson (1920) 183 Cal. 576, 579) that may be alleged using conclusive language (City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 803). The express allegation that Defendants knew of the condition is therefore sufficient to allege knowledge. It is not necessary to allege how a Defendant obtained that knowledge or evidentiary detail regarding proof of such knowledge.

   Control is a different issue. Genis alleges that he entered into a written lease for rental of the Premises on February 10, 2020, and was in possession of the Premises. (FAC, pp. 6-7, ¶¶ 3, 10.) In the absence of other allegations by which landlord premises liability would be permissible, Genis must allege some aspect of control of the Premises by which De Roos would have the right and power to address the dangerous condition alleged to have cause injury. The demurrer will be sustained on this ground with leave to amend.