Summerland Sanitary District v. Maria Stawiecki, et al.

Case Number

25CV02241

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 02/11/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication and for Permanent Injunction

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Summerland Sanitary District: Janet K. McGinnis

                                   

For Defendants Maria Stawiecki and Ryszard Stawiecki: Self-Represented

    

RULING

For all reasons stated herein, Plaintiff Summerland Sanitary District’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication and for permanent injunction is denied.

The PreTrial Date of 4/15/26 at 11:30 am is [again] confirmed; trial begins at 9am on 4/16/26 and continues until completed. Do not stipulate to a continuance. Do not file an ex parte motion to continue.

The MSC Date of 3/20/26 at 8:30am in Department #5 via Zoom is confirmed. 

Background

On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff Summerland Sanitary District (District) filed this complaint against Defendants Maria Stawiecki and Ryszard Stawiecki (collectively, Stawieckis) alleging three causes of action for (1) public nuisance, (2) recovery of abatement costs, and (3) declaratory relief. The dispute concerns a failing sewer lateral at 121 Hollister Street in Summerland, a residential property (Property) within the District’s jurisdiction and owned by the Stawieckis.

As alleged in the complaint:

The District is a California special district formed in 1957 pursuant to the Sanitary District Act of 1923 to provide sewerage service to properties in its jurisdiction. (Compl., ¶ 1.)

 

The Stawieckis own and reside at the Property. (Compl., ¶ 2.) The Property is within the jurisdiction of the District and receives sewer service via a lateral connected to District’s sewer system. (Ibid.)

The Property’s sewerage service is provided by the Property’s lateral connected to the main under Lillie Avenue. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Much of this sewer lateral is installed underneath the adjacent property at 2249 Lillie Avenue (Adjacent Property). (Compl., ¶ 9.)

In July 2024, recurring noxious raw sewage spills and odiferous discharges occurred on the Property and on the Adjacent Property. (Compl., ¶ 8.)

The District advised the Stawieckis that District Ordinance 18 requires them to maintain their sewer lateral and its wye connection to the main at their expense and that failure to comply would lead to enforcement. (Compl., ¶ 15.) The District requested that the Stawieckis hire a certified plumbing company to clean and repair their sewer lateral immediately and to have this completed by no later than August 8, 2024. (Compl., ¶ 13.)

Repairing the existing Property lateral or using any alternative route to install a new sewer lateral will require Stawieckis’ cooperation with the Adjacent Property owners. (Compl., ¶ 23.) Exhibit A to the complaint illustrates two proposed routes for a new lateral and the existing failing lateral. (Compl., ¶ 11, Ex. A.)

The Stawieckis failed to inspect, repair, and maintain the Property’s sewer lateral, installed and continue to use a porta-potty at the Property, continue to inhabit the residence on the Property without a connected sewer lateral, and failed to comply with the District’s repeated notices of violation. (Compl., ¶ 64.) This has resulted in a continuing public nuisance. (Ibid.)

The District seeks relief in the form of general compensatory damages and a mandatory or prohibitory injunction. (Compl., ¶ 69 & p. 13.) The District seeks an order authorizing the District to conduct all necessary repair, investigation, assessment, or cleanup, and mandating that the Stawieckis abate their nuisance within thirty days. (Ibid.) The District requests an order permitting the District to collect all related costs, expenses, fees, and charges in the same manner as it collects sewer service charges from the Property. (Ibid.) The District requests the Court order that all said damages constitute a lien on the Property. (Ibid.)

On October 6, 2025, the District moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication as to each cause of action (COA) and certain asserted defenses, and for a permanent injunction. The Stawieckis opposed the District’s motion.

On January 7, 2026, the Court ordered the Stawieckis to submit a revised separate statement and related documents so that the Court could evaluate this motion. The parties have filed additional documents in support of and in opposition to this motion.

Analysis

(1)       Standard on Summary Judgment

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)

“The motion shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).)

“A Plaintiff … has met that party’s burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the Plaintiff … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the Defendant … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The Defendant … shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the Court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the Court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the Court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437(c), subd. (c).)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more Defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

(2)       Unresolved Issues of Damages as to the First and Second COA

The District has moved for summary judgment as to the entire complaint or summary adjudication as to each COA in its complaint. Summary adjudication of a COA cannot be granted unless all the elements of the COA are completely resolved by the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “On a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the pleadings delimit the scope of the issues, and the function of affidavits, declarations, or other supporting evidence is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1132.)

The first COA seeks the recovery of monetary damages among other relief: “As a result of Defendants’ actions and omissions, District has suffered and will continue to suffer general, compensatory, and consequential damages, including any and all amounts incurred and to be incurred for the investigation, assessment, monitoring, removal, and remediation of the continuing nuisance created by Defendants. District’s damages are continuing, have increased with the initiation of this enforcement action, and will increase exponentially if District is required to undertake the abatement of the nuisance, including because it must pay prevailing wages and competitively bid the abatement project. District’s consequential expense and damage for Defendants’ maintenance of this nuisance are continuing and unknown at this time and shall be proven at the time of trial.” (Compl., ¶ 67.)

The second COA states in part: “District hereby seeks recovery, reimbursement, indemnity, and contribution from Defendants, and each of them, for any and all past, present, and future abatement and response costs incurred to abate the nuisance on the Property, together with interest thereon.” (Compl., ¶ 71.)

The prayer for relief in the complaint demands “for the recovery of all abatement costs … incurred or to be incurred by District in connection with Defendants’ defective sewer lateral’s release and threatened release …,” “for general compensatory and consequential damages in amounts shown at trial,” and “for reimbursement of the expense for District employees and counsel to enforce District Ordinance 14, expert fees and costs, and litigation costs and fees ….” (Compl., p. 13, ll. 11-26.)

Material fact No. 21 states in part: “District seeks a judgment allowing recovery of all its incurred expenses, fees, and costs at the time of this motion’s determination and for recovery of all expenses, fees, and costs to be incurred for continuing abatement and litigation expense.” (Corrected Reply to Stawieckis’ Response to Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts filed February 3, 2026 [SSUMF], Disputed No. 21.)

Material fact No. 93 states: “District incurred and continues to incur fees for its … managers to try to obtain voluntary compliance with the Sewer Use Ordinance and to abate the Stawieckis’ public nuisance. Stawieckis are liable for all District costs and fees for prosecuting this enforcement action since August 1, 2024, and continuing until abatement is achieved.” (SSUMF, Disputed No. 93.)

District seeks the recovery of all abatement costs as damages. Abatement has not occurred. The costs associated with abatement are not established. Attempts to achieve voluntary abatement are ongoing. It is not established if those efforts will be successful.

“Because issues of the calculation of damages apparently remain to be determined, it is not appropriate to grant summary judgment ….” (Department of Industrial Relations v. UI Video Stores, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1097.) “A determination of liability alone does not completely dispose of the cause of action.” Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 242-243.) “We conclude that Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1), does not permit summary adjudication of a single item of compensatory damage which does not dispose of an entire cause of action. The trial Court properly denied the motion for summary adjudication on this basis.” (DeCastro West Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 410, 422.) The Court will deny the District’s motion as to the first and second COA because there are unresolved issues of damages. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Summary judgment as to the entire complaint is also denied on this basis. (See id., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

(3)       Disputed Material Fact No. 11

“The supporting papers shall include a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).) “ ‘Material facts’ are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(2).) “The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion.” (Id., rule 3.1350(d)(2).) Courts have instructed litigants to “[i]nclude only those facts which are truly material to the claims or defenses involved because the separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included. Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in your separate statement, the motion must be denied! [Citation.]” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 (Nazir).)

District submits 98 material facts in its separate statement. Some of the material facts have subparts. In addition to unresolved issues of damages, it appears there are triable factual disputes as to some of the material facts submitted in support of the District’s motion. It would be inappropriate to grant the District’s motion for this additional reason. (See Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 252.)

Material fact No. 11 states in part: “No special circumstances existed on the Property that warranted granting any exception or relief from District ordinances.” (SSUMF, Disputed No. 11.)

Article II of the Summerland Sanitary District Sewer Use Ordinance, section 2.4, subdivision (a), defines special circumstances as follows: “When any person, by reason of special circumstances, is of the opinion that any provision of this or any other ordinance is unjust or inequitable as applied to his or her premises or circumstances, he or she may file a petition with the Board of Directors, citing the provision complained of, and requesting suspension or modification of that provision as applied to his or her premises.” (District Motion, Ex. 3, p. 19 [SSD_000019].)

The Stawieckis respond, in part: “Disputed. There are special circumstances in this case … The lateral that is in disrepair runs through the property of 2294 and cannot be repaired without an easement on file with the Santa Barbara Building and Development office. Our attempts to reach an agreement with the owners have been unsuccessful as they do not wish us to use their land for our lateral.” (SSUMF, Disputed No. 11.)

Although the District submits evidence that the Stawieckis did not seek to establish special circumstances though the District’s formal processes, material fact No. 11 states that it is material whether special circumstances existed. There appears to be triable issues of fact whether special circumstances existed at the Property pertaining to an easement of the Adjacent Property.

(4)       Disputed Material Fact No. 39

Material fact No. 39 states in part: “Rooter Solutions’s contract was canceled after thirty days because the Stawieckis did not follow through.” (SSUMF, Disputed No. 39.)

The Stawieckis respond, in part: “Disputed. All our attempts at acquiring an easement agreement from the owners so we could legally register it with the county and obtain permits could not be agreed upon and was denied by the 2294 owners. As such our plumber could not obtain a permit from the county to begin work on the lateral.” (SSUMF, Disputed No. 39.)

There appear to be triable issues of fact whether the Rooter Solutions contract was canceled because the Stawieckis did not follow through.

(5)       Disputed Material Fact No. 41

Material fact No. 41 states in part: “Stawieckis refused District’s offer for its legal counsel to assist them to develop a recorded agreement with the owner of 2294 Lillie to allow a lateral project to go forward for the Alternative 1 location or to repair the existing lateral.” (SSUMF, Disputed No. 41.)

The Stawieckis respond, in part: “Disputed. The district offered to write an MOU in which only the terms and conditions of the 2294 property would be agreed upon and none of our requests.” (SSUMF, Disputed No. 41.)

There appear to be triable issues of fact whether the Stawieckis refused a District offer to assist the Stawieckis with a recorded agreement.

(6)       The District’s Evidentiary Objections

Addressing the District’s objections to these statements included in the Stawieckis’ opposing separate statement, the Court will overrule the District’s objections that the statements are unsworn or undated. These statements filed by the Stawieckis on January 23, 2026, were signed under penalty of perjury by Maria Stawiecki (Maria) and dated December 18, 2025, as executed in Santa Barbara. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5.) The Court notes that the Stawieckis did not submit a revised declaration as ordered by the Court, but instead submitted the foregoing statements as part of their opposing separate statement. Moreover, the date of the signature, December 18, appears to be a typographical error and a holdover from the prior iteration of this document. Nonetheless, the Court declines to exclude these statements on these bases given there was a declaration executed by Maria in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5.

The Court will overrule the District’s objections of foundation and hearsay as to these statements because they appear to be within the personal knowledge of Maria and not based on hearsay. (See Evid. Code, §§ 403, 702, 1200.) Maria’s foundation and personal knowledge are further established by her prior declaration filed with the Court on December 18, 2025. (See Stawiecki Decl., ¶¶ 5-14.) “It is the general rule that statements in affidavits are presumed to be made on personal knowledge unless stated to be on information and belief and unless it appears affirmatively or by fair inference that they [c]ould not have been, and were not, on such knowledge.” (Foraker v. O'Brien (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 856, 863.) Objections to these statements are otherwise overruled. This ruling does not address objections to statements not material to the disposition of this motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

(7)       Third COA for Declaratory Relief

The District submits material fact Nos. 97-98 in support of the third COA for declaratory relief. Material fact No. 97 states: “The Court should declare the condition of the Property to be a public nuisance and order immediate abatement consistent with District’s Sewer Use and Enforcement Ordinances 13, 14, 16, and 18.” (SSUMF, Disputed No. 97.) Material fact No. 98 states in part: “The Court should enter judgment in the District’s favor and against Stawieckis, and permanently enjoin and prohibit Stawieckis and their agents ….” (SSUMF, Disputed No. 98.) These material facts are stated in the form of argument without supporting evidence and do not independently establish any right to relief. The Court will deny the motion as to the third COA for these additional reasons.

(8)       The Stawieckis’ Affirmative Defenses

“[A grant of summary adjudication of an affirmative defense is proper if it ‘completely disposes’ of that defense.” (North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1145, 1160.) The District’s notice of motion moves for summary adjudication as to “as to all stated defenses,” but the District’s separate statement of material facts only sets forth facts as to certain portions of these defenses and only as to the first COA. (Compare SSUMF, p. 65, ll. 17 - p. 66, ll. 24 with Answer, ¶¶ 4, 6 & Attach., Nos. 4, 6.) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of … an affirmative defense ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) The District’s separate statement does not establish that the District is entitled to summary adjudication as to any of these defenses in their entirety. There also appears to be disputed facts as to the easement over the Adjacent Property. The Court will deny the motion as to these affirmative defenses.

(9)       The District’s Request for a Permanent Injunction

The District seeks a permanent injunction against the Stawieckis. “A permanent injunction is very different from a pendente lite injunction [such as a preliminary injunction]. A permanent injunction is an equitable remedy for certain torts or wrongful acts of a Defendant where a damage remedy is inadequate. A permanent injunction is a determination on the merits that a Plaintiff has prevailed on a cause of action for tort or other wrongful act against a Defendant and that equitable relief is appropriate. A permanent injunction is not issued to maintain the status quo but is a final judgment on the merits.” (Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 640, 646.)

The District must prevail on the merits of a cause of action before it is entitled to a permanent injunction. As discussed above, the District has not established in this motion that it is entitled to summary adjudication as to any COA asserted in its complaint. The District did not move for a preliminary injunction. (See Donahue Schriber Realty Group, Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1177 [factors pertaining to a preliminary injunction].)

The Court will deny the District’s request for a permanent injunction. This ruling is without prejudice as to any potential motion for preliminary injunction or for a permanent injunction following trial.

For all reasons stated herein, the Court will deny the District’s motion for summary judgment, summary adjudication, and for permanent injunction.

(10)     Upcoming Settlement Conference

Although the Court is denying this motion for the reasons stated above, the Court has concerns that the evidence suggests the Property does not have a functioning sewer lateral and this has been going on since 2024. The parties are encouraged to find a resolution of these issues at the upcoming settlement conference set for March 20, 2026.