Belladiem Bookin v. Eric Torbet, et al.

Case Number

25CV02153

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 01/28/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

(1) Defendant Edward Bookin’s Demurrer to Complaint (2) Defendant Eric Torbet’s Motion for A Stay of Discovery

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Belladiem Bookin, by and through her guardian ad litem Ann Marie

Plaintiff: Timothy C. Hale, Nye, Stirling, Hale, Miller & Sweet, LLP

                                   

For Defendant Eric Torbet: Hugo Torbet

                                   

For Defendant Edward Bookin: John C. Eck, Griffith & Thornburgh, LLP

                                   

For Defendant the Estate of Marika Bookin: Cristi Michelon Vasquez.

RULING

(1) For the reasons stated herein, the demurrer of Defendant Edward Bookin to Plaintiff’s complaint is ordered off-calendar. Defendant shall, on or March 2, 2026, file and serve their response to the first amended complaint filed by Plaintiff on December 3, 2025.

(2) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of Defendant Eric Torbet for an order staying discovery is denied.

Background

On April 9, 2025, Plaintiff Belladiem Bookin (Plaintiff), by and through her Conservator Ann Marie Plane, filed a complaint against Defendants Eric Torbet (Torbet), Edward Bookin (E Bookin), and the Estate (Estate) of Marika Bookin (M Bookin) (collectively, Defendants), alleging seven causes of action: (1) childhood sexual abuse – Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (a)(1) (against Torbet only); (2) sexual battery – Civil Code section 1708.4 (against Torbet only); (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against Torbet only); (4) negligence (against all Defendants); (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress (against all Defendants); (6) assault (against E Bookin only); and (7) battery (against E Bookin only). As alleged in the complaint:

E Bookin and M Bookin are Plaintiff’s adoptive parents. (Compl., ¶ 1.) Torbet was an adult friend of Plaintiff’s parents from late 2000 and continuing for much of 2010. (Compl., ¶ 2.) From the time Plaintiff was five years old or younger, Plaintiff was groomed by Torbet and repeatedly subjected to childhood sexual assault while in the custody of Torbet, during times when Plaintiff’s parents allowed Plaintiff to be alone with Torbet and Torbet to have unfettered access to Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 9 & 12-17.) The abuse stopped before Plaintiff’s eighth grade year. (Compl., ¶ 18.) On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff made a police report to the Santa Barbara Sheriff’s Department about the childhood sexual abuse by Torbet. (Compl., ¶ 19.)

In addition, when Plaintiff was in the seventh grade or younger, E Bookin waived a large kitchen knife within ten inches of Plaintiff’s face after Plaintiff accidentally broke a plate, and, after Plaintiff tried to defend her mother against an attack by E Bookin, struck Plaintiff in the face with a closed fist, chipping one of Plaintiff’s teeth and causing another to move. (Compl., ¶¶ 42 & 48.)

On April 28, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint alleging that Plaintiff brings this action through her guardian ad litem.

On October 8, Torbet filed a demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that, as to the first through fifth causes of action, the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer of Torbet was calendared for a hearing on December 17.

On November 25, E Bookin filed a demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that the fourth and fifth causes of action fail to state facts establishing the necessary elements of those causes, and are uncertain. That demurrer is calendared for a hearing on January 28, 2026.

On December 3, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (the FAC) alleging the same causes of action against the same Defendants described above. The allegations of the FAC are substantively similar if not identical to those appearing in the complaint.

On December 17, the Court entered a minute order adopting its tentative ruling taking the demurrer of Torbet off-calendar as moot based on the filing of the FAC by Plaintiff.

On December 23, Torbet filed a motion for an order staying all discovery from Torbet until the expiration of any applicable statutes of limitations related to any crimes of which Torbet may be charged (the motion to stay). That motion is also calendared for hearing on January 28.

In support of the motion to stay, Torbet submits a declaration of his counsel, Hugo Torbet (attorney H Torbet), who states that in November 2025, they sent interrogatories to Plaintiff, in response to which Plaintiff claimed “unsubstantiated” violations of the Penal Code, which attorney H Torbet is unable to identify as to any specific crimes by Torbet. (H Torbet Dec., ¶¶ 2-6; Exhs. A-B.) Attorney H Torbet is also in the process of executing subpoenas to law enforcement agencies in Santa Barbara County, to obtain records related to the report made to the Sheriff and identified in the complaint, which, according to attorney H Torbet, should include any statements made by Plaintiff or other witnesses, and aid in assessing whether any crimes are cognizable. (H Torbet Dec., ¶¶ 7-8.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion to stay.

Analysis

(1)       The Demurrer of E Bookin

“A party may amend its pleading once without leave of the Court at any time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 472, subd. (a).) “Because there is but one complaint in a civil action [citation], the filing of an amended complaint moots a motion directed to a prior complaint. [Citation.]” (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1131; see also People ex rel. Strathmann v. Acacia Research Corp. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 487, 506 [filing of amended complaint renders demurrer moot].)

The demurrer of E Bookin is directed to Plaintiff’s original complaint. Noted above, Plaintiff filed the FAC on December 3, 2025, or before the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer of E Bookin. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b) [“[a]ll papers opposing a motion ... shall be filed with the Court and a copy served on each party at least nine Court days ... before the hearing.”].) As the timely filing of the FAC moots the demurrer of E Bookin for all reasons further discussed above, the Court will order that demurrer off-calendar and require E Bookin to file a response to the FAC.

(2)       The Motion to Stay

Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 provides: “Unless otherwise limited by order of the Court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) “In litigation, the Courts and parties must look to the Evidence Code to determine whether records are privileged and therefore not discoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section [2017.010].” (Marylander v. Superior Court (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125.)

The term “privileged” as used in Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 includes the privilege against self-incrimination described in Evidence Code section 940, which provides: “To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” (Evid. Code, § 940; Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1547.) The exclusion from discovery of self-incriminating information provided Evidence Code section 940 “permit[s] the privilege against self-incrimination to be asserted ‘in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory ....’ [Citations.]” (Pacers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 686, 688 (Pacers).) “Privileged matters thus lie beyond the reach of discovery and trial Courts may not compel individuals to make responses that they reasonably believe could tend to incriminate them or subject them to criminal prosecution.” (Fuller v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 299, 305 (Fuller).)

“However, while the privilege of a criminal Defendant is absolute, in a civil case a witness or party may be required either to waive the privilege or accept the civil consequences of silence if he or she does exercise it.” (Alvarez v. Sanchez (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 709, 712.) “ ‘There may be cases where the requirement that a criminal Defendant participate in a civil action, at peril of being denied some portion of his worldly goods, violates concepts of elementary fairness in view of the Defendant’s position in an inter-related criminal prosecution. On the other hand, the fact that a man is indicted cannot give him a blank check to block all civil litigation on the same or related underlying subject matter. Justice is meted out in both civil and criminal litigation. The overall interest of the Courts that justice be done may very well require that the compensation and remedy due a civil Plaintiff should not be delayed (and possibly denied). The Court, in its sound discretion, must assess and balance the nature and substantiality of the injustices claimed on either side.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 885.)

Under circumstances where the silence of a Defendant is “constitutionally guaranteed, the Court should weigh the parties’ competing interests with a view toward accommodating the interests of both parties, if possible.” (Pacers, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 690.) “While accommodation in this regard is sometimes made to a Defendant in a civil action, it is done from the standpoint of fairness, not from any constitutional right. [Citation.] The self-incrimination privilege is not applicable to matters that will subject a witness to civil liability.” (Blackburn v. Superior Court (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 414, 425-426 & fn. 11 (Blackburn).)

“[C]ourts are [also] guided by the strong principle that any elapsed time other than that reasonably required for pleadings and discovery ‘is unacceptable and should be eliminated.’ [Citation.] Courts must control the pace of litigation, reduce delay, and maintain a current docket so as to enable the just, expeditious, and efficient resolution of cases. [Citation.]” (Fuller, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 306-307.)

As grounds for the motion to stay, Torbet asserts that Plaintiff alleges in this action that Plaintiff made a complaint to the Sheriff of Santa Barbara County, purportedly with the intent that Torbet be arrested and prosecuted for crimes alleged in the pleadings; that Plaintiff’s allegations require Torbet to choose between protecting his liberty or protecting his assets; and that to the extent Torbet faces criminal liability, Torbet is not obligated to disclose information or material which may tend to incriminate Torbet. For these reasons, Torbet argues, a stay of discovery is warranted to preserve Torbet’s rights and permit Torbet to present a defense.

In the opposition to the motion to stay, Plaintiff asserts that, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s report to the Sheriff, Torbet was never arrested and there is no indication that law enforcement has taken or is taking any further action in response to that report, which Plaintiff alleges they filed over a year ago. Plaintiff also asserts that applicable statute of limitations provide that Torbet can be prosecuted for the crimes alleged in this action until Plaintiff turns forty, and that Torbet cites no authority which would support a delay of twenty years to resolve Plaintiff’s civil claims. Plaintiff also contends that the Court should determine whether the assertion of any Fifth Amendment privilege by Torbet is appropriate or justified at the time Torbet asserts that privilege instead of in the present proceeding. For these reasons, Plaintiff argues, discovery should be permitted to proceed as to Torbet.

For the reasons discussed herein, the nature and substance of the interests and purported injustices claimed by Torbet and, conversely, Plaintiff, on balance, weigh against granting a blanket stay of all discovery as to Torbet at this stage of the proceedings.

Though the Court acknowledges that the FAC, which is the operative pleading, alleges that Torbet’s conduct was “felonious” and in violation of the Penal Code and that Plaintiff made a police report regarding the purported sexual abuse by Torbet on January 9, 2025 (FAC, ¶¶ 19, 21-22, 26 & 31), there is no evidence or information showing or indicating that Talbot is a Defendant in any related criminal case, or that there exists a simultaneous or parallel criminal investigation or prosecution of Torbet which involves the same facts alleged by Plaintiff in this action. (Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 876, 885 [also noting that simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings are not objectionable and do not mandate a stay of civil proceedings]; cf. Pacers, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 688 [noting that Defendants in that case were “facing possible criminal prosecution involving the same facts as the civil action....”].) For these reasons, the motion to stay fails to show why the privilege against self-incrimination is implicated, if at all.

Furthermore, Torbet “is not entitled to decide for himself or herself whether the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked.” (Fuller, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 305.) “ ‘Rather, this question is for the Court to decide after conducting “a particularized inquiry, deciding, in connection with each specific area that the questioning party seeks to explore, whether or not the privilege is well-founded.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Warford v. Medeiros (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1045 (Warford), original italics.)

Relevant to the blanket stay of discovery requested in the motion to stay, “a blanket refusal to testify is unacceptable; a person claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege must do so with specific reference to particular questions asked or other evidence sought. [O]nce this is done, the trial Court must undertake a particularized inquiry with respect to each specific claim of privilege to determine whether the claimant has sustained his burden of establishing that the testimony or other evidence sought might tend to incriminate him.” (Warford, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045 & fn. 8 [also describing the “matters that should be within the scope of the inquiry or upon which the inquiry should turn....”].)
 

Though Torbet “cannot be expected to state the precise hazard that he fears because he might then be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee....” (Blackburn, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 428-429), wholly absent from the motion to stay is any information or reasoned argument showing “1) the nature of the information sought to be disclosed, 2) implications derived from the question asked, 3) the nature and verifiability of any investigation or proceeding claimed to justify the fear of incrimination, or the possibility that any such investigation or proceeding may be commenced, 4) matters disclosed by counsel in argument on the claim of privilege, and 5) evidence previously admitted.” (Warford, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045, fn. 8.)

For example, the motion to stay includes no information or evidence showing that Plaintiff has propounded discovery on Torbet, the nature of any discovery propounded by Plaintiff, or which, if any, particular discovery request seeks the disclosure of matters which may tend to incriminate Torbet, such as by supporting a conviction or furnishing a link in the chain of evidence necessary to prosecute Torbet. (Fuller, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the motion to stay fails to show that any discovery sought by Plaintiff might tend to incriminate Torbet, or why Torbet’s claim of privilege is well-founded.

The Court “must also consider the interests of the Plaintiff in civil litigation .... Plaintiffs are entitled to an expeditious and fair resolution of their civil claims without being subjected to unwarranted surprise. Among the myriad purposes of the civil discovery statutes is to safeguard against surprise and gamesmanship, and to prevent delay.” (Fuller, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 306.) Plaintiff, and the Court, have an interest resolving the claims alleged in this civil litigation, whose underlying subject matter does not appear to be related to any pending or parallel criminal investigation or prosecution of Torbet, in an appropriate manner without unnecessary or unwarranted delay. For these and all further reasons discussed above, and under the circumstances present here, the Court will deny the motion to stay.