Tentative Ruling: Jane Doe v. Santa Barbara Unified School District, et al.

Case Number

25CV01938

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 10/07/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion for Summary Judgment, Or In The Alternative, Summary Adjudication by Santa Barbara Unified School District

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Jane Doe: Natalie Weatherford, Sonya Ostovar, Afnan Shukry, Taylor & Ring

For Defendant Santa Barbara Unified School District: Dana John McCune, Sabira Sherman, McCune & Harber, LLP

For Defendant Jeffrey Uyesaka: Kevin J. Berreth, Berreth Law Group PC

RULING

For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant Santa Barbara Unified School District for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication is denied.

Background

As alleged in the complaint of plaintiff Jane Doe (Plaintiff):

Plaintiff was 16 years old when she entered her senior year during the 2007/2008 school year at Dos Pueblos High School (DPHS), which is part of the Santa Barbara Unified School District (the SBUSD). (Complaint, ¶¶ 3, 10.) Jeffrey Uyesaka (Uyesaka) was an adult male teacher and wrestling coach at DPHS in his mid-thirties. (Complaint, ¶ 10.)

At the outset of the school year, Uyesaka began “grooming” Plaintiff on the DPHS campus and in the presence of SBUSD employees and students by paying special attention to Plaintiff, spending time alone with Plaintiff, giving Plaintiff rides to and from campus in his vehicle, enrolling Plaintiff as his teacher’s assistant, regularly complimenting Plaintiff on her appearance, isolating Plaintiff from other students, and being physically affectionate towards Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-12 & 14.) On or around October 31, 2007, an athletic coach made a comment about how unusually often Plaintiff spent time with the adult staff at DPHS. (Complaint, ¶ 15.) Another SBUSD employee responded in Plaintiff’s presence that it wasn’t unusual. (Ibid.)

In November 2007, Uyesaka began sexually abusing Plaintiff on and off the DPHS campus, during and outside of school hours. (Complaint, ¶ 16.) The sexual abuse included over 100 incidents of oral copulation, digital penetration, and penetrative sexual intercourse along with other forms of inappropriate touching. (Ibid.) Uyesaka often provided Plaintiff with alcohol before molesting her. (Ibid.) At least one SBUSD employee learned of an incident when Uyesaka took Plaintiff to breakfast alone in November 2007 to celebrate Plaintiff’s birthday, and raised concerns about Uyesaka’s relationship with Plaintiff, stating that it was “weird” that Uyesaka had taken Plaintiff out alone. (Complaint, ¶ 17.)

Prior to and during Uyesaka’s abuse of Plaintiff, SBUSD administrators and personnel witnessed inappropriate “red flag” behavior by Uyesaka towards Plaintiff; had notice that Uyesaka was having an inappropriate relationship with Plaintiff and that Uyesaka had previously and contemporaneously engaged in the same “grooming” and “sexually abusive” type behavior with other minor female or male SBUSD; and received complaints and concerns related to Uyesaka’s inappropriate conduct. (Complaint, ¶¶ 19-20.) Despite witnessing these red flags, SBUSD did not supervise Uyesaka; did nothing to investigate or report Uyesaka’s inappropriate relationship with Plaintiff; and allowed Uyesaka to continue unhindered in his conduct. (Complaint, ¶¶ 15, 17, 19.)

The sexual abuse ended in the Fall of 2009, when Plaintiff was 18 years old. (Complaint, ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff filed their complaint against defendants the SBUSD and Uyesaka on March 28, 2025, for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.11. The complaint asserts seven causes of action: (1) sexual abuse/sexual battery of a minor (against Uyesaka only); (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against Uyesaka only); (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of an unfit employee (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a), & § 820) (against SBUSD only); (4) breach of mandatory duty: failure to report suspected child abuse (Gov. Code, § 815.6 & Pen. Code, § 11166 et seq.) (against SBUSD only); (5) negligent failure to warn, train, or educate (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a), & § 820) (against SBUSD only); (6) negligent supervision of a minor (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a) & § 820) (against SBUSD only); and (7) negligence (against all defendants).

On May 1, Uyesaka filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations.

On June 12, the SBUSD filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting fifteen affirmative defenses, and separately filed a cross-complaint against Uyesaka (the SBUSD Cross-Complaint) alleging three causes of action: (1) total equitable indemnity; (2) partial equitable indemnity; and (3) declaratory relief.

On August 4, Uyesaka filed an amended answer to the complaint generally denying its allegations and asserting nineteen affirmative defenses; separately filed an answer to the SBUSD Cross-Complaint generally denying its allegations and asserting seventeen affirmative defenses; and separately filed a cross-complaint against the SBUSD (the Uyesaka Cross-Complaint) asserting three causes of action: (1) equitable indemnification; (2) equitable contribution; and (3) declaratory relief.

On April 9, the SBUSD filed a motion for summary judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. That motion was calendared for hearing on July 1, 2026.

On April 18, the court signed, and on April 20 entered, an order pursuant to a stipulation of the parties to this case to continue the motion of the SBUSD to October 7, 2026.

On September 17, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion.

Analysis

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) Relevant here, “[a] defendant ... has met that party’s burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 & fn. 12 (Aguilar).) “From commencement to conclusion, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Id. at pp. 845, 850.)

“In reviewing a defense summary judgment, [the court] appl[ies] the traditional three-step analysis ..., that is, [the court] (1) identif[ies] the pleaded issues, (2) determine[s] if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff’s case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine[s] if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact.” (Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. omitted.)

The notice of the motion lists seven issues of which the SBUSD seeks summary adjudication. (Notice at pp. 2-4.) “Issue No. 1” and “Issue No. 2”, respectively, state that Plaintiff’s third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action against the SBUSD have no merit because “Plaintiff cannot show evidence that the [SBUSD] had the requisite notice of ... Uyesaka’s ... alleged propensity to abuse a minor[]” and because “[the SBUSD] did not proximately cause Plaintiff’s alleged harm.” (Notice at p. 2, ll. 8-18, capitalization unchanged.) “Issue No. 3”, “Issue No. 4”, “Issue No. 5”, Issue No. 6”, and “Issue No. 7”, respectively, state that Plaintiff’s third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action have no merit because Plaintiff “cannot establish one or more elements of th[e] cause of action.” (Notice at p. 2, ll. 19-27, & p. 3, ll. 1-2, capitalization unchanged.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

“A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

As further discussed above, a defendant may show that it is entitled to summary judgment “by establishing that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of all of his causes of action ....” (Risely v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 196, 207.) Based on the manner in which the seven issues described above are listed in the notice of the motion, it is the court’s understanding that the motion seeks summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of each cause of action for which the motion alternatively seeks summary adjudication.

“[T]he operative pleading frames the issues for purposes of summary judgment and a defendant need address only the claim(s) alleged and need not anticipate new, unpled claim.” (Restivo v. City of Petaluma (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 267, 279.) Noted above, the third cause of action of the complaint is brought under Government Code sections 815.2 and 820, based on the alleged negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Uyesaka by the SBUSD.

A motion for summary judgment or adjudication must “contain and be supported by” a “[s]eparate statement of undisputed material facts ....” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(1) & (c)(2).” Among other things, the separate statement must “separately identify” the “cause of action ... that is the subject of the motion” and “[e]ach supporting material fact claimed to be without dispute with respect to the cause of action .... that is the subject of the motion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(1)(A)-(B).) A “material fact” is one that “relate[s] to” the cause of action and “that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(2).)

With respect to the third cause of action which is the subject of issue nos. 1, 2, and 3 described above, the separate statement filed by the SBUSD in support of the motion lists 23 facts (the UMF) which the motion asserts are material and without dispute as to that cause of action. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 2-11 [Issue No. 1 listing UMF nos. 1-23] & p. 12 [incorporating by reference UMF nos. 1-23 re Issue Nos. 2 & 3].) “ ‘[T]he separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included. Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in [the] separate statement, the motion must be denied!’ [Citation.]” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, original italics.)

The facts that the SBUSD contends are material and without dispute include that, “[a]s of the 2007-2008 school year, ... Uyesaka’s personnel file reflected a valid California teaching credential ....” (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 2 & evidence cited therein.) In response, Plaintiff submits with their opposition, a declaration of their counsel, Sonya Ostovar (Ostovar). Attached to that declaration is a transcript of the videotaped remote deposition of John Becchio, Ed.D. (Becchio), who is listed as the person most qualified of SBUSD. (Ostovar Dec., exhibit 2.) The testimony of Becchio shows or suggests that, throughout Uyesaka’s employment with the SBUSD, Uyesaka’s teaching credential was “not the norm”; that Uyesaka  did not get a “clear” or “full” teaching credential during his employment with the SBUSD; that Uyesaka was “put on unpaid leave due to credentialing” during the 2011 to  2012 and 2012 to 2013 school years; and that Uyesaka’s employment with the SBUSD ended because Uyesaka did not “clear” his credential. (Ostovar Dec., exhibit 2 at p. 92, l. 18-p. 93, l. 11 [also stating “if you get your preliminary, the ... most common circumstance is that you would clear your credential”]; p. 94, ll. 6-23; p. 97, ll. 1-6; p. 99, ll. 13-22; & p. 109, ll. 11-21.)

“[S]ummary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The separate statement includes no facts which describe or define the meaning of a “valid” teaching credential. To the extent it can be inferred from the separate statement that Uyesaka had a “valid” teaching credential during the 2007 through 2008 school year, and notwithstanding whether Becchio’s testimony shows that Uyesaka was placed on leave due to credentialling in that school year, the available evidence gives rise to a competing inference that Uyesaka’s personnel file did not reflect a “valid” teaching credential throughout Uyesaka’s employment. For example, though the evidence presented with the motion includes a “Preliminary Single Subject Teaching Credential” (Becchio Dec., exhibit B), the motion does not explain, with reasoned factual or legal argument, why that evidence alone is sufficient to show that Uyesaka’s credential was “valid” during the stated time period.

The reply of the SBUSD asserts that a “theoretical lack of a teaching credential has no relevance to a propensity to commit sexual assault on a minor.” (Reply at p. 5, ll. 3-4.) To the extent a lack of a teaching credential has no relevance to the issues or causes of action which are the subject of the motion, the SBUSD fails to explain why the separate statement includes facts purporting to show that the existence of a “valid” teaching credential relates to those issues and causes of action. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(2) & (d)(1)(B).)

“The requirement of a separate statement from the moving party and a responding statement from the party opposing summary judgment serves two functions: to give the parties notice of the material facts at issue in the motion and to permit the trial court to focus on whether those facts are truly undisputed.” (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1210.) By including facts purporting to show that Uyesaka’s personnel file reflected a “valid” teaching credential during the 2007 through 2008 school year, the motion effectively concedes the materiality of those facts. To the extent it can be reasonably deduced from the evidence presented that Uyesaka possessed a valid teaching credential, that inference is, for all reasons discussed above, contradicted by other inferences that raise a triable issue as to that fact.

As the separate statement identifies the same material fact regarding Uyesaka’s teaching credential with respect to Issue Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, the same reasoning and analysis apply as to those issues. (See Sep. Stmt. at pp. 13-15.)

The motion also asserts that Plaintiff has no evidence to support her claim that Uyesaka’s alleged propensity to commit sexual misconduct was foreseeable because the SBUSD had no actual or constructive knowledge of Uyesaka’s alleged unfitness to be a teacher or coach and no notice of Uyesaka’s alleged dangerous propensities. (Memorandum at pp. 13 & 16.) “To carry its initial burden when the motion is directed to the plaintiff’s case rather than an affirmative defense, a defendant must present evidence that either ‘conclusively negate[s] an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action’ or ‘show[s] that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,’ evidence necessary to establish at least one element of the cause of action. [Citation.]” (Luebke v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 694, 702.)

The material facts listed in the separate statement with respect to Issue nos. 1 through 7 include that “[n]one of the administrators responsible for supervising Uyesaka observed ... misconduct by Uyesaka”; that “Plaintiff’s observable on-campus engagement with Uyesaka” including that “Uyesaka signed her out of class regularly, assigned her as the Teacher’s Assistant (“TA”) for his third-period Physical Education (“P.E.”) class, took her off-campus for lunch several times per week sometimes joined by other teachers, and drove her to and from school almost daily” was “consistent with their family-friendship relationship and living arrangement”; that “Plaintiff alleges one instance of on-campus sexual misconduct that she can recall: Uyesaka touched her over her clothing underneath a desk in a classroom during student standardized testing”, that “Plaintiff cannot identify any District employees who witnessed this contact”, and that “Plaintiff did not report this incident to any District employee at any time during her enrollment.” (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 4, 14, 17, & p. 12 [Issue nos. 2 & 3], p. 13 [Issue No. 4], p. 14 [Issue Nos. 5 & 6] & p. 15 [Issue No. 7], original unchanged.)

“The trial court must consider all evidence set forth in the parties’ papers, and summary judgment is to be granted if all the papers submitted show there is no triable issue of material fact in the action, thereby entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.” (Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1466, original italics.) “[I]f a plaintiff in response to a defendant’s summary judgment request demonstrates the existence of a triable dispute with ‘specific facts’ [citation] by making a prima facie showing of the merit of the complaint, the motion must be denied. There is to be no weighing of evidence.” (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 880.)

The present record reflects that, at their deposition, Plaintiff testified, among other things, that Uyesaka “touched [Plaintiff’s] vagina underneath the table in front of the whole classroom”; that Plaintiff and Uyesaka would “text alot on campus”; that it was “pretty common knowledge” that Uyesaka would take Plaintiff to school or home; that on Halloween, after a sexual or inappropriate joke or comment was made, a male teacher “said something along the lines of ... ‘[w]ell, [Jane Doe] [is] [sic] really mature. She spends a lot of time with Uyesaka[]”; that when Plaintiff and Uyesaka came to school late after going to breakfast, employee Wendy Whitehead “[m]entioned something about it being weird that [Uyesaka] took [Plaintiff] to breakfast alone”; that Uyesaka would often “sign [Plaintiff] out of class”; that Uyesaka and Plaintiff “had a bit more freedom” when they got to school because “no one was paying attention” and because they “just acted like we were a couple at school”; that at school and in front of other people, Uyesaka would regularly compliment Plaintiff on her appearance and hug Plaintiff in the hallways; and that, towards the end, Plaintiff thought “the teachers just knew I was going to not show up because of [Uyesaka].” (Ostovar Dec., exhibit 1 at p. 71, ll. 14-22; p. 72, ll. 17-18; p. 74, ll. 7 & 18-25; p. 75, ll. 3-6; p. 76, ll. 1-6; p. 77, ll. 11-13 & 18-19; p. 85, ll. 22-25; p. 86, ll. 2-4; p. 87, ll. 3-15; p. 88, ll. 111-112.)

“In examining foreseeability, ‘the court’s task ... “is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed ....” ’ [Citations.]” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 629, original italics.) Relevant here, “sexual abuse by members ‘of an organization ...’—like [a] school district—is reasonably foreseeable, even where the organization ‘had no knowledge that [the employee] had previously sexually or physically abused anyone or had a propensity to do so.’ [Citations.]” (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 132 (Lawndale Elementary).)

On summary judgment or adjudication, the court “must view the evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff ..., liberally construing her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendants’ own showing ....” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) “Doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the opposing party.” (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 842.) Though the examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive, a reasonable trier of fact could infer from the evidence presented here that the SBUSD failed to “notice, identify, and respond to warning signs that suggest[ed] that [Uyesaka] [was] sexually abusing or will sexually abuse” Plaintiff. (Lawndale Elementary, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 135.) The existence of competing inferences in regard to whether the purported sexual abuse of Plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable in light of Uyesaka’s conduct precludes summary adjudication of Issue Nos. 1 through 7. (Pierson v. Helmerich & Payne Internat. Drilling Co. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 608, 627.)

“The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855 & fn. 24.) For the same or similar reasons discussed above, the motion fails to show why Plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.

As the motion fails to completely dispose of the causes of action and issues described above, the court will deny the request for summary adjudication of those causes and issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) As the motion also fails to show, for the same reasons discussed above, that the causes of action asserted against the SBUSD have no merit, the court will also deny the request for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)

Objections to evidence:

“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert objections to any evidence, those objections are not clearly stated or presented in the format required under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. As to the SBUSD’s written objections, the court will overrule objection nos. 2, 3, 6, 32, and 33 to the deposition of Plaintiff, and objection nos. 7, 8, and 9 to the deposition of Becchio.