Marie Armida Ledesme vs Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss LLP et al

Case Number

25CV01058

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 02/20/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion Preliminary Injunction

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of plaintiff for a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from conducting a foreclosure sale is denied without prejudice.

Background:

On February 18, 2025, plaintiff Marie Armida Ledesma filed a complaint against defendants Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP (BDFTW), Harborview MTG Loan TR 2005-10 (Harborview), and Nationstar Mortgage LLC dba Mr. Cooper (Cooper), alleging six causes of action: (1) violation of Civil Code section 2923.6, subdivision (f), - no written denial; (2) violation of Civil Code section 2923.7 – no “SPOC”; (3) violation of Civil Code section 2923.6, subdivision (c), – failure to rescind foreclosure efforts after loan modification filed; (4) violation of Civil Code section 2924.9 – failure to provide homeowner with foreclosure alternatives; (5) violation of Civil Code section 2924.10 – failure to provide homeowner with written notice of receipt of loan modification application; and (6) violation of Civil Code section 2924.11 – dual tracking. (Note: The fifth and sixth causes of action appear to be mislabeled in the complaint as the sixth and seventh causes of action.)

The causes of action alleged in the complaint arise from a purported failure by BDFTW, Harborview, and Cooper to properly or equitably conduct loss mitigation for plaintiff’s residence at 7635 Padova Drive (the Property), resulting in the execution by BDFTW of a notice of trustee’s sale on September 29, 2024, for a sale of the Property on October 9, 2024. (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 3-4, 10-16, 30, 42-43, 47, 51, 54, 57, 60, 64, & Exh. 2.) BDFTW is the Trustee conducting the non-judicial foreclosure for Harborview; Harborview is the current beneficiary; and Cooper is plaintiff’s mortgage servicer, (Compl., ¶¶ 3-5 & 11.) Among other things, plaintiff alleges that Cooper “dual tracked” the loss mitigation; failed to provide plaintiff with a single point of contact; and failed to either deny or state a reason for any denial of the loss mitigation requested by plaintiff. (Compl., ¶¶ 17-18, 20-24, 26, 28-31, 33-44.)

On February 24, plaintiff filed an application (the TRO Application) for an order temporarily restraining BDFTW, Harborview, and Cooper from conducting a foreclosure sale on the Property, and setting a hearing date for a preliminary injunction. On February 25, the court denied the TRO Application because there was no proof of service or declaration filed, and the papers were insufficient to grant the relief requested, by plaintiff.

On July 7, plaintiff filed the present motion for an order restraining BDFTW, U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for the certificate holders of Harborview (US Bank), and Cooper (collectively, Defendants), from conducting a foreclosure sale of the Property. The motion is made on the grounds that, in the process of foreclosing on the Property, Defendants have violated Civil Code sections 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.10, 2924.11, and 2924, subdivision (c); Business and Professions Code section 17200; Civ. Code section 1788 et seq. (the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act), and regulations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act or “RESPA”, codified as 12 U.S.C. section 2601 et seq. The hearing on the present motion was continued several times by various orders entered upon stipulations filed by the parties, with the present hearing date calendared for February 20, 2026.

In support of the motion, plaintiff states that they took title to the Property in 2004, through a transfer from plaintiff’s ex-husband. (Ledesma Dec., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff has lived at the property since 1999, and currently resides there with their son, daughter, and another individual, each of whom have contributed income to making monthly payments for the Property. (Ledesma Dec., ¶¶ 2-3.)

Plaintiff asserts that in November of 2023, plaintiff’s mortgage statement showed an amount due of $6,328, which plaintiff asserts is double the usual monthly payment of $3,164. (Ledesma Dec., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff submits a document that plaintiff refers to as their “Bank Transaction Records” (the Bank Records) for November 2023. (Ibid. & Exh. 3.) Plaintiff called Cooper, who is plaintiff’s “servicer”, and was unable to find out why the wrong amount appeared on the mortgage statement. (Ledesma Dec., ¶ 5.) Though plaintiff called multiple times nearly every day, plaintiff was given the “runaround”. (Ibid.) Plaintiff was then blocked from making payments, and as the situation continued unresolved, the delinquent amount continued to increase. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff also experienced two incidents of unusual surveillance of plaintiff’s residence, and believes that there is a foreign entity which has intruded into plaintiff’s financial affairs in order to cause a false accounting in the mortgage account, leading to a block on plaintiff’s ability to make monthly mortgage payments. (Ledesma Dec., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff asserts they have been estopped from making monthly mortgage payments, resulting in extreme stress and expense to discern what was going on. (Ledesma Dec., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s health has also deteriorated, requiring medication and counseling. (Ibid.) Plaintiff submits their attendance records for community counseling. (Ibid. & Exh. 4.) Plaintiff also asserts that Cooper requested that plaintiff write various letters and suggested that plaintiff include facts that were not true. (Ledesma Dec., ¶ 8.)

On May 22, 2024, US Bank recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust (the NOD). (Ledesma Dec., ¶ 9 & Exh. 1.) The 90-day waiting period to set a sale date expired on August 20, 2024. (Ibid.) On August 29, 2024, US Bank executed a Notice of Trustee Sale (the Sale Notice) reflecting a sale date of October 9, 2024. (Ledesma Dec., ¶ 10 & Exh. 2.)

In October of 2024, plaintiff contacted National Foreclosure Defense Advocates (the NFDA) to request assistance in submitting a “Loss Mitigation Package”, which plaintiff asserts is also sometimes called a “Request for Mortgage Assistance” (collectively, the Mitigation Package). (Ledesma Dec., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff also uses the terms “applications” and “accounts” to identify the loss mitigation process conducted between the NFDA and plaintiff’s mortgage servicer. (Ibid.)

In support of the motion, plaintiff also submits a declaration of Noemy Gomez (Gomez), who is an employee of the NFDA. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 1.) According to Gomez, the NFDA assists homeowners who are having or have had trouble making their mortgage payments and are stressed with the demands of the loan modification process, to submit loss mitigation packages to those homeowners’ lender. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 1.) Gomez is the “Advocate” at the NFDA who assisted plaintiff with understanding and completing forms, finding requested documents, and submitting forms and documents to Cooper. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 3.) In addition, Gomez made and answered phone calls with plaintiff and Cooper, and kept a log and notes of those phone calls as well as other documents relevant to the loss mitigation process. (Ibid.) It is Gomez’s procedure to submit as complete a package as possible to allow the servicer to place the account into an underwriting status, and to not record notices of default or sale, or conduct a foreclosure sale. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 5.) 

Gomez states that plaintiff contacted the NFDA in October of 2024 to request help with loan number 0614524593 (the Loan), which plaintiff obtained in 2005 for the Property, and with submitting the Mitigation Package. (Gomez Dec., ¶¶ 4 & 6.) Plaintiff presented Gomez with the NOD, which, according to Gomez, identifies Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as the “BENEFICIARY, as NOMINEE FOR COUNTRYWIDE HOMELOANS, INC., ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS, as Beneficiary Recorded on 8/9/2005 as Instrument No. 2005-075367 of official records in the office of the County Recorder of SANTA BARBARA County.” (Gomez Dec., ¶ 8.) Gomez further states that the principal amount of the Loan was $605,000. (Ibid.)

Gomez asserts that on October 11, 2024, plaintiff completed and executed a “Uniform Borrower Assistance Form” and a “Hardship Letter” which stated that there was a recent increase in household income due to plaintiff’s son being a contributor and tenant income. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 10.) Gomez also states that a “Household Income Form” stated the amount of $1,900 from plaintiff’s son, and $1,00 from the tenant. (Ibid.) Gomez submitted the Mitigation Package to Cooper through Cooper’s web site on October 11 and, on that same date, a “Request for Information” letter was also sent to Cooper pursuant to the RESPA. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 11.)

According to Gomez, the 30 day period to provide documents has passed, and Gomez has not received a five day “acknowledgment” receipt, any requested documents, or any explanation or objection to the documents requested. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 11.)

On October 14, Gomez spoke with “Zayra”, and confirmed that the Mitigation Package was rejected due to insufficient time of sales date of October 16, 2024. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 12.) Gomez states that a single point of contact or “SPOC” (Tracy Dodson) was provided. (Ibid.)

On October 15, Gomez spoke with “Malik” who stated she was not able to review the Mitigation Package. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 13.)

Gomez states that on October 16, plaintiff filed a bankruptcy petition. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 14.) On that date, Gomez notified “Marie” of the filing of that petition, was transferred to the bankruptcy team, and spoke with “Christina” from Texas. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 15.) On October 17, Gomez was informed by “Annie” that the sale of the Property had been postponed. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 16.) On that date, Gomez also spoke with “Roshonda” and sent plaintiff’s “Letter of Authorization” by email. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 17.)

On October 21, Gomez was told by “Slorina” that a recission of the sale had been requested by Cooper. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 18.) On October 28, Gomez was told by “Robin”, that there was no sale date. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 19.)

According to Gomez, plaintiff’s bankruptcy case was dismissed on November 4, 2024. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 20.) On November 7, Gomez was told by “Cristina” that there was no sale date. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 21.)

On November 11, Gomez resubmitted the Mitigation Package at the request of Cooper. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 22.) On November 19, Gomez was told by “Taisha” that documents detailing the contributor’s monthly income were needed. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 23.) A new SPOC (Durrel Cleveman) was provided, and Gomez was told that there was a sale date of January 8, 2025. (Ibid.) Gomez asserts that the setting of that sale date violates “dual tracking” which prohibits the recording of a default or notice of sale, or holding a foreclosure sale, when an application is complete and waiting for a determination as to whether any modification options will be offered. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 24.) Gomez also asserts that, though Cooper requested documents from plaintiff, Cooper did not give plaintiff time to submit, and failed to specify a reasonable timeframe or opportunity to timely submit, any missing documents. (Gomez Dec., ¶¶ 24 & 25.)

On December 17, Gomez spoke with “Brianna” from Arizona, who stated that they needed contributor information. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 26.) According to Gomez, as it was not determined if the Mitigation Package was still active, Gomez requested that Cooper mail the request for contributor information to plaintiff’s address. (Ibid.)

On December 30, Gomez sent a listing agreement (the LA) to the lender which, according to Gomez, postpones any sale for 45 days. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 27.) Gomez spoke with “Rebecca” on January 2, 2025, who stated that there was still a sale date scheduled on January 8, and that a loan modification would not be considered due to insufficient time until that sale date. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 28.) Gomez informed Rebecca of the transmittal of the LA, requested a call back from the SPOC, and was told it would take 48 hours. (Ibid.) According to Gomez, that amount of time would allow a servicer to state the packet was not complete within 5 business days of the sale date. (Ibid.) Gomez memorialized the timeline and asserts that if an SPOC had been used, there would have been a faster processing of documents, and the servicer could not claim that the packet was incomplete or that there was insufficient time prior to a sale. (Ibid.)

On January 6, 2025, Gomez spoke with “Kelly” and, upon the LA resulting in a postponement of the sale to February 26, 2025, asked if there was time to review the Mitigation Package. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 29.) Kelly recommended that Gomez email the SPOC with their question, and Gomez resubmitted the Mitigation Package. (Ibid.)

Gomez spoke with “Lemoyne” on January 8, 2025, and was told: “’They are moving forward with loss mitigation. They are requesting 30 days of paystubs or 60 days of bank statements.’” (Gomez Dec., ¶ 30.) Because the prohibition on dual tracking does not allow loss mitigation and foreclosure activity to proceed simultaneously, Gomez understood this to mean the sale date was postponed. (Ibid.) Gomez submitted the requested paystubs and contributor income documents on January 10. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 31.)

On January 17, Gomez spoke with “Justin” who confirmed that proof of income for plaintiff and that the contributor information was received. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 32.) Because the contributor application was expired, Gomez was emailed a new application. (Ibid.)

On January 31, Gomez submitted a “Contributor Application” to the lender by email. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 34.) On February 4, Gomez spoke with “Raysene” and confirmed that the Contributor Application was received. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 35.) Gomez states that a copy of the lease agreement with proof of receipt were requested as well as a new “Request for Mortgage Assistance” due to the expiration of the Mitigation Package. (Ibid.) The NFDA submitted proof of cash receipt for rent and lease payment on February 11. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 36.)

Gomez asserts that the Mitigation Package, which is still active, has not been diligently processed by Cooper; that no review or offer has been made; that no letter of determination has been sent; and that no appeal has been noticed or provided. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 37.) Gomez states that a notice of a February 26, 2025, sale has been issued which, according to Gomez, also violates the prohibition of “dual tracking”. (Ibid.)

Gomez also asserts that, because of many different personnel were used instead of a single point of contact, Cooper has effectively delayed the forward progress of the account and prevented a determination of whether any modification options can be offered to plaintiff. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 38.) Gomez states that plaintiff has not received any denial or written determination identifying reasons for any denial, even though plaintiff has provided accurate income and household expense information within a reasonable time period to allow Cooper to make the required computations during the underwriting period, and that Cooper has had all information necessary to determine if a loan modification will be offered since January 10, 2025. (Gomez Dec., ¶¶ 38-39.) Gomez contends that Cooper relies on a false accusation that during the process, which began on October 11, 2024, it has not had a five day window before a sales date to finish the underwriting process. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 39.)

On February 19, Gomez spoke with “Shaudi” who reaffirmed the February 26, 2025, sales date, and noted a SPOC in “Durrell Cleveland” at Shellpoint. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 40.) On February 25, Gomez spoke with “Brittney” who claimed she could not speak to Gomez due to the Loan being in litigation. (Gomez Dec., ¶ 41.) On February 27, Gomez resubmitted an “LOA” to Cooper by email, and on March 4, Cooper referred Gomez to agent “Betty”. (Gomez Dec., ¶¶ 42-43.)

On February 5, 2026, Defendants filed an opposition to the present motion, which is supported by a declaration of Kathy Winchester (Winchester), who is the Assistant Secretary for Cooper and who states that they are familiar with the business records kept by Cooper as part of its servicing of residential mortgage loans. (Winchester Dec., ¶¶ 1 & 3.) Those records include communications with plaintiff and authorized third parties, data compilations, electronically imaged documents, and other documents which are made at or near the time by, or from information provided by, persons with knowledge of the activity and transactions reflected in those records, and which are kept in the course of regular business activities. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 3.) Winchester has personally examined those records, some of which are attached to Winchester’s declaration, and documents recorded in the official records of the County of San Diego. (Ibid.)

According to Winchester, plaintiff refinanced the Property with the Loan referenced in the Gomez declaration and described above, and signed a promissory note evidencing the repayment terms of the Loan and which is secured by a deed of trust that was recorded on August 9, 2005, in the official records of the County of San Barbara. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 5 & Exhs. 1 [promissory note] & 2 [deed of trust].) Cooper is the servicer of the Loan. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 4.)

Winchester states that, preceding a payment default by plaintiff that began on November 1, 2023, the Loan was under a forbearance plan due to financial hardship related to the Covid-19 pandemic which lasted eighteen months and ended December 2022. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 6.) According to Winchester, the Loan has been in default for 779 days. (Ibid.)

Winchester asserts that Cooper initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure against the Property by recording the NOD. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 7 & Exh. 4.) At that time, plaintiff had not submitted a complete application for a loan modification or other foreclosure alternative, and there was no pending appeal from any previous denial of any such application. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 7.)

Before initiating foreclosure, Cooper contacted or attempted to contact plaintiff to assess her financial situation and explore options to avoid foreclosure, which are documented in a “Communications History”, excerpts of which are attached to the Winchester declaration. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 8 & Exh. 5.) These attempts included repeated correspondence with plaintiff; providing plaintiff with the names and contact information of Cooper representatives who could assist plaintiff with options to avoid foreclosure; providing toll free phone numbers for housing counselors; and providing links to online resources for mortgage assistance information. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 8 & Exh. 6.)

Winchester states that, before initiating foreclosure, Cooper reviewed and denied one complete application by plaintiff for loan modification assistance, sent a written notice acknowledging receipt of that application, and sent a denial notice stating that plaintiff was not approved due to an insufficient monthly payment reduction. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 9 & Exhs. 7-9.)

On September 3, 2024, Cooper recorded the Sale Notice reflecting a sale date of October 9, which Winchester states was postponed to October 16. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 10.) According to Winchester, plaintiff filed the bankruptcy petition described in the Gomez declaration and above, two hours before the October 16 sale date, which stayed the foreclosure and caused Cooper to cancel the sale. (Ibid.) Attached to the Winchester declaration is a copy of an “Order and Notice of Dismissal for Failure to File Schedules, Statements and/or Plan” entered on November 4, 2024, in United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California bankruptcy case number 9: 24-bk-11194-RC, and which orders that case dismissed. (Winchester Dec., Exh. 11 [also identifying plaintiff as the debtor in the subject bankruptcy case].)

On November 25, Cooper recorded a second Notice of Trustee’s Sale (the Second Sale Notice), which set a sale date on January 8, 2025. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 11 & Exh. 12.) According to Winchester, that sale date was postponed in response to a listing agreement submitted by plaintiff’s real estate broker. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 11.) Winchester also asserts that plaintiff filed this lawsuit one week before that scheduled foreclosure sale date and that, notwithstanding the court’s ruling on the TRO Application, Cooper placed the foreclosure on voluntary hold by repeatedly postponing the sale in periodic intervals. (Ibid.)

Winchester states that plaintiff has submitted multiple applications for loan modification assistance, four of which Cooper reviewed and denied. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 12.) Winchester contends that, in some cases, plaintiff’s application was incomplete and could not be reviewed without additional information or documents and, in other cases, there was insufficient time before the next scheduled sale date to complete the review. (Ibid.) In each instance, Cooper corresponded in writing with plaintiff to either confirm receipt, review, and denial; to request missing information or documents; or to explain that there was not enough time to review plaintiff’s request before the next scheduled sale date. (Ibid.) The Winchester declaration includes a chronology purporting to summarize Cooper’s written notices to plaintiff, copies of which are also attached to that declaration. (Winchester Dec., ¶ 12 & Exhs. 13-38.)

As of this writing, court records reflect that plaintiff has not filed a timely reply or other response to the opposition of Defendants.

Analysis:

“As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim. [Citation.] To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits.

“Past California decisions further establish that, as a general matter, the question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.... ‘The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554, original italics.)

Relevant to the causes of action alleged in the complaint, the California Homeowner Bill of Rights (the HBOR), codified as Civil Code sections 2920.5, 2923.4 to 2923.7, 2924, 2924.9 through 2924.12, 2924.15, 2924.17 through 2924.20 (Valbuena v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1272 (Valbuena),) “is principally designed to ensure that ‘as part of the nonjudicial foreclosure process, borrowers are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options, if any, offered by or through the borrower’s mortgage servicer, such as loan modifications or other alternatives to foreclosure...’ ...” (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 295). “HBOR provides for injunctive relief for statutory violations that occur prior to foreclosure....” (Valbuena, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272; see also Monterossa v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 747, 753 [the statute “plainly incorporates both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.”].)

Though the parties dispute whether Defendants have violated any provision of the HBOR, or any other statute on which the motion relies, and whether Defendants have cured any such violations, the present undisputed record reflects that Cooper “has placed the foreclosure on an indefinite litigation hold to allow the parties to explore foreclosure alternatives...”, and that “[t]here is presently no foreclosure date scheduled.” (Opp. at p. 1, l. 26-p. 2, l. 1, original italics.) Defendants also assert that “the indefinite litigation hold on the foreclosure process removes any imminent risk of harm that might otherwise justify an injunction” because “[a] new notice of sale must be given before any new foreclosure sale can be held, giving plaintiff ample time to seek a restraining order in the event there is a change in the status quo.” (Opp. at p. 2, ll. 6-10.)

Defendants also contend that “the prior notice of sale has expired by operation of law....” (Opp. at p. 1, l. 28-p. 2, l. 1.)

The available information and evidence, which plaintiff does not appear to dispute, shows that the sale proceeding scheduled on January 8, 2025, was postponed to February 26, 2025. (See Gomez Dec., ¶ 37 [stating a notice of sale for February 26, 2025, was issued]; Winchester Dec., ¶ 11 [asserting that plaintiff’s complaint was filed “one week before the next scheduled foreclosure sale date....”].) Further, it can be inferred from the undisputed present record that a sale proceeding was not held on February 26, 2025.

Pursuant to Civil Code section 2924g, proceedings of a sale of property “under the power of sale contained in any deed of trust or mortgage” may be postponed. (Civ. Code, § 2924g, subd. (c).) “In the event that the sale proceedings are postponed for a period or periods totaling more than 365 days, the scheduling of any further sale proceedings shall be preceded by giving a new notice of sale in the manner prescribed in Section 2924f.” (Civ. Code, § 2924g, subd. (c)(2).) Available information and evidence, which plaintiff does not appear to dispute, also shows or suggest that no notice of sale was given or issued after November 25, 2024, the date the Second Sale Notice was given.

In addition, though it is unclear from the present record whether the 365 day period for postponing sale proceedings under Civil Code section 2924g has passed, Defendants expressly state, without qualification, that they have placed an indefinite litigation hold on the foreclosure process, and that there is presently no sale proceeding scheduled in regard to the Property. Plaintiff presents no information or evidence to show whether Defendants have noticed or announced any postponement of the February 26, 2025, sale proceeding, or have otherwise given notice of a new or future sale proceeding, such as in the manner prescribed in Civil Code section 2924f. (See Civ. Code, § 2924g, subd. (a)(2)(A)-(B).)

“A preliminary injunction is proper only if there is a substantial basis to suppose that the defendant, if not restrained, will actually engage in the conduct sought to be enjoined. Such an injunction ‘cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents’ fears about something that may happen in the future. It must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.’ [Citations.]” (Epstein v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1410, original italics.)

Further, “the express codified purpose of a prohibitory injunction is to prevent future harm to the applicant by ordering the defendant to refrain from doing a particular act. [Citations.] Consequently, injunctive relief lies only to prevent threatened injury and has no application to wrongs that have been completed. [Citation.] It should neither serve as punishment for past acts, nor be exercised in the absence of any evidence establishing the reasonable probability the acts will be repeated in the future. Indeed, a change in circumstances at the time of the hearing, rendering injunctive relief moot or unnecessary, justifies denial of the request. [Citations.] Moreover, not only can injunctive relief be denied where the defendant has voluntarily discontinued the wrongful conduct [citation], there exists no equitable reason for ordering it where the defendant has in good faith discontinued the proscribed conduct [citation]. ‘Thus, to authorize the issuance of an injunction, it must appear with reasonable certainty that the wrongful acts will be continued or repeated.’ [Citation.]” (Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 332–333.)

Though the motion seeks to enjoin Defendants from conducting a foreclosure sale of the Property, plaintiff submits no evidence or information to refute Defendants’ statement that an indefinite hold was placed on any further sale proceedings upon the filing of this litigation, or showing that Defendants have issued a timely or valid notice of any present or future sale proceedings. Moreover, the court interprets Defendants’ representations to mean that Defendants have discontinued any efforts to notice or conduct a foreclosure sale of the Property under any power of sale contained in any deed of trust or mortgage, and do not intend to, pending a trial on the merits, actually engage in the conduct which plaintiff presently seeks to enjoin.

Under the totality of the circumstances present here, and considering that Defendants have voluntarily discontinued and ostensibly do not intend to resume the conduct which plaintiff seeks to enjoin, there does not appear to presently exist sufficient grounds or equitable reasons to issue the injunction sought by the present motion, notwithstanding whether plaintiff has shown some possibility that they will prevail on the merits of any claim asserted in these proceedings (and the court presently makes no findings in that regard). Moreover, the available evidence and information suggests that denying the injunction would “preserv[e] the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the action.” (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the motion.

The court’s ruling herein is without prejudice to any future appropriate motion for a preliminary injunction that may be filed by plaintiff to the extent Defendants resume efforts to notice or proceed with a foreclosure sale of the Property pending trial of this action. Nothing herein shall be interpreted to indicate the manner in which the court might rule on any such future motion.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice:

In support of their opposition, Defendants submit a request for judicial notice of: (1) a deed of trust (the DOT) recorded on August 9, 2005, in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara; (2) an Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded on February 1, 2012, in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara (the 2012 Assignment); (3) an Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded on November 13, 2013, in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara (the 2013 Assignment); (4) a Corrective Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded on January 26, 2016, in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara (the Corrective Assignment); (5) the NOD; and (6) the Second Sale Notice. (RJN at p. 3 & Exhs. 1-6.)

The court will grant Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the DOT, the 2012 Assignment, the 2013 Assignment, the Corrective Assignment, the NOD, and the Second Sale Notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c).) Judicial notice of these recorded documents does not extend to their truthfulness or proper interpretation. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)