Brian Larson vs City of Santa Barbara; City of Santa Barbara Police Department

Case Number

25CV01046

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 12/10/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Petitioner Brian Larson’s Request for a Writ of Mandate

Tentative Ruling

For Petitioner Brian Larson [“Petitioner”]: Robert Baumann.

For Respondents City of Santa Barbara and City of Santa Barbara Police Department [“City” or “Respondents”]: Sarah J. Knecht, John S. Doimas, Paul D. Knothe, Alexandra Clark.

Acknowledgements

The Court acknowledges the excellent professional work done by the lawyers. The case was contentious, at times acrimonious. The Court apologizes for the length of this decision. But it took the Court days to read and consider everything. The materials submitted were voluminous. The case is a matter of consequence. The Court finds it helpful in such cases to summarized everything in one place. The Court notes the excellent attention to detail in the writing submitted by the lawyers and apologizes for grammatical and typographical errors in this ruling.

Issue

Petitioner Brian Larson’s Request for a Writ of Mandate.

RULING

For the reasons set out below

1. The Petitioner’s request for a Writ of Mandate is DENIED.

2. City’s Objection to Petitioner’s unserved, oversized Reply Brief is DENIED.

3. The request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

The Writ Request

The Operative pleading is the Second Amended Writ of Mandate filed 7/7/25; 15 pages; read and considered; summarized; framed as

COUNT ONE: CCP § 1094.5 - Administrative Appeal; Statute of Limitations Violation of Gov. Code § 3304(d)(1) (Against All Respondents)

COUNT ONE: Cal. Gov. Code § 3309.5 - Statute of Limitations Violation of Gov. Code § 3304(d)(1) (Against All Respondents)

COUNT TWO; Cal. Gov. Code § 3309.5 - Retaliation in Violation of Gov. Code § 3304(a) (Against All Respondents)

Prayer:

That this Court issue a peremptory writ of mandate and/or relief pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 and California Government Code §3309.5 of the Act directing Respondents and each of them to:

1. Rescind the discipline imposed on Petitioner; and

2. Reimburse Petitioner for his loss of pay; and

3. Award Petitioner reasonable costs and attorney's fees; and

4. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just.

Facts alleged:

Petitioner was first hired as a Police Officer in the Patrol Unit and was eventually promoted to Detective Sergeant in the Crimes Against Persons Unit. Petitioner is certified as a peace officer pursuant to California Penal Code §830.1.

On or about March 3, 2022, Chief Bernard Melekian learned through Sergeant Ethan Ragsdale that Detective Yumaira Kirk had issues with her supervisor, Petitioner.

On or around March 11, 2022, Kirk met with Chief Melekian to discuss her issue and allegations regarding Petitioner, wherein Chief Melekian advised Kirk to write and submit a formal complaint.

On or about March 11, 2022, Kirk submitted a formal complaint to Commander Kenneth containing allegations against Petitioner.

On or about March 11, 2022, Petitioner was placed on paid administrative leave.

On May 4, 2022, the Department conducted the initial interview of Petitioner regarding Kirk's complaint.

The City of Santa Barbara, in response to Kirk's formal complaint engaged attorney Kathy Gandara to investigate. Gandara's report was finalized and submitted to the City and Department on May 26, 2022.

On June 3, 2022, Petitioner received a Memorandum with the Notice of Intent to Dismiss ("NOID") from the Department, as well as a copy of Gandara's report and findings, from which the Department's decision for intent to discipline was based.

On June 9, 2022, Petitioner submitted a Skelly Hearing request letter to Chief Melekian, in response to the June 3, 2022, NOID.

On June 27, 2022, Petitioner appealed the Notice of Intent to Dismiss via a Skelly Hearing with the Department.

As part of his preparation for the Skelly Hearing with Chief Melekian, Petitioner requested pertinent character and factual letters from District Attorney Investigators along with reviewing one police report to prepare himself to address the allegations made against him.

On June 27, 2022, Petitioner participated in a Skelly Hearing with the Chief Melekian and presented the character/factual letters from the District Attorney Investigators and presented arguments that were gleaned from police reports to rebut the allegations against him.

On July 12, 2022, Petitioner received a Memorandum with the Subject: Skelly Decision and Final Notice of Suspension which overturned the recommended termination and imposed a suspension instead.

In response Petitioner chose to appeal the Suspension by way of a Civil Service Commission (CSC) Hearing, per the Memorandum of Understand (MOU).

On April 5, 2023, CSC was prepared to hear Petitioner's appeal for the aforementioned allegations, however as a new and additional administrative investigation had been initiated against Petitioner in February 2023, Petitioner withdrew the appeal at the time, as the new investigation was directly connected to Petitioner's due process right to defend himself regarding the aforementioned investigation which began with Kirk's formal complaint submitted on March 11,2022.

Due to the withdrawn appeal, Petitioner received a Final Notice of Discipling from the Department which included suspension without pay from December 3, through December 30, 2022. Petitioner served the suspension in full.

On January 3, 2023, Petitioner returned to work and was assigned out of the Crimes Against Persons Unit and reassigned to Patrol.

On January 5, 2023, Kirk, now employed at the Ventura County District Attorney's Office, submitted a new formal complaint against Petitioner, alleging that Petitioner made defamatory and retaliatory assertions against her and her work performance, in response to her initial complaint on March 11, 2022. Kirk's new complaint stemmed the reveal (sic) of character/factual letters written on behalf of -- and in support of -- Petitioner, by select District Attorney Investigators.

On January 12, 2023, Petitioner was placed on paid Administrative Leave by the Department, pending the new investigation, based on Kirk's new complaint from January 5, 2023.

On February 16, 2023, Petitioner received a Memorandum from the Department notifying Petitioner that he was the Subject of a new and additional Administrative Investigation, stating that the Department had contracted an outside investigator, Garon Wyatt to conduct the investigation and interview of Petitioner, regarding a new complaint by, Kirk alleging that Petitioner had defamed and retaliated against Kirk, in response to Kirk's 2022 complaint against Petitioner. The basis of this investigation was to investigate retaliation on behalf of Petitioner due to the District Attorney Investigator letters along with Petitioner's alleged inappropriate access of department records which Petitioner claimed was due to his prior meeting with Chief Melekian and to prepare himself for his new assignment as a Patrol Sergeant.

On April 18, 2023, Wyatt conducted the initial IA interview with Petitioner regarding the new administrative investigation, which formally opened on February 16, 2023. On July 25, 2023, a follow up interview was conducted with Petitioner regarding the new administrative investigation, which formally opened on February 16, 2023.

On July 11, 2023, Petitioner received two Memorandums from the City of Santa Barbara, signed by Kelly Gordon, Chief of Police, Santa Barbara Police Department, including:

1) Re: Notice of Intent to Demote - PSU 2023-002 which was based on Wyatt's report and findings which sustained Kirk's allegations that Petitioner made defamatory and retaliatory assertions against her and her work performance due to the District Attorney Investigator letters.

2) Re: Notice of Intent to Dismiss - PSU 2023-002 which was based on Wyatt's report to the Department, wherein Wyatt's findings stated that Petitioner allegedly accessed Department documents and files, including confidential records without permission, as well as allegations that Petitioner did not return all required Department materials upon Petitioner's notice of administrative leave on July 11, 2023.

On July 14, 2023, Petitioner submitted a dual request to appeal both above intentions to discipline under Department PSU 2023-003, requesting a pre-disciplinary Skelly meeting with the Department.

On July 27, 2023, the Department held a pre-disciplinary Skelly meeting with Petitioner, in the matter of Petitioner's request to appeal the Department's intent to demote, and to dismiss, under Department PSU 2023-002.

On September 18, 2023, a secondary "Super Skelly" hearing was held with Rene Eyerly, Assistant City Administrator at Petitioner's request to continue to appeal the Departments intent to demote, and to dismiss.

On October 6, 2023, Petitioner received a Skelly Decision and Final Notice to Dismiss by Rene Eyerly, Assistant City Administrator at the City of Santa Barbara.

On October 13, 2023, Petitioner submitted a request to appeal the Notice to Dismiss, specifically requesting an arbitration hearing, so that the matter may be heard by an objective, third party.

On April 29, 30, and May 1, June 3 and 4, 2024 the CSC hearing took place wherein Petitioner sought to appeal both disciple decisions; Demote & Dismiss, respectively. The hearing lasted five days, wherein Petitioner presented 53 exhibits, and called 10 witnesses, including himself.

On July 22, 2024, Petitioner submitted his written Closing Brief to Hearing Officer Stephen Underwood and the CSC.

On July 22, 2024, Respondents submitted their written Closing Brief to Hearing Officer Stephen Underwood and Petitioner.

On August 1, 2024, Respondents submitted the memo: "Re: Findings and Decision of the Civil Service Commission Related to the Dismissal of Brian Larson," which proposed to sustain the demotion and dismissal of Petitioner.

On August 9, 2024, Petitioner submitted "Larson Objections to Proposed Commission Decision," to Hearing Officer Stephen Underwood and the CSC, as instructed in the document in item "35" herein.

On August 20, 2024, at 2:30 P.M. the CSC met to discuss the Objections to the CSC's Proposed Decision, submitted by Petitioner on August 9, 2024.

Following the above-mentioned August 20, 2024, CSC meeting, CSC delivered their decision to sustain the discipline to dismiss Petitioner.

On September 30, 2024, Petitioner received an email from Respondents with two attachments entitled as follows: (1) CSC Final Decision Notice; and (2) Larson Finding and Decision on Appeal from Dismissal. The CSC Final Decision Notice was a letter from City of Santa Barbara Human Resources Director, Wendy Levy. The letter indicated that a copy was sent via Email, Regular and US Certified Mail. The letter also indicated two attachments, a copy of the Certification of Mailing and the Final Civil Service Commission Decision on Appeals from Dismissal. There was no affidavit of mailing, and despite stating that a copy of the Certification of Mailing was attached, it was not.

On October 6, 2024, Petitioner's employment as a Sergeant with the Santa Barbara Police Department was terminated by Respondents.

City’s Answer

Filed 8/8/25; 15 pages; read and considered; summarized:

1. In response to Paragraph 1 of Petition and Petitioner’s Prayer for Relief, Respondent denies, generally and specifically, each request for relief set forth in Paragraph 1. Respondent denies that Petitioner is entitled to any relief. 

2. In response to Paragraph 2 of Petition and Petitioner’s Prayer for Relief, Respondent denies, generally and specifically, each request for relief set forth in Paragraph 2. Respondent denies that Petitioner is entitled to any relief.

3. In response to Paragraph 3 of Petition and Petitioner’s Prayer for Relief,

Respondent denies, generally and specifically, each request for relief set forth in Paragraph 3. Respondent denies that Petitioner is entitled to any relief.

4. In response to Paragraph 4 of Petition and Petitioner’s Prayer for Relief, Respondent denies, generally and specifically, each request for relief set forth in Paragraph 4. Respondent denies that Petitioner is entitled to any relief.

Sets out 16 Affirmative Defenses

Prayer:

1. That the Petition be denied; and

2. That Petitioner take nothing by way of his Petition; and

3. That Judgment be entered in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner; and

4. That Respondent be awarded their costs of suit against Petitioner; and 

5. That the Court award such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

Petitioner’s First Amended Opening Brief in Support of the Petition for a Writ

Filed 10/31/25; 30 pages; read and considered; summarized: argues that Respondents have imposed grossly excessive and retaliatory discipline against Petitioner without satisfying their burden of proof. In doing so, Respondents blatantly violated Petitioner’s due process protections, bending their own policies and procedures to satisfy their personalized burden for conduct warranting disciplinary action. The ambiguous nature of the CSC’s decision highlights the unreasonableness of his termination. The CSC’s decision to uphold the discipline is fundamentally flawed given the absence of clear rationale or direct policy violations and, by extension, reflective of Respondents’ retaliatory intent. The decision tends to suggest that the entire appeal process was predetermined from the start, and it echoes the consistent bias held against Petitioner for the past three years. Disregarding Respondents’ conduct throughout the ordeal and upholding the CSC’s decision would set a chilling precedent for peace officers throughout the state. This is because terminating Petitioner in this case goes against everything POBR and Skelly were meant to protect against. POBR and Skelly are mandates in recognition of the integral role peace officers play in society, specifically implemented to protect those who protect us. Petitioner’s termination should be overturned because his actions were entirely justified and within Department policy. This Court can now remedy this injustice, as Petitioner requests that the Court issue a writ of mandate setting aside the discipline in its entirety. The Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate should be granted, thereby ordering the Respondents to rescind all disciplinary action against Petitioner and reimburse Petitioner for lost wages.

Contends the findings are against the weight of the evidence.

Larson did not retaliate against Detective Kirk by gathering character letters in his defense. The CSC did not find a violation of policy but found that Sergeant Larson retaliated against Detective Kirk by gathering character letters in his defense. The root requirement of due process is an opportunity for an employee to be heard and present their “side of the story” before deprivation of any significant property interest. Due process mandates that an employee is afforded certain procedural rights before the discipline becomes effective. Among these pre-removal safeguards, an employee is minimally afforded the right to respond either orally or in writing to the authority imposing discipline. The court in Skelly sought to harmonize and distill the rulings held in U.S. Supreme Court case Arnett v. Kennedy (1974) 416 U.S. 134, which discusses pre-removal due process for federal employees. The accused employee is entitled to respond to the disciplinary charges both orally and in writing, including submission of rebuttal affidavits. The case law and the controlling authority presented herein make clear that an accused employee is entitled to present their “side of the story” before the hearing officer. Skelly does not provide any limit or curtailing of the evidence the employee is allowed to present before the hearing officer. The Skelly hearing is the employee’s right to be heard, not the employer. This includes but is not limited to rebuttal evidence.  

Accordingly, there is no restriction on Sergeant Larson’s right to gather evidence to counter and mitigate the disciplinary charges brought against him. In fact, this is the very purpose of a Skelly hearing. As Constitutionally mandated, Sergeant Larson was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing after receiving the notice upon which the disciplinary actions were based. Sergeant Larson was more than free to commence an investigation to develop evidence and introduce mitigating factors before the hearing officer. Any denial of an employee lawfully gathering and presenting evidence before the pre-deprivation hearing directly undermines Sergeant Larson’s presentation of a defense, infringing upon his due process rights.  

Upon service of the proposed disciplinary charges, Sergeant Larson was not restricted to the contents of the notice of intent because evidence of an impeachable caliber may exist outside the Department’s selected evidence. To deny any employee an opportunity to conduct their own research and investigation to challenge administrative charges brought against them is both inconsistent with due process and absent any legal authority.  

There is no evidence the City or the Department instituted a gag order restricting Sergeant Larson’s communication with potential witnesses and holders of evidence prior to his Skelly hearing. There is no evidence that any of the employees or agencies who authored memos for Sergeant Larson were restricted in any capacity from doing so. In fact, all evidence supports these memos were written freely, voluntarily, and offered for the purpose to rebut the character inference and factual allegations against Sergeant Larson in the Gender Discrimination Case.

The assertion by the CSC that the letters constituted retaliation by Sergeant Larson is particularly absurd given the context and reasoning which drove Sergeant Larson to present them. Detective Kirk's March 11, 2022, complaint prompted an administrative investigation by Kathy Gandara, a private investigator hired by the Department. During his interview with Gandara, Sergeant Larson explained the rationale behind his supervisory approach with Detective Kirk. Gandara, however, did not investigate or even assess Detective Kirk’s work product. Instead, she relied solely on the opinions of Detective Kirk and her peers.

While Sergeant Larson upheld the quality of Detective Kirk's work product, noting it was always thorough, he highlighted issues with timely follow-up, tardiness, and disorganization. Sergeant Larson pointed out that only he and the DDAs who worked on cases with Detective Kirk had direct insight into her work product. Although Sergeant Larson could not recall the specific names of the DDAs who had complained, he referenced a particular case, the Leon Case, and suggested Gandara investigate it to corroborate his concerns.

Detective Kirk specifically named DDA Chanda and DDA Meyer in her complaint as the DDAs Sergeant Larson was referencing. Despite this, Gandara, who could have easily investigated and interviewed these DDAs, made the unfounded statement that “nor did anyone at the district attorney's office complain,” ignoring Sergeant Larson's allegations and Detective Kirk’s own account.

Sergeant Larson was shocked by the sustained findings of gender discrimination and recommendation for termination, despite his thorough explanation of the reasons for his approach to Detective Kirk. To his surprise, Gandara did not assess any of his reasons for his supervisory actions. Consequently, he took it upon himself to present evidence of Detective Kirk’s work performance problems, documented consultations with colleagues and supervisors, and letters in support of his “side of the story” to Chief Melekian at his Skelly hearing. The insights in the letters provided by DDAs Chanda and Meyer were instrumental components of his defense.

The CSC acknowledged that Gandara had failed to interview the DDAs despite receiving adequate information from both Sergeant Larson and Detective Kirk regarding their involvement and knowledge of Detective Kirk’s work performance. However, the CSC seemingly disregarded the glaring holes in the investigative process in reaching their decision. Rather, the CSC determined that Sergeant Larson “went too far and retaliated against Kirk” because he asked the DDAs to write “negative” comments about her work performance.

This conclusion is concerning given Gandara’s investigation or lack thereof, and the clear indication that the letters were written freely and voluntarily by DDAs, members of the community who are held to the highest standards of moral character. Furthermore, there is no legal basis provided for the finding of retaliation. For the CSC to make such a serious finding without providing a logical basis suggests a troubling bias, a theme which permeates the reasoning of the CSC’s decision.

At arbitration, much was made of Sergeant Larson's support letters being “negative.” The City consistently glossed over the fact that the “negative” aspects of the letters did not originate with Sergeant Larson; rather, they were the genuine sentiments of the DDAs who worked with Detective Kirk on the most serious cases of cases.

Before an investigation into Sergeant Larson ever commenced, DDAs Meyer and Chanda sought Sergeant Larson to explain their concerns regarding Detective Kirk’s work performance issues. Sergeant Larson then addressed the timeliness, organizational, and follow-up issues within the scope of his responsibilities as her sergeant.

The core allegation against him involved gender discrimination as it related to his supervision of Detective Kirk. Sergeant Larson’s natural defense to such an allegation was to present evidence that his management of Detective Kirk was based on her performance, not her gender. Sergeant Larson obtained the letters with full awareness that Detective Kirk had transferred to the Ventura DA’s office, believing that doing so would have no negative impact on her career. There was no retaliatory intent, and Investigator Hunt, DDA Chanda, DDA Meyers, and Sergeant Larson clearly expressed as much. He was being accused of treating Kirk differently because she was a woman. Sergeant Larson explained very clearly to Gandara that his strict supervisory approach to Kirk was due to her work performance issues, not her gender. Gandara found his rationale was not credible because she assumed no one from the DA’s office had complained about Kirk’s work.

Naturally, this prompted Sergeant Larson to seek additional perspectives from those who had complained about Detective Kirk's work, the DDAs, to bolster his defense. Doing so was an exercise of Sergeant Larson’s clearly established due process right to defend himself, nothing more. The demotion of Sergeant Larson should be overturned because he did not retaliate against Detective Kirk by gathering character letters in his defense.

The Allegation that Sergeant Larson violated Department Policy by accessing police reports is not supported by the evidence. Petitioner’s access of privatized and confidential victim-flagged reports was fully consistent with Departmental norms and practices, not a violation of policy.

Petitioner and Respondents agree that policy and law guides officers. The Department claimed that Petitioner violated policy despite there being no explicit policies regarding access to privatized or confidential victim-flagged reports and zero training or guidelines addressing prohibited access. The CSC found that Petitioner’s use of reports for verifying information from his Skelly hearing and preparation for arbitration constituted personal, non-work-related use. In doing so, Respondents and the CSC have either disregarded or failed to recognize established authority. 

As established above, peace officers subject to disciplinary proceedings are entitled to procedural due process protections, including the right to a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges against them. (Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 215.) POBR further guarantees officers access to investigative materials when punitive action is contemplated. (Cal. Gov. Code § 3303 (g).) The intention of the legislature is that POBR be construed liberally in favor of protecting officers’ procedural rights as “a matter of statewide concern.” (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 128, 136,) The California Supreme Court has emphasized that internal affairs investigations and disciplinary proceedings are “a necessary component of employment in law enforcement,” and therefore actions taken in response to such proceedings—such as building a defense—are inherently work-related. Officers must be afforded access to materials that form the basis of discipline to present a defense, particularly where those materials may be exculpatory or mitigating. These protections are not discretionary; they are fundamental to the fairness of the disciplinary process and flow directly from both statutory and constitutional due process guarantees. 

Sergeant Larson’s use of reports was strictly work-related, aimed primarily at training the young officers in his newly assigned patrol unit. Upon Sergeant Larson’s return from serving his suspension related to the Gender Discrimination Case, Sergeant Larson transitioned to a new role as patrol sergeant under the supervision of Lieutenant Miller of the patrol division. Lieutenant Miller initially indicated there was no formal plan for Sergeant Larson's return. However, Sergeant Larson proposed a two-week ramping up period: one week to wrap up his detective work and clear out his office, followed by a second week partnered with a senior patrol sergeant to familiarize himself with patrol duties. Lieutenant Miller agreed to the plan but provided no specific guidance or direction. Subsequently, Sergeant Larson had a general introduction meeting with the new chief, Chief Gordon, but no details were discussed regarding his reintegration or transition from detective to patrol duties. Next, Sergeant Larson discussed with Lieutenant Katsapis the significant responsibility of overseeing ten new officers and training the patrol team. The discussion centered on what Sergeant Larson could contribute to inspire these new officers.

Lieutenant Katsapis emphasized, “one of the ways that [an officer] can relay knowledge is through previous examples. So, I think that's where, perhaps, the concept of sharing reports as a foundation for learning could be a valuable tool.” Further, according to Lieutenant Katsapis, no supervisory approval is required for informal training. This meeting left Sergeant Larson motivated and inspired in his new position. He enjoys teaching and immediately sought out the best method to educate these officers through dynamic and engaging case examples. It is also important to note that Sergeant Larson made several requests for production of documents, which included the Smokey case discussed at his Skelly hearing. Each request was ignored by the City. With zero guidance or direction from the City regarding the potentially exculpatory or mitigating documents requested, Sergeant Larson took it upon himself to gather them in accordance with his right to due process. Because Sergeant Larson was never given access to any Department reports for verification, all the following assumptions are based on the accuracy of City Exhibit B4.

First, Sergeant Larson searched for the Smokey case to verify the information he provided during his Skelly interview to Chief Melekian, aiming to correct it promptly if necessary.

Second, he reviewed eighteen homicides that had valuable lessons for training his new patrol team, sixteen of which he had a role in. The remaining two cases included one homicide that occurred before he joined the Department, which had valuable teaching points, and another case, in which Detective Kirk was not involved.

Third, Sergeant Larson searched and reviewed two robbery cases and one rape case, all of which had valuable insights, where he was the primary officer or investigator. Several of these cases are privatized reports and three have “confidential victim flags per 293(A) PC” justifying the notion that the reports are only confidential from the public.

Training is undeniably a work-related purpose, as is ensuring honesty and accuracy during a Skelly hearing with the Chief of Police. The consensus among Investigator Hunt with twenty-seven years of experience, Investigator McGrew with twenty-nine years of experience, Officer Crooks with thirteen years of experience and Sergeant Larson with sixteen years of experience, in total eighty-five years of experience solely at SBPD, is that any officer may access any report, they have access to, for work-related purposes.

However, the Department contends that the “right to know and need to know” for all cases rests with Chief Gordon, who has two years of experience, and Lieutenant Katsapis, who has seventeen years of experience within the Department. This difference of opinion, exacerbated by the contrast in years of experience, divides command staff from those who utilize the reports daily.

First, Petitioner will address the accessing of privatized reports. Through the Versadex system, Command staff have the capability to restrict access to reports if necessary, ensuring that only designated individuals or groups can view specific reports. If access is not granted, the report remains invisible to those without authorization. Thus, visibility implies accessibility within this system. Investigator Hunt, Investigator McGrew, Officer Crooks, and Sergeant Larson maintain officers are not restricted from accessing privatized reports if they have access in the system.

It must be taken into consideration that there is no policy as it relates to handling privatized reports. There is no Department training regarding handling privatized reports.

Furthermore, Sergeant Larson was never informed of any restrictions on accessing privatized reports during his tenure at the Department or upon his return from administrative leave. Assistant Chief Arroyo admitted she considered removing Sergeant Larson’s access to privatized reports but decided to preserve his access. 

Accordingly, if the Department intended to restrict his access to previous cases, they should have explicitly denied him access in the system or provided clear directives.

 It is customary within the Department that if an officer has access to a report, they are permitted to view it for work-related purposes. This practice highlights the necessity for explicit policies or training on access protocols if the command staff’s opinion differs. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the Department to expect that Sergeant Larson should have foreseen accessing privatized reports as an issue or warrant supervisor approval.

Next, Petitioner will address the accessing of confidential victim flagged reports. Officer Crooks has over ten years of experience training officers on the Versadex system, instructing recruits in data collection and report input processes. Investigator Hunt, Investigator McGrew, Officer Crooks, and Sergeant Larson maintain officers are not restricted from accessing reports flagged with confidential victim information. The only policy reference to confidential victim flags is specifically related to public record releases where names of certain victims are redacted to maintain confidentiality.

There is no Department training regarding handling confidential victim flag reports. Sergeant Larson was never informed of any restrictions on accessing confidential victim flagged reports during his tenure at the Department or upon his return from administrative leave. Furthermore, it is the general practice within the department to allow officers to access all reports for work-related purposes without requiring supervisor approval.

Investigator McGrew highlights that as a supervisor for nearly fifteen years and as the Lieutenant of Department Records, not a single officer has sought his permission to access a report with a confidential victim flag. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the Department to expect that Sergeant Larson should have foreseen accessing confidential victim flagged reports as an issue or warrant supervisor approval.

Petitioner will now address “right to know and need to know.” The term “right to know and need to know” is a principle related to CLETS information, which is more controlled compared to internal Department reports. Investigator Hunt, Investigator McGrew, Sergeant Larson, Versadex training Officer Crooks and Lieutenant Katsapis, drawing on their extensive experience with the Department, could not recall a single Department training where access to internal Department reports was restricted based on the principle of “right to know and need to know.”

Further, not a single officer can recall any officer disciplined on the principle of “right to know and need to know” in accessing reports. The CSC even noted that Respondents failed to prove that it was a policy. If Respondents expect Sergeant Larson and other officers to adhere to this grey area rule, then why have they failed to establish clear policies, conduct trainings, or reach a consensus on the matter? 

Rather than penalizing an officer operating within an undefined framework, the Department should be made to address these policy gaps and provide clear directives. Sergeant Larson’s commitment to upholding departmental standards and ensuring the professional development of his team should be commended, not condemned, and Respondents’ decision to do so is very telling.

Ultimately, the CSC determined that Sergeant Larson’s use of the reports for primarily training purposes was plausible and there was insufficient evidence to find a policy violation for accessing the files. Yet the CSC concluded that Sergeant Larson indirectly violated policy because his access of the reports was for personal purposes. In doing so, the CSC recognized that “it is arguable that trying to keep your job is for personal purposes rather than police-related assignments” without providing any further rationale. The fact that the CSC acknowledges that there was no direct policy violation should alone be dispositive of the issue in favor of Sergeant Larson; however, as clearly established above, preparation for Skelly hearings and civil service commissions are, by definition, work-related purposes.  Therefore, the termination of Sergeant Larson should be overturned because he did not violate Department Policy in accessing the reports.

The Allegation that Sergeant Larson violated Department Policy by retaining a copy of the Smokey Case is not supported by the evidence, and the order to return the Smokey Case was unlawful. Given the Department's strong emphasis on honesty during internal affairs interviews, Sergeant Larson was committed to being accurate in his Skelly hearing with Chief Melekian.

To ensure his statements were truthful and precise, he needed to cross-reference his comments regarding Detective Kirk’s performance on the Smokey case with the Smokey case itself. This action was directly related to his career and professional obligations as a police officer. Accordingly, Sergeant Larson’s access to the Smokey report was a critical work-related purpose, demonstrating his commitment to integrity and adherence to policy during a pivotal moment in his career.

Furthermore, throughout the tenure of the investigations, Sergeant Larson diligently maintained contact with his attorney to ensure he was following all relevant policies.

The Department’s directive to turn over information on his flash drive was not lawful due to the presence of attorney-client privileged information and following his attorney's advice was both prudent and legally sound. The inclusion of attorney-client privileged information under the work product doctrine underscores the legality of his approach. The information involved was confined to a single case commingled with attorney-client privileged information, handled in accordance with legal protections.

Attorney-client privilege is a cornerstone of the legal system, ensuring that communications between an attorney and their client remain confidential. (Cal. Evid. Code § 954.) There are two categories of attorney-client privileged work product: absolute and qualified. (Cal. Code Civ. P. § 2018.030.) Absolute work product protects any writing that contains “an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories,” and it is “not discoverable under any circumstances,” unless there is waiver. (Cal. Code Civ. P. § 2018.030(a).) Even qualified work product, attorney work product that does not contain attorney opinions, theories, etc., is strongly protected. It may be discovered only if denying the discovery would “unfairly prejudice the party seeking” it.

Here, the flash drive Sergeant Larson maintained contained attorney-client privileged information, which falls under the absolute protection of the work product doctrine. Even if this information were to be considered under qualified protection, the Department would not be unfairly prejudiced by the lack Sergeant Larson’s copy of the Smokey case because the Department ultimately has access through Versadex, ensuring that no critical information was withheld. Despite being presented with this information at arbitration, the CSC determined that “[t]here was no legitimate justification articulated by Larson as to why he retained the ‘Smokey’ file or why he refused to return it per the Chief’s order.”

While troubling, the CSC’s reasoning may be explained by the fact that they failed to recognize the circumstances surrounding Sergeant Larson being placed on administrative leave. Just one week after returning from administrative leave from the Gender Discrimination Case, having an intent to terminate reduced to a suspension, Sergeant Larson was again placed on administrative leave pending an investigation into allegations of retaliation against Detective Kirk and improper access of Department reports.

Sergeant Larson was shocked and lightheaded, feeling as though he were in a bad dream. He had been off work for over a year and had only just begun to prepare for his new role before being abruptly stripped of his badge for a second time and asked to leave. As this nightmare scenario unfolded, Sergeant Larson signed the form acknowledging the Chief's verbal directive not to take any reports home.

On his drive home, he could not believe this was happening again and consulted his attorney, Mr. Baumann. Two lieutenants followed him home to retrieve his department issued laptop. The following day, Sergeant Larson informed the Department that he had additional work product at his home and requested that they retrieve it, demonstrating his intent to comply with orders and adhere to the proper procedures.

On the advice of Mr. Baumann,[1] Sergeant Larson retained a thumb drive containing attorney-client privileged information co-mingled with the Smokey case. This privilege is crucial for maintaining compliance with the law during personnel investigations. Once an employee is placed on administrative leave, all communications with the Department typically occur through attorneys.  Thus, Sergeant Larson later turned over the flash drive to Mr. Baumann. Because the Smokey Case was co-mingled with attorney-client privileged information on the flash-drive, Sergeant Larson was clearly justified and acted reasonably in refusing to turn it over on the advice of his attorney.

Therefore, the termination of Sergeant Larson should be overturned because his use of the Smokey case was work-related and the order to return it was unlawful.

The Department Violated G.C. § 3304(d)(1) by discipling Sergeant Larson for the Letters Case. POBR states that “[n]o punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed within one (1) year of the public agency’s discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct.” (Cal. Gov. Code § 3304(d)(1).) Simply put, the department has one year from the discovery of misconduct to render discipline. Ochoa v County of Kern (2018) gives a greater understanding of who is authorized to initiate an investigation stating the “statute of limitations period begins when any officer who has authority to investigate the facts of the allegation discovers potential misconduct. The officer does not need authority to initiate IA or impose serious discipline.” (Ochoa supra.) 

Here, Chief Melekian discovered the DDAs’ letters during Sergeant Larson's Skelly Hearing on June 27, 2022. As Chief of Police and the Skelly Officer, Chief Melekian not only had the authority but also a responsibility to initiate an investigation. Consequently, the Department became aware of the Letters Case allegations on June 27, 2022, and had until June 27, 2023, to render discipline. However, on July 11, 2023, Sergeant Larson received his Notice of Intent to Demote, which occurred one year and fourteen days after the alleged misconduct was discovered. This timeframe clearly exceeds the one year statute of limitations.

The City’s defense at arbitration to this violation was that Chief Melekian, as the Skelly officer, was not sitting in that position as a supervisor of the Department and somehow did not have the authority to initiate an investigation. This claim is illogical and unreasonable, and Assistant City Administrator Eyerly ultimately admitted as such, evidencing that the Department does not have a bona fide justification for violating the one year statute of limitations.

If the Department’s claim was taken as true, it would create the preposterous situation where the Chief of Police could not initiate an investigation if, during a Skelly Hearing, an employee commits misconduct or raises misconduct. This is not and cannot be the case as the Chief of Police does not suspend their duties but rather adds to their duties by playing the role of the Skelly Officer. It is well established that the Skelly Officer can reopen the investigation or even increase the discipline. Given the Skelly Officer has such abilities, not to mention the authority to make the ultimate disciplinary decision, it is illogical and ridiculous to state the Skelly Officer does not have the authority to initiate an investigation, especially when the Skelly Officer is the Chief of Police. As the Chief, even when acting as the Skelly Officer, his duties and adherence to department policies are not suspended. 

“An investigation into conduct that can have a devastating impact on the career of a public safety officer should only be initiated when the officer authorized to initiate an investigation knows or has reason to know that the conduct involves actionable Misconduct.” (Shouse v. County of Riverside (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1089.)

As the Chief of Police, Chief Melekian was authorized to initiate an investigation into actionable misconduct. Like all Department employees, if the Chief is presented with actionable misconduct, he would have a duty to report it in accordance with policy. 

The CSC asserted in their decision that there was no evidence presented as to whether Chief Melekian read the letters because he did not testify at the hearing; and therefore, the actionable misconduct was not discovered until Detective Kirk’s January 2023 complaint.

However, if the DDAs letters are found to be actionable misconduct as alleged, Chief Melekian at the very least had reason to know of the actionable misconduct on June 27, 2022, because the letters were presented to him at the Skelly hearing. Accordingly, the statutory period began to run on June 27, 2022.

Therefore, Chief Gordon rendering discipline on July 11, 2023, to demote Sergeant Larson, is barred because the one year statute of limitations was tolled on June 27, 2023.

Sergeant Larson accepted the allegations related to the inappropriate comments in the Gender Discrimination Case, however, he vehemently denied that his treatment of Detective Kirk was based on her gender. The very nature of the discipline at issue here is entirely based on Sergeant Larson’s lawful efforts to defend himself against the allegations of gender discrimination in the Gender Discrimination Case. 

According to POBR, “[n]o public safety officer shall be subject to punitive action, or denied promotion, or be threatened with any such treatment, because of the lawful exercise of the rights granted [under POBR], or under any existing administrative grievance procedure.” (Cal. Gov. Code § 3304 (a).) 

Both the demotion for soliciting letters of support in his defense and the termination for accessing department reports stem from Sergeant Larson exercising his right to conduct his own investigation and gather evidence in his defense. Unfortunately, the need for such rights was made evident by Investigator Gandara’s failure to interview witnesses with exculpatory or mitigating information.

However, Gandara was not the only investigator who failed to do right by Sergeant Larson. Respondents’ retaliatory intent was clear from the start, beginning with the nature of the investigations conducted by Investigator Wyatt. Wyatt’s involvement in the matter began one week after Sergeant Larson’s Skelly hearing with Chief Melekian when a local newspaper published confidential information about Sergeant Larson’s discipline in the Gender Discrimination Case before, he received his written Notice of Decision to Discipline.

Respondents hired Wyatt to investigate who leaked the information, and Wyatt determined that the leak had come from someone in command staff. However, when questioned at arbitration, Wyatt initially suggested that Sergeant Larson had leaked the information himself. Wyatt eventually conceded that it was impossible for Sergeant Larson to have done so, as the article was published before Larson received his Final Notice of Discipline.

Wyatt’s gut instinct to blame Sergeant Larson for the leak is very telling and reflects a bias which pervaded his subsequent investigations in the Letters Case and Reports Case. For example, Wyatt attempted to chill witnesses by threatening to assault Sergeant Larson and likening Sergeant Larson’s treatment of Detective Kirk to domestic violence and rape.

After Wyatt interviewed Sergeant Larson, he apologized for his inappropriate behavior and clear assertion of bias, an admission which underscores the validity of the concerns raised by Sergeant Larson regarding the impartiality of the investigation.

Shockingly, these concerns fell on deaf ears at his Skelly hearing with Eyerly. Eyerly uncritically accepted Wyatt's opinionated reports as true, ignored Sergeant Larson's defenses, and conducted no further investigation. This was Eyerly’s first time serving as a Skelly officer for a police officer, a role that follows POBR.

Although she claimed familiarity with Skelly and G.C. § 3303 and 3304, it took her several minutes to recall even a single detail about POBR during arbitration.

The CSC recognized Eyerly’s lack of familiarity “with the legal standards as to POBR violations” in disposing of her illogical defense to the Department’s violation statute of limitations. However, the CSC demonstrated a markedly similar lack of familiarity with POBR in their decision, stating that “had Larson accepted what was lenient punishment from the Gender Discrimination Case, the matter would have ended long ago.”

In doing so, the CSC asserted outright that Sergeant Larson should not have appealed the Gender Discrimination Case because his appeal of that case is why he was disciplined here, a true reflection of Respondents’ sentiments.

Sergeant Larson was clearly demoted and dismissed as punishment for defending himself against the allegations of gender discrimination.

POBR explicitly states that an officer cannot be disciplined for exercising their lawful rights. The decision to discipline Sergeant Larson, or even threaten Sergeant Larson with discipline, for defending himself at his Skelly hearing and at arbitration is a blatant violation of POBR. This not only demonstrates a retaliatory and unjust approach toward Sergeant Larson for simply exercising his right to defend himself under POBR, but also a complete disregard for or lack of understanding of the limitations established therein. 

Respondents have violated G.C. § 3304 in disciplining Sergeant Larson for exercising his due process right to defend himself.

City’s Opposition

Filed 10/31/ 29 pages; read and considered; summarized: This matter is before the Court on a petition for administrative mandate under California Civil Procedure Code section 1094.5, seeking this Court’s review of a Civil Service Commission decision upholding the discharge of Petitioner Brian Larson following a five-day hearing. Petitioner, who was a Sergeant in the City’s Police Department, took a criminal investigation file from the Department and kept it in violation of a direct order to return materials; surreptitiously accessed that file and other criminal records at the Department for his personal use; and, in retaliation against a subordinate Detective Yumaira Kirk who had submitted a personnel complaint against him, solicited letters from his acquaintances at the Santa Barbara District Attorney’s Office that accused her of incompetently handling a criminal investigation.

At the CSC hearing, Petitioner did not challenge the penalty of termination as too harsh, nor deny he engaged in any of the conduct at issue. Instead, he made generalized but unfounded claims of bias by the Department and took the position that because he had a right to defend against the charges brought by his subordinate (which included supervisorial abuse and gender discrimination), this gave him the right to violate important Department rules and directives of his commanding officer to build his case against his accuser. But Petitioner had no such right to commit egregious misconduct on the theory it somehow helped his termination case.

The weight of the evidence clearly supports the CSC’s decision sustaining the discharge, and this Court should thus deny the request for a writ of administrative mandate. This action fails for various sound procedural reasons as well, so that this Court does not even need to reach the merits.

The petition under Section 1094.5 is untimely. The Department properly mailed the Commission’s decision with the required affidavit, triggering the 90-day limitations period for Petitioner to file an action in Superior Court. Petitioner’s filing months after the deadline is time-barred. Second, res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Petitioner’s attempt to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 3309.5 for his claims under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (“POBRA”). Under principles of res judicata, the Section 3304(d)(1) time-bar claim is precluded, and because Petitioner raised the claim in the CSC hearing and it was actually decided, collateral estoppel applies as well. Petitioner did not raise the Section 3304(a) retaliation claim in the CSC hearing, but could have, so that it is barred under well-established principles doctrine of res judicata.

Even disregarding these procedural bars, the Section 3309.5 causes of action fail on their merits.  The Section 3304(d)(1) claim rests only on the appearance at a 2022 Skelly conference for Petitioner of the Assistant District Attorney letters disparaging Detective Kirk. But at the time, the Chief of Police who conducted the conference had no reason to know that Petitioner had improperly solicited the letters (as the CSC determined). Potential wrongdoing was only discovered after Kirk later learned of the letters and complained to the Department.

The Section 3304(a) retaliation claim fails because, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the POBRA right to an administrative appeal does not include a free pass to violate Department policy to seek information to support his defense. 

Supported by the Declaration of Erik Uchida; summarized: I am currently the Human Resources Analyst II for the City of Santa Barbara. I became the Human Resources Analyst II on July 12, 2025. As the Human Resources Analyst II, my job duties include, but are not limited to, conducting recruitments, handling employee relations issues, administering employee training, conducting classification and compensation studies. On September 30, 2024, I personally assembled and caused to be mailed an envelope addressed to Brian Larson, 4603 Chilon Way, Santa Barbara, CA 93110, with first-class postage fully prepaid. The envelope contained a letter signed by City of Santa Barbara Human Resources Director Wendy Levy, dated September 30, 2024, along with correspondence advising Brian Larson of the Santa Barbara Civil Service Commission’s action on his objections to the findings of the Civil Service Commission. A true and correct copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit A.

The September 30, 2024 letter from Wendy Levy stated, in substance, that after a thorough review of all evidence, testimony, and documentation presented during the appeal process, the Santa Barbara Civil Service Commission had determined to uphold Mr. Larson’s The letter further stated that the Commission’s decision was final, and that Mr. Larson’s employment with the Santa Barbara Police Department was considered officially terminated as of September 30, 2024.

The letter also advised that a fully executed final copy of the Commission’s decision was enclosed for Mr. Larson’s records.

Finally, the letter informed Mr. Larson that, pursuant to Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 1.30.020 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6, any action seeking further judicial review must be filed no later than ninety days following the day the decision became final, which was September 30, 2024. The letter also stated that a Certificate of Mailing attesting to the City’s mailing of the letter was enclosed. A true and correct copy of my Affidavit of Mailing, dated September 30, 2024, is attached as Exhibit B.

On the same date, I also sent the envelope by first-class and USPS Certified Mail.  I used certified mail as an additional safeguard to the first-class mailing to ensure confirmation of delivery and to provide an official record of the mailing to Mr. Larson. The certified mailing was unclaimed and was returned to me on or about 10/18/2024. A photo of the envelope I mailed, showing the first-class postage in the upper right-hand corner and the certified mail label, is attached as Exhibit C.  This photo accurately depicts the envelope, and its contents as described above.   

Petitioner’s Reply

Filed 11/21/25; 25 pages; read and considered: summarized:

The Petition is not time-barred. Respondents purportedly have demonstrated satisfaction of the mailing requirements under California Code of Civil Procedure (“C.C.P.”) § 1094.6(b), in turn, triggering the 90-day statute of limitations on September 30, 2024. This is not the case. Statutes of limitations “are technical defenses which should be strictly construed to avoid the forfeiture of a person’s rights. Such statutes are obstacles to just claims, and courts may not indulge in strained constructions to apply the statutes to the facts of a particular case. (Donnellan v. City of Novato (2001) 86 Cal. App. 4th 1097, 1103.)

The statute of limitations for bringing a claim under write of administrative mandamus was shortened by the legislature from three to four years to ninety days, as such, it is crucial the party have proper notice of the administrative body’s final decision. (Herman v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transportation Auth. (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 819, 829.)  In Donnellan, a cover letter accompanying city council’s decision to suspend a police officer that was mailed to the officer did not meet statutory requirement that the mailing include a copy of the affidavit or certificate of mailing for purposes of triggering 90-day statute of limitations for filing petition for administrative mandamus to review city council's decision; neither the cover letter nor the city council’s decision established or verified the date the decision was in fact mailed to officer. The court correctly pointed out that C.C.P. 1094.6(b) requires that, when the local agency mails its written decision to the party seeking the writ, such mailing must include a written statement verified by oath or affirmation, or a written statement attesting to the date that the decision was mailed to the party by first class mail, postage prepaid; only such verified or testimonial statement meets the statutory requirements.

Here, Respondents state that the Declaration of Erik Uchida provides that the September 30, 2024, package sent to Petitioner via certified mail included the (i) CSC’s Decision, (ii) Uchida’s Affidavit of Mailing, and (iii) Wendy Levy’s cover letter.

However, Uchida’s Declaration does not state that Uchida’s Affidavit was included in the package. Instead, Uchida’s Declaration refers to Wendy Levy’s letter, and the fact that it stated that Uchida’s Affidavit was included. These discrepancies are significant in that they highlight the exact issue with cover letters addressed in Donnellan: cover letters are not testimony of the truth.

Here, Wendy Levy’s letter was not written under the penalty of perjury, and accordingly, it is not testimony of the truth. Tellingly, Uchida’s Declaration, testimony of the truth made under the penalty of perjury, only references Wendy Levy’s cover letter in asserting that Uchida’s Affidavit was included in the September 30, 2024, package. The Declaration does not explicitly state that the Affidavit was included, thereby implying that it was not included. The Declaration only explicitly states that Exhibit A was included.

Therefore, because Uchida’s Declaration does not explicitly, or even impliedly, support Respondents’ assertion that Uchida’s Affidavit of Mailing was included in the package, Respondents have clearly failed to establish that they met the mailing requirements of § 1094.6(b). Accordingly, the 90-day statute of limitations was never triggered, and Petitioner’s claims are timely.

Additionally, it is important to note that the certified mail label on the package (Exhibit C) does not constitute a certificate or affidavit of mailing as defined in Donnellan; therefore, the certified mail label does not meet the requirement as a certificate of mailing would.

Respondents also claim that the package’s unclaimed status is “immaterial” because service by mail is complete upon deposit in the mail, not upon receipt, citing C.C.P. § 1013(a). However, C.C.P. provisions governing service of notices and other papers, such as § 1013(a), do not apply to the notice by mail requirements of § 1094.6(b). (Donnellan, supra, (2001) 86 Cal. App. 4th 1097, 1105). Furthermore, the return envelope, marked “Unclaimed,” demonstrates Respondents’ actual knowledge that Petitioner never received the package. It should be taken into consideration that, despite such knowledge, Respondents made no further effort to ensure that Petitioner received the CSC’s decision.

Accordingly, Respondents’ failure to take any further action should render service incomplete. Therefore, because Petitioner never received notice satisfying the requirements of C.C.P. § 1094.6(b), the filing of this petition is timely as the 90-day statute of limitations was never triggered.

Chief Gordon’s order was unlawful. Following the advice of his attorney, Sergeant Larson chose not to turn over the flash drive containing the Smokey Case in response to the Department’s directive because the flash drive was filled with attorney-client privileged information, a decision which was both prudent and legally sound. This privilege is crucial for maintaining compliance with the law during personnel investigations.

Once an employee is placed on administrative leave, all communications with the Department typically occur through attorneys. Thus, Sergeant Larson later turned over the flash drive to Mr. Baumann.

The Department’s directive to turn over information on his flash drive was not lawful due to the presence of attorney-client privileged information on the flash drive. The inclusion of attorney-client privileged information on flash drive underscores the legality of his approach under the work product doctrine.

Attorney-client privilege is a cornerstone of the legal system, ensuring that communications between an attorney and their client remain confidential. There are two categories of attorney-client privileged work product: absolute and qualified. (Cal. Code Civ. P. § 2018.030.) Absolute work product protects any writing that contains “an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories,” and it is “not discoverable under any circumstances,” unless there is waiver. (Cal. Code Civ. P. § 2018.030(a).) Even qualified work product, attorney work product that does not contain attorney opinions, theories, etc., is strongly protected. It may be discovered only if denying the discovery would “unfairly prejudice the party seeking” it. 

Here, the flash drive Sergeant Larson contained attorney-client privileged information, which falls under the absolute protection of the work product doctrine. Even if this information were to be considered under qualified protection, the Department would not be unfairly prejudiced by the lack Sergeant Larson’s copy of the Smokey case because the Department ultimately has access through Versadex, ensuring that no critical information was withheld. Despite being presented with this information at arbitration, the CSC determined that “[t]here was no legitimate justification articulated by Larson as to why he retained the ‘Smokey’ file or why he refused to return it per the Chief’s order.”

While troubling, the CSC’s reasoning may be explained by the fact that they failed to recognize the circumstances surrounding Sergeant Larson being placed on administrative leave. Just one week after returning from administrative leave from the Gender Discrimination Case, having an intent to terminate reduced to a suspension, Sergeant Larson was again placed on administrative leave pending an investigation into allegations of retaliation against Detective Kirk and improper access of Department reports.

Sergeant Larson was shocked and lightheaded, feeling as though he were in a bad dream. He had been off work for over a year and had only just begun to prepare for his new role before being abruptly stripped of his badge for a second time and asked to leave. As this nightmare scenario unfolded, Sergeant Larson signed the form acknowledging the Chief's verbal directive not to take any reports home. On his drive home, he could not believe this was happening again and consulted his attorney, Mr. Baumann. Two lieutenants followed him home to retrieve his department issued laptop. The following day, Sergeant Larson informed the Department that he had additional work product at his home and requested that they retrieve it, demonstrating his intent to comply with orders and adhere to the proper procedures.

In lockstep with the CSC’s decision, Respondent’s Opposition completely disregards the circumstances surrounding the directive to return Department property; namely, the traumatic effect of abruptly being placed on administrative leave just after returning to duty, and Sergeant Larson’s diligent efforts to comply with the Department’s directives while preserving his fundamental and well-establish right to privileged information between he and his attorney.

Additionally, Respondents’ echo the CSC’s reasoning that Sergeant Larson “could have separated attorney-client or work-product materials in his handling of the Smokey file so as at least to avoid this supposed impediment to returning it.” In so doing, Respondents assert that Sergeant Larson should have either (i) removed the Smokey Case from the flash drive and returned it to them in some way which would prevent Sergeant Larson from retaining a copy, or (ii) removed the attorney-client privileged information from the flash drive and delivered the flash drive. Sergeant Larson suggested such action to his attorney, who decided it would be best not to do so and advised Sergeant Larson to turn it over to him as is.

By following the advice of his attorney, not only was Sergeant Larson honoring the Department’s intent that he not be in possession of the case, but he was also preserving his most basic right to attorney-client privilege. Given these facts, the CSC’s decision to punish Sergeant Larson because he did not provide a “legitimate justification” defies logic.

Because the Smokey Case was co-mingled with attorney-client privileged information on the flash-drive, Chief Gordon’s order to turn it over was unlawful, and Sergeant Larson was clearly justified in refusing to turn it over on the advice of his attorney.

Petitioner accessed the Reports for work-related purposes. Given the Department's strong emphasis on honesty during internal affairs interviews, Sergeant Larson was committed to being accurate in his Skelly hearing with Chief Melekian. To ensure his statements were truthful and precise, he needed to cross-reference his comments regarding Detective Kirk’s performance on the Smokey case with the Smokey case itself. This action was directly related to his career and professional obligations as a police officer. Accordingly, Sergeant Larson’s access to the Smokey report was a critical work-related purpose, demonstrating his commitment to integrity and adherence to policy during a pivotal moment in his career.

Respondents do not contest that Sergeant Larson’s accessing of reports primarily for training purposes is work-related access. Additionally, Respondents abandon their previous assertions, purported as the basis for terminating Sergeant Larson, that accessing of privatized and confidential victim flag reports must be based on the grey area rule of “right to know need to know,” effectively conceding those issues.

Much like the CSC, Respondents cite to no authority, nor do they provide any rationale in asserting that Sergeant Larson’s accessing of Department reports constituted personal, rather than work-related use. Instead, Respondents simply rely on Sergeant Larson’s statements that he accessed Department records to gather evidence in his defense at the Gender Discrimination arbitration, claiming that Sergeant Larson subverted the established discovery process.

To the contrary, these statements constitute evidence that his accessing of reports was plainly work-related, not personal; and much like how the Department leaves its officers in the dark when it comes to policy and procedure for accessing reports, the Department provided Sergeant Larson with zero guidance or restrictions upon his return and repeatedly ignored his discovery requests.

Peace officers subject to disciplinary proceedings are entitled to procedural due process protections, including the right to a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges against them.

POBR further guarantees officers access to investigative materials when punitive action is contemplated. (Cal. Gov. Code § 3303 (g).) The intention of the legislature is that POBR be construed liberally in favor of protecting officers’ procedural rights as “a matter of statewide concern.” (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 128, 136.)

The California Supreme Court has emphasized that internal affairs investigations and disciplinary proceedings are “a necessary component of employment in law enforcement,” and therefore actions taken in response to such proceedings. such as building a defense, are inherently work-related. (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 574.) Officers must be afforded access to materials that form the basis of discipline to present a defense, particularly where those materials may be exculpatory or mitigating. (Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1280.) 

These protections are not discretionary; they are fundamental to the fairness of the disciplinary process and flow directly from both statutory and constitutional due process guarantees. 

Sergeant Larson was indeed aware of the discovery process which Respondents insist was available to him. In fact, Sergeant Larson made several requests for production of documents, which included the Smokey case discussed at his Skelly hearing. Respondents remain silent regarding the fact that each request was ignored by the City. With zero guidance or direction from the City regarding the potentially exculpatory or mitigating documents requested, Sergeant Larson took it upon himself to gather them in accordance with his right to due process.

Sergeant Larson searched for the Smokey case to verify the information he provided during his Skelly interview to Chief Melekian, aiming to correct it promptly if necessary.

Ensuring honesty and accuracy during a Skelly hearing with the Chief of Police, who encouraged Sergeant Larson to do so, is directly linked to his right to present a meaningful response and defend himself against allegations of misconduct, undeniably a work-related purpose.

Rather than being permitted to bend policy and procedure to penalize Sergeant Larson after ignoring his requests for discovery, the Department should be made to, at the very least, respond to his requests. After receiving no response, Sergeant Larson’s decision to gather materials in his defense, a simple exercise of his right to defend himself, should be protected, not punished, and Respondents’ decision to do so is very telling.

After being presented with these facts, the CSC determined that “no evidence was presented to clearly support whether Larson’s conduct was for personal use, rather than a work-related purpose.” Yet the CSC concluded that Sergeant Larson’s conduct was for personal use. This conclusion is deeply troubling. The fact that the CSC acknowledges that there was no evidence presented to support personal use should alone be dispositive of the issue in favor of Sergeant Larson; however, as clearly established above, preparation for Skelly hearings and civil service commissions is, by definition, work-related, and the CSC and Respondents have provided no authority or rationale to the contrary.

Therefore, the termination of Sergeant Larson should be overturned because his access of reports to gather potentially mitigating or exculpatory evidence in his defense was work-related, not personal.

Petitioner did not retaliate against Detective Kirk by gathering character letters in his defense. The CSC did not find a violation of policy but found that Sergeant Larson retaliated against Detective Kirk by gathering character letters in his defense. The root requirement of due process is an opportunity for an employee to be heard and present their “side of the story” before deprivation of any significant property interest. (Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 542-543.)

Due process mandates that an employee is afforded certain procedural rights before the discipline becomes effective. Among these pre-removal safeguards, an employee is minimally afforded the right to respond either orally or in writing to the authority imposing discipline. The court in Skelly sought to harmonize and distill the rulings held in U.S. Supreme Court case Arnett v. Kennedy (1974) 416 U.S. 134, which discusses pre-removal due process for federal employees. The accused employee is entitled to respond to the disciplinary charges both orally and in writing, including submission of rebuttal affidavits. (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 214.) 

The case law and the controlling authority presented herein make clear that an accused employee is entitled to present their “side of the story” before the hearing officer. Skelly does not provide any limit or curtailing of the evidence the employee is allowed to present before the hearing officer. The Skelly hearing is the employee’s right to be heard, not the employer. This includes but is not limited to rebuttal evidence.  

Accordingly, there is no restriction on Sergeant Larson’s right to gather evidence to counter and mitigate the disciplinary charges brought against him. In fact, this is the very purpose of a Skelly hearing. As Constitutionally mandated, Sergeant Larson was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing after receiving the notice upon which the disciplinary actions were based. Sergeant Larson was more than free to commence an investigation to develop evidence and introduce mitigating factors before the hearing officer. Any denial of an employee lawfully gathering and presenting evidence before the pre-deprivation hearing directly undermines Sergeant Larson’s presentation of a defense, infringing upon his due process rights.  

Upon service of the proposed disciplinary charges, Sergeant Larson was not restricted to the contents of the notice of intent because evidence of an impeachable caliber may exist outside the Department’s selected evidence. To deny any employee an opportunity to conduct their own research and investigation to challenge administrative charges brought against them is both inconsistent with due process and absent any legal authority.  

There is no evidence the City or the Department instituted a gag order restricting Sergeant Larson’s communication with potential witnesses and holders of evidence prior to his Skelly hearing. There is no evidence that any of the employees or agencies who authored memos for Sergeant Larson were restricted in any capacity from doing so. In fact, all evidence supports these memos were written freely, voluntarily, and offered for the purpose to rebut the character inference and factual allegations against Sergeant Larson in the Gender Discrimination Case.

The assertion by the CSC and Respondents that Sergeant Larson’s gathering of letters from Deputy District Attorney’s constituted retaliation by Sergeant Larson is particularly absurd given the context and reasoning which drove Sergeant Larson to present them. The private investigator hired by the Department to conduct the administrative investigation in the Gender Discrimination Case, Kathy Gandara did not investigate or even assess Detective Kirk’s work product after Sergeant Larson explained Detective Kirk’s various deficiencies to her. Instead, she relied solely on the opinions of Detective Kirk and her peers.

Importantly, Sergeant Larson pointed out that only he and the DDAs who worked on cases with Detective Kirk had direct insight into her work product. Furthermore, Detective Kirk specifically named DDA Chanda and DDA Meyer in her complaint as the DDAs Sergeant Larson was referencing. Despite this, Gandara, who could have easily investigated and interviewed these DDAs, made the unfounded statement that “nor did anyone at the district attorney's office complain,” ignoring Sergeant Larson's allegations and Detective Kirk’s own account.

Sergeant Larson was shocked by the sustained findings of gender discrimination and recommendation for termination despite his thorough explanation of the reasons for his approach to Detective Kirk. To his surprise, Gandara did not assess any of his reasons for his supervisory actions. Consequently, he took it upon himself to present evidence of Detective Kirk’s work performance problems, documented consultations with colleagues and supervisors, and letters in support of his “side of the story” to Chief Melekian at his Skelly hearing. The insights in the letters provided by the DDAs were instrumental components of his defense. The CSC acknowledged (Respondents failed to in their Opposition) that Gandara did not interview the DDAs despite receiving adequate information from both Sergeant Larson and Detective Kirk regarding their involvement and knowledge of Detective Kirk’s work performance. However, like the CSC in their decision, Respondents disregard the glaring holes in the investigative process. Rather, the CSC and Respondents assert that Sergeant Larson “went too far and retaliated against Kirk” because he asked the DDAs to write “negative” comments about her work performance.

This is concerning given Gandara’s investigation or lack thereof, and the clear indication that the letters were written freely and voluntarily by DDAs, members of the community who are held to the highest standards of moral character.

Furthermore, there is no legal basis for retaliation provided by the CSC or Respondents. All that is cited to is the NOID’s warning not to retaliate, and Sergeant Larson’s email. Throughout these proceedings, Respondents have made much of Sergeant Larson's support letters being “negative,” denigrating or disparaging.  Respondents have consistently glossed over the fact that the “negative” aspects of the letters did not originate with Sergeant Larson, they were not fabricated; rather, they were the genuine sentiments of the DDAs who worked with Detective Kirk on the most serious cases of cases.

Before an investigation into Sergeant Larson ever commenced, the DDAs sought Sergeant Larson to explain their concerns regarding Detective Kirk’s work performance issues. Sergeant Larson then addressed the timeliness, organizational, and follow-up issues within the scope of his responsibilities as her sergeant. Because the core allegation against him involved gender discrimination as it related to his supervision of Detective Kirk, Sergeant Larson’s natural defense to such an allegation was to present evidence that his management of Detective Kirk was based on her performance, not her gender. There was zero retaliatory intent.

Sergeant Larson was being accused of treating Detective Kirk differently because she was a woman. Sergeant Larson explained very clearly to Gandara that his strict supervisory approach to Detective Kirk was due to her work performance issues, not her gender. Gandara found his rationale was not credible because she assumed no one from the DA’s office had complained about Detective Kirk’s work. Naturally, this prompted Sergeant Larson to seek additional perspectives from those who had complained about Detective Kirk’s work, the DDAs, to bolster his defense. Doing so was an exercise of Sergeant Larson’s clearly established due process right to defend himself, nothing more.

Therefore, the demotion of Sergeant Larson should be overturned because he did not retaliate against Detective Kirk by gathering character letters in his defense.

Respondents have violated Government Code § 3304(d)(1). POBR states that “[n]o punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed within one year of the public agency’s discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct.” (Cal. Gov. Code § 3304 (d)(1).) Simply put, the department has one year from the discovery of misconduct to render discipline.

Here, Chief Melekian discovered the DDAs’ letters during Sergeant Larson's Skelly Hearing on June 27, 2022. As Chief of Police and the Skelly Officer, Chief Melekian not only had the authority but also a responsibility to initiate an investigation. Consequently, the Department became aware of the Letters Case allegations on June 27, 2022, and had until June 27, 2023, to render discipline. However, on July 11, 2023, Sergeant Larson received his Notice of Intent to Demote, which occurred one year and fourteen days after the alleged misconduct was discovered. This timeframe clearly exceeds the one year statute of limitations. 

The City’s defense at arbitration to this violation was that Chief Melekian, as the Skelly officer, was not sitting in that position as a supervisor of the Department and somehow did not have the authority to initiate an investigation. This claim is illogical and unreasonable, and Assistant City Administrator Eyerly ultimately admitted as such, evidencing that the Department does not have a bona fide justification for violating the one year statute of limitations.

If the Department’s claim was taken as true, it would create the preposterous situation where the Chief of Police could not initiate an investigation if, during a Skelly Hearing, an employee commits misconduct or raises misconduct. This is not and cannot be the case, as the Chief of Police does not suspend their duties but rather adds to their duties by playing the role of the Skelly Officer. It is well established that the Skelly Officer can reopen the investigation or even increase the discipline. Given the Skelly Officer has such abilities, not to mention the authority to make the ultimate disciplinary decision, it is illogical and ridiculous to state the Skelly Officer does not have the authority to initiate an investigation, especially when the Skelly Officer is the Chief of Police. As the Chief, even when acting as the Skelly Officer, his duties and adherence to department policies are not suspended. 

As the Chief of Police, Chief Melekian was authorized to initiate an investigation into actionable misconduct. Like all Department employees, if the Chief is presented with actionable misconduct, he would have a duty to report it in accordance with policy.  The CSC asserted in their decision that there was no evidence presented as to whether Chief Melekian read the letters because he did not testify at the hearing; and therefore, the actionable misconduct was not discovered until Detective Kirk’s January 2023 complaint. Respondents have added in support of the CSC’s decision that “Chief Melekian had no reason to suspect any wrongdoing” because “the letters appeared to be unsolicited references, not retaliatory documents.”

Chief Melekian had no reason to suspect any wrongdoing because he was aware that Sergeant Larson was acting in accordance with his above mentioned right to gather and present evidence, such as the letters, in his defense. 

However, if the DDAs letters are found to be actionable misconduct as alleged, Chief Melekian at the very least had reason to know of the actionable misconduct on June 27, 2022. Unlike the mere rumors in Shouse (84 Cal. App. 5th at 1087), the letters were presented outright to Chief Melekian at the June 27, 2022, Skelly hearing and then scrutinized by Chief Melekian in reaching his decision to reduce Petitioner’s discipline. Accordingly, the statutory period began to run on June 27, 2022. Therefore, Chief Gordon rendering discipline on July 11, 2023, to demote Sergeant Larson, is barred because the one year statute of limitations was tolled on June 27, 2023.

Petitioner’s § 3304(d)(1) claim is not barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata. Petitioner is not before the Court to re-litigate the 3304(d)(1) claim brought before the CSC. As Respondents point out in their Opposition, “[w]hen a fundamental vested right is involved, such as the right of a [government] employee to continued employment, the trial court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether due process requirements were met and whether the agency’s findings are supported by the weight of the evidence.” (Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Serv. Commissioners (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279.)

Here, as detailed above, the Department’s, the City’s, and the CSC’s findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. As such, Petitioner seeks to convince the Court to issue a writ of mandate setting aside the discipline in its entirety. In doing so, the Court is to determine whether the CSC abused its discretion in any of its findings, including its finding that Respondents did not violate 3304(d)(1) in disciplining Petitioner for gathering letters from the DDAs in his defense.  Therefore, Petitioner’s 3304(d)(1) claim is not barred by collateral estoppel.

Petitioner’s 3304(a) claim is not barred by res judicata. POBR provides that “[n]o public safety officer shall be subjected to punitive action, or denied promotion, or be threatened with any such treatment, because of the lawful exercise of the rights granted under this chapter, or the exercise of any rights under any existing administrative grievance procedure.” (Cal. Gov. Code § 3304(a).) Respondents claim that Petitioner failed to argue before the CSC that he was retaliated against in violation of Government Code (“G.C.”) § 3304(a).

However, Petitioner did, in fact, raise this claim, plainly stating that the discipline in both the Letters Case and Reports Case was being brought for his exercise of his, clearly established, above mentioned, right to defend himself at his Skelly hearing with Chief Melekian and subsequent arbitration in the Gender Discrimination Case. Terminating Sergeant Larson for exercising his right to defend himself is expressly prohibited and textbook retaliation under G.C. § 3304(a). 

Respondents have decided to do so, in accordance with the CSC’s decision, which addresses the issue as it relates to both the Letters Case and the Reports Case. In determining that Sergeant Larson should be demoted for his conduct in the Letters Case, the CSC plainly stated that, although Sergeant Larson has the right to defend himself by soliciting letters from anyone on his behalf, Sergeant Larson is to be demoted for soliciting letters from the DDAs. In determining that Sergeant Larson should be dismissed for his conduct in the Reports Case, the CSC acknowledged his right to defend himself by gathering evidence in his support and determined he should be dismissed for doing so.

Accordingly, because the issue of retaliation was clearly raised at the CSC hearing, Petitioner’s claim under G.C. § 3304(a) is not barred by res judicata.

Assuming arguendo that the Court finds Petitioner did not raise his G.C. § 3304(a) claim before the CSC, it must be taken into consideration that Sergeant Larson was not terminated by Respondents until October 6, 2024, not before or during the CSC hearing, but after.

Respondents’ and the CSC’s decision to uphold and execute the proposed discipline constitutes an additional act of retaliation in violation of G.C. § 3304(a) which could not have been presented before the CSC, as it had not yet occurred. Therefore, Petitioner’s retaliation claims under G.C. § 3304(a) is not barred by res judicata.

Skelly and its progeny grant Petitioner the right to conduct his own investigation. As established above, Skelly and its progeny grant Sergeant Larson the right to conduct his own investigation, including gathering evidence in his defense, when faced with allegations of misconduct affecting his vested property interest in continued employment. Additionally, as established above, Sergeant Larson was not disciplined for misconduct as purported by Respondents. Rather, Sergeant Larson was clearly disciplined for exercising his right to defend himself, which Respondents apparently mistake for misconduct.

Counsel for Respondents acknowledges the relatively unlimited nature of Sergeant Larson’s right to defend himself on their website. Yet before the Court, Respondents claim that Sergeant Larson exceeded what bounds do exist.

Respondents rely on Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264, the facts of which are readily distinguishable from those here. 

In Gilbert, the appellant was denied criminal investigative reports from an agency outside of his department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI’s investigation into appellant had prompted his department to initiate an internal affairs investigation into the appellant. The appellant requested copies of the FBI’s reports to respond at the pre-termination stage. Appellant’s department did not possess, nor could it provide the appellant with the FBI’s report because the FBI’s investigation was still ongoing and therefore confidential; however, the Department stated that they would provide the reports once the FBI’s investigation had concluded, and the reports were made available to the Department.

The court in Gilbert recognized that, under G.C. § 3303(g), the Department “may not make adverse personnel decisions concerning the [appellant] based on reports, or the portions thereof, deemed confidential and not made available to the [appellant].” (Id. at 1282.) The court ruled in favor of the department because the department’s discipline was based on its own internal reports, rather than the FBI’s reports, which were still ongoing and confidential. Importantly, the court noted that the appellant had already been provided with the department’s reports prior to the appellant’s Skelly hearing.

Furthermore, the administrative hearing (arbitration) had not yet been held; therefore, the court found it premature to evaluate whether the Appellant had been denied due process.

Here, Sergeant Larson was not requesting or accessing reports without authorization from an ongoing investigation from an outside agency such as the FBI. Sergeant Larson was fully authorized and never denied access to the Department’s reports. His discovery requests for reports containing potentially exculpatory or mitigating information were simply ignored. Given these facts, and Respondents concession that the issue with Petitioner’s access of reports was not due to confidentiality, and instead whether his access was personal or work-related, it follows that Petitioner was clearly entitled to the exculpatory or mitigating information in those reports as provided by Skelly and its progeny, such as Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 1264.

The evidence Petitioner has provided is more than sufficient to establish a violation of 3304(a). It is indisputable that both the demotion for soliciting letters of support in his defense and the termination for accessing department reports directly stem from Sergeant Larson exercising his right to conduct his own investigation and gather evidence in his defense. The very nature of the discipline at issue here is entirely based on Sergeant Larson’s lawful efforts to defend himself against the allegations of gender discrimination in the Gender Discrimination Case.

The conduct of investigators Kathy Gandara and Garon Wyatt, and Assistant City Administrator, Rene Eyerly, simply serve to demonstrate how far Respondents have been willing to go to ensure that Sergeant Larson is terminated from his employment with the City. That includes: (i) refusing to investigate Sergeant Larson’s “side of the story;” (ii) chilling Sergeant Larson’s witnesses, DDAs, with threats of assault; (iii) likening Sergeant Larson’s conduct to domestic violence and rape; and (iv) claiming that the SBPD Chief does not have the authority to initiate an investigation into misconduct. (Id.) Respondents’ conduct, over the course of several years, is systemic in nature and troubling to the highest degree. For the sake of the officers of SBPD, City employees, and government employees of California as a whole, Respondents conduct cannot be excused. Rather, it must be fully dealt with in the interest of justice and preservation of government employees’ right of due process endowed by the Constitution.

Unfortunately, despite being presented with this information at the CSC hearing, the CSC placed the blame squarely on Sergeant Larson. In so doing, the CSC failed to acknowledge Respondents’ role in contributing to the issues which proceeded from his appeal of the Gender Discrimination Case and scolded Sergeant Larson for exercising his right to appeal the Gender Discrimination Case, a true reflection of Respondents’ retaliatory intent.

Therefore, there is no question that the discipline imposed by Respondents was, by definition, retaliation for Petitioner’s exercise of his right to defend himself under G.C. § 3304(a).

Over the course of several years, Respondents have systematically orchestrated a personalized burden for conduct warranting disciplinary action to exact Petitioner’s termination in complete disregard of the law, dragging his good name through the mud the entire way.

Petitioner brings this action for writ of mandate because the CSC has clearly abused their discretion in failing to recognize Respondents’ blatant violations of Petitioner’s due process protections. Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court issue a writ of mandate setting aside the discipline in its entirety. For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate should be granted, thereby ordering the City to rescind all disciplinary action against Petitioner and reimburse Petitioner for lost wages.

Administrative Records Lodged by City

Volumes 1-7 lodged 11/17/25. 1,700 pages.

The Court’s Conclusions

An administrative writ may be issued with respect to any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding where a hearing is required to be given, and evidence is required to be taken. (Civ. Proc. Code, § 1094.5(a).)

Pursuant to Section 1094.5, the Court’s inquiry into the validity of an administrative order or decision shall extend to questions regarding: (1) whether the agency proceeded without or in excess of jurisdiction; (2) whether there was a fair trial; and (3) whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. With narrow exceptions, the Court’s inquiry is limited to the administrative record made before the agency. (City of Hesperia v. Lake Arrowhead Community Servs. Dist. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 734, 766.)  “A trial court may only overturn an administrative decision for prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Civ. Proc. Code, § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

Abuse of discretion is established if the agency did not proceed in the manner required by law, if its decision is not supported by its findings, or if its findings are not supported by the evidence in the administrative record. When a fundamental vested right is involved, such as the right of a [government] employee to continued employment, the trial court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether due process requirements were met and whether the agency’s findings are supported by the weight of the evidence.” (Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Serv. Commissioners (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279.)

In exercising independent judgment, the trial court must nevertheless afford a strong presumption of correctness to the administrative findings. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.)

The party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of demonstrating that the findings are against the weight of the evidence. (Id. at 817.) “[R]arely, if ever, will a board determination be disturbed unless the petitioner is able to show a jurisdictional excess, a serious error of law, or an abuse of discretion on the facts.” (Id. at 814.)

The very thorough and exhaustive materials submitted by Petitioner do not meet these requirements. The Court has no question that Petitioner is sincere and adamant about his position. He was very well represented by a quality presentation. But he very clearly has not met what the law mandates. This Court must follow that law.

As established in Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, a proceeding under Government Code section 3309.5 is distinct from administrative mandate. The standard under Section 3309.5 is limited to whether the public employer violated the officer’s rights under POBRA and does not extend to re-evaluating the merits or validity of the underlying administrative decision.

The Petition is time-barred Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.6(b). Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.6(b), a petition for writ of administrative mandate must be filed within 90 days after the administrative decision becomes final. The decision “shall become final for purposes of this section upon the date it is mailed by first-class mail, postage prepaid, including a copy of the affidavit or certificate of mailing, to the party seeking the writ.” Service by mail is complete upon deposit in the mail, not upon actual receipt. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1013(a).) 

Petitioner alleges the CSC decision was not mailed via first-class mail, that the City failed to include an affidavit or certificate of mailing, and that Petitioner’s receiving only a cover letter does not satisfy the statutory requirement. He asserts the City sent an email on September 30, 2024, transmitting the CSC decision, but that the email did not indicate the required documents were sent via first-class mail, nor did he receive an affidavit or certificate of mailing. Accordingly, he claims the decision never became final and the limitations period never began to run. These contentions are both factually and legally incorrect. 

The CSC decision was properly mailed in full compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6(b). The City mailed a complete packet on September 30, 2024, containing: (1) the CSC’s written decision; (2) the Affidavit of Mailing dated September 30, 2024, mirroring the statute’s language, confirming compliance with the procedural requirements; and (3) Ms. Levy’s transmittal letter identifying both enclosures. Mr. Uchida attests that he personally assembled the packet, addressed it to Petitioner’s residence of record, affixed full first-class postage and certified mailing, and caused it to be mailed with the U.S. Postal Service on September 30, 2024. The envelope bears both a first-class postage stamp and a certified-mail label, clear physical evidence that it was mailed by first-class mail, with certified mail added as a safeguard. The Postal Service later returned the certified envelope marked “unclaimed,” but that unclaimed status is immaterial. Service by mail is complete upon deposit in the mail, not upon receipt. This rule promotes certainty in calculating the limitations period; service does not depend on actual receipt. 

Although Ms. Levy’s September 30, 2024, transmittal letter did not expressly state that the CSC decision was sent by first-class mail, it is not required to. The envelope itself bears first-class and certified-mail indicators, conclusively showing compliance. When read together with the Affidavit of Mailing and Mr. Uchida’s declaration describing the preparation and mailing of the packet, the evidence establishes the City fully satisfied all statutory requirements. Thus, the 90-day limitations period expired on December 29, 2024, and Petitioner’s February 19, 2025, filing, nearly seven weeks after the statute of limitations period expired, was untimely and barred as a matter of law.

Additionally, and importantly the petition also fails on its merits because the CSC’s findings are supported by the weight of the evidence. At the CSC hearing, Respondents proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner committed the charged misconduct. The “weight of the evidence” standard is considered synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence standard. (People v. Miller (1916) 171 Cal. 649, 654.)

The CSC found Petitioner: (1) disobeyed Chief Gordon’s direct order to return all Department files, constituting insubordination; (2) accessed the Department’s confidential files for a personal, non–work-related purpose, in violation of written Department policy; and (3) retaliated against Detective Kirk in direct violation of Commander Kushner’s written warning not to do so, by providing Deputy District Attorneys with sample language criticizing Kirk’s performance. Respondents overwhelmingly established Petitioner engaged in all three charged acts of misconduct. 

Petitioner Knowingly Disobeyed a Direct Order from the Chief of Police.  A peace officer’s refusal to comply with a direct order from the Chief of Police is serious misconduct, and Petitioner’s repeated contradictions and false testimony compound that misconduct. His statements to the Commission were self-serving and false, given to evade discipline. The Department’s evidence, his own admissions, contemporaneous written statements, and inconsistent testimony, carry greater convincing force than his implausible denials. Respondents therefore proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner engaged in this act of insubordination. Petitioner argues that the directive for him to turn over the “Smokey” case file was unlawful because, after misappropriating it, he commingled it with attorney-client and/or work product information on a thumb drive. Non-privileged information does not acquire privileged status in this manner. As the CSC pointed out, Petitioner could have separated attorney-client or work-product materials in his handling of the Smokey file so as at least to avoid this supposed impediment to returning it.

Petitioner illicitly accessed confidential Department records for personal purposes. As established by his own admissions, Petitioner deliberately accessed confidential Santa Barbara Police Department records between January 4 and January 12, 2023, for his personal use in connection with his disciplinary appeal, in violation of Department policy.

Petitioner retaliated against his subordinate by soliciting negative statements from Deputy District Attorneys. Petitioner engaged in a deliberate and retaliatory campaign to undermine his subordinate, Detective Kirk, by soliciting Deputy District Attorneys to disparage her work performance in letters to Chief Melekian in June 2022. This misconduct occurred immediately after Petitioner received his Notice of Intent to Dismiss and despite the Notice’s explicit warning. This testimony confirms that Petitioner orchestrated and guided the DDAs’ efforts to denigrate Kirk’s performance in letters to her Chief. The evidence also corroborates the harm Petitioner caused. Detective Kirk testified that the letters deeply damaged her professional reputation and working relationships. The Commission reviewed witness testimony, documentary evidence, and the parties’ briefing, and found that Petitioner’s conduct was retaliatory and violated Department policy and the City Charter. It violated Department Policy 340.3.4, which prohibits “discourteous and disrespectful treatment” of fellow employees, as well as City Charter § 1007, which bars “repeated discourteous treatment of his fellow employee.” The record shows that Petitioner intentionally retaliated against his subordinate, an abuse of authority and conduct wholly inconsistent with the integrity and professionalism expected of a supervisory officer. The CSC’s determination was supported by the evidence.

The City did not violate POBRA’s limitations period. To the extent it is asserted under § 1094.5 as opposed to the Court’s initial jurisdiction 6 under § 3309.5, Petitioner’s POBRA statute of limitations defense fails both legally and factually. Petitioner bore the burden to prove a limitations violation and failed. A POBRA statute of limitations claim is an affirmative defense in the CSC proceedings. The burden rests on the officer, not the agency, to prove that an authorized individual discovered actionable misconduct more than one year before discipline was imposed. The CSC correctly found that Petitioner presented no evidence satisfying this burden.

The CSC’s Decision is consistent with controlling precedent. The CSC’s determination aligns squarely with controlling California authority. As the CSC correctly found, consistent with controlling authority, the existence of the letters alone at the June 27, 2022, Skelly meeting did not reveal actionable misconduct or trigger the one-year statute.

The limitations period began on January 5, 2023. There is no evidence in the record that Acting Chief Melekian had any reason to view the DDAs’ letters as potential misconduct by Petitioner when he received them in June 2022. The City first obtained actionable information only when it received Detective Kirk’s written complaint on January 5, 2023, her first assertion that Petitioner had solicited the DDA letters in retaliation for her protected activity. Petitioner presents no new evidence beyond what the CSC already considered. Because the one-year limitations period under POBRA began on January 5, 2023, and the City issued its Notice of Intent on July 11, 2023, the action was timely, as the CSC correctly concluded.

The limitations period claim is barred by collateral estoppel. Petitioner’s attempt to relitigate his alleged POBRA statute of limitations claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. He already raised this identical issue before the CSC in his administrative appeal challenging his demotion and termination, and the CSC squarely rejected it after a full evidentiary hearing. Having had a complete and fair opportunity to litigate that claim, Petitioner cannot now ask this Court to reach a different result. Here, Petitioner’s administrative appeal was conducted as a formal adversarial proceeding akin to that in a judicial tribunal before the impartial City of Santa Barbara Civil Service Commission. The hearing spanned five days and included testimony from twelve witnesses, all of whom testified under oath. Both parties made opening statements, presented documentary evidence, examined and cross-examined witnesses, and submitted post-hearing briefs. Petitioner was represented by the same law firm representing him in this action. A court reporter maintained a verbatim transcript of the proceedings, and the record included more than a thousand pages of documents and testimony. The CSC acknowledged the substantial scope of the proceedings, stating: “Reviewing and sorting through the material in this case was a significant task. The documents and transcripts of hearing testimony were well over a thousand pages. Many hours have been consumed by this appeal due to its complexity and conflicts in the testimony. The five-member CSC, acting as an impartial adjudicatory body empowered to affirm, modify, or rescind disciplinary actions, issued a written decision containing detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The decision reflected careful evaluation of conflicting testimony and documentary evidence. The CSC expressly considered and rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the City violated Government Code § 3304(d)(1), finding: There is no POBR violation. The alleged actionable misconduct was not discovered until Ms. Kirk’s claim of discrimination in January 2023. The statute of limitations began to run on that date and therefore, there is no one-year violation. That determination is final and binding. The petition cannot revive or reopen issues already adjudicated by the CSC.

Petitioner’s POBRA limitations period claim is barred by res judicata. Here, both proceedings arise from the same asserted injury, the termination of Petitioner’s employment. Res judicata, therefore, squarely applies. The CSC proceeding here satisfied every element of due process for it to provide for preclusive effect, and afforded Petitioner a full and fair opportunity to contest his discharge, including any defenses or claims under POBRA. Under res judicata, his claims are barred as a matter of law.  

The City did not violate POBRA’s one-year limitations period. Assuming arguendo that collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply, the result would be the same. Petitioner’s statute of limitations defense fails both legally and factually. This is the case for all the reasons set forth in the analysis above of the Section 1094.5 claim for review. Petitioner latches on to on statements of an assistant city administrator regarding the 2022 Skelly conference to avoid the clear fact that Acting Chief Melekian had no reason at that conference to suspect misconduct based on the letters themselves or the information from them.  For the same reasons the weight of the evidence favors Respondents under Section 1094.5, Petitioner fails to meet this burden of proof under Government Code section 3309.5 as to this claim.  Nothing put the Department on notice that the warning letters in the June 2022 Skelly were the basis for discipline.  

Petitioner’s stand-alone POBRA retaliation claim is barred by res judicata and lacks merit. The discipline imposed was based on misconduct, not the exercise of Skelly or POBRA Rights. Skelly and POBRA do not grant unlimited rights to violate policy in the name of gathering evidence. Due Process and POBRA do not immunize misconduct. The evidence that Petitioner contends shows retaliation for exercise of POBRA rights is insufficient

The supposed evidence from the Administrative Hearing that Petitioner advances to support his Section 3304(a) retaliation claim is inconsequential and comes nowhere close to proving any claim by a preponderance of evidence.  The supposed evidence consists of Investigator Wyatt blaming Petitioner for a leak of information that was published by a local newspaper, Wyatt’s supposedly threatening to assault Petitioner and likening his conduct as to Kirk to domestic violence, and Ms. Eyerly, in conducing the 2023 Skelly, not being as familiar with POBRA as Petitioner would have liked.  This is insufficient. Petitioner also contends that both the DDA letters and reports at issue “stem from” his right to “conduct his own investigation and gather evidence in his defense.” This is not alone enough to show retaliation considering the clear evidence that Petitioner retaliated against Detective Kirk, accessed and used criminal records of the Department for his own purposes, and misappropriated criminal records of the Department.    

Request for Judicial Notice

Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter. Judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by law. Matters that are subject to judicial notice are listed in Evid. Code §§ 451 and 452. A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute. Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein. When judicial notice is taken of a document, the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable. Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., (2011) 196 Cal. App. 4th 1366.)  [Emphasis the Court’s]

The documents requested meet the requirements of 451 and 452.

City’s Objections to Petitioner’s Reply Brief

Filed 12/8/25; 8 pages; read and considered; summarized: On August 11, 2025, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation for Briefing Schedule, which limited Petitioner’s Reply Brief to 12 pages. On August 15, 2025, the Court executed an order adopting this page limit. On November 21, 2025, without seeking leave of court, Petitioner filed a 20-page Reply Brief, in violation of the August 15 order. Although Petitioner’s oversized brief was accompanied by a proof of service representing that the Reply Brief had been served on Respondent, Petitioners never actually effected service. Accordingly, Respondent requests that the Court disregard Petitioner’s Reply in its entirety as an untimely and noncompliant paper, or, in the alternative, decline to consider any portion of the Reply that exceeds the ordered page limit. Here, Petitioner did not file an application with the Court seeking leave to file an oversized Reply Brief, nor did Petitioner inform Respondent that it would be filing a 20-page Reply Brief. Additionally, it was not “served.” On November 26, 2025, Alexandra Clark, counsel for Respondent, observed that she had not received a Reply Brief from Petitioner and requested that office staff check the court website.  Respondent’s counsel downloaded a copy of the Reply Brief from the court’s website.  Attorney Clark confirmed with her office’s Information Technology department that none of the lcwlegal.com email addresses listed on the Proof of Service attached to the Reply Brief had received any email from aalexnian@ferronelawgroup.com between November 21 and November 26, 2025. Attorney Clark also confirmed with John Doimas of the City Attorney’s office, who was also listed on the Proof of Service, that he did not receive service of the Reply Brief If the Court is inclined to consider Petitioner’s oversized and untimely Reply, Respondent requests that the Court decline to consider any portion of the Reply exceeding the agreed-upon and Court-ordered 12-page limit.

The Court: The point is not ignored in a case such as this which has already voluminous documentation. Timely service is also very important for many obvious reasons. The fact that it was not properly served is not ignored. But on balance the Court has read and considered the entire document and will overrule the objections.

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[1] The Court does not make any conclusions based on this reference, but it appears odd; it would appear to open the door to attorney-client communications and not be protected.